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1  Executive Summary and Introduction 
1.1  A globally shared goal: Ubiquitous, seamless, high-capacity connectivity in the 
next generation 
Fostering the development of a ubiquitously networked society, connected over high-capacity networks, 
is a widely shared goal among both developed and developing countries.  High capacity networks are 
seen as strategic infrastructure, intended to contribute to high and sustainable economic growth and to 
core aspects of human development.  In the pursuit of this goal, various countries have, over the past 
decade and a half, deployed different strategies, and enjoyed different results.  At the Commission’s 
request, this study reviews the current plans and practices pursued by other countries in the transition to 
the next generation of connectivity, as well as their past experience.  By observing the experiences of a 
range of market-oriented democracies that pursued a similar goal over a similar time period, we hope to 
learn from the successes and failures of others about what practices and policies best promote that goal.  
By reviewing current plans or policy efforts, we hope to learn what others see as challenges in the next 
generation transition, and to learn about the range of possible solutions to these challenges. 
Among the countries we surveyed, two broad definitions of “broadband” have emerged for the purpose 
of  planning  the  transition  to  next-generation  networks.    The  first  emphasizes  the  deployment  of 
substantially higher capacity networks.  This sometimes translates into a strong emphasis on bringing 
fiber networks ever closer to the home.  High capacity is mostly defined in terms of download speeds, 
although some approaches also try to identify a basket of applications whose supportability defines the 
quality of the desired next generation infrastructure.  The second emphasis is on ubiquitous, seamless 
connectivity.  Exemplified most clearly by the planning documents of Japan, which has widely deployed 
fixed and mobile networks half a generation ahead of networks in the United States and Europe, this 
approach emphasizes user experience, rather than pure capacity measures.  Just as the first generation 
transition  from  dial-up  to  broadband  included  both  the  experience  of  much  higher  speeds,  and  the 
experience of “always on,” so too next generation connectivity will be typified not only by very high 
speeds, but also by the experience that connectivity is “just there”: connecting anyone, anywhere, with 
everyone and everything, without having to think about it.   
All countries we surveyed include in their approaches, strategies, or plans, a distinct target of reaching 
their entire population.  Many of the countries we observed explicitly embrace a dual-track approach in 
the near future: achieving access for the entire population to first-generation broadband levels of service, 
and  achieving  access  to  next  generation  capabilities  for  large  portions  of  their  population,  but  not 
necessarily everyone, in the near to medium term. 
1.2  A multidimensional approach to benchmarking helps us separate whose 
experience is exemplary, and whose is cautionary, along several dimensions of 
broadband availability and quality 
Our  first  task  is  to  understand  how  to  distinguish  countries  whose  broadband  outcomes  are  more 
successful  from  those  whose  outcomes  are  less  desirable,  so  that  we  can  tell  which  countries' 
experiences are exemplary, and which provide  more of a cautionary tale.  We reviewed a  range of 
current efforts at benchmarking the broadband performance of different countries, and conducted our 
own independent studies and evaluations to complement and calibrate existing efforts.  As a result of this 
process we have been able to produce a set of benchmarks on the three attributes of particular interest–
penetration,  capacity,  and  price–that  we  believe  offers  more  fine-grained  insights,  and  with  greater     Executive summary and introduction 
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confidence, than do the benchmarks that have commonly been used in American public debates over 
broadband performance.  These benchmarks attempt to answer the questions: (a) how many people have 
fixed, mobile, and nomadic broadband, (b) what is it that they “have” technically, and (c) at what prices.  
1.2.1  The United States is a middle-of-the-pack performer on most first generation broadband 
measures 
Our  findings  confirm  the  widespread  perception  that  the  United  States  is  a  middle-of-the-pack 
performer.  On fixed broadband penetration the U.S. is in the third quintile in the OECD; on mobile 
broadband penetration, in the fourth quintile.  In capacity the U.S. does better, mostly occupying the 
second quintile by measures of both advertised and actual speeds.  In price, the U.S. does very well for 
the lowest prices available for the slowest speeds, but is otherwise a third quintile performer in average 
prices at medium, high, and very high speeds.   On those few measures where we have reasonably 
relevant historical data, it appears that the United States opened the first decade of the 21
st centuries in 
the top quintile in penetration and prices, and has been surpassed by other countries over the course of 
the decade.    
Table 1.1. United States rank among OECD countries, data from OECD and Berkman studies, on 
dimensions of penetration, speed (advertised and actual), and price (by tier of service defined by 
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1.2.2  More important than identifying the U.S. position, our approach allows us to separate the 
experiences of other countries into positive and negative along various dimensions of 
interest  
Quite apart from judging the relative performance of the United States, our benchmarking exercise 
allows us to diagnose which countries are potential sources of positive lessons, and which countries are 
potential  sources  of  negative  lessons.    Here,  our  multidimensional  benchmarking  approach  offers 
substantial new insights.  Canada, for example, is often thought of as a very high performer, based on 
the most commonly used benchmark of penetration per 100 inhabitants.  Because our analysis includes 
important  measures  on  which  Canada  has  had  weaker  outcomes—prices,  speeds,  and  3G  mobile     Next Generation Connectivity 
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broadband penetration—in our analysis it shows up as quite a weak performer, overall.  Most other 
countries do not move quite as much from what that most common benchmarking measure describes, 
but countries like Switzerland and Norway nonetheless are not as strong performers as they are usually 
perceived to be, while France exhibits much better performance than usually thought because of its high 
speeds and low prices.  The Netherlands has had good experiences with fixed broadband, but not with 
mobile,  while  Italy  had  exactly  the  inverse  experience.    The  changes  in  our  interpretation  of  the 
experience of other countries are particularly important when our goal is to learn from that experience 
what practices and polices may be helpful, and what practices may be less helpful, for which outcomes.   
1.3  Policies and practices 
1.3.1  Transposing the experience of open access regulation from the first broadband transition to 
next generation connectivity occupies a central role in other nations' plans 
Our  most  surprising  and  significant  finding  is  that  “open  access”  policies—unbundling,  bitstream 
access,  collocation  requirements,  wholesaling,  and/or  functional  separation—are  almost  universally 
understood as having  played a core role in the first generation transition to broadband in most of the 
high performing countries; that they now play a core role in planning for the next generation transition; 
and that the positive impact of such policies is strongly supported by the evidence of the first generation 
broadband transition.   
The importance of these policies in other countries is particularly surprising in the context of U.S. policy 
debates throughout most of this decade.  While Congress adopted various open access provisions in the 
almost unanimously-approved Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC decided to abandon this mode 
of regulation for broadband in a series of decisions in 2001 and 2002.  Open access has been largely 
treated as a closed issue in U.S. policy debates ever since.   
Yet the evidence suggests that transposing the experience of open access policy from the first generation 
transition to the next generation is playing a central role in current planning exercises throughout the 
highest performing countries.  In Japan and South Korea, the two countries that are half a generation 
ahead of the next best performers, this has taken the form of opening up not only the fiber infrastructure 
(Japan) but also requiring mobile broadband access providers to open up their networks to competitors.  
In  leading  countries  like  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands,  following  the  earlier  example  of  the  United 
Kingdom, regulators are addressing the complexities of applying open access policy to next-generation 
infrastructure  by  pushing  their  telecommunications  incumbents  to  restructure  their  operations  and 
functionally  separate  their  units  that  sell  access  to  network  infrastructure  from  their  units  that  sell 
connectivity directly to consumers.  Moreover, countries that long resisted the implementation of open 
access policies, Switzerland and New Zealand, changed course and shifted to open access policies in 
2006.   
1.3.2  Open access policies in other countries have sought to increase levels of competition by 
lowering entry barriers; they aim to use regulation of telecommunications inputs to 
improve the efficiency of competition in the consumer market in broadband 
Open access policies seek to make it easier for new competitors to enter and compete in broadband 
markets by requiring existing carriers to lease access to their networks to their competitors, mostly at 
regulated rates.  The idea is that the cost of replicating the underlying physical plant: digging trenches, 
laying  ducts,  pulling  copper/cable/fiber  to  each  and  every  home  is  enormous;  it  therefore  deters 
competitors from entering the market in broadband services.  By requiring that capacity to be shared,     Executive summary and introduction 
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through  leasing,  with  competitors,  open  access  rules  are  intended  to  encourage  entry  by  those 
competitors, who can then focus their own investments and innovation on electronics and services that 
use that basic infrastructure.  The theory underlying open access is that the more competitive consumer 
broadband markets that emerge from this more competitive environment will deliver higher capacity, at 
lower prices, to more of the population.  The competing theory, that underlies the FCC's decision early 
in this decade not to impose open access for broadband infrastructure, is that forcing incumbents to lease 
their  network  to  competitors  will  undermine  that  industry's  incentives  to  invest  in  higher  capacity 
networks to begin with, and without that investment, the desired outcomes will not materialize.   
1.3.3  The emphasis other countries place on open access policies appears to be warranted by the 
evidence 
Because the near-universal adoption of open access is such a surprising result, because this kind of 
regulation goes to the very structure of the market in broadband, and because the policies adopted by 
other countries are so at odds with American policies during this decade, we dedicate the bulk of our 
discussion  of  policies  in  other  countries  to  assessing  the  international  experience  on  open  access 
regulation.  Our approach is both qualitative and quantitative.  We first undertake detailed country-by-
country  and  company-level  analyses  of  the  effects  of  open  access  and  the  political  economy  of 
regulation on broadband performance.  We find that in countries where an engaged regulator enforced 
open  access  obligations,  competitors  that  entered  using  these  open  access  facilities  provided  an 
important catalyst for the development of robust competition which, in most cases, contributed to strong 
broadband performance across a range of metrics. Today these competitors continue to play, directly or 
through  successor  companies,  a  central  role  in  the  competitiveness  of  the  markets  they  inhabit.  
Incumbents almost always resist this regulation, and the degree to which a regulator is professional, 
engaged,  and  effective  appears  to  play  a  role  in  the  extent  to  which  open  access  is  successfully 
implemented  with  positive  effects.      In  some  places  where  incumbent  recalcitrance  has  prevented 
effective implementation of open access, regulators have implemented functional separation to eliminate 
the incentives of the incumbent to discriminate among consumer broadband market providers in access 
to basic infrastructure.  We supplement these case studies with two quantitative analyses.  First, we 
conducted a study of pricing at the company level of 59 companies that offer high speed access.  Our 
pricing study (Figure 4.2) shows that prices and speeds at the highest tiers of service follow a clear 
pattern.  The highest prices for the lowest speeds are overwhelmingly offered by firms in the United 
States and Canada, all of which inhabit markets structured around “inter-modal” competition—that is, 
competition between one incumbent owning a telephone system, and one incumbent owning a cable 
system.  The lowest prices and highest speeds are almost all offered by firms in markets where, in 
addition to an incumbent telephone company and a cable company, there are also competitors who 
entered the market, and built their presence, through use of open access facilities.  Companies that 
occupy the mid-range along these two dimensions mostly operate either in countries with middling 
levels of enforcement of open access policies, or in countries that only effectively implemented open 
access more recently.  Second, we re-analyzed two of the most recent econometric studies of the effect 
of one form of open access–unbundling–on broadband penetration.  Our econometric analysis confirms 
the positive contribution of unbundling to penetration per 100 inhabitants.  We also perform several 
transformations of the analysis that suggest that the effect is larger and the result more significant and 
more robust than prior studies based on the same data found. 
1.3.4  Wireless policies 
The next generation broadband user experience is built upon not only the deployment of high capacity 
networks, but also the creation of ubiquitous seamless connectivity.  A central part of this new user     Next Generation Connectivity 
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experience  involves  the  integration  of  fixed,  mobile,  and  nomadic  access.    (By  mobile,  we  mean 
networks  evolved  from  cellular  telephones  to  offer  mobile  broadband,  primarily  3G  networks;  by 
nomadic, we refer to versions and extensions of Wi-Fi hotspots.) Approaching that goal has in most 
countries been associated with embracing fixed-mobile convergence. In many countries this has entailed 
accepting vertical integration of fixed with mobile network operators.  Importantly, those countries that 
permit, or even encourage such vertical integration, couple it with open access policies that seek to 
preserve competition in, and in Japan’s case with net neutrality or non-discrimination rules for, these 
integrated networks.  The countries we reviewed are actively identifying or allocating more spectrum for 
4G, or very high speed mobile services, and many are struggling with how to transition existing uses—
both earlier generation cellular, and television spectrum—to these future uses.  
We review the wireless experience of several countries, both high performers and low, both those that do 
well in fixed and mobile, and those that do poorly in one but well in the other.  We find that the effects 
of basic policy choices in wireless are difficult to tease apart.  We find good performers and poor who 
have used auctions and beauty contests (that is, the awarding of licenses through a regulatory selection 
process); we find good performers and poor that started out early with four or five identical 3G licenses, 
and good performers who started out with what should have led to a weaker market, with only two or 
three licenses.  We find high performers who imposed strict buildout requirements, and others who did 
not.  Nomadic access has developed with little support from policy: it is increasingly integrated into 
innovative service models.  It is offered by fixed broadband providers who seek to make their networks 
more flexible, by mobile broadband providers who seek to increase the utility of their networks to their 
subscribers or reduce load on their 3G infrastructure by handing some traffic over to their nomadic 
access networks, or through public efforts to create connected public spaces.  A major consideration in 
future planning will be identifying regulatory policies and practices that allow these kinds of integrations 
that promote seamless, ubiquitous access, without undermining competition.  
1.4  Investments in infrastructure and demand side programs 
1.4.1  Stimulus and recovery funds are spent in many countries 
Like the United States, several countries plan to use stimulus and recovery funds to support rollout of 
high capacity networks, either to upgrade to fiber for everyone, or to bring underserved areas up to 
speed.  Here we survey the investments of other countries both in response to the economic crisis and in 
response to the perceived challenges and opportunities of the next generation transition.  We found that 
the current U.S. investment of $7.2 billion appropriated in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act,  adjusted  per  capita,  is  commensurate  with,  and  mostly  higher  than,  investment  made  in  other 
countries. The exception to this statement is the announced, but not yet fully-funded, very high levels of 
planned government investments in Australia and New Zealand.  
1.4.2  Large, long term investments have played a role in some of the highest performing 
countries 
Several  countries  have  invested  over  the  long  term  as  a  strategic  choice  rather  than  as  a  stimulus 
measure.  Sweden's investments are the most transparent in this vein.  While the relative share of direct 
government investment is harder to gauge outside of Sweden, it does appear that the leaders in fiber 
deployment—South  Korea,  Japan,  and  Sweden—are  also  the  leading  examples  of  large,  long  term 
capital investments through expenditures, tax breaks, and low cost loans that helped deployment in those 
countries.   These countries have spent substantially more, in public spending on a per capita basis, than 
the U.S. has appropriated for stimulus funding.  On the other hand, there are models of high performing     Executive summary and introduction 
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countries, like France, that invested almost nothing directly, and instead relied almost exclusively on 
fostering a competitive environment.   
1.4.3  In Europe, substantial effort has been devoted to delimiting when government investment, 
both national and municipal, is justified and will not risk crowding out private investment 
Because public investment risks crowding out market investment, we review current decisions by the 
European Union on the proper guidelines for when and how public investment is appropriate.  In the 
context of considering municipal investments, like Amsterdam's CityNet, and country-level investments, 
the European Commission has studied both specific cases and the general policy question under an 
explicit mandate to limit state interventions that could undermine the development of a common market 
in  goods  and  services.    Here  we  review  that  experience,  and  the  new  European  guidelines,  issued 
September 17th, 2009. These guidelines are a formal decision of the European Commission on two 
kinds  of  state  and  municipal  investments.    The  first  is  aimed  to  achieve  universal  access  to  first 
generation broadband technologies.  This decision refers to similar problems, and takes a broadly similar 
approach to, funding for access to unserved and underserved areas as taken under the stimulus funding 
in the U.S. The second is intended to speed deployment of next generation broadband technologies, so as 
to harvest the anticipated social and economic benefits of the next generation transition.  On this subject, 
the European ruling holds that government funding can be appropriate even where there are two present 
facilities-based incumbents, offering triple-play services, including 24Mbps broadband service, as long 
as there are no discrete plans for deployment of next generation connectivity, with truly high capacity, 
within three years, by both incumbents.  Moreover, building on the experience of Amsterdam’s CityNet, 
the European guidelines permit government investment where it is shown to be on terms equivalent to 
what  a  market  investor  could  have  undertaken.    Public  investments  in  next  generation  networks, 
permissible under these conditions, should be oriented towards providing “passive, neutral, and open 
access infrastructure.” 
1.4.4  Several countries engaged in a range of investments to support broadband demand, 
including extensive skills training, both in schools and for adults 
Several  countries  we  observed  invested  on  the  demand  side  of  broadband,  not  only  in  supply  side 
policies.  Here we survey the experience of these countries, and identify specifically the prevalence of 
national and local skills training programs.  We see adult training, workplace training, and a heavy 
emphasis in schools, including both teacher training and curriculum development programs.  We also 
see on occasion major programs to subsidize both computers and connections for low income users.    
1.5  Overview of this document 
 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: 
 
•  Part 2 outlines current thoughts on “what is broadband?”—that is, how the target of the policy 
should be defined, and how the definition may reflect on policy  emphases.   It briefly notes 
current reasons given in other countries for emphasizing next generation connectivity as a policy 
goal.   
 
•  Part 3 describes our independent assessment of current benchmarking and measurement sources, 
and describes the results of our independent analysis and testing of benchmarks.   
     Next Generation Connectivity 
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•  Part 4 describes our findings on competition and open access policy.   
 
•  Part 5 offers an overview of practices and policies concerned with mobile and nomadic access.  
 
•  Part  6  discusses  government  investment  practices,  on  both  the  supply  and  demand  sides  of 
broadband and next generation deployment.   
 
This document is accompanied by a series of select country overviews, in which we offer country-
specific overviews of performance and policies.       Next Generation Connectivity 
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2  What is “broadband”? 
When the term “broadband” was initially introduced, it was by differentiation from dial-up service, and 
was typified by two distinct characteristics: speed and “always on.”  The former was a coarse measure of 
capacity.   The  latter  was  a  definition  of  fundamentally  different  user  experience:  the  experience  of 
relatively seamless integration into one's life—at least one's life at the desk—relative to the prevailing 
experience that preceded it.  Today's planning documents for the next generation transition continue to 
reflect, in different measures, these two distinct attributes of future networks.  A review of broadband 
planning efforts suggests that there is a broadly shared set of definitions and targets of policy, but some 
diversity of emphasis.  The primary distinction in emphasis is between a focus on high capacity and a 
focus  on  user  experience,  in  particular  on  ubiquitous,  seamless  connectivity.    We  also  observe  a 
secondary division, within the focus on high capacity, between a focus on numeric measures of capacity, 
most prominently download speeds, and a focus on applications supported.   
There is substantial overlap in practical policy terms between the two goal definitions.  Both would seek 
the highest capacity feasible within a time period.  There might, however, be subtle differences.  For 
example,  both  would  emphasize  fiber  to  the  home  infrastructure;  but  a  high  capacity  focus  might 
emphasize the theoretically unlimited capacity of fiber, while a focus on user-centric experience and 
might focus on the relative symmetry of data carriage capacity, assuming that end-users have as much to 
give as to receive.   
The  primary  difference  between  the  two  definitions  of  broadband  would  likely  be  the  emphasis  of 
ubiquitous  seamless  connectivity  on  mobile  and  nomadic  connectivity,  and  on  fixed-mobile 
convergence. As we will see in Part 4 however, countries that emphasize high capacity networks (such 
as France) have also seen entrants in fixed broadband develop vertically integrated services that combine 
mobile and fixed.  This came both from fixed-broadband innovator Iliad/Free expanding its Wi-Fi reach 
to a system-wide nomadic network, and in the opposite direction, with the purchase of fixed broadband 
entrant  neuf  Cegetel  by  mobile  provider  SFR.    Similarly,  in  South  Korea,  both  fixed-broadband 
incumbent KT merged  with second-largest mobile provider KFT, while the largest mobile provider, 
SKT,  purchased  the  second-largest  fixed  broadband  provider.    Japan,  the  primary  proponent  of  the 
emphasis on ubiquity, can in some senses “afford” to emphasize ubiquity, rather than capacity, because it 
already  has  in  place  the  high  capacity  fixed  network  that  most  other  countries  are  still  aspiring  to 
achieve.    The  two  approaches  might  therefore  be  better  thought  of  as  stages,  rather  than  distinct 
pathways, with high-capacity, ubiquitous, seamless connectivity the broad long-term overlapping goal of 
all. 
2.1  High speed networks 
2.1.1  Goals set in speed measures 
The  most  commonly  used  term  to  describe  future  planning  for  the  next  transition  in  networked 
connectivity is simply “next generation” networks or access.  Most of the definitions and considerations 
focus on measurable capacity, and largely continue to use speed as its measure.  The Ofcom document in 
the United Kingdom, “Delivering Super-Fast Broadband in the UK”
1 is a well-thought-out document 
that offers a crisp example of this approach.  The goal, while occasionally described in that document by 
the  generic  term  “next  generation  access,”  is  usually  referred  to  as  the  title  indicates:  “super-fast 
                                                 
1  Ofcom, 3 March 2009.     What is “broadband”? 
  17 
broadband.”  The goal is defined in terms of download and upload speeds.  The speeds set out as future 
goals in the UK document as “very fast” are what would be considered as second-tier speeds by the 
standards of what is available today in the best performing countries: 40 to 50 Mbps download, and 20 
Mbps upload.  Complementing this target, the government document “Digital Britain” emphasizes a 
commitment to universal availability of 2Mbps downstream service by 2012. This too is a modest goal 
by the standards of the highest performing countries, but is broadly consistent with the near-term goals 
of other European countries' universal access plans.   
2.1.2  Dual targets 
Many of the European plans adopt a dual-track approach.  They seek truly universal access to first 
generation broadband technologies, and independently also seek to catalyze high levels of availability 
and adoption of next generation capacities.  The Finnish Government's National Plan of Action for 
improving  the  infrastructure  of  the  information  society  sets  a  goal  that  by  2010  every  permanent 
residence, permanent business, and government body will have access to a network with an average 
download rate of 1Mbps.
2  The Finnish plan has a more ambitious medium-term goal, calling for a fiber-
optic or cable network permitting a 100Mbps connection to be available for access within 2 kilometers 
of 99% of permanent residences, businesses, and public administration bodies by 2015.  The “bite” of 
this plan is that it authorizes regional governing bodies that conclude that market demand will not meet 
that target to design public plans that will.  The German Federal Government's Broadband Strategy
3 
adopts  a  similar  two-step  strategic  goal,  with  universal  availability  of  at  least  1Mbps  throughout 
Germany targeted by the end of 2010, and a less ambitious availability of 50Mbps to 75% of households 
by 2014.  The October 2008 French plan, Digital France 2012, originally included universal service with 
a capacity of over 512 kbps as its core emphasis and first target.
4 That target is out of step with offerings 
already available in the highly competitive French market, but is intended to represent a commitment to 
truly  universal  access  to  what  would  count  as  prior-generation  broadband.    Since  that  time,  a  new 
minister  has  been  appointed  and  the  targets  are  reorienting  towards  a  fiber  and  applications-based 
definition of targets, as well as to supporting fixed-mobile convergence.
5  Recognizing this dual-target 
approach, of universal access to first generation broadband and high degrees of penetration for next-
generation connectivity, the European Commission's recent guidelines on state aid specifically separate 
out first generation broadband networks and next generation networks for separate analysis.  They make 
it easier for states to invest even where there already are two providers offering speeds on the order of 
20Mbps or so, as long as there are no current genuine plans, by at least two providers, to get higher, 
next-generation speeds in place in the geographic market within three years.
6 
2.1.3  A focus on fiber   
Another way of defining “next generation” in terms of high and potentially growing capacity is to focus 
on  the  trajectory  of  deployment  of  fiber-to-the-home  (FttH)  in  particular.    The  recent  European 
Regulator's  Group  report  entitled  “Report  on  Next  Generation  Access:  Economic  Analysis  and 
Regulatory Principles” captures the degree to which this focus on “next generation” heavily emphasizes 
                                                 
2  Government Resolution: National Plan of Action for improving the infrastructure of the information society.  
Government of Finland, 4 December 2008. 
3  Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, February 2009.   
4  Eric Besson, Digital France 2012.  October 2008. 
5  http://www.arcep.fr/fileadmin/reprise/communiques/communiques/2009/comnq-nkm-fibre-100709.pdf. 
6  17.9.2009 Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of broadband 
networks, available http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/guidelines_broadband_en.pdf.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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fiber as  a widely shared goal in Europe.
7  This approach is at odds with the equally widely-stated 
commitment to technological neutrality in government planning.  The ERG report attempts to reconcile 
this tension by emphasizing that cable broadband also largely depends on fiber backhaul; that current 
investments in higher-speed cable infrastructure include pulling fiber deeper into the neighborhood; and 
that a core goal of all current models is therefore to bring cable as close to the home as possible.  The 
idea expressed is that fiber capacity is more “future proof,” and will likely scale over longer periods to 
accommodate  the  increasing  capacities  and  growth  rate  of  communications  needs,  capacities,  and 
innovations.    Hybrid  fiber  coaxial,  as  well  as  fiber-to-the-cabinet  or  fiber-to-the-curb  (FttC)
8 
deployments (that is, pulling fiber deeper into neighborhoods and distributing from there over ever-
shorter copper loops), are thought to be way stations on the way to a fully fiber optic infrastructure.  This 
belief is supported by a recent UK report by the Broadband Stakeholders Group, influential in both UK 
and European debates, that FttC deployment costs roughly one-fifth of the cost of fiber-to-the-home 
(FttH).  The recent increasing concerns with middle mile—as opposed to last mile—issues is certainly 
consistent with a near term focus of providers on rolling higher capacity facilities to the neighborhood 
before linking the very last mile and last 100-meter drop.   
2.1.4  Capacity to support future applications 
A variant of the effort to define high capacity as the measure of the next generation transition uses 
anticipated applications, rather than speed measures, or as a complement to speed measures, to define 
the goal.  This variant is most explicitly represented in South Korea's IT839 program.  South Korea uses 
the term “ubiquity” to describe its goals, but defines it very differently than that term is used in Japan, as 
we will see.  South Korea's plan calls for a network aimed to support a list of eight services, three 
infrastructures, and nine growth engines, hence 839.  Ubiquity gets translated most directly into WiBro 
service—wireless  broadband,  anytime,  anywhere,  on  the  move;  digital  multimedia  broadcasting,  in 
vehicle infotainment, RFID etc.  The three infrastructures are called Broadband Convergence Network, 
aiming to provide services of 50-100Mbps to 20 million people, Ubiquitous Sense Network, to manage 
information through RFID so that things can be connected to  people, and provision of  Ipv6-based 
services. The growth engines are various technologies thought to provide a technological growth path, 
from high-speed packet mobile transmission and digital TV to Intelligent Service Robot.  While the 
particulars  of  the  plan  are  representative  of  the  explicitly  industrial  policy  frame  of  mind  that  has 
typified South Korean Internet development since the 1990s, the basic idea is for the plan to identify 
currently  attainable  as  well  as  futuristic  technologies,  and  plot  a  path  toward  their  implementation.  
Along  some  dimensions—such  as  delivering  high  adoption  of  fixed  networks  with  speeds  of  50-
100Mbs, or achieving a stepping stone towards WiBro (South Korea is the only country in which 100% 
of mobile phones subscriptions are 3G)—the policy has already achieved success.  Other dimensions, 
such as attaining an intelligent service robot, appear distant.  Certainly South Korean past successes at 
least recommend consideration of aspects of this approach, such as identifying a basket of currently-
imagined high-capacity, high-sensitivity applications, and targeting a network whose capacity is more 
than sufficient to support at least those applications.   
Other countries have also referred to a suite of applications as targets or measures. No other country, 
however, has relied so heavily on such a suite to define its national plan targets.  Digital Britain focuses 
on near-future applications like transportation control, energy/smart-grids, home-based telehealth, and 
                                                 
7   ERG(09)17, June 2009.   
8   In Europe the term more often used is fiber-to-the-cabinet; in the US, fiber-to-the-curb.  On occasion, fiber-to-the-
neighborhood is used.  Functionally, these are various ways of describing the intermediate solution between fiber-to-the-
home, on the one hand, and fiber to a main switch serving many neighborhoods, whose capacity is distributed over 
copper plant.     What is “broadband”? 
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education, as well as smoother high capacity to download music, video, and texts.  The French ARCEP 
Annual Report notes similar target applications, adding the possibility that the relevant applications 
could be video-calls integrated into social networking or location-specific access to cultural content 
(such as in a museum).  A current communiqué about intended stimulus investments also identifies as 
targets the development of Web 2.0 applications and “serious games”: or video-game-like experience 
software environments applied to more functional applications like health or language instruction.    
2.2  Ubiquitous seamless connectivity 
The main alternative definition of next generation connectivity emphasizes user experience: ubiquity 
and seamless connectivity.  Just as “always on” fundamentally changed what it meant to be connected in 
the first broadband transition, so too ubiquity is intended to identify a fundamentally different user 
experience:  seamless  connection  that  supports  creation  and  innovation  from  anyone,  anywhere, 
communicating  to  and  with  anyone  and  any  thing,  anywhere  and  anytime,  connecting  devices, 
applications, people, and objects, with room to innovate.  The prime examples of this definition are 
Japan's major policy documents.
9  The first generation e-Japan policy, governed the massive growth in 
high-speed Internet access in Japan, and involved regulatory reforms and market developments in 2000-
2001.  The transition to a next-generation emphasis on ubiquitous, seamless connectivity was marked by 
the  introduction  in  2005  of  the  u-Japan  policy.   While  it  is  culturally  normal  for Americans  to  be 
skeptical about grand names and plans from government agencies, we should at least acknowledge that 
the first generation policy was accompanied by results that continue to leave other countries far behind 
by several relevant measures.  Japan has not only the highest percent of fiber penetration, but providers 
in Japan have also invested in squeezing out the highest possible speeds over DSL and cable (160 Mbps 
from J:COM, as compared to 50Mbps offered using the same DOCSIS 3.0 technology in the United 
States, and J:COM's offering is available for about half the price).   (While geography plays some role, 
urban density does not appear to be an adequate explanation in Japan's case, see Section 3.3.2 and 
Figure 3.7; competition, however, seems to play an important role, see Sections 4.9 and 4.10.) In service 
of ubiquity, Japan has the second highest percentage of 3G deployment, second only to South Korea. 
As in the speed-based definition, network capacity measured in speed does play some role in the next 
generation access definition. An important example, following the dual-target European model, is the 
2006 commitment to achieving ultra-high speeds in 90% of Japan by 2010, alongside eliminating all 
zero-broadband areas.  But the core of what is distinct about Japan's definition of the goals is its focus 
on user experience.  This includes not only ultra-high speeds, but also seamless connectivity between all 
devices, people, and networked objects; support for distributed creativity from anyone, anywhere; and a 
well-skilled population that has access to applications and devices designed for a wide range of needs.  
While ubiquity and its anyone-anywhere-anytime concept may be easier to intuit, seamlessness appears 
to focus on an experience that connectivity is “just there,” without the user needing to think about 
connecting.  As a target, this definition is more ambitious.  Its ambition should be understood on the 
background of the fact that it sets out the future plans of country with the most advanced network 
currently deployed, whose network already matches or exceeds the “next generation” targets of some of 
the  European  plans.    This  suggests  that  it  may  be  a  better  predictor  of  future-proof  policy  than  a 
definition focused more specifically on speeds currently within plausible reach, or on currently well-
understood  applications.    In  current  French  planning,  ubiquity  shows  up,  alongside  continuous 
connectivity, primarily in the context of spectrum policy.
10   
                                                 
9  See Japan case study, Appendix, for list of references. 
10  ARCEP Annual Report 2008 (June, 2009).     Next Generation Connectivity 
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2.3  Next generation connectivity: Recap 
The targets of current plans for the future infrastructure of the digitally networked environment suggest 
two broad types.  The first focuses on high capacity networks.  Its most common variant focuses on 
objective measures of network performance, most often download speeds.  In other variants it focuses 
on fiber deployment as a temporary proxy and a long-term primary pathway, and on the capacity to 
support a basket of capacity-hungry applications whose performance is seen as desirable and not yet 
supported  by  first  generation  broadband  networks.    The  second  type  of  definition  focuses  on  user 
experience of seamless, ubiquitous access to a fully distributed network.  Table 2.1 summarizes the 
implications of adopting one or another of these two main emphases.   
The primary differences between the two definitions include: 
•  Data collection, benchmarking and future monitoring: an emphasis on high capacity treats all 
pathways—3G, WiMax, Wi-Fi, fiber—as substitutes for each other on the dimension of interest.  
They  are  all  potential  means  of  achieving  penetration  to  high  capacity  connectivity.    The 
emphasis  on  ubiquity  needs  to  measure  penetration,  speed,  and  price  independently  for 
connectivity  that  is  untethered,  be  it  mobile  (evolved  from  cellular  networks)  or  nomadic 
(evolved from Wi-Fi campus access and hotspots).   
•  Deployment:  high-speed  broadband  definitions  focus  on  residential  households—universality 
can be satisfied by access for households.  It can focus on fiber deployment as its core form.  
Ubiquitous connectivity requires equal attention to individual connectivity, not only households 
and businesses, and requires a dual focus: on high-speed fixed and high-speed mobile as distinct 
targets for deployment as an integral part of broadband policy.   
•  Competition and Access: A focus on high-speed networks emphasizes the role of wireless access 
as  an  alternative  pathway  of  providing  competitive  pressure  on  prices,  penetration,  and 
innovation  in  technologies  to  offer  high-speed  capacity  to  households.    The  most  important 
implication of this would be a wariness of permitting integration between wireless providers and 
fixed-broadband  providers,  because  it  would  tend  to  limit  competition  on  the  dimension  of 
interest:  high-speed  capacity  to  the  home.    Access  regulation,  if  any,  is  focused  on  fixed 
infrastructure: the last mile and the last fiber drop in the building.  A focus on ubiquity and 
seamless connectivity would be more amenable to vertical integration between fixed and mobile, 
seeing  them  as  complements  in  a  single  service:  ubiquitous  access.    To  the  extent  that  it 
perceived access regulation as important to a competitive market where entry barriers are high, 
however,  it  would  tend  to  extend  open  access  obligations  to  the  cellular,  as  well  as  fixed, 
infrastructure of the combined entities, and to assure a competitive environment for services that 
ride on both.   
•  Fiber: on fiber deployment the primary difference is between a carrier-centric view of how to 
deliver high-capacity as soon as possible, and a user-centric view of how to achieve the most 
end-user controllable architecture.  The high capacity definition emphasizes the maximum total 
capacity of fiber, and may thus be willing to accept topologies that lower the costs for carriers, at 
the cost of accepting more single-firm controlled topologies, like PON.  The user-centric view 
would  tend  to  emphasize  the  long  term  benefit  of  giving  users  as  much  symmetric  upload 
capacity at the edges as there is download, and a point-to-point fiber topology that enables more 
cost-effective upgrading and innovation on a per-user basis.  The difference between the two on 
how to deploy fiber, as opposed to whether to focus primarily on fiber as opposed to mobile,     What is “broadband”? 
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should not be overstated: we discuss the implications of fiber network topology on competition 
and innovation in Section 3.5.3. below. 
•  Subsidies:  A high capacity focus would tend to emphasize subsidies to network rollout to high 
cost or poor areas.  Subsidies might focus on equipment, like computers.  A user-centric focus 
would  tend  to  emphasize  user  skills  and  training  programs.    Furthermore,  where  ubiquitous 
connectivity is the goal, equipment subsidies could focus on mobile or nomadic access as well as 
computers and fixed broadband connections, although we have not seen this in practice. 
2.4  Universal access and next generation plans 
Practically  all  countries  we  observed  set  achieving  universal  access  to  “broadband”  (by  their  own 
definitions) as a goal of their current plans.  That ambition is distinct from the ambition to achieve 
widespread, even if not universal, access to the highest capacity networks technically achievable.  For 
example, Japan seeks to completely eliminate all zero-broadband areas, but also seeks to have ultra-high 
speeds in 90% to of its population.   Germany seeks to reach its entire territory with 1 Mbps service, but 
states an independent ambition to reach 75% coverage at 50Mbps.  The United Kingdom has a similar 
bivalent target—2Mbps throughout the country; 40-50Mbps as a broad goal for widespread deployment.  
The basic lesson from these kinds of targets is that the equity or universality concern is distinct from, 
and cumulative to, the cutting-edge technology concern.  Countries seem to be concerned both with 
assuring  that  substantial  portions  of  their  economy  and  society  enjoys  what  is,  by  international 
standards,  high  capacity  connectivity,  and  with  assuring  the  availability  of  substantial  capacity,  by 
historical standards, to their entire population.   
2.5  Why do we want next generation connectivity? 
Efforts  to  foster  a  ubiquitously  networked  society  connected  over  high-capacity  networks  share  the 
belief that moving to the next generation of networked communication will provide social, political, 
economic, and cultural benefits.  As Figure 2.1 shows, a July, 2009 report from the World Bank on 
information and communications technologies calculates that every 10 additional broadband subscribers 
out of every 100 inhabitants are correlated in high income countries with GDP growth increases of 
1.21%,  while  the  correlation  was  even  more  pronounced  for  low-  and  middle-income  countries,  at 
1.38%.
11 To understand the magnitude of the effect, it is important to realize that the average growth rate 
of a developed economy over the period of the study—from 1980 to 2006—was 2.1%.  U.S. growth in 
the shorter period of 1997-2008 was 2.8%.
12 Confidence that this statistic describes causality would 
support substantial focus on assuring future networked capacity at the highest levels.  Several countries 
specifically think of next generation  access as  tied to their competitiveness in a  global information 
economy.    South  Korea's  IT839  certainly  emphasizes  growth  paths  that  support  its  export-oriented 
industries that depend on, and support, information infrastructure, devices, and services.  Digital Britain, 
the  core  vision  document  published  by  the  British  government  in  June,  2009,  defined  as  its  core 
ambition : “To secure the UK's position as one of the world's leading digital knowledge economies.” The 
German strategic plan simply opens with the sentence: “High-speed broadband networks that enable the 
rapid exchange of information and knowledge are crucial for economic growth.”
13 
                                                 
11  Christing Zhen-Wei Qiang and Carlo Rossotto, with Kaoru Kimura, Economic Impacts of Broadband, in Information 
and Communications for Development 2009: Extending Reach and Increasing Impact, World Bank, July 2009.   
12  Bureau of Economic Analysis, July 31, 2009.  http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm 
13  The Federal Government's Broadband Strategy, p. 6.    Next Generation Connectivity 
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Implications 
Definition    Benchmarking  Deployment 
Competition and 




speed, fixed line, 
















Emphasis on access to 
fixed infrastructure 
competition; Passive and 
active components of 
fiber systems; emphasis 
on open access to in-
building, last drop, last 
mile fibers. 
Mobile is seen primarily 
as a potential 
competitive driver to 
fixed deployment: may 
resist vertical fixed-
mobile integration 
Emphasis on high 
capacity; long-term 
theoretical capacity; 




point topology focused 
on competitive access to 
passive components; can 
trade off PON or VDSL 
topologies to achieve 
earlier deployment of 
very high speeds 
Network rollout 











outside the target 




















fiber and other 
fixed, including 
fixed wireless 
Fixed, mobile, nomadic.   
Expands access 
regulation from fixed 




More amenable to 
vertical integration 
between fixed and 
mobile to achieve 
seamless ubiquity 
High capacity important, 
but symmetry may be 
more important; 
Point-to-point topologies 
supported more for 
anywhere, anyone logic 
and innovation over time 
Emphasis on user 
skills; equipment 
(hypothetical, not 
yet in practice) 
may expand to 
mobile or 
nomadic aspects  
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Various countries' plans 
and  documents  tend  to 
converge  on  a  number 
of  avenues  of  benefit.  
These  include 
telemedicine, 
particularly  its 
extension  to  remote 
areas and the home for 
patient  monitoring, 
smart  grids  and  more 
efficient electricity use, 
better  control  of 
transportation  systems, 
telecommuting,  support 
for  electronic 
commerce and payment 
systems and lower costs 
for  businesses  through 
infrastructure  sharing 
on the cloud computing 
model,  and  better 
access  to  educational 
materials  and 
experiences.  They also emphasize supporting highly valued social and cultural practices, from social 
networking to, as Digital Britain put it, downloading the entire works of Charles Dickens in less than 10 
minutes (alongside downloading Star Wars or mp3s.).   As the European Regulators Group noted, many 
of these concrete benefits are hard to measure and quantify.  Nonetheless, the consensus of broadband 
planning efforts is that, even if we do not precisely know what the benefits might be, the likelihood that 
we will discover them is sufficiently high to justify the planning and investment.  Furthermore, what 
little  evidence  there  is  does  indeed  suggest  that  the  expected  effects  and  correlations  are  indeed 
observable.  
One major anticipated application often discussed is telecommuting.  It is thought to offer cost-savings 
for businesses, permit workers to balance family and work, and contribute to  reducing carbon emissions 
both from electricity use in offices and from commuting.  Quantitative evidence, however, is sparse.  
Nonetheless,  European  survey  data  suggests  that  levels  of  household  broadband  penetration  are 
correlated with businesses' and workers ability to telecommute, and that fit is slightly better for small 
and medium size businesses than for larger businesses, which seems plausible given that such businesses 
are more likely to depend on extant conditions in the population rather than on special programs they 
might initiate themselves (Figure 2.2). 

































Source:  World Bank, 2009
Note:  The y-axis represents the percentage-point increase in economic growth per 10-percentage-
point increase in telecommunications penetration.  All results are statistically significant at the 1 
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Note:  The y-axis represents the percentage-point increase in economic growth per 10-percentage-
point increase in telecommunications penetration.  All results are statistically significant at the 1 
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Figure 2.2.  Household broadband penetration and telecommuting 





























































































































































Source: Berkman Center analysis of Eurostat data
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Source: Berkman Center analysis of Eurostat data
 
 
Beyond telecommuting  for other businesses, European data  also suggests that household broadband 
penetration is correlated with individuals responses that they themselves sell goods and services on the 
Internet (Figure 2.3).  Again, as with telecommuting, this is hardly a surprise.  The story implied by this 
correlation is that higher levels of broadband penetration correlate with the ability of individuals to be 
entrepreneurial and run small businesses from their homes.  This, in turn, would certainly support the 
Japanese  focus  on  networks  that  are  user-centric,  as  opposed  to  service-provider-centric.    It  seems 
entirely plausible that higher levels of adoption reduce the cost of home-based entrepreneurship, and 
therefore  cause  higher  levels  of  reported  instances  of  individual  Internet-based  small  businesses 
(although it is not impossible that the causal effect is reversed: societies with more entrepreneurial 
individuals adopt new technology more rapidly).   Again, however, these correlations are likely to hold 
for many online activities, and are merely suggestive of the more general-form predictions that animate 
next generation broadband planning.  
Many of the benefits of a ubiquitously networked society are difficult to quantify or measure at all.  How 
does one quantify the ability of grandparents and grandchildren to interact with each other through full 
video  communications,  keeping  families  together  in  an  increasingly  global  economy  with  an 
increasingly mobile workforce?  How would these improve when homes had built-in capacity for 3D 
real time video conferencing? 
    What is “broadband"?   
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The National Broadband Task Force has provided a broad review of the uses and benefits of broadband, 
from quantifiable measures of jobs created or health outcomes improvements from home monitoring, to 
necessarily less quantifiable entities, like civic engagement. The promise of both the quantifiable and the 
non-quantifiable benefits of networked connectivity seems to have been accepted more-or-less globally 
as sufficient justification to seek to promote the next generation of the Internet: be it defined in terms of 
high capacity infrastructure and supported applications, or in terms of a fundamental shift to a user-
centric, ubiquitously networked society.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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3  International comparisons: Identifying benchmarks and 
practice models 
3.1  Why use international comparisons? 
International comparisons, in particular broadband penetration rates as reported by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 
have been a political hot button in the past few years. Because the United States began the first decade 
of this century with the fourth highest levels of broadband penetration among OECD nations, and is 
closing the decade in 15
th place in these same rankings, and because, according to ITU measures the 
United States slipped from 11
th to 17
th between 2002 and 2007, many have used these data to argue that 
the United States, on its present policy trajectory, is in decline. Others have responded by criticizing the 
quality of the data in various ways, asserting that the United States broadband market is performing well 
and there is no concern to be addressed. The debate occasionally resembles that of a horse race; indeed, 
a horse race in which those who have already placed their bets are arguing about how to decide which 
horse has won.  
There are two primary problems with the horse race approach to international rankings as it has been 
used in public debate in the United States.  First, there has been too much emphasis on one particular 
measure—penetration per 100 inhabitants, which is only one way of measuring one facet of what one 
might plausibly seek to learn from a benchmarking exercise.  Second, there has been too much emphasis 
on precisely where the United States ranks, as opposed to on defining a range of metrics that would 
allow us to identify countries that are appropriate targets of observation, so that we can learn from their 
successes and failures.  The point of benchmarking along multiple dimensions is to provide us with an 
ability to identify countries that have had positive or negative outcomes along given dimensions of 
interest.  Where a country measures well on a given desired outcome—for example, high levels of 
mobile broadband penetration, or low prices for very-high-speed offerings—it is worthwhile to look at 
the  environmental  conditions  and  policy  actions  that  contributed  to  this  outcome,  and  to  consider 
whether these could be transplanted successfully to the U.S. If a country or cluster of countries performs 
well on several different measures, one can begin to look more holistically at that country or cluster, and 
consider whether there are characteristics that are susceptible to transposition into the American context. 
The basic premise is that, in broadly similar democratic, market societies, intelligent, well-intentioned 
people face similar problems and have different approaches to addressing those problems. Through real 
world experimentation, by a process of trial and error, different approaches are tried in different places. 
Looking to the experience of places that implemented a policy and thereafter began to perform better (or 
worse) than other places that did not implement that policy at the same time, on measures we consider 
pertinent, allows us to separate when there is a lesson to be learned at all, and whether the lesson is that 
a given practice may make sense to adopt or should be avoided (or at least treated with suspicion). 
Because  countries  differ  along  many  dimensions,  the  lesson  is  practically  never  available  as  a 
determinate  command:  this  or  that  policy  is  clearly  justified  for  a  given  country,  without  room  for 
judgment. This is why the rankings and quantitative analyses can point in the right direction, but must be 
supplemented with a qualitative understanding of the detailed conditions and practices as market, social, 
geographic, and regulatory-political determinants. 
While  there  can  and  should  be  plausible  critiques  of  any  sources  of  data  and  analysis,  along  with 
adjustments to data collection over time, and appropriate caution in its interpretation, it would be a grave 
mistake on the part of the United States simply to ignore and fail to use such data sets as exist in its 
planning and longer-term monitoring of our own performance  and the consequences of policies we   International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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adopt. To support the integration of evidence into American policymaking, here we endeavor to do two 
things. First, we present a wider range of measures than are commonly used to get at the core questions: 
how many people have broadband; what, technically, do they “have” when they have broadband; and at 
what  price.  That  is,  we  look  at  measures  of  penetration,  capacity,  and  price.  Second,  we  provide 
independent data that we gathered or analyzed, aimed to fill in gaps, and independently test existing 
measurements. We use market analysis data for penetration and price, and actual measurements of speed 
and  latency,  in  the  case  of  capacity.  We  describe  these  data  alongside  other  sources  of  data,  most 
extensively OECD data, and correlate the data from different sources. The combination of independent 
measurement or analysis with reanalysis of OECD data gives us a degree of confidence in our results 
here.  While we do not claim that our measurements are necessarily better than those made by others, we 
do gain confidence where the results of our observations, using independent techniques and/or sources 
of evidence, are well correlated with other sources of measurement. Before turning to reporting the 
measurements, the analysis of critiques, and the results of our independent tests, we explain in Section 
3.2. the relative emphasis of different existing measurement exercises, and which of these exercises is 
most useful to provide evidence for which kind of policy focus.     
3.2  Measures focused on users/consumers vs. measures focused on business 
There are two clusters of rankings: those that tend to locate the U.S. in the mid-teens of the rankings, 
and those that locate the U.S. at the very top of the rankings. The most important of the former are the 
OECD (U.S. ranked 15
th) and ITU (17
th) rankings.
14 The second cluster includes, most prominently, the 
Connectivity Scorecard (U.S ranks 1
st) created by Leonard Waverman of the University of Calgary in 
collaboration with the consulting firm LECG and funded by Nokia Siemens Networks, and the World 
Economic Forum Network Readiness Index (3
rd), produced in collaboration with the Insead Business 
School in France.  
The difference between these two clusters of indices or rankings is not their methodological quality but 
their focus. The purpose of one's inquiry determines which cluster is more relevant. The OECD and ITU 
measures  are  directly  focused  on  Internet,  broadband,  and  telecommunications-specific  measures  of 
performance. The OECD in particular covers and reports extensively on broadband-related data: such as 
number of subscribers and their percentage in the population or among households, price ranges, speeds 
of access, etc. The ITU itself also collects and reports actual statistics on telecommunications, but covers 
many more countries. It therefore includes many comparators that are sufficiently different in wealth and 
technological state as to be noisier targets of observation, and it reports information that is not quite as 
rich on this much larger set of countries. Its index or ranking, the ICT Development Index (ITU-IDI), 
largely reflects communications and computer data, but also includes a component reflecting literacy, as 
well as secondary and tertiary educational enrollment rates. In this regard, both the OECD broadband 
measures  and  the  ITU-IDI,  particularly  its  sub-indices  that  exclude  the  educational  attainment,  are 
focused  on  specific  measurable  outcomes  in  terms  of  population-wide  broadband  availability,  use, 
capacity, and price.  
 
                                                 
14  In this cluster there is also an additional sensible adaptation of the OECD data, produced by Robert Atkinson of the D.C.-
based Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) (15th), which creates a ranking based on a composite 
of penetration per households rather than per-inhabitant, speed, and price (while it does not change the position of the 
U.S., which is the concern of those looking at the horse races, it does change the position of several other countries, 
emphasizing in particular the successes of South Korea and Japan). 
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By contrast, the WEF/INSEAD Network Readiness Index and the Waverman Connectivity Scorecard 
emphasize business use and availability. The WEF/INSEAD index captures a wide set of indicators, 
addressing a much broader range of policy concerns, not only in science and technology, but also in 
business environment more generally. Factors that the report accompanying the Index explicitly cites as 
burdens  on  the  U.S.  ranking  (3
rd  overall)  are  its  relatively  high  burden  of  regulation  and  tax,  the 
inefficacy of American law making, the inefficiency of American dispute resolution and its low level of 
judicial independence (the U.S. ranks in the 20s on efficacy of law making and on judicial independence 
in this index). Factors tending to support the relatively high ultimate standing of the U.S. on this index 
are the  efficiency of its markets and venture capital activity, its well developed R&D clusters, like 
Silicon Valley or the Research Triangle, its large pool of scientists and engineers, and the high quality of 
its universities.
15 The breadth of parameters, both positive and negative, should provide sufficient flavor 
to understand that this Index is useful in considering broad science and technology policy questions. If 
one  is  interested  more  specifically  in  broadband  policy—understood  as  policy  aimed  at  supporting 
ubiquitous  high  capacity  access  to  all  Americans  at  affordable  rates—the  measures  that  influence 
standing in this index sweep too broadly to provide meaningful guidance. It would be odd to include in a 
National Broadband Plan an effort to improve the efficacy of American law making or the independence 
of its judiciary. Moreover, in the more relevant sub-index of the WEF/Insead index (the sub-index that 
focuses on individual network readiness) the U.S. ranks 14
th, very similar to its ranking in the OECD 
and ITU rankings, and in the individual usage sub-index the U.S. ranks 10
th. In the sub-index describing 
business readiness the U.S. ranks 3
rd, and in business usage we rank 5
th.  
Consistent  with  the  findings  of  the  WEF/INSEAD  Readiness  Index,  the  Waverman  Connectivity 
Scorecard also focuses on business use of information and communications technology. And, like the 
Network Readiness Index, the Waverman Scorecard finds that businesses in the United States are well 
connected and networked, and relatively well-positioned to take advantage of that connectivity. As the 
2009 edition states, “the Scorecard is  relatively heavily  weighted towards the business sector. As a 
result, countries that perhaps have superior fiber residential broadband networks, or perhaps high mobile 
subscriber rates, will find themselves weighed down if there has not been a corresponding investment in 
business  infrastructure  and  the  necessary  capital  and  skills  to  turn  infrastructure  into  productivity 
enhancing  vehicles.”
16  Beyond  the  general  focus  on  the  business  sector,  the  Waverman  Scorecard, 
because of its focus on economic  growth and its determinants, measures not only  connectivity, but 
factors that would complement network connectivity to make for growth. The U.S. occupies a middle-
tier  position  based  on  the  measures  that  are  shared  with  the  other  indices. As  Waverman  and  his 
collaborators put it: “When one considers consumer infrastructure measures – as is typical of most 
indices  –  the  U.S.  performance  is  mediocre  on  some  metrics.  However,  our  results  are  actually 
consistent with much published research showing that the U.S. economy has benefited more strongly 
from ICT than most others, with the primary difference lying in more intensive ICT use by business.” To 
the extent one is concerned with business use of information technology, these two indices suggest that 
the United States is in a reasonably good condition. To the extent that one is concerned with wide 
dispersion  of  broadband  to  consumers,  in  both  served  and  underserved  areas,  and  with  developing 
ubiquitous access for the American population, both the Connectivity Scorecard and the WEF/INSEAD 
Network Readiness Index provide less insight and, where they cover similar ground, do not appear to 
contradict the OECD and ITU data. 
                                                 
15  WEF/INSEAD 2009 report, Chapter 1.1, page 14. 
16  Waverman 2009, at 3.   International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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3.3  Penetration: Fixed 
3.3.1  Penetration per 100 inhabitants measure 
The best known benchmark of international performance on broadband has been the OECD's annual 
release of rankings of its 30 members, based on penetration of fixed broadband per 100 inhabitants. In 
these rankings the United States was 15
th in the most recent report in 2009. These rankings have been the 
most salient, and have received the most extensive critique. 
Figure 3.1 represents the number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants in a country. We emphasize several 
aspects  of  this  ranking.  First,  the  Nordic  countries  are  uniformly  high  performers  by  this  measure, 
occupying five of the top eight slots. The top  six, or top quintile, includes Denmark, Norway, and 
Iceland, as well as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and South Korea. The second quintile includes, in 
addition  to  Sweden  and  Finland:  Canada,  the  United  Kingdom,  Belgium,  and  Luxembourg.  In  our 
analysis throughout much of this report we largely exclude close analysis of the very small countries like 
Iceland and Luxembourg, because their experience is too different to provide useful insight. The third 
quintile is made up of France, Germany, the United States, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Spain, 
Ireland and Italy only make the fourth quintile. As we continue to go through the various metrics, one of 
the things we will be looking for are particularly high performers, and another will be performers with 
particular anomalous rankings ratios between different measures. For example, Italy is only 22
nd out of 
30 in fixed broadband penetration per 100 but, as we shall see, is fifth in mobile broadband penetration. 
Canada is a second quintile performer in penetration (down from having penetration levels second only 
to South Korea's in 2003), but only a fourth quintile performer on speeds and prices. Keeping an eye out 
for these kinds of discrepancies allows us to identify false “successes” and false “failures,” or be more 
precise  about  what 
aspects  of  a  country's 
performance  are  worth 
learning  for  adoption, 
and  which  are  worth 
learning for avoidance.  
The  ITU  reports  the 
same  measure  of  fixed 
broadband  subscribers 
per  100  inhabitants  as 
part  of  its  ICT 
Development  Index.
17 
If  we  look  only  at 
OECD  countries  as 
reported  in  the  ITU 
index  for  2007,  the 
United  States  switches 
places  with  Germany, 
edging  ahead  to  14
th 
place. 
                                                 
17   ITU, ICT-IDI, 2009, Indicator 7. Reported under Use Indicators, pp. 93-94. 
    





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1.  Broadband penetration   Next Generation Connectivity 
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The  only  substantial 
change  is  that  Sweden 
moves  from  7
th  to  1
st 
place,  nudging 
Denmark  and  the 
Netherlands  from  first 
and  second  to  second 
and  third  places,  and 
Finland  and  South 
Korea  switch  places 
from the bottom of the 
first  to  the  top  of  the 
second  quintile  and 
vice  versa.  The  ITU 
data shows Hong Kong 
as the only non-OECD 
member  with  higher 
fixed  broadband 
penetration  than  the 
U.S. 
The  penetration  rates 
per  100  have  been  the 
most salient politically because they are collected and published regularly, and so have provided the 
starkest image of what has been described by some as American relative decline in the pace and level of 
uptake of the first broadband transition. Figure 3.2 presents historical penetration rates from the second 
quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 2008 for the top quintile performers in 2002, and the top 
quintile performers in 2008.  Figure 3.3 presents a similar longer term comparison of the United States 
and  the  four  largest 
European economies.  
There  can  be  little 
argument  that,  to  the 
extent  that  the  OECD 
reports  of  penetration 
per 100 inhabitants are 
a  pertinent  measure  of 
broadband uptake, they 
provide  a  long  term 
view  of  the 
performance  of  the 
American  broadband 
market  relative  to  the 
performance  of  other 
markets.  The  numbers 
suggest  that  many  of 
these  other  countries 
started  with  lower 
levels  of  penetration, 
Figure 3.2  Top quintile penetration rates over the last 6 years. 
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and, with the exception of Italy, at some point between 2002 and 2005, accelerated and overtook the 
U.S. broadband market. Trying to identify what made these countries accelerate as they did, which 
countries accelerated more, and why, could offer some insight into the potential contribution of policy to 
broadband penetration.  
3.3.2  Critiques of OECD penetration per 100 inhabitants measure 
Because of their salience, the OECD penetration per 100 rankings have been the subject of extensive 
criticism. The most plausible arguments against their usefulness or competence as a benchmark have 
been: (1) Measuring penetration per 100 inhabitants “penalizes” countries with bigger households, like 
the U.S.; (2) The OECD data represent what companies tell their regulators, and what these regulators in 
turn  tell  the  OECD;  the  concern  is  that  companies  sometimes  misreport  to  their  governments,  and 
governments misreport to multilateral organizations, in each case to make themselves look good; (3) 
High speed facilities are harder to deploy in sparsely populated countries, and the U.S. is less densely 
populated than are the countries ahead of it in the rankings (note that, unlike the other critiques, this is 
not a claimed refutation of the findings, but a reason to explain the findings on grounds other than policy 
divergence); (4) Americans access broadband at work and in their educational institutions, and these are 
under-counted  by  the  rankings;  and  (5)  the  OECD  rankings  do  not  cover  wireless  connections,  in 
particular 3G and publicly-available Wi-Fi connections.  
Because this measure has been the longest standing available metric, it is of particular importance as an 
element of benchmarking over time, and a means of learning about broadband policy.  We therefore 
dedicate some space here to evaluate these critiques. We find that none undermines the competence or 
validity of the OECD numbers, though we agree that an exclusive focus on penetration per 100 as a 
measure is too narrow a focus.  We take up the last critique, about mobile broadband penetration, in the 
context of the next part: mobile penetration, which we treat here as sufficiently important to be reported 
as an independent metric.  
Counting penetration per 100 inhabitants rather than per household 
The first, most important, and widely accepted critique of the OECD per 100 rankings is that they 
penalize the United States, which has larger households than other countries.  The argument is that 
fixed-line broadband is subscribed to by households, not by individuals, and so percentage penetration 
of households is the appropriate measure.   While we agree that observing household penetration is 
distinctly important, indeed, likely more important than penetration per 100, two reasons make this 
critique unpersuasive in context.  First, each measure has slightly different advantages, and using both is 
better than using one.  Second, the measures are highly correlated, so shifting to look at household 
penetration does not in fact result in a significant change in U.S. performance.   
The primary disadvantage of using penetration per household rankings, rather than rankings per 100 
inhabitants, is that by seeking to correct for household size such a ranking will miss—and therefore 
understate—business  use.  Most  pertinently,  this  approach  will  result  in  ignoring  use  by  small  and 
medium  size  businesses  that  may  use  consumer-type  offerings.    Moreover,  household  penetration, 
properly done, is based on household surveys, not carrier-level subscription data reporting, because not 
all  subscriptions  reported  by  carriers  are  for  households.    One  occasionally  sees  efforts  to  state 
household  penetration  numbers  based  on  taking  all  subscriptions  and  dividing  them  by  number  of 
households, instead of by number of inhabitants.  This includes businesses in the numerator, but divides 
by households, which overstates household penetration in countries with relatively high business use (a 
larger  numerator)  and  large  households  (a  smaller  denominator).    This  makes  data  collection  for   Next Generation Connectivity 
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household penetration more expensive and time consuming.  Well constructed household level data is 
therefore updated less frequently, and offers more coarse-grained observation over time.  The reason to 
use both metrics is that, while we care about small business use as a measure of broadband policy, is it 
clearly correct that, for  purposes of identifying  countries that have been more or less successful in 
connecting citizens in their homes, a household measure is indeed analytically better.   
Using household subscription levels provides useful nuance, but does not fundamentally change the 
picture.    As  Figure  3.4  shows,  the  two  measures  are  highly  correlated.  The  U.S.  rank  is  entirely 
unaffected  by  counting 
penetration  per 
household,  as  opposed 
to penetration per 100 
inhabitants.  The  only 
two  countries  that 
appear  to  be 
“penalized” by the use 
of  a  “per  inhabitants” 
rather  than  “per 
households”  measure 
are  South  Korea  and 
Japan.    Table  3.1 
shows that the primary 
effects  of  looking  at 
household  penetration 
are  to  move  South 
Korea back to the top 
of  the  list,  to  move 
Japan,  which  has 
widely  been 
understood to lead the 
way  on  speed  and 
price-per-speed 
measures, into the top quintile for penetration as well, to move Switzerland from the first to the third 
quintile  on  penetration, and  France  from  the  top  of  the  third  to  the  top  of  the  fourth  quintile. The 
Japanese numbers are potentially polluted by the fact that they include 3G subscriptions, which are 
particularly  high  in  Japan,  and  therefore  make  it  potentially  inappropriate  to  interpret  the  Japanese 
household penetration numbers as in fact comparable to those of other countries. It is the case, however, 
that 3G services include, for example, NTT DoCoMo's “U Home” service, which offers 54Mbps service 
in the home. This home-specific 3G service is, in other words, faster than the fixed service available in 
all but a handful of countries. Given this fact, we report the Japanese household numbers with the 
remainder of the household penetration numbers, though with the noted caution. 
Because we have a longer period of consistent measurement by the OECD for penetration per 100 
inhabitants,  because  that  measure  is  so  highly  correlated  with  the  real  target  of  interest  for  much 
policy—household penetration, and because it is more current, we will often use penetration per 100 
inhabitants where doing so will allow us to make claims about periods that precede good comparable 
data  on  household  penetration,  or  periods  that  are  more  recent  than  available  household-level  data. 
While we do so, however, we must remember that per inhabitant penetration has little effect on the 
standing of all countries, except that it substantially understates penetration in South Korea, slightly 
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overstates penetration in France and Denmark, and substantially overstates penetration in Switzerland. It 
has no effect on U.S. standing.  
Doubly distorted self-reporting. 
Another critique of the penetration data is that it comes through doubly distorting self-reporting. First, 
companies report to their national regulators, then national regulators report to the OECD. The concern 
raised is that these numbers therefore cannot be taken seriously, in part because some countries are less 
reliable in their data collection than others, and may try to “look good” in the international rankings, and 
in part because companies may misreport to their regulators. The correlation with household data is one 
signal  that  this  critique  is  unlikely  correct,  because  household  penetration  is  generally  based  on 
household survey data, not on company reporting. Its high correlation with a measure of penetration that 
does depend on company reporting increases our confidence in the quality of the first prong of the 
double distortion: the company data as reported by the countries to the OECD. Second, we attempted to 
assess the rankings by correlating them to estimations of penetration levels in an independent market 
analysis database, as applied to OECD countries.  The market analysis data is based largely on reports 
by the companies directly to Telegeography, the firm collecting the data, and so moderates concerns over 
the imperfections inherent in communications between a company and its regulator, on the one hand, 
and a country and the multilateral organization of which it is a member, on the other. In our dataset, the 
United  States  comes  out  16
th,  instead  of  15
th,  (Figure  3.5)  but  the  basic  finding  is  that  penetration 
rankings based on independent market data and penetration rankings of the OECD are almost perfectly 
correlated, with an R
2 of 0.98 (Figure 3.6).   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Table 3.1.  Impact on country rank 
Country Per inhabitant rank
Belgium 12 12



























Slovak Republic 28 26
Turkey 29 30
Mexico 30 29
Change in rank Country Per inhabitant rank
Belgium 12 12
United Kingdom 11 11
Sweden 7 7
Per household rank
Denmark 1 4 Denmark 1 4
Netherlands 2 3 Netherlands 2 3
Switzerland 3 13 Switzerland 3 13
Iceland 4 2 Iceland 4 2
Norway 5 6 Norway 5 6
Finland 6 9 Finland 6 9
South Korea 8 1 South Korea 8 1
Luxembourg 9 10 Luxembourg 9 10
Canada 10 8 Canada 10 8
France 13 18 France 13 18
Germany 14 15 Germany 14 15
United States 15 14 United States 15 14
Australia 16 17 Australia 16 17
Japan 17 5 Japan 17 5
Austria 18 16 Austria 18 16
New Zealand 19 20 New Zealand 19 20
Spain 20 19 Spain 20 19
Ireland 21 22 Ireland 21 22
Italy 22 27 Italy 22 27
Czech Republic 23 25 Czech Republic 23 25
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Population urbanicity 
and density 
A  second  common 
critique  of  the  OECD 
penetration  rankings  is 
that  population  density 
affects  the  ranking. 
Note  that  this  is  not  a 
critique  of  the 
competence  of  the 
penetration  rankings, 
but  of  their  pertinence 
to  policy.  In  other 
words,  if  population 
density  generally,  or 
urban  density  in 
particular,  overwhelm 
the effect of policy, then 
the penetration rankings 
are  less  relevant  as  a 
benchmark  for  policy 
makers, since they merely reflect geography, and not the comparative success of different broadband 
policies. If, on the other hand, density is irrelevant, or if it contributes only a part of the explanation of 
penetration, then the question remains how much of the residual effect is explained by policy. As long as 
penetration is not fully explained by non-policy considerations like density (or income or poverty, as we 
shall see), it remains a pertinent benchmark for policymakers to be able to identify which countries 
outperform their predicted levels of penetration, given known contributing causes. These then become a 
model  of  observation  for  positive  policies,  just  as  countries  that  substantially  underperform  their 
predicted levels of penetration given alternative causes become models of policies one might wish to 
avoid. 
The basis of this argument against use of penetration data is that a widely dispersed population is more 
expensive to connect than a densely packed population.  This argument has been particularly forceful, 
and probably correct, in explaining part of the early success of South Korea, and the emergence of some 
competitive fiber offerings in Japanese urban centers.  This has led to efforts to correct for this mistake. 
One proposal is to introduce a measure of “urbanicity”: how much of a country's population is located in 
dense urban areas, multiplied by the population density of those areas.
18  This measure, reasonably, 
assumes that the cost of reaching many customers is lower if they live in dense neighborhoods with 
high-rises. This suggests that one metric for country performance in the future may seek to compare 
penetration,  speed,  and  price  in  similarly  dense  areas  of  different  countries,  as  mandated  by  the 
Broadband Data Improvements Act.
19  As a very coarse initial pass at that approach we report speed test 
data from 55 cities throughout the OECD, in the section on speed below (Table 3.3.).  That Busan and 
Seoul have the highest average download speeds in the OECD countries tends to support the urbanicity 
hypothesis.    That  New  York  City  is  not  among  the  top  twenty  cities  in  average  download  speeds 
suggests that something else is at work as well.  Given our focus on penetration in this section, however, 
                                                 
18  Atkinson ITIF rankings doc, in endnote 14 explained. Also cite the Correa paper that creates the methods. 
19  Pub. Law 110-385, Section 103, requiring the FCC to include in its 706 reports measures of broadband capabilities 
(including speeds and prices) from at least 75 communities in 25 countries. 
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we report here a simple 
initial  test  of  the 
urbanicity  hypothesis, 
where  we  performed  a 
simple  bivariate 
correlation  of  OECD 
reported  levels  of 
penetration  and  urban 
concentration  as 
reported  by  the  UNDP 
(Figure 3.7). 
We find that the United 
States performs roughly 
consistently  with  the 
best  fit  line  for  the 
effect of urbanicity, and 
that  urbanicity  is 
positively  correlated 
with  penetration, 
though  clearly  is  not  a 
sole  determinant.  The 
surprise here is that despite its high density, South Korea actually outperforms even what its high urban 
density  would  predict,  and  that  highly  dense  countries  like  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark  also 
outperform what their urban concentration would predict. In general, most of the countries that appear to 
be positive observation models, as identified by their levels of penetration, are above their predicted 
penetration levels given urban concentration, suggesting that their presence in the higher quintiles of 
penetration indeed marks them as potential models for policy observation, rather than simply as the 
beneficiaries of propitious geography. 
The OECD itself has taken an alternative approach to correcting for rankings that reflect penetration in 
terms of population. Its analysis focuses on how densely packed half of a country's population is.
20  The 
intuition  here  is  similar  to  the  intuition  around  urbanicity,  but  focuses  on  relative  proportion  of  a 
country's  land  mass  necessary  to  reach  half  the  population.  This  would  be  a  particularly  pertinent 
predictor for a country in which large portions of the population reside in suburbs, and is relatively 
densely  populated,  but  still  not  urbanized. As  Figure  3.8  shows,  however,  the  correlation  between 
density so measured and broadband penetration is not statistically significant. What this analysis does 
allow us to do, however, is again identify countries that outperform the (very limited) degree to which 
their  50%  concentration  measure  predicts  their  penetration.  As  with  urbanicity,  the  United  States' 
ranking is largely unaffected, but the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, South Korea, and to a lesser 
extent France, outperform what their level of concentration, using this looser measure, would predict. 
For future benchmarking exercises, our measure of urban density appears to be more useful statistically 
than the measure of density by 50% concentration.  This finding makes intuitive sense, given the relative 
benefits of rolling fixed lines to apartment buildings.   
                                                 
20  ITU IDI rankings. 
Figure 3.3.1.  Broadband penetration and population dispersion 






50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%





































Source: Berkman Center analysis of OECD Broadband Statistics and






GB BE FR DE
US AU
JP














50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%





































Source: Berkman Center analysis of OECD Broadband Statistics and






GB BE FR DE
US AU
JP













GB BE FR DE
US AU
JP








CA  International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
  37 
Urban concentration 
versus poverty 
The effect of the degree 
of  urban  concentration 
can  be  further 
confounded  by  cultural 
patterns  of 
concentration  or 
deconcentration  of 
poverty.
21  This 
observation  ties  in  to 
the  more  widely 
accepted  observation 
that  poverty  and 
inequality  explain  a 
substantial  portion  of 
levels  of  broadband 
penetration.
22    While 
one would not put in a 
National  Broadband 
Plan  a  target  of 
reducing  poverty  and 
inequality in the United States generally, any more than one would include improving the efficiency of 
law making or judicial independence in response to the WEF Network Readiness Index, the observation 
does suggest the relative importance and potential high returns to policies focused on the poor as poor, 
whether urban or rural, rather than on the rural as rural, irrespective of poverty. 
To test this hypothesis we used a 2008 dataset that enabled us to re-run the model proposed by Derek 
Turner (who first made this argument in context of broadband) on current data, and we obtained Turner's 
original data to evaluate whether we could replicate his findings. First, we were able to replicate Turner's 
findings with his data. Second, using our own updated data, we analyzed the effects of median income, 
urban concentration, and poverty (see Annex). We find that median income, urban concentration, and 
poverty all contribute to explaining levels of penetration. In all our models, median income explained 
more  of  the  difference  in  penetration  than  urbanicity  or  poverty,  but  both  urbanicity  and  poverty 
contribute to the explanation. When we tested whether the effect was primarily driven by any single 
country, we found that they were not.  Our findings in this analysis suggest that interventions targeted at 
improving broadband penetration among poor people, urban or rural, may be warranted independently 
of interventions aimed at addressing rural access. Our data do not allow us to differentiate whether 
interventions  focused  on  low-income  users  should  be  on  measures  such  as  public  construction  and 
management of facilities, or on Lifeline-like universal service subsidies. All these non-policy predictors 
of penetration, however, do not explain the entire difference between countries, leaving room for policy 
to have an effect at the margin. 
                                                 
21  Derek Turner, Broadband Reality Check II 2006, Annex A. 
22  This is a surprising point of congruence between the technically sophisticated advocates who have analyzed these 
questions from opposing policy perspectives. Compare Turner to Wallsten, Understanding Broadband (2008) pp 39-41. 
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Workplace access 
Another critique is that the OECD undercounts American broadband penetration because it does not 
count  use  at  work  in  the  numerator  of  the  broadband  per  100  metric.    Given  the  relatively  higher 
investment levels in information technology in the business sector in the United States, this is a plausible 
concern.  First,  however,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  capturing  a  portion  of  business  use  is  an 
advantage of the per 100 inhabitants measure over the per household measure, because only the former 
includes at least those businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises whose Internet access is 
likely  counted  in  the  carrier  reports  on  broadband  subscriptions.    Second,  much  of  the  U.S.  ICT 
investments are not in simple high speed Internet connectivity, but in business software and equipment. 
While data on U.S. business usage is weak, the OECD does collect and publish survey data from various 
national sources on broadband penetration among businesses.
23  Unsurprisingly in the global networked 
economy, 99% of businesses with over 250 employees in almost all OECD economies have broadband 
connections.  This number drops off to about the 98% for mid-sized businesses, and only then, for 
businesses with between 10-49 employees, do some differences emerge. Among the higher performers 
in general broadband penetration, some indeed do have relatively low broadband penetration for small 
businesses: Canada (93.7%), the UK (92.1%), and Sweden (94.1%). The rest of the countries that have 
high  penetration  per  100  inhabitants  also  have  penetration  rates  above  95%  even  in  these  smaller 
businesses. These are the only countries where it is possible that undercounting of business use would 
result  in  a  substantial  decline  in  their  rankings  relative  to  the  US.  Given  the  very  high  level  of 
penetration in Sweden, if there is likely an effect on the meaning of penetration it is that Canada and UK 
may look slightly worse on penetration than by the standard measure. 
Conceptually, however, it is not at all clear that use at work is a confounding factor. In order for use at 
work to be a critique of the U.S. position in the rankings, one would have to assume that broadband use 
at work is a substitute for home access, rather than a complement to it. That is, one would have to 
assume that people who access high speed Internet at home do so instead of getting broadband at home, 
rather than to assume that people who have high speed access to the Internet at work learn about what 
they can do when they are connected, and then subscribe at home, or simply live in a society where, 
increasingly, living without a connection is a burden. While we do not have data about the United States, 
European survey data suggests that within Europe at least, higher household broadband penetration is 
well correlated with higher individual use at work. See Figure 3.9. While this shows no causality, it is 
certainly consistent with the intuition that access at work would complement demand for access at home, 
rather than substitute for it.  
                                                 
23   http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/62/39574066.xls.   International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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3.4  Penetration: mobile and nomadic broadband 
Understanding the future of the networked information environment as involving ubiquitous, seamless 
connectivity suggests that mobile and nomadic broadband are important independent measures of next 
generation transition performance. Even countries that follow capacity-oriented definitions treat mobile 
broadband, or ubiquitous connectivity, or Internet everywhere, as integral parts of their national plans. A 
critical component of ubiquity will be wireless access.  
Wireless mobile connectivity for most people is experienced primarily and initially through devices that 
have evolved from what originally were mobile phones. However, providing a full picture of the next 
generation transition to ubiquity requires observations of both the trajectory from mobile telephony to 
mobile  broadband,  and  the  trajectory  from  local  area  network  extension  for  laptops,  to  nomadic 
connectivity  through  whatever  will  develop  from  Wi-Fi  hotspots.  The  need  to  consider  mobile 
penetration was initially raised in the American context as a critique of the OECD penetration metrics. 
The argument was that the United States would rank higher if we accounted for wireless connectivity of 
both sorts instead of purely for fixed connection. Upon examination, that argument proves to be false. 
On mobile broadband the United States is a weak performer.  On nomadic connectivity we do better, but 
are  not  a  particularly  high  performer.  Nonetheless,  our  purpose  here  is  not  to  continue  to  test  the 
competence and pertinence of measures of fixed broadband penetration, but to supplement that data with 
measures that would allow us to identify those countries that are particularly high performers in mobile 
and nomadic connectivity.    Next Generation Connectivity 
  40 
3.4.1  Mobile broadband: From phones to data 
A  commitment  to  understanding  ubiquitous,  seamless  access  as  an  integral  part  of  next  generation 
connectivity requires that we provide independent measures of mobile broadband penetration.  In the 
longer term, it requires that we measure and monitor a set of metrics for mobile broadband similar to 
those we describe in the 
remainder of the chapter 
for broadband generally.  
Current  OECD 
reporting  on  3G 
subscriptions  is 
wanting,  as  we  explain 
below.    We  therefore 
report  here  on  the 
results  of  our  analysis 
of  independent  market 
data  regarding  3G 
subscriptions.
24    We 
found  that  the  United 
States ranks 19
th among 
OECD  members  in  3G 
subscriptions  per  100 
inhabitants  (Figure 
3.10).    Note  that,  given 
personal  usage  patterns, 
subscriptions  measured  as  a 
proportion  of  population, 
rather than households, is the 
only appropriate measure for mobile communications penetration.  The growth of 3G subscriptions in the United 
States was robust between the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, and indeed was the 10th 
highest in the OECD (Figure 3.11). The longer-term implications of this better performance in growth 
than in current penetration is moderated somewhat by the fact that several of the countries with higher 
growth rates, sometimes much higher growth rates, are those countries that currently have lower levels 
of 3G penetration than that of the United States. Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Czech 
Republic, have subscription growth rates that are two to three times larger than U.S. growth in 3G 
subscriptions, and Iceland, which a year ago had much lower levels of 3G subscriptions, has catapulted 
in one year into the top 5 countries. (Mexico has a much more pronounced late-mover high-growth rate.) 
Japan and South Korea are the highest performers, each with over 3 times as many 3G subscribers per 
100 inhabitants as the United States. Three countries substantially outperform in 3G penetration their 
level of fixed penetration: Australia, Italy, and Spain; while the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and 
Switzerland seem to underperform their high fixed broadband performance.  
                                                 
24  We use the Telegeography, GlobalComms database.   
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The  OECD's  reports 
subscriptions  to  mobile 
phones  generally,  and 
its effort to separate out 
3G  subscriptions  seem 
to miss a lot.  In mobile 
telephony  subscriptions 
generally,  the  United 
States is 26
th among the 
OECD  30  (Figure 
3.12
25).  This  position 
seems to skew strongly 
against  countries  with 
low  levels  of  pre-paid 
card  use:  the  United 
States  (26
th,  17%  use 
pre-paid),  Japan  (28
th, 
2% pre-paid) and South 
Korea  (24
th,  2%).  By 
contrast,  countries  with 
the  highest  numbers  of 
mobile  cellular 
subscribers  per  100 
inhabitants  have  much 
higher levels of pre-paid 
usage
26:    Italy  (1
st, 
89%),  Greece  (2d, 
71%), and Luxembourg 
(3d,  92%).  These 
countries all have levels 
of  penetration  above 
140%,  reflecting  the 
measurement  difficulty 
posed  by  counting 
multiple  accounts  held 
by single subscribers in 
a pre-paid system. More 
importantly,  these 
aggregate  numbers  by 
themselves  do  not 
reveal how much of the 
usage  is  for  voice 
communications, and how much for data; and within data, how much is really mobile broadband as 
opposed to simpler, 2G-supportable applications.  
                                                 
25   Figure 4.7 from the OECD Communications Outlook 2007, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/620604300202). 
26   OECD Communications Outlook 2009, Table 4.14. 
Figure 3.12.  Cellular mobile penetration: 2G & 3G in OECD Report 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































m  Next Generation Connectivity 
  42 
The OECD in its 2009 Communications Outlooks, tried to separate out 3G from 2G subscriptions.
27 2G 
and what is sometimes called 2.5G are the second generation phones, capable of slower data speeds, 
which have been available in the United States for a while, and supported personal communications 
devices  like  Blackberry  and  iPhone  until  relatively  recently.  3G  networks  have  been  rolled  out  by 
Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint, and are planned by T-Mobile, but are still currently focused in urban areas. 
Looking purely at the 3G levels of subscription as reported by the OECD, the United States would not 
rank in the top 20, and this is so also the case in that report for otherwise high performing countries like 
Norway,  France,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  Canada.  Upon  examination,  it  appears  that  the  OECD 
representation  for  3G  penetration  reflects  many  missing  values.  Looking  at  a  much  smaller  set  of 
countries  examined  in  2008  by  Britain's  Ofcom,
28  which  looked  only  at  an  ambiguous  measure  of 
“availability” (not actual subscriptions), the United States seems to have roughly similar levels of mobile 
broadband networks. In this report, Japan (100%) and the UK (92%) had higher potential coverage for 
3G, but other countries were more closely bunched together. The Ofcom numbers certainly suggest that 
the numbers reported by the OECD for 3G in particular are too low across many of the countries.  It is 
not  clear,  however,  what  “availability”  means  in  this  report,  and  whether  it  is  calculated  based  on 
availability  where  the  stated  percent  of  the  population  resides,  or  works,  or  exists  during  some 
proportion of the day.  As a result, we have more confidence in the data we presented above than we do 
in the OECD measure, and believe it to be more pertinent than the Ofcom availability measure, because 
we  focus  on  subscriptions  rather  than  areas  of  potential  coverage.    Future  efforts  to  incorporate 
measurements of mobile broadband should include a broader set of market data sources, and emphasize 
validation from independent diverse sources.   
3.4.2  Nomadic access: From Wi-Fi to ubiquity 
If  3G  is  the  evolutionary  trajectory  from  the  mobile  phone,  the  alternative  pathway  to  ubiquitous 
connectivity evolves from the wireless home network. Americans mostly know hotspots in airports, 
hotels,  or  cafes.  Other  emerging  models  include  models  like  FoN,  a  company  that  allows  users  to 
register as members of a “club” of users who exchange free access to their Wi-Fi spots: every member 
can access the Internet nomadically when they are near any other member, and non-members can buy 
access when they are within reach of a member's connection. This model has recently been extended by 
several European companies to be integrated with fixed broadband subscriptions. Iliad/Free, in France, 
allows every Free subscriber (about 24% of the entire French broadband market) to connect nomadically 
through the service box of every other Free subscriber, as well as make free phone calls from any Wi-Fi 
enabled  mobile  phone.  French  mobile  competitor  SFR  has  a  similar  arrangement,  and  allows  its 
subscribers to interconnect with FoN subscribers as well.  In Sweden, both Telenor and TeliaSonera 
bundle  their  mobile  broadband  subscriptions  with  access  to  a  large  network  of  hotspots  that  each 
company  operates,  and  in Telenor's  case,  to  hotspots  operated  throughout  Europe  by  pan-European 
hotspot provider The Cloud.  We discuss these and other service innovations that form a part of the 
fixed-mobile  convergence  pattern  in  Parts  4  and  5.    For  now,  we  simply  note  that  the  European 
experience is pointing to the conclusion that Wi-Fi nomadic access is beginning to provide a trajectory 
toward complementing mobile broadband networks for ubiquitous access.  
                                                 
27   Fig. 4.7 and Table 4.12. 
28   Ofcom, The International Communications Market 2008 (20 November 2008).   International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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We  found  no 
authoritative  source  of 
information  for  Wi-Fi 
hotspots. This is an area 
that  requires  greater 
effort  at  measurement 
and  reporting.  Two 
separate,  older  reports, 
one  from  the  OECD 
based  on  information 
from  Informa  (Figure 
3.13),
29  and  the  second 
from  Ofcom  based  on 
IDATE and its own data 
collection  (Figure 
3.14),
30  have 
sufficiently  similar 
values for 2006 that one 
can  be  reasonably 
confident  that  the 
estimates are acceptable 
for that period. Judging 
by  these  numbers  and 
their  congruence,  the 
United States is 7
th out 
of  the  10  countries 
identified,  in  terms  of 
hotspots  per  100,000 
population.  Of 
particular  interest  in 
these  reports  is  the 
enormous  jump  in 
number  of  Wi-Fi 
hotspots  in  France 
within  one  year,  which 
Ofcom  interprets  to 
partly reflect 400 public 
Wi-Fi  deployments  in 
Paris in the summer of 
2007,  on  a  more 
traditional  model,  and 
partly  reflecting  the 
very  early returns from 
the  Free  strategy.  One 
should  note  that  400 
                                                 
29   See OECD, Broadband Growth and Policies in OECD Countries (2008). Fig. 2.4, p. 89. 
30   Ofcom, The International Communications Market 2008 (20 November 2008). Fig 5.67, p. 242. 
 
Figure 3.13.  Public wireless hotspots, OECD 
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public hotspots translate into an increase of 0.4 hotspots per 100,000, implying that if these were indeed 
the two primary sources of increase, the Free strategy would account for practically the entire doubling 
effect. 
Because  the  data 
underlying these reports 
are old, and the changes 
clearly  very  rapid,  we 
sought  to  identify  a 
separate  source  of 
information  to 
supplement  and  update 
these other sources. Our 
study  uses  information 
from  marketing  firm 
Jwire,  which  collects 
lists  of  Wi-Fi  hotspots 
and  makes  them 
available  to  the  public 
for search as part of its 
business  of  selling 
advertising  linked  to 
connection  through 
hotspots.  Because  there 
is  no  full  inventory  of 
hotspots, we take these 
data with caution. The major incongruities that these data present from the older sources of data are for 
Japan, which Jwire data seems to severely undercount, unless Wi-Fi hotspots available two years ago in 
Japan have been dismantled, and Switzerland and Sweden, which have dramatically higher levels of 
availability per 100,000 population in the data we used for 2009 relative to the data Ofcom and the 
OECD used for 2006 and 2007. We gain some confidence in our findings, however, from qualitative 
review of the Wi-Fi market developments in Sweden and Switzerland. In Sweden, Telenor expanded 
nomadic access through its acquired subsidiary, Glocalnet, and contracted with The Cloud to build 800 
hotspots, while incumbent TeliaSonera responded to this challenge by investing in more Wi-Fi hotspots. 
Its strategy was announced in mid-2007. In February of 2008 TeliaSonera announced an aim to double 
the number of hotspots in Sweden. It began to deploy hotspots in locations operated by the Svenska Spel 
gaming company. It now accounts for about a third of hotspots in Sweden and bundles unlimited access 
to its Surfzone Wi-Fi hotspots with its mobile broadband subscriptions. In Switzerland, Swisscom itself 
is a pan-European hotspot provider (Swisscom Eurospot), and since 2008 launched a collaboration with 
the  Swiss  railway  system  to  offer  Wi-Fi  access  in  train  stations  and  on  trains.  There  was  also  a 
substantial push to deploy Wi-Fi hotspots during the European soccer championship in the summer of 
2008, undertaken by a range of players: Swisscom itself, independent hotspot provider Trustive, and 
various municipal efforts, most successfully in Berne. We therefore think that with appropriate caution, 
the figures we report in Figure 3.15 are likely representative of available nomadic access in the covered 
countries. Data on this important development trajectory  for ubiquitous access is otherwise limited, 
uncertain, and dated. 
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3.4.3  Conclusion  
In looking at measures of penetration: household penetration, to emphasize the importance of home 
access to policy; per 100 inhabitants, to capture some small and medium enterprise use; mobile, and to 
some extent nomadic access, we can begin to identify a set of models for observation and learning.  
South Korea is a leading performer across all measures: leading household penetration, second on 3G, in 
the top quintile for per 100 inhabitants, and 7
th for Wi-Fi Hotspots.  Japan leads in 3G and is a top 
quintile performer for household penetration, but has lower results on per 100 inhabitants, and very low 
results  on  hotspots.    We  have  some  concerns  about  our  data  for  Japan,  however,  because  3G  and 
household penetration have some overlap, and the hotspot data is inconsistent with prior studies in ways 
for which we cannot account.  The Nordic countries are all very strong performers, with Sweden in the 
first or second quintiles across the board, while Denmark and Norway show some weakness on 3G, and 
Finland,  Norway,  and  Iceland  show  weakness  in  nomadic  access.    Switzerland  has  first  quintile 
performance on the per 100 inhabitants measure and the nomadic access measure, but third quintile 
performance on 3G and per household penetration (although the Swiss per household data is a year older 
than most other countries in the set, and so understates its performance there, possibly significantly; this 
exhibits one disadvantage of the per household measure in that it depends on survey techniques that are 
harder to update as regularly as the subscription data on which the per 100 inhabitants measures, both 
fixed  and  mobile,  are  based).    The  Netherlands  and  Canada  both  do  well  on  the  fixed-broadband 
penetration front, but are substantially weaker on 3G; while Italy and Spain exhibit the inverse profile.  
Of  the  larger  European  countries,  the  United  Kingdom  is  the  steadiest  performer  on  penetration, 
showing up in the second quintile in all measures except nomadic access, for which it is in the first 
quintile.  France and Germany are solidly in the third quintile across the board, except for France's 
stellar  performance  on  nomadic  access.    The  United  States  is  a  third  quintile  performer  for  fixed 
penetration by both measures, a fourth quintile performer for 3G, and a second quintile performer in 
nomadic access.  As we will see in the practices and policies chapters, these measures suggest a focus on 
South Korea and Japan, on the Nordic countries, on the United Kingdom among the larger European 
countries, and on the Netherlands and Canada for fixed, positively, and for 3G, negatively, and vice versa 
for Italy and Spain.   
Table 3.2 provides an at-a-glance report of these various measures, providing both the actual rank and, 
through shading, the quintile it represents: from dark green for first quintile to dark red for fifth quintile.  
The ranking reflects a  weighted aggregate quintile performance measure, reflecting  an emphasis on 
fixed (60%) over mobile (40%), per-households (35%) over per 100 inhabitants (25%), and 3G (30%) 
over Wi-Fi (10%).   Next Generation Connectivity 
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1  South Korea  6  1  2  7  3.15 
2  Iceland  5  2  4  27  5.85 
3  Sweden  7  7  6  1  6.1 
4  Denmark  1  4  18  10  8.05 
5  Finland  8  9  8  15  9.05 
6  Japan  17  5  1  29  9.2 
7  Luxembourg  9  10  9  12  9.65 
8  Norway  3  6  17  19  9.85 
9 
United 
Kingdom  11  11  10  3  9.9 
10  Switzerland  4  13  15  2  10.25 
11  Netherlands  2  3  25  13  10.35 
12  Australia  16  17  3  17  12.55 
13  Belgium  12  12  20  8  14 
14  Germany  14  15  13  14  14.05 
15  France  13  18  14  4  14.15 
16  Canada  10  8  26  20  15.1 
17  United States  15  14  19  9  15.25 
18  Spain  20  19  7  16  15.35 
19  Austria  19  16  12  18  15.75 
20  New Zealand  18  20  11  11  15.9 
21  Italy  22  27  5  21  18.55 
22  Ireland  21  22  22  5  20.05 
23  Portugal  25  23  23  6  21.8 
24 
Slovak 
Republic  27  26  16  25  23.15 
25  Hungary  24  21  27  24  23.85 
26  Czech Republic  23  25  24  23  24 
27  Greece  26  28  21  22  24.8 
28  Poland  28  24  28  28  26.6 
29  Mexico  30  29  29  26  28.95 
30  Turkey  29  30  30  30  29.75 
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3.5  Capacity: Speed, fiber deployment, and emerging new actual measurements 
The second quantity of interest in “broadband” is capacity: what is the capacity of the network that is 
being delivered to however many households or individuals in the population? The OECD still defines 
the threshold for broadband as any technology capable of delivering Internet connectivity at a speed of 
256k download or better.
31  The ITU uses the same measure.
32  For purposes of its own data gathering 
purposes under Form 477, the FCC early defined “high speed” connectivity as Internet connectivity with 
speeds  of  at  least  200kbps  in  at  least  one  direction—effectively,  downloading,  given  the  service 
assumptions of providers about what users use their connections for—and as “advanced services” speeds 
of at least 200kbps in both directions. In the past five years, the Commission has also required carriers to 
report what percent of their lines provide between 200 kbps and 2.5 Mbps; 2.5Mbps and 10Mbps; 10-25, 
25-100, and over 100Mbps. The Commission first reported using these more fine-grained data in its 
Fifth Report.  While the more fine-grained data is important, conceptually, the FCC is collecting the 
same data as the data relied on by the OECD: peak download rates provided to the end user.  
Two  things  must  be  noted  in  discussing  capacity  benchmarks.    First,  benchmarking  capacity  alone 
ignores the attribute of ubiquitous seamless connectivity. Second, using speed alone to measure the 
performance of a country's or region's network understates another major component of the definition of 
capacity: latency.
33  Latency is the degree to which a packet of data is likely to be delayed in arriving at 
its destination. It is irrelevant in some applications, like email or even when downloading a large file for 
later use. Other applications, like voice over IP (VoIP), require relatively little bandwidth, but are highly 
sensitive to latency—if we have to wait for a second between when we are done speaking and the other 
party hears what we said, the conversation falters. Most current benchmarks ignore latency. Moreover, 
because companies do not report latency, this measure is only available from actual measurements data, 
which  still  presents  substantial  difficulties  for  data  cleaning  and  analysis.  Following  efforts  by  the 
Oxford Saïd Business School and the University of Oviedo, funded by Cisco Systems, we provide here 
analysis of actual measurements that do identify latency as one of their reported characteristics. We note, 
however, that the measurements for latency deviate substantially from other measures, including actual 
measurements of upload and download speeds from the same test platform, in ways that are difficult to 
interpret.  We  therefore  report  latency  measures  separately,  without  bundling  them  like  the 
Oxford/Oviedo study, and we do so with great caution about the extent to which it is appropriate to use 
currently available measures to reflect actual user experience. Substantially more work needs to be done 
to  validate  and  interpret  actual  latency  measurements  before  they  can  provide  a  well-understood 
benchmark.  
Despite  its  limitations,  speed,  usually  stated  in  terms  of  theoretical  or  advertised  download  speed, 
sometimes upload, has been the basis of measurement in the past decade and it is, in some countries, 
currently  used  by  governments  to  define  their  own  national  goals—Australia  (100Mbps),  Austria 
(25Mbps), Finland, (1 Mbps by 2010, 100 Mbps by 2015), Germany (50 Mbps), Spain (30Mbps), UK 
(2Mbps as universal service to 90% of population, 40-50Mbps in broad use).
34 
                                                 
31  OECD Broadband Subscriber Criteria. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_34225_39575598_1_1_1_1,00.html 
32  ITU IDI 2009 Annex 2, page 85. 
33  Pepper presentation @ workshop on international comparisons August 18 2009. 
http://www.broadband.gov/docs/ws_int_lessons/ws_int_lessons_pepper.pdf. 
34  OECD Impact of the Crisis on ICTs and the Role in Recovery (2009). 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/20/43404360.pdf. (Table 3, p. 34).   Next Generation Connectivity 
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By  several  measures 
Japan  currently  enjoys 
the  fastest  speeds 
among  OECD 
countries.  This  is  due 
both  to  high  degree  of 
fiber penetration, which 
is both theoretically and 
practically  the  highest-
capacity  medium 
currently  used,  and  on 
higher  speeds  achieved 
over  DSL  and  Cable. 
Japan  is  the  first 
country where DOCSIS 
3.0  has  been  deployed 
at  its  fastest  current 
speed  over  cable 
modems  (160Mbps  by 
J:COM), it has been  at 
the cutting edge of DSL 
speeds (100Mbps, various operators), and is the first country where 1 Gbps is publicly offered over 
fiber, from K-Opticom and KDDI. South Korea, France, and Finland follow right behind in terms of 
advertised speeds, with  higher  advertised speeds than other countries on average, as well as higher 
speeds over DSL and cable plants, respectively. As we describe below, Sweden jumps ahead to join 
Japan and South Korea when actual measurements, rather than advertised speeds, are used. The OECD 
reports several measures, including maximum advertised speed by the incumbent (Figure 3.16), where 
the United States is ranked in the second group of countries, after the four leaders, together with the 
Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. This is due to the availability of 50Mbps service over fiber by 
Verizon and the implementation of DOCSIS 3.0 by some of the cable carriers.  
3.5.1  Advertised download speeds 
The average–as opposed to top–speed of offerings advertised in the United States is relatively lower. As 
Figure  3.17  shows,  the  United  States  ranks  19
th  by  this  measure.  Countries  that  appear  as  learning 
models are Japan, South Korea, France, and Finland, as well as the Netherlands. Some of the countries 
that  have  higher  levels  of  penetration  than  the  United  States,  like  Sweden,  Norway,  or  the  United 
Kingdom,  also  have  higher  average  advertised  speeds.  Other  countries,  such  as  Germany,  Portugal, 
Australia, and Italy, which do not have higher penetration levels than the United States, do appear to 
have higher average offered download speeds. On the other hand, Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada, 
which have higher penetration levels than the United States, have lower average advertised speeds.  
Advertised average download speeds are a coarse measure of capacity as actually used and experienced 
by users. As a result, several regulators have begun to address speed advertising, in an effort to move 
providers to implement measurement systems and offer a clear set of expectations for users of their 
actual likely speed. In 2008, both Finland and the United Kingdom published standards for expressing 
speeds of service that seek to reflect more accurately the actual likely transmission speeds that would be 
available. As we will see below, however, when we discuss actual speed measurement data, average 
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advertised  speeds  are  highly  correlated  with  actual  speeds.  Given  the  limitations  of  each  approach, 
continued use of advertised speeds as part of the standard suite of benchmarks seems warranted.  
3.5.2  Actual speed measurements 
As we noted when discussing latency, the observation of differences between actual and advertised 
speeds leads to a set of efforts to develop measures of actual use. The two primary approaches currently 
in use involve either carrier-based testing or user-side testing. Carrier-based testing uses test equipment 
located at the premises of the carrier, or on identified clients in cooperation with a carrier, and is initially 
designed to help carriers understand their network. In the 2009 Communications Outlook, the OECD 
first  reported  actual  speeds  and  compared  them  to  advertised  speeds.  The  data  came  from  tests 
performed  by  a 
company  called  Epitiro 
in the United Kingdom, 
but  apparently  covered 
countries  other  than 
only  OECD  countries, 
and  the  OECD  chose 
not to report the data by 
country.  The  primary 
findings  reported  were 
that  (a)  actual  speeds 
are  lower  than 
advertised  speeds,  and 
(b)  that  different 
technologies 
underperformed  their 
advertised  speeds  by 
different  ratios.  While 
the  basic  point  about  a 
persistent  difference 
between  advertised  and 
observed  prices  is 
certainly  true,  the  per-technology  shortfall  calculations  vary  widely  by  country,  and  the  aggregate 
averages as measures of systematic performance characteristics of different technologies are not reliable. 
Our independent  evaluation is that we should place little confidence in the aggregate, non-country-
specific per-technology shortfall ratios reported in the OECD Communications Outlook 2009. We take 
no position on whether the weakness of the data is caused by shortfalls in the underlying data collection 
technique, or in the way it was aggregated and reported. There is no inherent reason for the former to be 
the case, but we were not permitted to independently report on the underlying data. 
The alternative source of actual measurements is distributed measurement on the user side. The idea is 
that users test their own speeds, and in the aggregate these provide millions of observations about actual 
downloading and uploading, as experienced by end users. The current most extensive dataset we have 
found implementing this approach is run mostly using Speedtest, a testing site developed by Ookla, a 
Montana company. The company provided the Berkman Center access to its global testing data from the 
fourth quarter of 2008, which is the equivalent period to the period described by the OECD 2009 report. 
We report here the results of our analyses of the Speedtest.net data. 
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Speedtest data is not perfect, but it offers an enormous database of actual tests, which provide insight 
into the speeds users experience on their computers. The dataset we analyzed included about 41 million 
actual tests from the OECD countries, from the fourth quarter of 2008. These provide the time of day, 
the ISP, the geographic location of the client and the server, measures of upload and download speeds 
and latency, as measured from the perspective of an application running on the end user's computer. 
Several confounding factors require that we interpret the data with caution. For example, users may be 
running a test through a wired connection or a wireless local area network; they may be plugged in 
directly to a modem or through a switch; or they may be running other bandwidth-hungry applications in 
the background. Users may be self-selecting because they have high speeds they want to test, and so the 
results may all be upwardly biased. Users who know enough to measure their bandwidth probably are 
above-average in their Internet skills, and again upwardly bias actual tests. All of these factors may 
pollute the results. Despite these limitations, the advantages of the Speedtest data include the size of the 
sample, the time over which it has been collected, the richness of the geographic specificity of the client 
and  server  location,  and  the  addition  of  latency  to  upload  and  download  speeds  (although,  as  we 
mentioned, the latency data in particular is difficult to interpret). Together, these advantages suggest that 
these data are potentially useful for, at a minimum, offering an additional source of insight on actual 
performance of networks. Like carrier-side testing data, they are an element that should be explored as a 
component of future stable measurement platforms that the FCC should wish to implement, as it seeks to 
develop a continuous basis for observing the state of broadband deployment and to identify other best-
practice models. A similar model of testing is currently being developed by other projects as well; for 
example, the M-Labs project seeks to provide a broader-yet set of measures of quality, however, project 
data was not yet ready for our use.  
The actual speed test data confirms, in broad terms, the findings of the average advertised speeds: that 
Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands are particularly high-performing countries. Actual test data 
particularly calls attention to Sweden's very high performance in fact, much more so than its advertised 
speeds alone would suggest, and confirms Portugal's surprisingly high performance on advertised speeds 
(by comparison to penetration) as consonant with high actually measured speeds. Moreover, from a U.S. 
specific  perspective,  actual  measurement  benchmarks  look  better  for  average  download  speeds,  but 
worse  for  highest  speeds.  In  average  download  speeds,  the  U.S.  moves  from  the  top  of  the  fourth 
quintile to the middle of the third quintile.  In speeds attained by the top 10% of users, however, the U.S. 
moves from being in the second group, but still at the bottom of the first quintile, in top advertised 
speeds, to just barely making the second quintile. We show the correlation between advertised speeds 
and actual speeds using the measure with the most comparable benchmark in existing data—average 
download speeds—in Figure 3.18.     International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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We  observe  a 
surprisingly high degree 
of correlation (R
2 0.52) 
between  the  average 
advertised  speeds 
metric  and  the  actual 
speed tests metric, but it 
is  a  correlation  that  is 
far  from  perfect.  In 
figures 3.19a-i we show 
a  series  of  correlation 
graphs  that  offer  us 
some  degree  of 
confidence  that  the 
actual  measurements 
are  giving  us  a  decent 
measure  of  relative 
country  performance, 
even if we are uncertain 
as  to  whether  the 
reported  values  in  fact 
perfectly  report  actual  user  experiences.    As  these  graphs  show,  average  measurements  are  well 
correlated  with  median  measurements,  which  in  turn  are  well  correlated  with  top  10%  of  users’ 
measurements. In all cases, the results are cleaner and more certain for download and upload speeds, and 
noisier for latency measures. Nonetheless we report latency here too, at least to underscore the need for 
further inquiry into measuring and using latency as a significant additional factor in considering capacity 
measures. However, the noisiness of the data leads us to decline to follow the practice publicized by a 
study done by the Oxford Saïd Business School and the University of Oviedo, with Cisco System's 
funding, of meshing these measures into a “broadband quality score” (BQS). That study produced odd 
results for several countries of interest, such as locating the U.S. just ahead of Russia and Bulgaria, and 
the U.S., France, Norway, Belgium, and Finland behind Romania. These results may be caused by data 
limitations, such as the presence of non-residential testers (removing these data points is a difficult and 
expensive task, which we have only partly been able to implement for the results we report here, with 
the help of Ookla).  However, our own, likely cleaner dataset still produced very counterintuitive results 
for latency, such as locating the United States between Greece and Turkey, both of which were ahead of 
France and Japan. We report the latency results here separately, and only with the caveat that they 
require substantial further analysis.  
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Another way of assessing the quality of capacity available in various countries, while keeping constant 
specific geographic differences, is to compare service in the major urban centers of different countries. 
We  therefore  analyzed  the  Speedtest  data  to  identify  upload  and  download  speeds  for  each  OECD 
country's capital city and its largest city, or where the two were one and the same, we added the second 
largest city as well.  We found sufficient data for 55 cities using this method of selection.  For average 
download speeds, we found that New York City is ranked 21
st out of the 55 cities and Washington D.C. 
is ranked 36
th. Both American cities in our sample did better on upload speeds, with New York City 
coming in at 13
th and Washington D.C. at 25
th for average upload speeds. The top 20 cities in each 
category are reported in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3.  Top 20 cities in OECD countries by actual speed measurements, Q4 2008 
Average download speed  Average upload speed 
1.  Busan  1.  Yokohama 
2.  Seoul  2.  Stockholm 
3.  Göteborg  3.  Tokyo 
4.  Stockholm  4.  Göteborg 
5.  Yokohama  5.  Kosice 
6.  Amsterdam  6.  Copenhagen 
7.  Paris  7.  Aarhus 
8.  Tokyo  8.  Oslo 
9.  Aarhus  9.  Amsterdam 
10.  Helsinki  10.  Paris 
11.  Rotterdam  11.  Espoo 
12.  Hamburg  12.  Bergen 
13.  Kosice  13.  New York 
14.  Bern  14.  Helsinki 
15.  Berlin  15.  Rotterdam 
16.  Copenhagen  16.  Wellington 
17.  Espoo  17.  Bratislava 
18.  Lyon  18.  Prague 
19.  Lisbon  19.  Bern 
20.  Oslo  20.  Busan 
 
3.5.3  Fiber deployment 
One measure of the long-term construction of high-capacity networks is the deployment of optical fiber 
networks to the home or near the home. This is the technology used in the truly high capacity core of the 
network. DSL plant is both theoretically and practically more limited in its capacity. Its capacity has   International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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increased in the past few years partly thanks to electronics, but partly also as a result of rolling fiber 
ever-closer to the home so as to shorten the copper path from the end of the fiber to the user. Cable plant 
too  depends  on  hybrid  fiber-coaxial  networks,  with  the  fiber  relied  upon  to  deliver  the  aggregate 
capacity to the neighborhood, and the coaxial cable to distribute it from there. DOCSIS 3.0, the new 
cable broadband standard, functions by binding more than one “channel” (what used to be the 6 MHz 
channels for TV) on the cable into a single high speed bitstream. This approach can substantially expand 
cable plant capacity for several more years, as it already has. But the broad consensus seems to be that 
the long-term fixed platform will likely be fiber, and cable plant too will likely become increasingly 
fiber-based over time. Given the theoretical, currently-practical, and long-term likely advantages of fiber 
infrastructure, it is plausible to look at the experience of other countries in fiber deployment.  
As of December 2008, the OECD reported that 4% of U.S. broadband subscriptions were served by fiber 
to the home networks. Only six countries were reported as having a higher proportion of total broadband 
subscriptions to fiber: Japan (48%), South Korea (43%), Sweden (20%), the Slovak Republic (19%), 
Denmark (10%), and Norway (9%). The Czech Republic (4%) had an equal rate of fiber subscriptions. 
Our  independent  analysis  suggests  that  the  Slovak  Republic's  government  report  to  the  OECD 
erroneously reported houses passed by Orange Slovenska's then-recent fiber deployment, rather than 
subscriptions,  resulting  in  an  order-of-magnitude  error.
35 As  of  December  2008  about  2%  of  actual 
subscriptions in the Slovak Republic were to fiber, leaving only five countries ahead of the U.S. Again, 
looking specifically at deployment of the most future-proof, high-capacity technology, Japan and South 
Korea emerge as high-performing outliers. Among the Nordic Countries, Sweden has clearly performed 
best and deserves special attention on this dimension, but Denmark and Norway clearly are also on a 
high-performance investment path to fiber. An argument might be made that with fiber, homes passed 
might be a better measure, because it would represent levels of new investment in a more future-proof 
technology. Several factors militate against this, as well as the poor data on the subject. First, actual 
subscriptions  provide  a  less  ambiguous  metric.  “Homes  passed”  might  include  a  fiber  to  the 
neighborhood plant that is a mile from the homes in the neighborhood. Second, in some cases the last 
fiber  drop  will  only  be  rolled  out  when  the  subscriber  makes  a  commitment.  In  these  situations 
subscribership indeed becomes the moment that the home genuinely gets connected by fiber. Third, 
given  these  concerns,  and  given  that  there  are  already  countries  where  fiber  subscriptions  form  an 
appreciable proportion of subscriptions, so that using this measure does not result in complete absence 
of data, moving to a fiber “homes passed” metric would simply mask these high performers, whose 
identification is a primary purpose of benchmarking. 
3.5.4  Other metrics considered: Contention ratios 
One of the factors affecting actual speed is what is often called “the middle mile,” a portion of the 
network that connects the last mile, such as the local loop or cable head end, to the core of the network. 
Many network topologies adopted by broadband providers share this backhaul, or middle mile facility 
among multiple users. It is cheaper to build a higher capacity fiber connection to a local location, and 
split that capacity among multiple homes using existing infrastructure, like copper wires or cable. Even 
with fiber-to-the-home, the topology deployed currently by many of the carriers in many of the countries 
we observe is point-to-multipoint, which also brings a single shared fiber to the neighborhood, buries an 
                                                 
35  The Slovak Republic seemed to have reported the number of houses past by Orange's major deployment, in 12 Slovak 
cities, of fiber passing 270,000 houses. The same report also made it into the country studies published by the European 
Regulators Group, ERG (17) 2009. Market data suggests that the correct number is 13,000 subscriptions to Orange's 
service. Given that the Slovak Republic has the highest prices for high speed capacity in the OECD, an immediate uptake 
of 100% of the capacity just rolled out last year would be nothing short of miraculous. The initial uptake of 5%, followed 
by what appears to be a doubling of subscriptions as of the end of the second quarter of 2009, to 29,000, is impressive 
enough.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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optical splitter in the ground or puts it in an above ground closet, and pulls additional fiber strands from 
that closet to homes. In several countries, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and Ireland, some 
providers have begun to offer packages that are price differentiated by contention ratios—that is, by a 
measure of how many other subscribers share the backhaul with a given subscriber. The same download 
speed will offer a faster connection with a 20:1 contention ratio than with a 50:1 ratio. That is, when the 
same  backhaul  capacity  is  dedicated  to  20  users  rather  than  50.  Contention  ratios  then  become  a 
plausible measurement for benchmarking, although it is ambivalent because it already assumes a certain 
topology. We will return to the question of topology and policy in the concluding section of Part 4 of this 
report.  
3.5.5  Conclusion 
Looking at speed, as well as the limited information we have on other measures of capacity, the list of 
countries  that  offer  potential  sources  of  insight  remains  relatively  stable.  Japan  and  South  Korea 
continue to be obvious targets of observation. So too the Nordic countries, with a special emphasis on 
Sweden, as well as the Netherlands, continue to be of interest. When speed, rather than penetration, is 
the  focus,  France  becomes  a  very  high  performing  country,  and  Germany  and  Portugal  also  do 
substantially better on advertised and observed speeds than their numbers on penetration would lead one 
to anticipate. Interestingly, neither of these latter two countries has any fiber deployment to speak of, 
and they differ dramatically in market structure—Portugal has roughly 60/40 split between DSL and 
Cable, whereas Germany has almost no mode of broadband delivery but DSL. Both have advertised 
speeds of roughly 50% faster than the United States, and both have higher average observed actual 
speeds. Among the relatively higher performers on penetration, Canada in particular shows up as weaker 
than it was on penetration, as do, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom and Switzerland.  As with 
penetration, we offer an at-a-glance table collecting our measures on speed in Table 3.4.  Different 
measures of speed, emphasizing average advertised speeds (35%) over  maximum advertised speeds 
(15%), treating median upload and download actual speed tests equally (15% each), with higher weight 
than median latency (10%), and a light emphasis on 90 percentile download and upload (5% each).   International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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1  Japan  1  1  4  1  17  3  1  3.15 
2  South Korea  3  2  1  9  3  1  8  3.40 
3  Netherlands  8  5  2  3  1  5  9  4.50 
4  Denmark  3  8  8  4  8  6  3  6.30 
5  Sweden  3  13  3  2  4  2  2  6.35 
6  Finland  2  4  14  7  10  9  10  6.80 
7  France  3  3  9  6  24  4  13  7.00 
8  Germany  9  6  6  10  14  7  16  8.40 
9  Portugal  13  9  5  16  2  13  20  10.10 
10  Norway  9  12  10  8  11  14  4  10.25 
11 
United 
States  9  19  11  5  17  11  7  13.00 
12  Switzerland  17  21  7  11  6  8  14  14.30 
13 
Czech 
Republic  23  16  13  13  4  16  5  14.40 
14  Iceland  3  10  26  15  30  24  12  14.90 
15  Australia  14  7  22  24  17  18  24  15.25 
16  Austria  16  17  17  17  12  15  15  16.15 
17 
New 
Zealand  17  11  19  19  28  25  23  17.30 
18 
United 
Kingdom  21  15  18  21  17  17  25  18.05 
19  Belgium  25  22  12  19  7  12  21  18.45 
20  Canada  17  25  15  12  15  22  19  18.90 
21 
Slovak 
Republic  23  24  23  14  16  10  6  19.80 
22  Spain  9  20  16  27  26  23  29  20.00 
23  Italy  25  14  21  22  23  28  27  20.15 
24  Greece  20  23  20  18  17  19  26  20.70 
25  Luxembourg  14  18  27  29  27  26  30  22.30 
26  Hungary  25  27  25  23  9  20  11  22.85 
27  Ireland  21  26  24  25  25  21  17  24.00 
28  Poland  25  28  28  26  22  27  18  26.10 
29  Turkey  29  29  29  28  12  29  22  26.80 
30  Mexico  30  30  30  30  29  30  28  29.80 
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3.6  Price 
Price  is  obviously  an  important  characteristic  of  the  state  of  broadband  connectivity.  On  the 
consumption or access side, price determines affordability for purposes of diffusion to communities with 
poorer residents, or to higher-cost service areas. Price at the lower end of service offerings will affect 
overall diffusion rates. Price at the higher end will determine diffusion of, and transition to, the highest 
capacity, world-class services. On the supply side, price is also an indicator of levels of competition. 
While the importance of competition to lowering rates is hardly news, the recent Pew survey released in 
June, 2009
36 finds that U.S. broadband subscribers who report that four or more providers are available 
to them pay $32.10, where three broadband providers are available, that price rises to $38.10, where 
only two providers are available the price increases further to $42.80, or fully one-third more than where 
there  are  four  or  more 
providers,  and  where 
only  one  provider  is 
available,  the  price 
reported  increases 
further  to  $44.70,  or 
139%  of  the  price 
reported  by  those  who 
live  in  places  with 
competitive  services 
(See Figure 3.20).  This 
does  not  necessarily 
mean  that  the  price 
where  there  are  only 
one  or  two  providers 
reflects  the  absence  of 
competition.  It  may  be 
that  the  high  prices 
reflect the high costs of 
providing  service  in  a 
given  area,  which  in 
turn  results  in  a  lower 
level of competition as competitors are dissuaded from entering these markets by the high costs of entry.  
To assume that prices reflect purely higher costs and not the lack of competition would be equally 
speculative.  The difference is likely a combined effect of cost and lack of competition that varies by 
location. Teasing out the relative influence would require additional studies comparing properly selected 
areas with similar costs but different levels of competition, and presents an important future avenue of 
research.   
3.6.1  ITU and OECD data on pricing of lowest available prices 
In terms of entry-level price available from a major incumbent, the United States seems to be doing well. 
The  ITU  collects  data  that  includes  the  least  expensive  entry-level  broadband  price  offered  by  the 
incumbent telecommunications carrier.
37 It then ranks countries by the ratio of this low-cost price option 
to  monthly  GNI  per  capita.  In  this  ranking  the  United  States  is  ranked  first.  Measuring  the  lowest 
                                                 
36   Pew Internet and American Life, John Horrigan, Home Broadband Adoption 2009. p. 17. 
37   ITU-IDI 2009, Table 6.6, p. 67. 
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available price for an entry-level offering is useful as an initial step at identifying affordability. However, 
two problems in particular are presented by this measure.  First, it looks only at offerings from the 
incumbent, or where that data is not available, one other provider. The ITU therefore reports the U.S. 
low-cost option to be lower than related OECD estimates, as the OECD surveys more providers in each 
country.  And  while  the  U.S.  indeed  performs  well  in  entry-level  price  when  more  providers  are 
considered (6
th), the  ITU reports higher entry level prices for Sweden, Denmark,  Italy  and  Ireland, 
whereas  all  these  countries  in  fact  have  lower  entry-level  offers  from  non-incumbent  providers, 
according to the OECD. The ITU data assumes that the incumbent's offer represents well the lowest 
price offer, an assumption that does not fit with either our qualitative case studies or our company-level 
pricing study, reported in Part 4 below.  Moreover, the ITU does not report anything for Turkey, the 
country with the lowest entry-level offer in the OECD data. The second problem with the ranking is that 
it is based on the GNI per capita rather than purchasing power parity, which is a better measure of 
relative affordability. Using PPP to generate the rankings does not, however, change the ranking of the 
United States, as long as one uses the ITU methodology of looking only at incumbent prices. 
3.6.2  OECD pricing measures 
The OECD collects and reports a wider range of price indicators, from a larger number of providers in 
each of its countries. Because an increasing number of providers bundle services, including voice and 
video, with their broadband offerings, the data are incomplete. One fact that is immediately obvious is 
that South Korea's high performance on penetration and capacity comes at a price: its subscribers who 
wish to receive cheap, low-speed entry level access have no options. No carrier offers speeds slower 
than 8Mbps, and the price range from the lowest to the highest offer available is narrower than in any 
other country. KT offers consumers the same rate irrespective of technology of delivery, whether fiber to 
the home (FttH), ADSL or VDSL. Given the near-universal household penetration (94%), one could say 
that high speed fixed broadband service has become a utility in South Korea. Everyone has it, and there 
is  a  relatively  narrow 
choice  about  price  or 
type of package. Other 
observations  to  point 
out  regarding  some  of 
the  countries  that  are 
among  the  common 
learning  models  is  the 
relatively  narrow  range 
of prices in Sweden and 
Finland, as compared to 
Denmark  and  Norway, 
and  the  relatively  high 
prices  in  Norway  in 
general.  From  the 
perspective of the price 
of  the  lowest  available 
offering,  for  speeds 
between  256k  and 
2Mbps,  it  appears  that 
the  United  States 
compares  well  to  other 
OECD countries.  
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Another  measure  commonly  referred  to  when  comparing  pricing  is  price  per  megabit  per  second. 
Because neither the value of speed to consumers nor its cost to providers increases linearly with Mbps, 
these prices grossly reflect, on the low end, the prices of the highest-speed offerings available in a 
country and, on the high end, the price of the slowest speed offerings. They underscore the relative 
flexibility of offerings available in Japan and the fact that in South Korea the per-megabit price of 
capacity is dirt cheap in global terms. This way of viewing the data also allows us to see that the slowest, 
most expensive per-megabit prices in France are only slightly higher than prices in the United States, but 
the higher speed connections are ten times less expensive. The Nordic countries continue to present an 
attractive profile, although Norway clearly has higher prices, and it is important to try to understand 
why. So too the United Kingdom, where the lowest speed available is 2 Mbps, the highest 24Mbps, and 
the price, correspondingly, is somewhat higher than the lowest price in the U.S. at the low end and lower 
at the high end. Whether this makes the United Kingdom a good model for observation depends on 
whether one considers the cheaper 768kbps offerings available in the lowest tier in the United States to 
be “broadband” in a future-looking way. If the objective is to provide affordable access not to any kind 
of offering that meets the globally-used regulatory definition of “broadband,” but actually to reasonably 
high capacity offerings by global standards of practice, then the United Kingdom certainly serves as a 
useful model. As with speed and entry-level prices however, Canada's performance merits caution when 
observing its policies. While penetration there is high, not only is speed lower, but prices too are high in 
every tier of service. 
A  more  useful 
measure of price than 
the price per megabit 
per  second,  which 
reflects  speed  as  an 
endogenous  factor,  is 
the  OECD's  ranking 
based  on  tier  of 
service.  The  OECD 
surveys  operators  to 
create  an  average 
offering  price  for 
different  tiers  of 
service:  low  speed 
(256kbps  –  2Mbps), 
medium-speed 
(2.5Mpbs-10Mbps), 
high  speed  (10Mpbs-
32Mbps),  and  very-
high  speed 
connections  (above 
35Mbps).  Looking  at 
a range of speeds that fall within the definition of low, medium, and high, as opposed to solely at the 
minimal offer for the slowest speed, the United States is 12
th for low speed, 17
th for medium speeds, and 
18
th for high speeds. As for the ultra-high speeds, the good news is that the United States is on the list of 
only 12 OECD countries that have any kind of offering in that range (35Mbps and above) in the OECD 
dataset (our independent research added two more, both with more attractive prices than available in the 
U.S.). The bad news is that prices in the U.S. for this highest speed offering are higher than in any other 
OECD country where these speeds are available except Norway.  
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Looking over time, it 
is harder to determine 
the  trend  of  price 
affordability  in  the 
U.S.  The  nature  of 
packages  and  the 
reporting  has  been 
more  variable  than  it 
has  been  for 
penetration  per  100 
inhabitants. 
Nonetheless, what we 
can say is that in 2001 
the  United  States 
ranked  first  (that  is, 
lowest  price)  in  the 
price  of  40  hours  of 
Internet at peak times 
(the  measure  for 
consumer access) and 
6
th for 2Mbps private 
lines (the high speed 
measure  used  at  the 
time).
38  In 2002 the 
United  States,  when 
comparing incumbent 
prices,  was  fifth 
behind  Switzerland, 
Canada,  Japan,  and 
Sweden,  although 
South  Korea's 
offering  was  only 
marginally  more 
expensive  but  twice 
as fast, and the UK's 
was  just  a  hair  more 
expensive.
39  In 2004, 
prices  had  dropped 
everywhere,  and  the 
U.S.  was  still  5
th, 
with  a  slightly 
different  mix  of 
countries with better offers, and other countries in the very close neighborhood.
40 Today, as we saw, 
according to the OECD data the U.S. ranks 12
th for low speeds, and 17
th and 18
th for medium and high 
speeds. In the categories of medium and high speeds, France has the best average prices, followed by the 
                                                 
38  OECD Measuring the Information Economy 2002, page 57. 
39  OECD Communications Outlook 2005, Table 6.16. left hand columns. Prices for 256kbps were excluded from 
comparison to Verizon's 768kbps, but offerings of 512 kbps were included. 
40  OECD Communications Outlook 2005, Table 6.16, right hand columns.  
Figure 3.23.  Average monthly price for medium speed tier 
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usual  suspects.  The 
primary  additions  to 
potential observations 
are  Italy  and  Greece, 
which  have  lower 
rates in the medium to 
high speeds. However, 
recall  that  both 
countries  have  very 
low  levels  of 
household 
penetration,  and 
Greece  also  has  very 
low  levels  of  per 
inhabitant penetration, 
while  Italy  has  very 
high  levels  of  mobile 
phone  and  mobile 
broadband 
penetration.  Low 
prices  in  Italy  may 
therefore  reflect  a 
substitution to mobile broadband coupled, perhaps, with low costs because of urban density, in which 
case Italy becomes a less interesting target of observation for fixed broadband policy, but remains an 
interesting target for wireless and the ubiquity aspect of the next generation transition. 
As  with  contention  ratios,  service-providers  have  begun  offering  differentiated  pricing  for  different 
kinds of use patterns. Just as some operators began to price the same speed at different rates based on 
contention  ratios  to  the  middle-mile,  so  too  in  both  Norway  (over  cable)  and  France  (over  fiber) 
subscribers  can  purchase  higher  upload  speeds  for  an  additional  fee.  Providers  in  some  countries, 
although not in any of the high-performing countries, impose bit caps—or maximum data transferred per 
month—on their customers, and charge additional fees for additional files transferred. This practice is 
found in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, and Turkey. Data caps are used by 
cable operators, but not DSL providers, in Portugal as well.
41 
3.6.3  Results of Berkman Center pricing study 
Because price is so important and hard to get at, we developed our own analysis of prices available in 
the OECD countries, using market data from the GlobalComms database. Our analysis looked at prices 
offered in every tier of service by the top four providers in every country, on the assumption that these 
offerings will reasonably reflect the market prices in each of the countries and best capture the prices 
upon which consumers make decisions.   
We report simple averages of these offers, for each country, in each tier of service. For countries with 
data caps, we excluded offers with data caps lower than 2 Gb per month. We chose that number because, 
although lower data caps may be a way of giving low end connectivity to subscribers who are interested 
in no more than email and web surfing, these do not provide a measure of what the price of broadband, 
and certainly broadband in a forward-looking sense, provides. We chose 2Gb per month as the lower 
                                                 
41  OECD Outlook 2009, Table 7.14. 
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bound of the offer we would include in our analysis because that was the lower end of the data usage 
rates quoted by U.S. cable firm Comcast as the median monthly usage of its subscribers.
42 (See Annex 
on pricing for a more detailed explanation of both our methods and our examination of the OECD data.) 
Figure 3.26 through Figure 3.29 report the correlations between the rankings of countries based on the 
average offer we identified in each price tier, and the rankings created by the OECD in the same tier. 
Our findings are well correlated with those of the OECD for low speed tier prices (R
2 .63), highly 
correlated for the fastest service (R
2 0.87), and more moderately but significantly correlated for the 
middle (R
2 .45) and high speed (R
2 .47) tiers. Several of the countries in our dataset vary significantly 
from their rankings according to the OECD, suggesting that determining available pricing is difficult and 
noisy, and requires further sustained study. Notable differences include the fact that, consistent with the 
ITU data, and inconsistent with the OECD data, we find that prices in the United States for the very low 
tier  offers  are  among  the  best  in  the  OECD,  third  behind  Switzerland  and  Italy.  This  reflects  the 
availability of offers from Verizon, AT&T, Time Warner Cable and various smaller DSL providers at 
768kbps for less than $20 a month. Our findings for the U.S. in the middle to high speed tiers are more 
consistent with the findings of the OECD—which is to say that U.S. prices in those tiers are middling to 
weak (17
th for medium speed, and 19
th for high). For the very highest speeds the U.S. has substantially 
higher prices than are available to residential customers in other countries where offerings of speeds 
over 35Mbps  are available.   By comparison, in France, 100 Mbps plus TV, unlimited national and 
international calling to 70 countries, and nomadic access to all other subscribers of the same provider are 
available  from  Free 
(which  has  24%  of 
French  broadband 
subscribers)  for  $32.55 
PPP,  and  SFR,  which 
serves  another  22%  of 
the  French  market,  has 
an  identically-priced 
offer for roughly similar 
services.  Other  notable 
deviations  in  our  study 
from  the  OECD  data 
are  that  we  found 
substantially  better 
offers  at  the  medium 
speeds  in  Sweden, 
Belgium,  and  Austria, 
and  in  the  high  speed 
tier  we  found 
substantially  better 
offers  in  the  UK, 
Germany,  and 
Denmark.  Our  prices 
for  Finland  are 
systematically higher than those that the OECD found, reflecting various differences in the datasets that 
we describe in the Annex.  
                                                 
42   http://www.comcast.net/terms/network/amendment/ (last visited Sep. 4, 2009). 
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Source: Berkman Center analysis of OECD  and Global Comms 3.0 Broadband Statistics
Note:  Belgium, UK, Japan, Portugal are top 10 players in OECD dataset but are not displayed 
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Source: Berkman Center analysis of OECD  and Global Comms 3.0 Broadband Statistics
Note:  Belgium, UK, Japan, Portugal are top 10 players in OECD dataset but are not displayed 
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We cannot say that our 
dataset  is 
methodologically  more 
robust  than  the  price 
data  of  the  OECD. 
Instead, we believe that 
the  relatively  wide 
deviations  reflect  the 
difficulty  of  getting 
good  price  estimates, 
and emphasize the need 
to  invest  in  collecting 
and verifying price data 
in  the  future.  From  a 
“rankings”  horse-race 
perspective,  our 
analysis  has  very  little 
effect on the standing of 
the United States in all 
tiers of service that are 
of  interest  in  forward-
looking terms. From the 
more  important 
perspective  of 
identifying  models  for 
learning  and 
observation, we suggest 
looking  at  those 
countries  (identified  by 
the lower left hand box 
in  Figure  3.26  through 
Figure  3.29)  that  were 
in the top 10 in both our 
data  and  that  of  the 
OECD  as  clearly  high 
performers,  and  taking 
that definition as a loose 
guide rather than a strict 
criterion.   
Figure 3.27.  OECD versus GlobalComms pricing in medium speed tier 
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Source: Berkman Center analysis of OECD and Global Comms 3.0 Broadband Statistics
Note:  France is the best ranked player in the OECD dataset but is not displayed here because it 
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Source: Berkman Center analysis of OECD and Global Comms 3.0 Broadband Statistics
Note:  France is the best ranked player in the OECD dataset but is not displayed here because it 
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3.6.4  Conclusion 
International comparison suggests a mixed picture on prices in the United States. On the one hand, the 
lowest prices available for the lowest tier offerings are very good by comparison to other countries. On 
the other hand, average prices for other tiers, and the OECD's data–but not our independent analysis–
suggest that on average prices at the lowest tiers are only middling. Our independent analysis suggests 
that for the lowest tiers of service, at speeds below 2Mbps, U.S. consumers see low average prices by 
comparison to most other OECD countries. Whether these data suggest that affordability of entry-level 
service  is  not  a 
significant  problem  in 
the  United  States 
depends  on  two 
questions, one empirical 
the  other  aspirational. 
The  empirical  question 
is  the  degree  to  which 
the  lowest  available 
offers  are  more-or-less 
nationally  available. 
That is a question to be 
addressed  by  the  more 
fine-grained analysis of 
broadband  availability 
contemplated  by  the 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment  Act.  On 
qualitative  inspection 
however, we found that 
our data for the U.S. in 
the  low  tiers  suggests 
that  the  good  U.S. 
ranking in that low end 
tier is likely representative of what is really available throughout much of the country at the low end, 
and is not an artifact of our methods for selecting offers from the market data. The aspirational, or policy 
judgment  required,  is  whether  the  lowest  currently-available  speeds  are  the  appropriate  target  for 
broadband policy and planning. To the extent that one believes that any level of connectivity counts, 
then the answer is yes. To the extent one adopts the proposition that higher capacity connections, up to a 
point at any given moment in time, are necessary for full enjoyment of the benefits of the then-prevalent 
and next-step technologies, then the answer would be no, and the most pertinent data would concern 
prices at the tier of service we consider to be the target of present policy making.  
If we conceive of the benefits of broadband connectivity to include capacity-sensitive applications like 
voice  and  video  over  IP;  if  we  consider  telecommuting  and  individual,  home-based  Internet 
entrepreneurship as important applications, then the price of the slowest speeds and capacity possible is 
likely too low a target for policy benchmarking purposes. Once we consider medium and high speeds, 
the picture in the United States becomes less rosy. If the target of policy is to achieve near-universal 
availability of relatively high capacity connectivity, then it would be important to look at the experience 
of countries that have achieved better prices for higher capacity. These include Japan, South Korea, 
France, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, as well as Italy, Germany, and Greece. Among the 
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countries that perform well by penetration standards, Norway, the Netherlands, and Canada seem to 
present less attractive models on the price dimension. We present our at-a-glance table as we did for the 
prior attributes, ordering the countries here by their relative performance on prices at the different speed 
tiers, each weighted equally (12.5%) to reflect no particular emphasis on one or another speed tier, or on 
the quality of OECD vs. Berkman pricing study.  











































1  Japan  7  7  2  1  2  1  1  1  2.75 
2  Sweden  8  4  8  2  8  4  2  2  4.75 
3  Denmark  2  2  9  5  10  5  7  6  5.75 
4  Finland  4  10  5  8  4  9  4  4  6.00 
5  France  17  18  1  3  1  2  5  5  6.50 
6 
United 
Kingdom  6  13  3  6  6  7  N/A  9  10.00 
7  Italy  1  1  7  11  3  3  N/A  N/A  10.75 
8  Netherlands  9  8  11  13  16  17  10  12  12.00 
9  South Korea  25  28  13  16  7  6  3  3  12.63 
10  Switzerland  13  3  6  4  9  8  N/A  N/A  12.88 
10  Germany  26  15  14  12  11  11  6  8  12.88 
12 
United 
States  12  5  17  18  19  14  11  13  13.63 
13  Greece  15  19  4  14  5  10  N/A  N/A  15.88 
14  Portugal  11  9  10  9  14  15  N/A  N/A  16.00 
15  Belgium  3  23  12  7  13  12  N/A  N/A  16.25 
16  Norway  18  17  18  20  17  16  12  N/A  18.50 
17  Spain  24  25  22  26  15  18  9  11  18.75 
18  Iceland  23  27  25  25  22  22  8  10  20.25 
19 
Slovak 
Republic  14  11  30  17  28  27  N/A  7  20.50 
20  Austria  29  22  19  10  12  13  N/A  N/A  20.63 
21  Luxembourg  19  12  16  15  23  23  N/A  N/A  21.00 
22  Ireland  5  6  24  22  26  26  N/A  N/A  21.13 
23 
New 
Zealand  10  21  20  23  18  20  N/A  N/A  21.50 
24  Hungary  16  14  21  24  21  25  N/A  N/A  22.63 
25  Canada  21  16  23  19  27  21  N/A  N/A  23.38 
26 
Czech 
Republic  20  24  15  21  25  24  N/A  N/A  23.63 
27  Australia  27  29  26  27  20  19  N/A  N/A  26.00 
28  Poland  28  20  28  29  24  28  N/A  N/A  27.13 
29  Turkey  22  26  29  30  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  28.38 
30  Mexico  30  30  27  28  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  29.38 
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3.7  Summary benchmarking report 
In this part we reported the results of a multi-dimensional benchmarking study, combining our own 
independent  research  and  analysis  with,  primarily,  OECD  data.  Our  independent  data  sometimes 
confirm, sometimes refine, and sometimes disagree with OECD data in particular areas, such as low-tier 
service pricing or approaches to actual speed measurement. The degree of correlation between these two 
independent datasets and analyses adds to our confidence in the quality of both.  Our core purpose 
throughout  has  been  to  identify  which  countries  are  stronger  and  which  are  weaker,  along  several 
dimensions of each of the three major attributes: penetration, capacity, and price.  This approach resulted 
in  greater  nuance  than  is  captured  by  more  widely  used  broadband-specific  benchmarks—most 
commonly the penetration per 100 inhabitants measure—and in a tighter focus on measures of interest 
than used in the wider, business-use oriented scorecards we discuss in Section 3.2.  Throughout the 
report, at the end of each section, we offered an at-a-glance table that described how each country did 
along each of the several measures of each attribute, and how they ranked, in the aggregate, in terms of 
that attribute.  Here we conclude by rolling all these attribute-specific tables into a single combined 
table,  reported  as Table  3.6,  treating  penetration,  speed,  and  price  as  equally-weighted  performance 
measures. 
From the perspective of looking at the United States rank alone, our approach improves the position by 
two spots, but largely confirms and increases our level of confidence in the competence of the finding 
that the United States is, overall, a middle-of-the-pack performer. More interesting are the substantial 
changes in position of several countries often thought of as good performers to middling or even weak, 
and of middling performers to good.  First, our balanced measures place South Korea and Japan where 
they are widely perceived to be—at the top of the list.  More useful in terms of adding information, are 
the shifts in place for Canada, Switzerland, and Norway, all of which show up as weaker performers in 
our benchmarking study than commonly perceived.  First, Canada's weak speed and price performance, 
as well as low 3G penetration, move it from a solid second quintile performer into the fourth quintile.  
They also move Norway and Switzerland out of the first quintile, mostly because of higher prices, lower 
speeds, and to a lesser extent because of lower 3G penetration.  On the other hand, France comes out as 
a  stronger  performer,  moving  from  the  third  to  the  second  quintile,  and  the  United  Kingdom  too 
improves its relative performance within the second quintile.  As we move to the next parts of the report, 
we  will  be  able  to  use  the  insights  gained  from  the  benchmarking  exercise  to  add  valence  to  our 
findings: that is, to interpret the practices and policies adopted by any given country in light of whether 
we understand that country to be a better or worse performer, either on a given attribute, or in the 
aggregate.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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Table 3.6.  Country ranks based on weighted average aggregates 
  Country  Penetration  Speed  Price 
Overall weighted 
average rank 
1  Japan  6  1  1  2.67 
2  Sweden  3  5  2  3.33 
3  Denmark  4  4  3  3.67 
4  South Korea  1  2  9  4.00 
5  Finland  5  6  4  5.00 
6  Netherlands  11  3  8  7.33 
7  France  15  7  5  9.00 
8  Switzerland  10  12  10  10.67 
8  Germany  14  8  10  10.67 
10  United Kingdom  9  18  6  11.00 
11  Iceland  2  14  18  11.33 
11  Norway  8  10  16  11.33 
13  United States  17  11  12  13.33 
14  Portugal  23  9  14  15.33 
15  Belgium  13  19  15  15.67 
16  Italy  21  23  7  17.00 
17  Luxembourg  7  25  21  17.67 
18  Australia  12  15  27  18.00 
19  Austria  19  16  20  18.33 
20  Spain  18  22  17  19.00 
21  New Zealand  20  17  23  20.00 
22  Canada  16  20  25  20.33 
23  Greece  27  24  13  21.33 
23  Slovak Republic  24  21  19  21.33 
25  Czech Republic  26  13  26  21.67 
26  Ireland  22  27  22  23.67 
27  Hungary  25  26  24  25.00 
28  Poland  28  28  28  28.00 
29  Turkey  30  29  29  29.33 
30  Mexico  29  30  30  29.67 
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3.8  Annex: Statistical Modeling of Poverty, Income, and Urbanicity on OECD 
Broadband Penetration per 100 
3.8.1  The model 
This analysis uses country-level data to investigate factors influencing broadband penetration rates in the 
30 OECD countries.  The dataset was constructed using the most recent numbers available from the 
OECD  and  UNDP,  with  broadband  prices  and  total  penetration  reported  from  October  2008  and 
December 2008, respectively.   
Ordinary least squares regression is employed, largely replicating Turner’s 2006 analysis.
43  Predictors 
include national poverty, median income, percent of the population in urban areas, average years of 
formal education, and average broadband subscription price.  The primary model specification is: 
ε β β β β β β i      ) (sub.price        (yrs.ed)        (urban)      come) (median.in        (poverty)          
5 4 3 2 1 0 tration total.pene + + + + + + =  
Due to well-founded concerns that broadband price is endogenous to the model, this model was also 
specified excluding price as a predictor. The results of these models are as follows: 
 
Table 
                     
    Model Includes Price    Model Excludes Price 
                     
    Coefficient  s.e. 
p-
value      Coefficient  s.e. 
p-
value   
Poverty    -0.54  0.21  0.019  *    -0.55  0.22  0.018  * 
Percent in Urban Areas    0.20  0.08  0.019  *    0.18  0.0801  0.03  * 
Median Income (Thousands)    0.65  0.15  0.000  ***    0.72  0.15  0.000  *** 
Average Years Education    0.19  0.70  0.784      0.04  0.71  0.958   
Average Subscription Price    -0.11  0.07  0.140      x  x  x   
(Intercept)    4.58          1.47       
    n =30;  Adj R
2 =.776      n =30;  Adj R
2 =.764   
                     
(***) p < .001;   (**) p < .01;  ( *) p < .05                 
 
 
The findings indicate that including subscription price does not change the substantive results of the 
model.    Although  the  coefficient  on  price  is  in  the  expected  direction,  it  is  not  significant  when 
controlling  for  other  covariates.    Poverty,  percent  in  urban  areas,  and  log  median  income  are  all 
significant predictors of broadband penetration. The effect of formal education is small and does not 
approach statistical significance.  Examining various interaction terms between these covariates did not 
reveal any notable effects. 
The  model  reveals  a  substantial  and  highly  significant  impact  of  median  income  on  broadband 
penetration.  A $5,000 rise in median income, for example, results in more than a 3% increase in the 
predicted penetration rate.  Median income is measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) US dollars 
and was computed by the OECD over the mid-2000 years.  Median income was included as a linear 
                                                 
43 Turner, Broadband Reality Check II 2006, Annex A.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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(rather than logged) predictor after an inspection of the data showed a roughly linear relationship with 
broadband penetration, in addition to very little variation in the center of its distribution.  It is worth 
noting that the findings are essentially unchanged when including GDP per capita (2008) rather than 
median income, or when taking the natural log of either of these variables. 
This  model  estimates  a  significant  and  negative  relationship  between  poverty  and  broadband 
penetration, with a 2% rise in poverty associated with a more than 1% decrease in penetration.  The 
poverty measure used in this analysis represents the proportion of the population earning less than 50% 
of the national median income, and was computed by the OECD over the mid-2000 years.  The relative 
nature of this measure means that it also captures inequality within countries, and the model’s findings 
are similar to what is obtained when including the GINI measure of inequality rather than poverty. 
This model estimates a smaller but also significant effect of “urbanicity” on broadband penetration.  A 
5% increase in the proportion of the population in urban areas results in a roughly 1% increase in the 
predicted penetration rate.  The proportion of population in urban areas was computed by the UNDP for 
2005. 
This analysis found no evidence of an impact from average years of formal education, with coefficients 
not  approaching  statistical  significance.    This  measure  was  computed  by  the  OECD  for  2004,  and 
weighted to reflect differences between countries in standard years to graduation. 
3.8.2  Assessing relative importance of predictors 
 
Quantifying the relative importance of predictors in the model gives a sense of which factors are most 
important in determining broadband penetration.  Because all predictors in the model are correlated to 
some  extent,  simply  comparing  R-squared  coefficients  from  bivariate  regressions  yields  inaccurate 
estimates of relative importance.  Figures 3.30 and 3.31 show the contribution of each predictor to the 
total R-squared using the most common techniques to correct for correlated predictors.
44  This exercise 
suggests that between 50 to 80% of the variation explained by the model is explained by median income, 





                                                 
44 LMG and PMVD methods are generally considered superior (see Gromping 2006).  http://www.jstatsoft.org/v17/i01/paper   International comparisons: Identifying benchmark and practice models   
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Evaluating influential data points 
 
Among OECD countries, the United States ranks near the top in both median income and poverty.  To 
test sensitivity of the findings, the model was run excluding the United States.  Although p-values rise, 
especially  for  the  poverty  coefficient,  neither  the  significance  nor  magnitudes  of  the  estimates  are 
affected.   
Figure 3.32 plots standardized residuals from the models against leverage for each data point.  Cook’s 
distance, measuring the effect of deleting each observation, is less than .5 for each country.  As the 
conventional threshold for closer examination of a data point’s influence is a Cook’s distance greater 
than 1, this suggests that no single country is driving the results. 
Figure 3.32 
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Figure 3.33 
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4  Policies and practices: Competition and access 
This  part  and  the  two  that  follow  it  review  the  core  policies  and  practices  of  other  countries,  and 
evaluate whether we can conclude that one or another policy intervention contributed to a country's 
broadband performance. These policies and practices fall into the two major categories of government 
action: regulation and public spending.  They are focused on improving either the supply of, or the 
demand for, ubiquitous connectivity, or on assuring equitable access to the technological capabilities of 
the  digitally  networked  environment.    On  the  supply  side,  governments  spend  and  invest  in 
infrastructure  or  tailor  their  regulatory  action  so  as  to  improve  competition  in  telecommunications 
markets  while  preserving  investment  incentives.    On  the  demand  side,  governments  mostly  spend 
improve skills, subsidize equipment and services, or act as buyers.   
In our review, we found that a central aspect of policy has been the effort to foster competition in an 
imperfect and difficult market.  This was true of the first broadband transition, and is at the center of 
many planning efforts for the next generation transition.  Fostering competition entailed a shift from 
older-style regulated monopoly structures to a system that deploys its regulatory power to lower entry 
barriers by requiring open access to hard-to-replicate infrastructure elements.   Both the degree to which 
national  regulators  were  engaged  and  effective  relative  to  usually  recalcitrant  incumbents,  and  the 
degree to which regulators emphasized protecting entrants appear to have been important.  In wireless 
markets, the lessons are murkier.  There are countries that have done well with policies that “should” not 
have worked—beauty contests or small numbers of allocations—and countries that have done poorly 
even though they acted early and auctioned four or five dedicated 3G licenses with adequate spectrum.  
There were also countries that had the inverse results.  We review these in Part 5, but mostly suggest that 
this is an area that needs further study.  In our review of investment policies, we found that major 
spending on infrastructure, either directly, as in South Korea and Sweden; through subsidies, subsidized 
loans, and tax breaks, as in South Korea and Japan; or through municipal-level requisitioning and public 
private partnerships, as in Sweden and the Netherlands, played a role.  In Part 6 we review those general 
strategic  investments,  stimulus-specific  investments,  and  municipal  approaches,  paying  particular 
attention to the new European Commission guidelines aimed at considering the risk that government 
investments will crowd out market investments.   We also review several innovative programs on the 
demand side in terms of skills training and subsidies to poorer users and higher cost areas. 
A word on the question of whether government policy matters at all.  A number of analyses (including 
our own analysis of urbanicity and poverty, as well as our econometric analysis of unbundling below) 
show that many factors other than government action predict broadband penetration, a primary metric 
for  measuring  broadband  success.    Clearly  income,  geography,  and  poverty  all  contribute  to  the 
difference between broadband penetration levels in different counties. These demand and supply factors 
will also influence price and speed.  An extreme interpretation of these results would suggest that these 
factors explain so much of the overall performance of a country that policy plays no appreciable role. 
We  do  not  find  this  assertion  to  be  credible  and  find  that  the  available  data,  both  quantitative  and 
qualitative, contradicts such a view. We note that it is unnecessary to show that policy is primarily 
responsible for a country's performance; it is sufficient to show that a policy can contribute positively 
and appreciably, at the margin, to a country's performance relative to that country's performance without 
that policy.  For example, imagine a policy intervention whose effect is to add only 1% to penetration 
rates annually over the course of a decade.  Looked at from the perspective of a single year, the effect 
seems insubstantial.  Over the course of a decade, however, it would mean that a country will have 10% 
higher penetration than it would have had without the policy. If we accept the World Bank analysis that 
10 points in penetration per 100 translates into 1.21% GDP growth, that becomes a very important effect 
indeed  for  any  given  single  policy  intervention.    We  do  not  in  fact  attempt  to  measure  the  total   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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contribution of a  given  policy or practice we describe here.  We merely  note that even very small 
positive  contributions  policy  can  make  incrementally  can  have  a  significant  medium  to  long-term 
impact. 
4.1  Competition and access: Highlights 
The most surprising finding in our analysis is that open access policies contributed to the success of 
many of the highest performers during the first broadband transition, and as a result are now at the core 
of future planning processes in Europe and Japan.   Contrary to perceptions in the United States, there is 
extensive evidence to support the position, adopted almost universally by other advanced economies, 
that  open  access  policies,  where  undertaken  with  serious  regulatory  engagement,  contributed  to 
broadband penetration, capacity, and affordability in the first generation of broadband.  We review the 
evidence here at length.  We consider the qualitative method we use throughout most of this part more 
appropriate for the complex underlying phenomena than purely econometric techniques, given the small 
number  of  countries  and  observation  points.   As  a  complement  to  our  qualitative  analysis  we  also 
conducted  a  re-analysis  and  refinement  of  the  most  recent  econometric  work  on  the  effects  of 
unbundling  on  penetration.    We  find  that,  consistent  with  the  findings  of  this  recent  work,  and 
inconsistent with a recent critique of it, econometric analysis supports the proposition that unbundling 
contributed to broadband penetration in OECD countries.  Indeed, new analyses we perform on the 
existing data suggest that the effect was larger than previously thought, the confidence level higher, and 
the finding more robust.  
Countries whose performance makes them valuable learning models are transposing what they learned 
about  access  from  the  first  generation  broadband  transition  to  next  generation  connectivity.    They 
present several interesting models of observation regarding how to implement such open access policies 
in various next generation topologies. We see models of active and passive component sharing; we see 
models  of  required  sharing  of  the  last  drop;  and  we  see  competition  policy  adjusted  to  allow 
competitors, both incumbents and entrants, to cooperate in deploying new fiber plant.  We also see a 
substantial recent move to adopt or consider adoption of the United Kingdom's imposition of functional 
separation between retail and wholesale divisions of incumbents, in order to facilitate competition based 
on open access to network components.    
Table 4.1 summarizes the core lessons, and focuses on which of the case studies or sections is most 
pertinent to that lesson.  The core lessons are also highlighted at the end of each discrete section or case 
study.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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Table 4.1.  Core lessons from international strategies 
Core lesson  Case study or section 
Open access policy, in particular unbundling, played an important role in 
facilitating competitive entry in many of the countries observed; In many cases, 
even where facilities-based alternatives were available, unbundling-based 
entrants played an important catalytic role in the competitive market; In some 
cases competition introduced through open access drove investment and 
improvement in speeds, technological progression, reduced prices, or service 
innovations.   
Japan, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
France, UK, New Zealand, 
Econometric study 
An engaged regulator practically enforcing open access policy is more important 
than the formal adoption of the policy; incumbents resist access policies whether 
they are formerly government-owned or not 
Japan, South Korea, France, 
Germany, UK, Canada, 
Econometric study 
Broadband providers are regulated as carriers, and their carriage function is 
regulated and treated separately from their retail service function 
All surveyed countries. 
Access rules are now being applied to the next generation transition, particularly 
to fiber 
Japan, South Korea, Sweden, 
Netherlands, France, UK, 
European Regulators 
Group/EU, New Zealand 
Ubiquitous access has led regulators to accept increased vertical integration 
between mobile and fixed broadband providers.  In some places this has also led 
to application of open access requirements to mobile broadband platforms 
Japan, South Korea apply 
access; France, Germany 
experience greater integration 
but have not extended access 
In the two earliest instances where functional separation was introduced, it had 
rapid effects on competitive entry, penetration, prices, and/or speeds 
UK, New Zealand 
Functional separation is increasingly adopted or considered to achieve open 
access into the next generation transition 
UK, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Netherlands, Italy, Australia  
Facilities-based competition usually complements, rather than substitutes for, 
access-based competition 
Japan, South Korea, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, New Zealand 
Entrepreneurial competitors have tended to enter through bitstream and 
unbundling access 
Japan, South Korea, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, France, UK 
Where unbundling was formally available but weakly implemented competition 
was limited to facilities-based entrants, with weaker results 
Germany, Canada 
The anticipated high costs of next generation transition are pushing countries 
and companies to seek approaches to share costs, risks, and facilities, rather than 
focusing primarily on creating redundant facilities to assure competition 
European Regulators Group, 
Netherlands, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, UK 
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4.2  Overview 
Talking about “unbundling,” or more broadly open access in the United States today is a bit like wearing 
bellbottoms  or  talking  about  a  national  healthcare  system.    We  nonetheless  open  with  this  subject 
because  it  is  impossible  to  discuss  the  international  experience  in  the  past  decade,  or  to  describe 
contemporary  thinking  in  other  countries  about  the  next  generation  of  high  speed  networks  and 
ubiquitous  connectivity  without  discussing  access  regulation.    It  would  be  no  more  plausible  than 
discussing current policy debates about climate change, but not mentioning emissions caps and tradable 
permits.  The most surprising findings to an American seeped in the current debate in the United States 
are the near consensus outside the United States on the value and importance of access regulation, the 
strength of the evidence supporting that consensus, and the central role allotted to transposition of that 
experience to next generation networks in current planning efforts.   
Open access policies require telecommunications providers, mostly incumbents, to make available to 
their  competitors,  usually  at  regulated  rates,  various  parts  of  their  network  or  service,  so  that  the 
competitors can begin to compete using these components as part of their service, without having to 
replicate  the  full  investment  that  the  incumbent  originally  made.    The  various  types  of  access—
unbundled local loop, shared access, bitstream access, or wholesale—differ primarily in how they trade 
off the level of investment a competitor must make to provide competing services, in exchange for the 
flexibility that the new entrant has in what improvements it may offer consumers.  With unbundled local 
loop, the competitor leases the right to use the copper loops of the incumbent, and adds the electronics 
and switching.  With shared access, the competitor leases only the right to use high frequency portions 
of the local loop, not those frequencies used for voice telephony.  In both cases the competitor must 
invest in putting equipment deep in the network, so that it controls the technical characteristics of the 
DSL service, but to do so it must make substantial investments.  Bitstream access gives entrants less 
control over the technical characteristics of the service, because the incumbent provisions the DSLAM, 
which in turn defines the parameters of what DSL services can be provided.  It nonetheless offers more 
flexibility, and requires more investment, than wholesale offerings.  With wholesale, the incumbent is 
providing a finished service, but selling it to competitors at wholesale rates.  The entrant can try to 
improve  administrative  efficiency  or  marketing;  compete  on  customer  care,  packaging  or  service 
bundling; or improve billing, but not innovate on the technical characteristics of the service.   
The theory underlying open access obligations is that entry barriers in telecommunications markets are 
high  and  deter  competitive  entry.    By  requiring  incumbents  to  sell,  at  regulated  rates,  the  most 
expensive, and in the case of local loop and shared access, lowest-tech elements of their networks, 
regulators enable competitors to invest a fraction of the total cost of setting up a competing network, 
focus that investment on the more technology-sensitive and innovative elements of the network, and 
compete.  In this model, regulated access provides one important pathway to make telecommunications 
markets more competitive than they could be if they rely solely on competition among the necessarily 
smaller number of companies that can fully replicate each other's infrastructure.   
Some form of open access regulation has at this point been adopted by every country in the OECD 
except the United States, Mexico, and the Slovak Republic (which has been in the process of passing 
unbundling  requirements  for  over  two  years,  but  has  not  yet  done  so).    Mexico  has  the  lowest 
penetration per 100, the slowest average advertised and actual speeds, and the highest prices for the low 
speeds that are on average available there.  The Slovak Republic's fixed broadband penetration is 28
th or   Next Generation Connectivity 
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26
th of 30 countries, and its residents pay the highest prices of any OECD country for medium speeds, 
and almost highest for the high speed services available to them.
45  
The United States is the country that invented the Internet, drove initial popularization through dial-up 
service on what functioned like an open access model, and was among the earliest to formally introduce 
open access policies as the centerpiece of the major, bipartisan, telecommunications reform in the almost 
unanimously approved Telecommunications Act of 1996.  From the start however, implementation of 
unbundling was burdened and thwarted, largely by incumbents' resisting implementation through foot-
dragging  and  litigation,  but  also  by  a  judiciary  highly  skeptical  of  the  theory  behind  unbundling, 
receptive to the arguments of the incumbents, and exhibiting little deference to the judgment of the FCC.   
Our review of the experience of other countries shows that open access policies were gradually adopted 
throughout most other OECD countries over the course of the following decade.  In some cases, this was 
done without appreciable incumbent resistance.  The Nordic countries stand out in this regard.  But in 
many cases, incumbents resisted open access as vigilantly as they had in the United States.  France 
Telecom and its union were no less reluctant to share their rents with entrants than were the Baby Bells; 
nor  was  Deutsche Telekom.      In  various  countries,  the  degree  to  which  either  the  regulator  or  the 
European Union's pressure enabled a country to overcome this resistance was a factor in whether the 
policy  then  in  fact  became  a  reality.    In  some  countries,  the  moment  of  the  shift  in  the  relative 
professionalism, independence, and power of the regulator in relation to the incumbent, and its will and 
capacity to engage in enforcing a competitive playing field, are widely seen as the moment of takeoff for 
their  present  generation  broadband  deployment.    Japan's  newly-reorganized  MIC  succeeded  in 
overcoming a weakened NTT's resistance in 2001.  The new regulatory change was followed almost 
immediately by entry of Softbank, using unbundled capacity, which in turn forced NTT to shift from a 
strategy focused on high-priced ISDN services to a highly-competitive DSL market.   France succeeded 
in breaking through the resistance of France Telecom and its politically powerful unions in 2003. The 
change was followed almost immediately by the introduction of unbundled services by Iliad and neuf 
Telecom, who now hold about 46% of the French market between them.  The best bundle currently 
available from Iliad's “Free” service includes 100Mbps service to the home, digital TV with HD and the 
ability to create your own private television channel for others to watch on their TV sets, unlimited voice 
telephony throughout France and to 70 other countries, including the U.S., and secure nomadic Wi-Fi 
access wherever one's laptop or Wi-Fi-enabled phone is within range of the Freebox of any other Free 
subscriber in the country (24% of the French market), for USD32.59 PPP a month.    
Most of this part of our report reviews the experience of other countries as they implemented open 
access.  The premise is that if open access policies work, they work through their effects on the actions 
of firms.   Here we offer detailed qualitative case studies of open access and competition in fourteen 
countries.    We  describe  how  open  access  did,  and  did  not,  work  through  the  choices  of  firms  in 
broadband markets during the first transition, and what the regulatory and planning bodies in these 
countries are doing today to transpose their experience during the first broadband transition to the next 
generation.   Where pertinent, we describe the political economy that surrounded the adoption of an 
effective access regime.   
What we found in our review of the evidence is a pattern similar to what we described for Japan and 
France.  In other countries that implemented open access successfully, like Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
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or the Netherlands, the policy enabled entrants like Softbank and Iliad to compete, and that competition 
quite clearly followed close on the heels of adoption of the policy and contributed to the creation of a 
more competitive market.  In other countries that implemented open access more weakly, results were 
mixed.    Canada  in  particular  offers  an  example  of  half-hearted  efforts  to  impose  unbundling,  and 
increasingly heavy reliance on competition between local telephone and cable incumbents.  Its results, as 
our benchmarking study shows, have been weaker than those of other countries we review here.  There 
are, of course, countries whose experience does not fit this model as neatly. Finland, which implemented 
unbundling early, enjoys fierce competition, but it does not appear that the competitors in fact made use 
of unbundling as part of their strategy. In South Korea unbundling was introduced late, after it had 
already  reached  high  levels  of  service;  its  early  entrants  did  rely  on  leased  access  to  incumbent 
facilities—but not those of the telecommunications incumbent.  We discuss these in the case studies 
themselves. Switzerland has been the strongest example of successful broadband performance without 
effective adoption of unbundling.  Nonetheless, that success cannot unambiguously be attributed to the 
absence of regulation, because throughout most of the relevant period the Swiss regulator and Swisscom 
had been battling over the former’s efforts to impose unbundling, as it ultimately succeeded in doing in 
2007. The persistent shadow of regulation renders the case harder to interpret than would otherwise have 
been the case.   Even after the imposition of unbundling on copper, for example, the continued debates 
over  whether  to  extend  unbundling  to  fiber  may  now  be  contributing,  alongside  competition  from 
municipal power companies, to Swisscom’s particularly innovative approach to sharing the costs and 
risks of investment in next generation roll out: inviting competitors to cooperate in laying four-fiber 
plants into each home and sharing the resultant infrastructure.   
The United Kingdom's experience introduces an additional policy element.  There, efforts to implement 
the most extensive form of open access—unbundling—met with subtle resistance from BT.  As a result, 
although the UK had adopted unbundling in 2001, by late 2005 there were still only 200,000 unbundled 
loops in the entire country.  At that point, Britain's regulator, Ofcom, forced BT to undertake functional 
separation: that is, create a separate unit, Openreach, that specialized in selling open access components 
to telecommunications providers, both to the retail operations of BT itself and to its competitors.   The 
separation changes the incentives of the provider, and eases monitoring of its behavior.  Functional 
separation was followed by a flurry of investment activity by entrants, resulting in the strengthening of 
competitors  Carphone  Warehouse,  Tiscali  UK,  and  BSkyB  and  their  shift  to  competing  over  more 
flexible unbundled loops instead of almost solely through wholesale offerings.  By the end of 2008, 
there were 5.5 million unbundled loops in the UK.  Prices fell by over 16% each year between 2006-
2008.  While the UK's competitive market did not result in the very high speeds we see in France of 
Japan, our analysis of prices advertised by 59 companies in the countries we review here shows that the 
UK companies do have among the lowest prices in the high speed (as opposed to very high speed) 
category of services.  In our benchmarking study, the UK now has prices that are among the top quintile 
of performers for all tiers of service but the very highest speeds.  Following the UK's experience, New 
Zealand implemented functional separation in December of 2006 in a dramatic reversal of its consistent 
policy of  regulatory  abstention since 1989, and in response to its substantial under-performance on 
broadband  penetration.    Between  the  last  quarter  of  2006  and  that  of  2008  New  Zealand  saw  its 
penetration per 100 rates jump, surpassing those of Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal; it saw speeds 
increase more than in any other OECD country, and the primary competitor to New Zealand Telecom, 
TelstraClear, invested in its own fiber ring connecting all of South Island's towns.  Sweden and the 
Netherlands have now followed this path in preparation for the next generation transition, as has Italy, 
and Australia has just announced that it too will force its incumbent to undergo functional separation.    
The experience of all these countries has led to a wide consensus outside the United States that open 
access policies played an important role in creating competitive broadband markets in those countries   Next Generation Connectivity 
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that adopted and enforced them.  As a result, current planning efforts emphasize transposition of the 
lessons learned about open access to the different topologies and cost  structures of next generation 
networks as a core element of these countries' policy.  The clearest documents in this regard are those 
produced by the European Regulators Group (ERG), which coordinates among the European regulators.  
The  ERG  has  studied  the  lessons  of  its  members  extensively  over  the  past  several  years,  and  has 
produced  a  series  of  reports  on  implementation  and  transposition.   These  include  analysis  of  when 
“active access,” that is, access akin to bitstream and wholesale, and when “passive access,” or access to 
ducts and dark fiber, would be desirable, and consideration of when functional separation is sensible.   
We follow the detailed qualitative analysis with a firm-level pricing study. The study looks at prices 
offered by the 59 companies that offer the very high speeds in the countries we review here, or if none 
do, the highest speeds otherwise available in the country.  It incorporates both our own research and 
OECD data.  It identifies companies by their status as incumbent telecommunications companies, cable 
operators, unbundling-based entrants, and utilities or other facilities-based entrants.   We find that U.S. 
and Canadian companies–both telephone and cable incumbents–that occupy markets that rely on inter-
modal competition, offer the lowest speeds at the highest prices.  Japanese, French, and Swedish firms, 
including telephone incumbents and cable and unbundling-based entrants, offer the highest speeds and 
lowest prices, together with the more ambiguous cases of Finland and South Korea.  The rest of the 
companies we observed occupy a middle ground. 
We conclude the data presentation with an econometric re-analysis of the most recently analyzed dataset 
on adoption of unbundling and penetration per 100 inhabitants.  We treat the econometric analysis as a 
useful adjunct to the qualitative analysis, rather than a replacement, because any analysis of such a small 
set of observations of questions of such great complexity and nuance, taking one measure of policy and 
one  measure  of  performance,  will  of  necessity  overlook  important  factors.    Nonetheless,  we 
independently verified and tested the most recent dataset and analyses, and confirmed the results that 
supported  the  contribution  of  unbundling  to  penetration  levels.    Moreover,  we  performed  influence 
points  testing,  which  has  not  been  done  in  past  studies  and  is  now  common  for  cross-country 
comparisons. We  found  that  most  of the  ambiguity  about  the  effect  of  unbundling  comes  from  the 
experience  of  Switzerland.    Removing  Switzerland  substantially  increases  the  confidence  in,  and 
contribution of, the effect of unbundling across all other countries.  Taking poetic license, one might say 
that pointing at statistical ambiguity regarding the effect of unbundling across all OECD countries is 
primarily a way of using econometrics to say: “but look at Switzerland.”  Finally, we tested the effect of 
changing the values in the model to account not for the formal passage of unbundling rules, but for the 
dates on which these rules were in fact implemented on the ground in a serious, engaged way, reflecting 
what we found in our qualitative case studies (for example, moving the timing of the United Kingdom's 
implementation from when unbundling was formally adopted but remained practically unused, to the 
moment at which the imposition of functional separation on BT and the creation of Openreach in fact led 
to  adoption  of  unbundling).    We  found  that  reflecting  the  realities  of  implementation  in  the  data 
increases both the significance of unbundling and its predicted contribution to the levels of penetration.    
We conclude this part with a detailed review of current efforts to transpose the experience of open access 
to the very different context of next generation connectivity. 
4.3  The second generation Internet: From dial-up to broadband 
During the 20
th century telecommunications services were a monopoly business.  Outside the United 
States, these monopolies were mostly state-owned.   In the United States, AT&T became a de facto 
monopoly in the second decade of the century.  The theory throughout this period was one of natural   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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monopoly.  Because the fixed investments necessary to create a telecommunications network were so 
high, while the marginal costs to serve each subscriber over time relatively lower, and because it was 
valuable to subscribers to be connected to all other subscribers, it was thought to be most efficient to 
have a single network connect everyone, and then subject the carrier to regulation to assure that it would 
not abuse this monopoly by charging high prices for poor service.   
By  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century  this  model  was  globally  seen  as  a  failure.    The  state-run 
telecommunications carriers were seen as inefficient and bloated. In the United States, the Bell System 
repeatedly outwitted the FCC and the Department of Justice, preventing competitors from entering into 
competitive lines of business that depended on the core, hard-to-replicate facilities of the local copper 
loop,  like  long-distance  telephone  service,  the  manufacture  of  telephone  or  office  switches,  or  data 
processing at a distance, and continued to capture rents that, in theory, should have been regulated away.  
The global disenchantment with the idea of a well-regulated monopoly swept the industrialized nations.  
In the United States, AT&T was broken up in 1984.  Its “daughter companies” operated under antitrust 
court supervision for over a decade, until Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to 
modernize the law to fit the new competitive environment.   In the rest of the world, national telephone 
companies were gradually privatized in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, although in many 
places  the  government  still  holds  a  non-controlling  share–and  an  influential  voice–in  the  resulting 
private companies.   
The history is important because the quandaries presented by the transition from regulated monopoly to 
competition continue to be the core quandaries facing regulators everywhere as they ponder the next 
transition to a ubiquitously networked society.  Just like now, the entry barriers to creating a second, 
independent,  competitive  telecommunications  network  were  enormous.  While  these  regulators  were 
disenchanted with the idea of a well-regulated monopoly, they worried that competition was unlikely to 
emerge in many places, and where it did, it certainly would not be a perfectly efficient market.  So a 
shift to inevitably imperfect competition was a second-best solution; just like regulated monopoly had 
been before it.   
The core institutional innovation intended to square this circle—imperfect competition in a market for a 
network  good  with  extraordinarily  high  upfront  costs—was  open  access.    The  idea  was  that  the 
incumbents—the former Bell companies here, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) in Japan, British 
Telecom  (BT)  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  so  forth—would  be  required  by  law  to  lease  to  newly 
entering competitors parts of their existing network on nondiscriminatory, regulated terms.  This would 
lower the cost of entry and allow entrants to innovate in the electronics attached to the network, or in 
customer care systems or services they would offer, rather than investing in digging trenches and making 
holes in the walls of the houses of subscribers to pull their own, independent wiring.  To give entrants 
flexibility, open access policies provided a menu of options for trading off investment for flexibility.  
Entrants could lease access to copper loops or portions of them, which were very expensive to build 
because of the high costs of digging trenches or pulling wires, but were not particularly technologically 
advanced.  If they did so, they would have great flexibility in what electronics equipment to attach to 
these loops, but at the cost of having to invest heavily in their own equipment.  In the alternative, 
incumbents were required to provide competitors with access to DSL service at different points in their 
networks, in ways that provided different tradeoffs.  Because the incumbent had market power, the rates 
at which these components of the network were to be sold would be regulated so as to set them at a level 
that allowed the incumbent to recover its costs while leaving enough room for the entrant to make a 
retail profit.  After a while, it was thought, the entrants would gain market share and brand recognition, 
they would be able to predict more reliably what their investment prospects were like, and they would 
increase their levels of investment deeper into the network.  Throughout this period incumbents argued   Next Generation Connectivity 
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that forcing them to sell to competitors at regulated rates reduced their own incentives to invest: Why 
invest, they would ask, if you know that you will be forced to share the benefits of the new networks you 
are building with competitors, at regulated rates?   
4.4  Baseline: The United States 
The  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  represented  the  most  extensive  overhaul  of  American 
communications law since the New Deal.  It passed by a vote of 91 to 5 in the Senate, and 414 to 16 in 
the House of Representatives.  Georgia Representative John Linder hailed it at the time as “the most 
deregulatory telecommunications legislation in history.”
46  The basic problem it dealt with was how to 
transition from monopoly to competition.  The most innovative idea at the core of the 1996 Act was that 
in order to enable competition to develop, incumbents would have to open up access to components of 
their  networks  to  competitors.    The  Act  introduced  unbundling,  interconnection,  collocation,  and 
wholesale access as elements of open access.   
Unbundling in the 1996 Act initially had little to do with Internet access.  It dealt mostly with letting 
new entrants enter telephone markets.  Residential Internet was peripheral to the Act, and what there was 
of it was dial-up over voice telephone lines.  Dial-up Internet was, as a practical matter, “open access” 
from the start, but not because of unbundling.  Early on the FCC treated Internet Service Providers as 
regular businesses, like the corner grocery, instead of like telecommunications companies.  That meant 
that the ISPs were allowed to “use” the carriers' network without paying a fee for every call carried.  
They too, like the grocery store and unlike other telecommunications carriers, could simply pay a flat 
monthly fee for business service.  Things changed with the introduction of digital communications over 
copper, first ISDN and then DSL, because to compete in these new offerings, providers had to invest in 
reconditioning lines and installing new electronics equipment.  
After the 1996 Act, the incumbents litigated many of its provisions.  The FCC's efforts to define what 
elements of the network needed to be unbundled were struck down by the courts.  Later, when DSL 
became important and the Commission tried to implement line sharing, or what in Europe came to be 
called shared access, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck the decision down.
47  In the meantime, 
around 1999-2000, as AT&T purchased major cable systems, a new question emerged—whether cable 
should be subject to the same kind of open access regulation.  In several instances cable franchising 
authorities tried to do this; but the power to impose open access on cable operators was seen as residing 
in the FCC, not local authorities.  Half a decade after the formal adoption of open access provisions, 
they still were not effectively implemented as the Internet access market began its broadband transition. 
By the fall of 2001 a new FCC had changed course.  Between that fall and the spring of 2002, the FCC 
passed a series of decisions that abandoned the effort to implement open access, and shifted the focus of 
American policy from the idea of regulated competition within each wire—competition over the copper 
plant  of  the  telephone  company  and  over  the  coaxial  cable  of  the  cable  company—to  competition 
between the owners of the two wires.  The theory was that two competitors with a strong base in a 
technology they own were enough to discipline each other, and much preferable to the uncertainties of 
unbundling and the price regulation and continuous monitoring of anticompetitive abuses that it entailed.  
The two facilities-based competitors would drive each other to invest, would discipline any monopoly 
pricing, and would not suffer the negative incentives of knowing that some of their investments in 
upgraded networks would go to subsidize their competitors.  At the time, this was not an unreasonable 
idea.  Cable operators were leading the way in the broadband transition in the United States, while 
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telephone companies were playing catch up.  Exactly the same was true in neighboring Canada.  In 2001 
and 2002, when these decisions were being made, the United States had the fourth highest level of 
broadband penetration, while Canada had the second highest.  The model of inter-modal competition 
(competition between firms, each of which uses a different technological mode to provide its service) 
seemed to work well.   
Perhaps the most contested (at least legally) aspect of this decision was that it was done not by simply 
forbearing from regulation, but by changing the definition of  what the cable and telecommunications 
carriers were doing when they offered broadband.  The new decisions defined “broadband” as a single, 
integrated information service, rather than a combination of two distinct services: telecommunications 
carriage—carrying  bits  from  place  to  place—and  information  service—doing  everything  else,  like 
hosting a web site or providing a portal.  This move too was litigated all the way to the Supreme Court.
48  
The decision split the Court.  Justice Thomas thought that, while the decision was not clearly right, it 
was not clearly wrong either, and the FCC had the power to make it.  Justice Scalia, in dissent, thought 
the idea was as silly as saying that because a “pizza delivery” company offered both together one could 
say that the company didn't offer delivery, as well as pizza.  He thought it was silly enough that the 
Court should reverse the decision and force the FCC to treat carriers as carriers, and then decide to 
forbear or not based on established categories in the Telecommunications Act, not based on an unguided 
and uncharted part of the Act, the residual that would apply if the Commission's interpretation were 
upheld.   
In  summary,  resistance  by  incumbents  and  skepticism  by  the  courts  meant  that  the  unbundling 
provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act were largely stillborn; certainly in their application to 
the emerging broadband market.  In their stead, the FCC decided to embrace a theory that competition 
between  the  incumbent  telephone  companies  and  incumbent  cable  companies—inter-modal 
competition—introduced sufficient competition to discipline both.  That decision was then upheld by a 
divided Supreme Court as permissible, if not necessarily advisable.  Our review of the experiences of 
other countries during this past decade, relative to that of the United States, suggests that the original 
judgment made by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 represented the better course.  The 
experience of other countries is complex, nuanced, and detailed.  Not all of it lines up exactly with a 
single storyline, and not all of it unambiguously supports one conclusion.  Still, as one works through 
the details, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that open access policies, where seriously 
implemented by an engaged regulator, contributed to a more competitive market and better outcomes.  
In  turn,  these  policies  and  the  experience  with  them  now  form  the  basis  of  much  forward-looking 
planning throughout the world.   
4.5  Japan and South Korea: Experiences of performance outliers 
Across a range of broadband measures, Japan and South Korea represent outliers as high performers.  
The experience of Japan and its current plan provide measured support for consideration of an open 
access policy.  The South Korean experience is more ambiguous on access, pointing more toward heavy 
government investment.  Both suggest that a strong, professional regulator, exercising effective power 
over incumbent providers, can foster significant market development and competition.   
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4.5.1  Japan: The first transition 
NTT was privatized in 1985, although the Japanese government continues to hold an interest in it.  Up to 
that point, NTT was a powerful incumbent, which received appropriations directly from the Diet, whose 
staff  was  more  professional  and  could  overwhelm  the  more  weakly  staffed  Ministry  of  Posts  and 
Telecommunications (MPT), and which was backed by a coalition of equipment manufacturers that 
manufactured directly to NTT's specifications and were tightly bound to it.  The decade following the 
privatization of NTT was a messy one.
49  MPT battled not only NTT over its efforts to break up the 
incumbent, as AT&T had been in the United States, and to force NTT to lower the interconnection rates 
it  charged  competitors,  but  also  with  Japan's  fabled  industrial  policy  ministry,  MITI,  over  which 
government agency would have power over telecommunications.  The battle continued for a decade until 
1996, at which point NTT was able to escape breakup, but MPT had grown in power.  In the following 
three years MPT pushed an agenda of further privatization of NTT, as well as deregulating some aspects 
of its telecommunications law to come into compliance with WTO requirements.  In 1999, NTT was 
reorganized into one long distance company and two regional companies, NTT East and NTT West, 
while MPT was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), with MITI-like 
capabilities, marking a new relationship between NTT and MIC, with authority finally shifting to the 
MIC.   
In 1999 NTT was focused on building a high cost, per-minute fee-based ISDN service.  Several new 
entrants, like Tokyo Metallic, tried to enter with DSL, but NTT was not at the time regulated to require it 
to provide the entrants with access, in that case collocation, to its physical network.  Japan had no 
broadband to speak of, and the first efforts to start it failed.  In 2000, the MIC created an IT Strategy 
Headquarters, created the e-Japan strategy, and received substantial regulatory powers in the Basic IT 
Law.  In October of 2000, following an intervention by the Japanese trade authority, MIC promulgated a 
series of rules requiring collocation, and requiring NTT to publish a fee structure, to lease dark fiber at 
regulated rates, and to unbundle the last mile of its network to entrants.  In 2001 the MIC created a 
public  forum  to  resolve  disputes  between  entrants  and  incumbents.    That  year,  Softbank  founded 
Yahoo!BB,  based  on  leased  access  from  NTT  for  backhaul  and  unbundled  loops  for  access  to 
consumers.  Usen, a cable company, also at that time launched the first fiber effort in Japan, which was 
more facilities-based.  Usen focused explicitly on high density areas with households and businesses, 
using its own facilities, but apparently also relying on the availability of NTT dark fiber to lease at low 
rates.
50   NTT was forced to abandon its  ISDN-to-Fiber  gradual move,  and shift to DSL and  fiber 
investments.  NTT had already built much of the heart of the fiber infrastructure in the 1990s, with 
cheap government loans during the lost decade.   
What followed were several years of extensive competition, first in DSL, and then in fiber, leading to 
Japan's state today.   In  a 2006 paper, the director of the competition policy division in MIC, Yasu 
Taniwaki, presented the trajectory of events with a stark graph, reproduced here as Figure 4.1.
51  While 
we are skeptical of the strong, clear causal claim in such a complex dynamic, at a minimum we can learn 
how the Japanese regulators themselves understand the dynamic.  What is clearly true is that unbundling 
enabled Yahoo!BB to enter the market with lower prices, aggressive marketing, free DSL modems and 
installation,  and  innovative  new  services,  most  disruptive  of  which  was  bundling  free  VoIP  with 
broadband access as early as 2001.  Today Yahoo!BB has slightly over a third of the DSL market, NTT 
has  another  third,  and  the  remainder  is  shared  among  other  providers,  mostly  KDDI  and  eAccess.  
Moreover, Softbank is now moving to invest in fiber, and has become a major player in fixed mobile 
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convergence  by  buying  Vodafone's 
Japanese operations in 2006.  In this 
case,  unbundling  or  open  access 
operated  exactly  as  anticipated—it 
created  low  entry  barriers  for  an 
entrant  who  was  able  to  introduce 
extensive service innovations, create a 
brand,  and  become  an  aggressive 
competitor  which  helped  drive 
investment  away  from  monopoly-
rent-extraction  devices,  like  NTT's 
ISDN policy.  That entrant continues 
to  be  a  major  force  in  the  market 
almost a decade later.   
The story of fiber development, on the 
other hand, is more ambiguous in its 
implications  for  open  access,  and 
more supportive of the argument that facilities-based competitors are sufficient.  The first fiber launch in 
Japan was by Usen, a cable music distribution network, largely based on its own facilities.  While Usen 
still  has  about  7%  of  the  fiber  market,  much  more  important  was  entry  by  power  companies,  in 
particular  K-Opticom,  a  subsidiary  of  Kansai  Electric  Power.    K-Opticom  entered  using  its  own 
facilities, built over the electric utility's conduits and poles.  K-Opticom became the first company, in 
2008,  to  offer  1Gpbs  residential  service.   This  part  of  the  story  supports  the  argument  in  favor  of 
facilities-based competition, and against the need for open access.  But even on the fiber side, focusing 
solely on facilities-based competition and ignoring the impact of open access would miss a part of the 
story.  A major player in fiber today is KDDI, whose roots in the early 2000s were in mobile phones 
(through its au Corp brand), and wholesale carrier pre-selection of telephony (like Carphone Warehouse 
in the UK, as we will see.)  KDDI expanded into fiber by purchasing Poweredcom, a fiber-delivery 
subsidiary of Tokyo Electric, and building its own fiber. It now offers service by combining its own fiber 
networks, those of some smaller cable providers, and, because it owns no DSL facilities of its own, 
offering various DSL services over the networks of other providers to complement its fiber facilities.  
KDDI's combination of facilities-based and open-access-based elements into its business model, as well 
as Softbank's entry into fiber services through its Hikari service, suggest that even in fiber the story in 
Japan is partly driven not only by the demand created on the DSL side, but also because some fiber 
entrants use unbundled DSL facilities to complement coverage in areas where these entrants' facilities 
have not yet been rolled out.  Moreover, the overall level of investment in the fiber market questions the 
argument that open access deters investment.  Despite early availability of unbundling for dark fiber, and 
Japan's continued commitment to assuring open access to the network layer independent of technology, 
NTT responded to the fiber challenge by investing and building out fiber (with support of low-cost loans 
from the government), and today has over half the fiber market in Japan.    
The  Japanese  story  is  therefore  nuanced.    It  does  not  suggest  a  single  cause,  but  rather  that  a 
combination of government-subsidized loans, open access policies on the DSL side, and facilities-based 
competition, created both supply and demand for very high speed Internet access early on, and that this 
cycle led to further investments in both plants.    
Figure 4.1.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Japan: Thinking about a ubiquitously networked society 
Japanese  policy  shares  one  assumption  with  the  belief  that  underlay  the  FCC's  decision  to  treat 
broadband providers as information services.
52  That assumption was that, going forward, carriage of 
bits would have to vertically integrate with higher-layer services and applications to work seamlessly 
and in an economically sustainable manner.  Moreover, Japan's focus on a ubiquitously network society 
also contemplates “fixed mobile convergence.”  The policy conclusion that the Japanese MIC drew from 
this assumption, however, was exactly the opposite of the conclusion that the FCC drew.  Rather than 
applying the anticipated integration to withdraw from access and carriage regulation, the MIC saw this 
anticipated business model as requiring the implementation of both open access at the network layer and 
net neutrality higher-up in the stack.  These steps were intended to assure that the incumbent could be 
permitted  to  enter  vertically  integrated  services  (NTT  East  and  West  in  collaboration  with  sister 
company NTT DoCoMo) while preventing it from undermining competition in any layer that depends 
on other layers, lower down in the stack.  As a result, telecommunications carriers that carry more than 
50% of subscriber lines in a given prefecture are required to offer equal treatment of all operators, 
including through offering price-regulated unbundling and interconnection of both fiber and copper.  
The price for the elements, in particular for fiber, is to be set so as to secure a profit for the incumbent 
that invested in the fiber.  In this regard, the target of pricing policy is conceptually similar to the one 
used in the United Kingdom for BT and Openreach, where sustaining structural separation requires that 
pricing allow the company to invest specifically for sale to competitors.  Moreover, following an 18-
month dispute process,  DoCoMo acquiesced in opening up its mobile  network to competitor Japan 
Communications, and publishing leasing and interconnection terms more transparently.   The result is 
the launch of two data-focused mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) (Japan Communications and 
IIJ Mobile) with a higher degree of control over their network than traditional resellers.  In order to 
support and permit further integration, the MIC set up a close annual review process, designating a 
watch list of potential points of bottleneck or anticompetitive limitations, to be reviewed and updated 
annually  with  the  anticipation  of  swift  regulatory  intervention  where  anticompetitive  practices  are 
observed. 
The critical insight here is that the Japanese approach sees a highly competent and intensely engaged 
regulator  as  an  enabler  of  competition,  rather  than  that  a  weak  and  removed  regulator  is  what 
competition requires.  Precisely to the extent that market conditions require market actors to integrate 
and innovate across dependent parts of the network and services, to that same extent the activity of the 
regulator allows dominant market actors to experiment with new operating arrangements while assuring 
competitors and entrants that they too can invest, because abuses by carriers who hold market power 
will be checked by the regulator.  The system of observation is not based on clear ex ante definitions of 
regulated versus unregulated elements (say copper, or even fiber), but on continuously updated and 
reviewed  actual  dependencies  between  elements  of  the  integrated  services,  followed  by  continuous 
updating of whether, and what,  elements require access by dependent  services to assure continuing 
competition.   As  a  practical  regulatory  matter,  this  approach  becomes  part  of  the  definition  of  net 
neutrality, which is understood as a mandate to ensure openness of the platform layer functions and 
openness of interfaces between layers, so that every user (end user and intermediate) should have equal 
access to every layer, based on well-defined technical standards that offer ready access to content and 
application layers. 
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Core lessons from Japan  
•  The target of next generation policy is not one or another level of measured capacity, in terms of 
speed or applications supported, but a ubiquitously-networked society, focused on seamless user 
experience and centered on the needs of users, not carriers. 
•  A professional and engaged regulator can monitor and measure a market, and provide confidence 
in its capacity to diagnose and respond to abuses by market-dominant players. 
•  A regulator capable of continuous monitoring and updated response can permit greater latitude 
for business innovation, secure, for itself and competitors, that it will identify and be able to act 
upon anticompetitive abuses masked as innovations. 
•  Access to incumbent networks, at regulated rates, was a critical part of the most visible early 
introduction of broadband into Japan with Yahoo!BB and is considered in Japan to have played a 
major role in driving speed and price competition.   
•  Access has long been applied to fiber, as well as to copper, and this policy is extended into the 
future.   It does not  appear to be the case that  fiber unbundling  was an important factor for 
entrants in fiber, which were largely facilities-based entrants either in cable or in power.  Copper 
unbundling that supported DSL was, however, important to the ability of important entrants like 
KDDI and Softbank to roll out services in areas where they did not yet have fiber coverage, 
mixing and matching capabilities and infrastructures to offer complete service.   
•  Access requirements do not seem to have stymied investment in fiber by NTT.   
•  Access and net neutrality are seen as part and parcel of the same commitment to permitting 
vertical integration and business innovation in the creation of ubiquitous access.   
•  Access to the physical and network layers and net neutrality above them are seen as ways of 
assuring innovation and competition while allowing incumbents to innovate and expand capacity 
as well.   
•  The move to ubiquitous, seamless connectivity as a goal appears to be in the process of being 
transposed into expanding some access requirements on the dominant mobile platform. 
4.5.2  South Korea 
The South Korean experience speaks more to government investment than to access regulation.  By one 
assessment South Korea invested $24 billion in its first transition on connecting schools and government 
centers in the 1990s, over $70 billion in low-cost loans to providers, and over $12 billion per year from 
2004-2007 on the transition to the next generation ubiquitous network.
53 It is not entirely clear how 
much of this is actual government subsidy, and how much is private investment.  If these numbers are 
even roughly representative of actual investments, made by a country with higher urban density and a 
population roughly one-sixth the size of the United States, then what we say about access in this context 
is largely moot, given that what is considered to be a major investment by the United States was the $7.2 
billion appropriated in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  As we will see in the discussion 
of  investment,  it  is  more  likely  that  these  numbers  reflect  a  large  proportion  of  private  investment 
complementing  the  public  investment,  in  which  case  it  is  not  outlandishly  large  by  standards  of 
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American total investment, adjusted per capita.  Moreover, South Korea is often given as an example of 
a  country  that  developed  fantastic  speeds  and  penetration  without  access  regulation,  and  so  it  is 
worthwhile looking at that aspect of its policies in the context of this section. 
Unlike in Japan, the South Korean MIC was long the more powerful and professional partner in the 
relationship between the regulator and the incumbent, Korea Telecom.  The first generation transition 
occurred largely under the Korea Information Infrastructure (KII) initiative, from 1995-2005.
54  Much of 
this program was about liberalization and permitting competitors into a market earlier dominated by a 
state-owned incumbent.  In addition, the program emphasized investment.  The program did not include 
a formal unbundling obligation imposed on KT until 2002, after South Korea had already moved from 
having practically no broadband to having by far the highest levels of penetration in the OECD.    
Two elements of early South Korean broadband adoption make the assessment that South Korea is a 
story inconsistent with access interventions overstated.  First, KT, like NTT, was focusing on ISDN as 
its  approach  to  high-rent  extraction.    DSL  was  introduced  by  facilities-based  entrants  Thrunet  and 
Hanaro.    The  catch  in  this  story  is  that  Thrunet  relied  partly  on  its  own,  government-funded 
infrastructure, and partly on leased access to cable facilities owned by Kepco, the state-owned Korean 
Electric Power Company.  Hanaro too relied in part on its own DSL capabilities, but in part on leasing 
cable capacity from Kepco.  For both companies, being able to lease capacity from an incumbent who 
was not itself permitted to offer direct broadband services to users played a significant role in their early 
deployment.  It was only after Hanaro and Thrunet introduced broadband that KT was forced to abandon 
its ISDN strategy and shift to DSL.  Once it did, its size and penetration allowed it to quickly capture a 
large market share, whereupon the South Korean MIC imposed unbundling obligations on KT in 2002.  
The ambiguity in this story is that, from the perspective of the entrants, they functioned under economic 
conditions  of  an  open  access  policy—they  built  their  entry  in  part  on  leasing  facilities  from  an 
incumbent, rather than facing the entire entry cost of rolling their own facilities from the start.  From the 
perspective of the incumbent, however, there was no “cost” in terms of investment incentives, because 
this  was  a  government  provider,  investing  government  funds,  without  reference  to  likely  long  term 
competitive abilities.  The most we can say from the South Korean experience, then, is that leased access 
to incumbent facilities spurred new entry; that the new entrant was the more innovative, just as Softbank 
Yahoo!BB had been in Japan, and that this entry spurred competition in the market and its transition to 
DSL.  We cannot make a full assessment because the incumbent sharing the lines did not internalize the 
cost of the regulation, and so the theoretically predicted negative effects on it were not brought to bear 
on the outcome.   
The second element from South Korea's first generation transition that bears on the access question is 
the role of collocation agreements with apartment complexes.  What had killed Tokyo Metallic in 1999 
was its inability to collocate—to put its electronics sufficiently within the network of the incumbent that 
it  could  efficiently  deliver  service  to  customers.    In  South  Korea,  however,  large  portions  of  the 
population live in huge apartment blocks, covering hundreds or even thousands of families.  Unlike in 
practically every other country, in South Korea the apartment building owners locate and own the small 
exchanges for the building.  The new entrants could, thus, enter into agreements with the apartment 
block owners to collocate their facilities on the premises.  The South Korean government amplified this 
effect by creating as part of its Internet deployment strategy a building certification program, in which it 
granted certification to buildings as “connected” when they had high capacity wiring installed.  The size 
of the multi-dwelling units makes access to their inside wiring the practical equivalent, in American or 
European  terms,  to  a  neighborhood  developer  or  association  owning  the  neighborhood  fiber  closet, 
rather than the incumbent doing so.  They provided ample physical space to accommodate new entrants, 
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and had every incentive in the world to do so in order to introduce competition in telecommunications 
services  for  the  neighborhood,  or  the  building.  The  practical  effect  of  the  legal  and  urban  design 
background facts was to replicate what required collocation rules to be put into effect in Japan, or, as we 
will see, in Europe.  On a much smaller scale, achieving this in-building collocation and sharing of 
connection points for fiber is one of the regulatory reforms introduced in the past year in France. 
Finally, as in Japan, in the last year the South Korean market has seen a substantial move toward fixed-
mobile convergence.  Mobile broadband leader SKT purchased the successor to Hanaro, SK Broadband.  
KT merged with the second largest mobile broadband provider, KFT.  As a condition for approving these 
mergers, which cover over 80% of the wireless market and close to 70% of the fixed broadband market, 
each of the new merged entities will have to provide open access to its mobile data network.  Because 
these  orders  are  all  from  the  first  half  of  2009,  it  is  too  soon  to  tell  how,  precisely,  they  will  be 
implemented, and what effect they will in fact have on the ability of competitors to compete in handsets, 
network components, or value added services higher up in the stack.  The development does suggest, 
however, increasing integration between fixed and mobile networks, consistent with the shift to a focus 
on ubiquity. 
Core lessons from South Korea 
•  Large coordinated investment, much of it public, and high-density urban cores may confound 
any serious possibility of importing insights from South Korea.  All other lessons should be taken 
with caution. 
•  The major market driver during the first transition was the introduction of new entrants, at least 
one of which relied on leased access to the plant of a government-owned cable incumbent. From 
the entrant's perspective it functioned as unbundled networks, or access to passive elements of a 
fiber network would.  From the incumbent's perspective it functioned very differently because 
the incumbent here was government owned and not in the business of broadband provision. 
•  South Korea has had substantial facilities-based competition from cable and electricity.   
•  South Korea, like Japan, has begun to expand open access to its mobile data networks, while at 
the same time permitting its dominant players to integrate across the fixed-mobile connection. 
4.6  The highest performers in Europe: Mid-sized, relatively homogeneous societies 
with (possibly) less contentious incumbents: the Nordic Countries and the 
Netherlands 
The Nordic countries occupy five of the top 8 positions in penetration per 100 inhabitants, despite their 
low density and urbanicity.  The Netherlands occupies the second position by that measure.  By our own, 
more detailed and balanced measures, Norway and Iceland slip because of higher prices, but Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands occupy four of the top quintile spots, together with Japan and 
South  Korea.    High  per  capita  GDP  and  median  income,  high  education,  low  inequality  all  likely 
contribute  to  this  performance,  as  does  government  investment  in  Sweden  and  to  some  extent  the 
Netherlands.  Iceland has a very small population which is extremely concentrated and urban, and we 
exclude it from our detailed studies here.   
The  four  Nordic  countries  are  reported  to  have  had  relatively  smooth  transitions  from  national 
ownership to privatized competition, in all cases with incumbents required to share their facilities with   Next Generation Connectivity 
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entrants.    Finland's  market  began  with  several  regional  monopolies  rather  than  a  single  national 
monopoly,  and  has  therefore  had  a  different  trajectory  to  competition.    The  Netherlands  had  what 
appears to be a bumpier implementation, but still smooth by comparison to the larger countries like 
France and Germany.  We report here in some detail the particulars of the market conditions in each, 
because the details explain, much better than theory, how unbundling  in the context of a smoothly 
regulated environment works.   
4.6.1  The Nordic Countries: Cross platform competition and “investment ladder” through 
entrepreneurial entrants being bought out by neighboring national incumbents 
In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, unbundling and open access worked exactly as they “should” have, 
according to the underlying theory that supported unbundling.  Innovative entrants opened up markets; 
some continued to operate; others were bought out by pan-European or pan-Nordic players and became 
the basis for entry by those players.  The risks—that incumbents would disinvest, that entrants would 
never graduate to independent competitors—did not materialize.  Finland is the outlier, and a puzzle.  
While it passed unbundling and enforced it, as best we can observe, unbundling has played little role in 
its development.  Finland's fixed-line competition seemed to have developed from the former regional 
and national telephone monopolists entering the more densely populated parts of their rival's territories 
with  their  own  fixed-line  plant.    More  recently,  these  incumbent-entrants  seem  to  have  shifted  to 
extending their reach through mobile broadband only, placing Finland in what its government considers 
a  mini-crisis  on  long-term  growth  and  spurring  plans  for  government  investment  in  less  densely 
populated areas.   
The Nordic countries appear to represent the case that a well functioning unbundling and open access 
regulatory regime, combined with well functioning markets and facilities-based competition, create a 
competitive  market  and  deliver  high  levels  of  penetration  and  quality  at,  mostly,  reasonable  prices.  
Competition  occurs  between  companies  that  each  compete  across  multiple  platforms,  not  between 
companies that use different platforms.  Investment and expansion are opportunistic, wherever there is 
capacity to be bought or built, and companies mix-and-match unbundled and own copper with cable and 
fiber. 
4.6.2  Denmark 
Denmark  introduced  local  loop  unbundling  in  1998.    The  primary  sources  of  competition  to  the 
privatized former state company, TDC, are now owned by the privatized former national operators in the 
other three Nordic countries:  the Swedish-Finnish merged incumbents, TeliaSonera, and the Norwegian 
Telenor.  These large competitors entered the market in the last few years, in large part by acquiring 
local entrants that had begun to operate through local loop unbundling and bitstream access.  
Telenor entered the Danish market by purchasing Danish DSL providers, Cybercity and Tele2, both of 
whom had their roots in unbundled and bitstream access.   Cybercity was a dial-up ISP founded in 1995.  
It moved to provide broadband primarily over unbundled loops, and to a lesser extent over bitstream 
access, until it was acquired by Telenor in 2005.  Tele2 was a Swedish company that launched voice 
telephony services in 1996. It entered the DSL market by purchasing Tiscali in 2003. Tiscali had been a 
competitive  ISP  that  built  its  business  model  on  local  loop  unbundling  where  it  was  available,  in 
relatively high-revenue areas. By the time it was purchased by Tele2 in 2003, it was one of Denmark's 
leading four providers.  Telenor bought Tele2 in 2007.  TeliaSonera entered the Danish market through a 
combination of cable facilities-based competition and unbundled access.  First, it entered in part by 
purchase  of  cable  company  Stofa.  It  also  did  so  in  part  by  purchasing  DLG-Tele,  an  agricultural   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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cooperative that had entered the fixed telephony  and DSL  markets after the 1996 privatization and 
introduction of unbundling.   
Danish competition today is a composite of large incumbents from neighboring countries entering each 
other's territories, buying up both copper and cable lines, rolling their own fiber as well.  The DSL side 
of the story very much depends on unbundling, and fits the “investment ladder” story about unbundling, 
although with a twist.  Unbundling attracted entrants like CyberCity or Tiscali. They used it to establish 
a customer base and presence, generated some competition to the incumbent (these entrants occupied on 
the  order  of  15%  of  the  market)  and  ultimately,  as  the  market  matured,  were  purchased  by  larger 
established competitors who could combine these customers with their own infrastructure.
55  At the 
same  time,  however,  competition  developed  over  cable.    But  just  like  the  entrants,  here  too  the 
incumbent, TDC, owned both copper and cable.  What we see in Denmark, then, is competition that 
includes cross-technology competition, but it is not run by a monopolist in either technology.  Instead, 
each  of  the  major  competitors  buys  different  bits  and  pieces  of  existing  companies,  using  various 
technologies, to create  coverage.   Like the Japanese story, the Danish  story is  an “and/both” story.  
Competition developed both within each technological platform, and across platforms; to some extent 
benefiting from unbundling when it was available, and to some extent benefiting from relatively low 
levels of investment necessary to upgrade an existing infrastructure like cable, or, in Japan, using power 
ducts.   
4.6.3  Sweden 
Sweden introduced local loop unbundling in January of 2001.  It also has large public investments and 
over 200 municipal initiatives.  It has the highest fiber penetration of all the Nordic countries, and is 
behind only Japan and South Korea in levels of fiber deployment.  The incumbent, TeliaSonera, is the 
largest  broadband  provider  in  the  country,  with  about  40%  of  the  market.    While  it  accepted  the 
regulator's requirement that it unbundle its copper loop, it fought the requirement that it offer unbundled 
bitstream access until it ultimately lost its appeals in 2007.  As in Denmark, Telenor has moved in to 
become the second largest broadband provider (21.5%), competing with TeliaSonera throughout the 
country.  As in Denmark, Telenor did so by buying several entrants, some of whom relied exclusively on 
unbundling to start up and build a customer base.   
Telenor entered the Swedish residential market by buying a large block in Glocalnet.  Glocalnet was 
launched in 1998 as a voice competitor, using wholesale purchase and repackaging voice, and then 
moved  to  offer  broadband  over  unbundled  copper  from TeliaSonera.    Telenor  purchased  Glocalnet, 
which  now  covers  90%  of  Swedish  homes  through  unbundled  DSL,  in  2003.    Telenor  bought 
Bredbandsbolaget  (B2  Bredband)  in  2005,  which  by  then  was  Sweden's  second  largest  broadband 
provider. B2 Bredband itself bought unbundling-based provider BoStream a year earlier.  B2 Bredband 
combined unbundled DSL with fiber over its own facilities to businesses and high end users.  Telenor 
later bought Spray from Lycos.  In all, Telenor combined, over the course of four years, several entrants, 
all of which depended either fully or mostly on unbundling to launch and sustain their business.  It 
continues to combine both owned facilities, particularly fiber, and unbundled copper loop.  In 2006-2007 
Glocalnet launched Wi-Fi mesh networks in 24 cities, called “Glocalzone,” and agreed with a pan-
European hotspot provider, the Cloud, to roll out 800 hotspots in Sweden and give its subscribers access 
to 8000 hotspots throughout Europe.  Telenor now bundles access to hotspots in Sweden's 20 largest 
cities with its mobile broadband offerings on the cellular side.  Telenor also bought nationwide WiMax 
licenses in the 3.6-3.8GHz and in the 2.6Ghz bands in 2007 and 2008.  The third largest broadband 
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provider is Com Hem, which offers a cable alternative, covering 18% of the market. It represents the 
straight facilities-based, cable alternative.   
The fourth provider, with 15.4% of the market, is Tele2, which launched in 1991 as the first dial-up ISP 
in Sweden.  Tele2 combines all three major avenues for fixed broadband networks.  It offers DSL service 
over  unbundled  local  loop  that  it  acquires  from  TeliaSonera.    It  increased  its  investment  in  these 
unbundled networks in 2005 to the point that since 2006 it has been selling access to components of 
unbundled local loops that it installed and owns to other providers, alongside its own retail services.  It is 
also Sweden's third largest cable company, and offers broadband and triple play over its cable network.  
Finally, given the high level of municipal fiber networks in Sweden, Tele2 has fiber and fiber/DSL 
combination networks as the contracted provider in 30 municipal fiber networks throughout Sweden.  
More generally, Tele2 has focused on selling to government purchasers, as well as businesses, as an 
independent line of investment.  Finally, Tele2 purchased nationwide WiMax licenses in May 2008, and 
plans to roll out WiMax networks to complement its other strategies.    
Convinced by the perceived success of unbundling in fostering competition, investment, and innovation 
in its broadband markets, concerned about managing the transition to next generation networks, and 
possibly  smarting  from  the  long  fought  battle  over  bitstream  access,  the  Swedish  regulator  PTS 
concluded  that  it  would  best  manage  the  transition  to  next  generation  connectivity  by  imposing 
functional separation on its incumbent.
56  The PTS then “leaned” on TeliaSonera to accept functional 
separation in June of 2007.  In September of that year, TeliaSonera announced its agreement, and by 
January 1, 2008, it formed TeliaSonera Skanova Access to provide services to its wholesale customers.  
In March 2008 the government proposed a bill that formalized the action by empowering the regulator to 
require functional separation; in the summer of 2008 legal guidelines implementing the law were put 
into effect.
57    
4.6.4  Norway 
While  Norway  ranks  high  on  penetration  per  100,  its  overall  performance  based  on  our 
multidimensional  benchmarking  here  is  lower  than  that  of  the  other  Nordic  countries.    Norway 
introduced unbundling in 2001.  The incumbent Telenor serves half the broadband market.  The second 
largest broadband provider is NextGenTel, which was bought by TeliaSonera in 2006 and now has a 
10% market share.  NextGenTel was launched as a business-oriented ISP in March 2000, and expanded 
to the residential market using unbundled copper loops and bitstream access from Telenor, after the 
introduction of local loop unbundling.  NextGenTel also owns and operates WiMax networks in some of 
Norway's harder-to-reach areas.  TDC has also entered Norway, but has focused on providing high-end 
connectivity  to  businesses  over  its  own  facilities.    In  the  broader  broadband  market,  therefore, 
NextGenTel  is  followed  by  a  clutch  of  smaller,  5-7%  of  market  share  sized  competitors:  Get, 
Ventelo/Norge, and Tele2 Norge.   
Telenor's competitors are made up of both cable operators and entrants who, like NextGenTel, built their 
networks on unbundled elements.  Get is the main competitor to Telenor's cable system, Canal Digital 
Kabel, and reaches about 7% of Norway's broadband market over its cable systems.  Another of the 5-
10% market share competitors is Tele2.  In Norway, Tele2 is a subsidiary of the Swedish Tele2 (the 
Danish Tele2 subsidiary was bought by Telenor.), and was launched as a dial-up ISP in 1997.  In August 
2002 it began to offer DSL using wholesale access as a complement to voice telephony, which it also 
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was offering on a resale model.  In 2005 it began to roll out its own DSL service using unbundled 
elements, and in 2008 to switch customers over to its own facilities.  This pattern of investment fits the 
investment ladder model, but may also be driven by the absence of wholesale bitstream access price 
regulation in Norway.  At the same time, the absence of bistream access price regulation may contribute 
to the fact that Norway's prices are substantially higher than they are in the other Nordic countries.  The 
third competitor in this cluster is Ventelo/Norge, a composite of a business-focused provider and two 
earlier entrants, BlueCom and Catch.  While it is clear that the company combines own-infrastructure 
with unbundled and wholesale bitstream, as did its predecessors, the details are difficult to tease out.  It 
appears that, like NextGenTel and Tele2, Venetelo/Norge also is built of a composite that, at least insofar 
as its residential business goes, was built on unbundling, bitstream, and wholesale access.   
4.6.5  Finland 
Finland was the first Nordic country to introduce unbundling, in 1996.  Unbundling seems to have had 
little or no effect in the Finnish market, however.  First, Finland's old telecommunications system was 
different  from  those  of  other  European  countries.    It  had  a  single  long-distance  and  international 
monopoly, Sonera, which in 2002 combined with Swedish monopoly Telia to form TeliaSonera.  It also 
had 27 local phone monopolies.  Of these, two, Elisa and DNA, now operate as independent players. 
The other former local monopolies form the Finnet Group.  Finland also has a cable company, Welho, 
which provides broadband, but covers less than 7% of the market.  The aggregate national market is not 
highly concentrated. Elisa, the former local monopoly in Helsinki, is the largest, and TeliaSonera, the 
former  long-distance  monopolist,  each  has  slightly  less  than  30%  of  the  broadband  market.    The 
remainder is split between DNA, Finnet, and Welho.  Because all of these players are former local 
monopolists, each is the incumbent in its own area.  They then appear to selectively enter each other's 
markets: In Helsinki, Espoo, and Vantaa, it would be Elisa, TeliaSonera, and Welho, while in Oulu, a 
historically DNA incumbency, it would be Elisa, TeliaSonera, and DNA, and so forth for the various 
Finnet Group members.  In the discussion of the Canadian market below, we see that a similar structure, 
where  former  incumbents  can  enter  each  other's  markets,  has  not  in  fact  resulted  in  significant 
competition.  In Finland, on the other hand, it does appear likely that competition has indeed emerged.  
Finland has a high level of penetration, at some of the highest speeds available in the world, at prices 
that are among the five best prices, in every single speed range, in the OECD.  Moreover, as we observe 
in  our  company-level  pricing  study  (See  Fig.  4.2),  Elisa  and  TeliaSonera  Finland  have  practically 
identical offerings at the very high speed tiers, which are in the same highest-speed level, low prices as 
the entrants (but not KT) in South Korea and France Telecom, and only somewhat higher prices than in 
Japan, France (entrants only), and Sweden (entrants). It is possible, however, that the impetus for this 
has been the high levels of investment and penetration of wireless mobile networks: Over 85% of the 
country is covered by 3.5G networks.  Concerned that broadband providers would fail to invest further 
in fixed technology and rely too heavily on wireless mobile broadband that will not lead to sufficient 
long-term capacity, the government of Finland passed a resolution in September of 2008 committing to 
deliver 100 Mbps service to 99% of permanent residences by 2015.  The practical consequence is a 
commitment  to  invest  in  government  subsidies,  where  necessary,  to  reach  that  goal  where  market 
conditions appear not to be leading in that direction.   
4.6.6  The Netherlands: From unbundling and facilities-based competition to shared next 
generation infrastructure 
The Netherlands offers a case where facilities-based competitors use the incumbent's unbundled network 
elements to extend their reach, and offers particularly interesting observations about current approaches 
to competitors sharing capacity of newly constructed fiber plant on an open access model.  The Dutch   Next Generation Connectivity 
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experience  combines  substantial  facilities-based  competition  with  relatively  early  availability  of 
unbundled access to drive competition.   
The Netherlands has a very high level of cable penetration.  Cable providers began to provide broadband 
early on. Cable broadband providers Zesko and UPC account for 36% of the market.   
Competitive  DSL  providers  seem  to  rely  heavily  on  their  own  middle-mile  facilities-based 
infrastructure, combined with last mile unbundled local loop from the incumbent KPN.  Tele2-Versatel 
uses backhaul facilities from its telephony side, Versatel.  A second DSL provider, BBned began to offer 
an  alternative  partial-facilities-based  competitor  as  early  as  2000,  over  its  own  telecommunications 
infrastructure, as well as offer its network for other providers to use on a wholesale basis.  BBned is now 
owned by Telecom Italia, which uses its network to offer triple-play offerings, and offers DSL as BBned 
and Alice.  Online is another provider, a subsidiary of T-Mobile Netherlands (that is, a subsidiary of 
Deutsche Telekom).  Much of the competition in the broadband market is between different brands 
managed by discrete wholly-owned subsidiaries of KPN, which use the parent's network.  The same was 
true for a while for the major cable provider, Zesko, until it began to consolidate its brand as Ziggo.   
The  presence  of  substantial  facilities-based  investment  in  the  middle  mile  is  complemented  by 
unbundling  in  the  last  mile.    KPN  reported  in  the  last  year  3.7  million  unbundled  loops  at  Main 
Distribution Frames and 800,000 at the cabinet.  Negotiations over next generation network deployment 
in  2007-2009  focused  on  how  to  retire  1,400  exchanges  at  which  KPN  competitors  had  collocated 
facilities.  These data strongly support the conclusion that the DSL competitors combined their facilities 
with KPN's local loop through unbundling.   
The  Dutch  experience  seems,  then,  to  suggest  a  clear  example  of  a  context  in  which  unbundling 
complements facilities-based investment and competition.  Current investment plans and agreements for 
the fiber transition suggest that this pattern of investment by both incumbents and entrants around a 
shared core set of facilities will continue.   
OPTA, the Dutch regulator, is the first regulator in Europe to have implemented a requirement for fiber 
unbundling on regulated terms.
58  OPTA uses a price-cap approach, subject to three-year review, with 
levels backed out of the business case of KPN and Reggefiber (below) with an explicit commitment to 
leave enough headroom to make the positive business case for investing in an open  fiber network.  
OPTA also set a deadline for KPN to reach agreement with its competitors on how it was to transition its 
network to next generation access, including the open access element, or face an OPTA-designed plan.   
In  2008  telecommunications  incumbent  KPN  responded  by  announcing  a  plan  to  roll  out  its  next 
generation network on an open access model, using a joint venture to spread the risk and separate the 
functions of wholesale access for providers from retail.  KPN concluded memoranda of understanding 
with Tele2-Versatel, BBned, and Orange Netherlands (which is moving from mobile to DSL to take 
advantage of fixed-mobile convergence) on the terms of next generation roll out and the sharing of 
facilities.  The core of the plan, as it has been implemented since 2008, seems to be a self-imposed 
quasi-structural separation.  In November of 2008 KPN entered an agreement with a private company 
that  had  been  working  on  municipal  and  utility  fiber  deployments,  Reggefiber,  to  deploy  the  fiber 
infrastructure in a number of towns and retain ownership in the cable.  KPN will apparently own 41% of 
the stock of the new venture, which is expected to invest 6-7 billion Euro in rolling fiber out to the 
home, mostly using point-to-point topology, with occasional uses of VDSL2 topology.  KPN will then 
provide service over that platform alongside, and on equal terms with, its competitors.  Reggefiber has, 
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as part of this effort, increased its share of a public private partnership that was rolling out fiber in 
Amsterdam, Glasvezelnet Amsterdam (GNA) to 70%, increasing its share by buying shares from the city 
and housing corporations that are part of the project (see below, section on municipal investments).  
Unlike Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, and Bell Canada, which have argued that the investments 
necessary to deploy next generation infrastructure require that they be allowed to exclude competitors, 
KPN has used the transition to the next generation of connectivity to decrease its share of the cost and 
risk  in  laying  out  the  basic  network,  and  coupled  its  investment  with  a  structural  commitment  to 
implement open access.  As in Sweden, and perhaps with Telecom Italia, and unlike in the UK and New 
Zealand, this was achieved not by explicit regulation, but by agreement between the incumbent and its 
competitors, backed by the threat of a regulatory solution if no such agreement was reached.    
4.6.7  Core lessons from the Nordic countries and Netherlands 
1.  Facilities-based competition from cable and unbundling-based competition are complementary 
forms of competitive entry, not substitutes. 
2.  Entrepreneurial  competitors  mostly  entered  through  wholesale  and  unbundling.    Their 
“investment ladder” advancement was facilitated by being purchased by incumbents from nearby 
countries expanding into neighboring countries.  In Finland, where there were several regional 
incumbents, competition developed through their expansion into each other's territories. 
3.  Competition occurred between companies across platforms, rather than between platforms where 
each  platform  was  itself  monopoly-owned.    Entrants  mixed-and-matched  low-cost  entry 
strategies  whether  upgrading  cable,  partnering  with  an  electric  utility,  or  acquiring  an 
unbundling-based broadband entrant. 
4.  In Sweden and the Netherlands, the translation of the lessons of the past decade to the next 
generation transition have taken the form of imposing functional separation on the incumbent as 
it  moves  to  deploy  the  next  generation  network.    In  both  countries  that  approach  was 
complemented by municipal efforts, as we will discuss in the section on municipal investments. 
4.7  The larger European economies: Diverse responses to recalcitrant incumbents  
France,  Germany,  the  UK  and  Italy  are  much  larger  countries  and  economies,  with  (excepting  the 
Netherlands) more diverse populations.  In all of them, dealing with recalcitrant incumbents was a more 
pronounced part of the story.  France and Germany represent in many cases symmetric stories, with a 
divergence point in 2002-2003 that offers a particularly sharp view of the differing effects of an engaged 
regulator genuinely improving conditions for competitors.  The UK represents a different case yet, with 
an  incumbent  that  was  less  directly  confrontational,  but  that  effectively  succeeded  in  resisting 
unbundling until the regulator forced functional separation.  Italy rounds out the group with an overall 
more ambiguous case, where it is unclear that unbundling played much of a role, where fixed broadband 
penetration is low, despite low prices, and where mobile broadband seems to have taken off and to a 
great extent substituted for fixed broadband. 
4.7.1  France and Germany: Divergent responses to incumbent opposition 
Despite having roughly similar GDP per capita (Germany slightly higher) and population concentration 
(France slightly higher), the two countries present quite different trajectories.  In 2002-2003, France 
revamped its regulatory scheme to emphasize the needs of innovative entrants over those of incumbent   Next Generation Connectivity 
  96 
France Telecom.  Germany did not.  As a result, France Telecom's major competitors have a larger 
market  share  than  do  Deutsche  Telekom's,  present  more  entrepreneurial  corporate  profiles,  and  are 
among the most innovative in the world in terms of services and fixed-mobile-nomadic integration.  
In 2002, France had half the penetration levels of Germany.  Today, the two countries have similar levels 
of penetration, with France slightly ahead per population and slightly behind per household.  In speed, 
France today is part of the small group of first tier countries with substantial offerings of 100 Mbps 
service.  Four companies are now pulling fiber through Paris.  Germany occupies the second tier, where 
50Mbps speeds are the highest available residential offering.  Average prices are lower in France for 
every tier of service, from the very low speed offerings to the very high speed offerings, than they are in 
Germany.  France's prices for the mid- to high level offerings (2.5Mbps – 32Mbps) are the lowest in the 
world, and for the highest speeds tier, its prices are lower than anywhere but Japan.  Levels of mobile 
cellular  data  access  are  similar,  but  nomadic  access  in  France  is  about  two  and  a  half  times  as 
widespread as it is in Germany, the result of an innovative business model introduced by the competitors 
in fixed broadband.  In our composite measures, both countries perform better than they are generally 
perceived to have performed based on the penetration metric alone.  France is located in the 7
th rank by 
our measures; Germany shares the 9
th/ and 10
th slots with the UK. 
France   
If the United States was about a decade ahead of the main body of OECD countries on what we called 
deregulation and the Europeans call liberalization, France was about a decade behind.  Throughout the 
1990s, under the governments of both Presidents Mitterrand (left) and Chirac (right), France Telecom 
(FT) was left very much intact, the state kept a substantial investment in it and dragged its feet on easing 
competitor entry.  In 2001, France's broadband penetration levels were less than one-quarter that of the 
United States, and about one-third of the average broadband penetration across the OECD countries.
59  
Its broadband penetration rate per 100 inhabitants was 15
th to the U.S. 4
th.
60   In 2003, 86% of  FT 
employees were still civil servants.   
The  French  1996  Telecommunications Act  created  the  first  independent  telecommunications  sector 
regulator in France, the ART.  The ART was a five member commission whose members could not be 
removed during their 6 year term.  However, the ART was a relatively weak regulator, by the standards 
of other European countries.  Its core regulatory decisions, about network operations, interconnection, 
etc., required approval by the Minister for Economy, Finance, and Industry before becoming binding.  
Its decisions could be appealed in court, on both substantive and procedural grounds. FT used this power 
on several occasions to block ART efforts. On interconnection, the ART for the first few years could act 
only on complaints, not of its own accord, and its dispute resolution decisions were delayed and slow. As 
a 2003 OECD assessment of the state of regulatory reform in France put it: “There have been continuing 
criticisms  about  certain  aspects  of  the ART’s  approach  to  dispute  resolution,  but  the  real  problem 
appears to be the number of appeals against ART decisions and the lack of power to enforce decisions or 
unwillingness  to  implement  sanctions  where  these  are  not  respected.”
61    The  primary  source  of 
complaints  was  not  so  much  explicit  price  abuses,  but  non-price  abuses  by  FT,  such  as  delays  in 
interconnection  and  the  use  of  imprecise  terms,  like  using  “average”  delays  rather  than  clear  fixed 
commitments that would have allowed entrants to plan.    
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Change in France came largely as a result of European Union action.  As part of the Lisbon Agenda 
aimed in part to make Europe “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy,” the 
European  Commission  passed  a  Framework  Directive  in  early  2002,
62  as  well  as  a  series  of  more 
specific  directives,  requiring  member  states,  among  other  things,  to  adopt  wholesale  local  loop 
unbundling, bitstream access, and leased lines into national law by July of 2003.  Formally, French law 
had long been in compliance.  Unbundling had come into effect in January of 2001.  However, the ART 
did not pre-approve  FT's reference offer, and did not effectively  enforce it.   In 2002 the European 
Commission  brought  an  infringement  action  against  the  ART,  forcing  action  on  both  requiring  a 
reference offer and regulating the rates.  By the end of 2002 France's regulated unbundling and shared 
access rates dropped, and were the second lowest in the EU, second only to Denmark.
63  Between 
February 2003 and January 2004, the number of unbundled loops in France grew from practically none 
to over 250,000.
64  In 2004 the French parliament concluded its revision of French law in response to the 
European regulatory framework, and approved a new set of powers and reorganization for the ART, 
which by 2005 concluded its transformation into the current regulator, ARCEP.
65   
Today, FT holds 47% of the French broadband market, has two major competitors, Iliad (Free) (24%) 
and SFR (with Neuf Cegetel) (22%), and one significant minor fourth, Numericable-Completel (5.5%).   
Free  built  its  business  primarily  through  use  of  unbundled  loops,  and  now  combines  both  its  own 
broadband  service  and  that  of Alice,  originally Tiscali  (a  company  that  built  unbundled  services  in 
several of the countries we studied), which it purchased from Telecom Italia in 2008.  Free began to 
build its own network in 2000, but took off when it was able to roll out unbundled services in 2003, soon 
after effective regulations were put in place.  It introduced a 30 Euro offering, and has since kept that 
price while extending the quality of the offerings and making that the reference price of competitive 
broadband  services  in  France.      In  2007,  Free  announced  a  municipal  partnership  with  the  city  of 
Valenciennes, rolling out a 100Mpbs down / 50Mbps up network.  More recently, as part of a Paris fiber 
project announced earlier, Free formally announced in May of 2008 a collaboration with the real estate 
industry association in Paris Ile-de-France to promote Free's FttH in buildings.  Faced with the fast 
development of fiber, and with the importance of connections at the building and home level, in August 
of 2008 the French parliament passed a law requiring new building operators and co-owners to install 
fiber throughout the building, and to open this fiber plant to any FttH provider that wishes to reach 
residents.  In existing buildings ARCEP has required that FttH providers cooperate to assure minimal 
disruption in construction while assuring equal access to the last fiber drop to all FttH providers.   Free 
has announced its intentions to invest EUR1 billion by 2012, connecting 4 million French households to 
its FttH network.   
Where  it  has  rolled  out  fiber,  Free  offers  a  triple-plus  play  package  that  includes  100Mbs 
upload/50Mbps download, HDTV (including the ability to upload your own content onto a TV channel 
that can then be watched by family or friends in other cities), and unlimited voice calling nationally and 
to 70 international countries for EUR29.99 per month, or about USD32.59 PPP.  Customers it reaches 
over unbundled networks rather than fiber networks receive the triple play offer with 28Mbps service, 
for the same price.  In addition to the triple play packaged recognizable to Americans, Free subscribers 
also have as part of their package access to Wi-Fi hotspots whenever they are within reach of another 
Free subscriber's home, because the home Freebox that connects each subscriber to the service also acts 
as a hotspot for any Free subscriber.  The Wi-Fi nomadic capabilities were added to what originally was 
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an  innovative  workaround  to  the  fact  that  Free  had  not  won  any  of  France's  original  3G  wireless 
licenses, and refused to pay the government's reservation price in a later spectrum auction intended to 
give Free the opportunity to become another mobile broadband provider.  In 2006, Free made it possible 
for users who owned Wi-Fi-enabled cellular handsets to make free calls as long as they were within 
reach of a Free Wi-Fi hotspot.  Another workaround that Free has tried to pursue was its 2005 purchase 
of Altitude Telecom, the owner of the sole 3.5GHz WiMax license in France.  
SFR is a mobile operator, owned by Vivendi Universal and Vodafone.  In 2008 it took control of the 
primary wireline telephony competitor to FT, Neuf Cegetel, which in turn is the result of a 2005 merger 
between Neuf telecom and Cegetel.  A January 2005 report on Neuf's then-proposed introduction of 
IPTV over DSL, Industry newsletter Light Reading reported: “Talking to Light Reading at last week's 
TVoverDSL 2005
66 event in Paris, François Paulus, director of the operator's networks division, says 
Neuf trialed TV-over-DSL in September 2002, but 'we wanted to own the customer, so we waited for 
unbundling,' which took off in France in 2004.”
67 Neuf was described in that publication as “the most 
aggressive unbundler of the French local loop, having installed its own access equipment in more than 
700 local exchanges, covering the majority of the French population.”  Perhaps the most interesting 
innovation that the new combined SFR is currently offering as its path to fixed-mobile convergence is its 
iPhone app, which allows customers to switch seamlessly from its 3G network to Wi-Fi boxes of SFR 
fixed broadband subscribers.  While this may not do much for customers—who subscribe to unlimited 
data plans anyway—it appears to allow the company to reduce the load on its cellular data network.  
Neuf Cegetel launched its first fiber offering in 2007, and, like Free, now offers it for EUR29.99.   
Numericable is the major cable telephony and broadband company in a country where cable penetration 
is  low.    While  it  covers  almost  100%  of  the  cable-served  households  in  France,  its  share  of  the 
broadband market is only 5.5%.  In 2008 it sought to expand its broadband coverage by using the 
Completel unbundled network (the two companies were bought a few months earlier by the Carlyle 
Group).  It now offers broadband speeds of up to 100Mbps over its cable network for EUR19.90, and up 
to 20Mbps, bundled with television and free unlimited voice calls nationally and to 45 international 
destinations, over Completel's unbundled network, for EUR29.90. 
France Telecom has responded to all this activity with higher investment and lower prices. Its prices are 
still higher for its triple-play offers than those of Free and SFR (USD48.70PPP for up to 100Mbps) (it 
also  adds  a  EUR3  per  month  box  rental  and  a  49EUR  deposit  on  the  box).    It  has  increased  its 
announced investment plans in fiber rollout from EUR270 million to between 3 and EUR4.5 billion, but 
hedged that it would not invest more than 2 billion if it did not attain sufficient market share.  Like Free, 
FT too reached agreement with a major multi-unit building owners' association to install FttH in 800,000 
French homes.  At least one market analysis credits FT's broadband response as an important part of 
improving FT's financial performance, stating that “The success here has been attributed in the main to 
the rapid development of ADSL access, increased revenues gained from unbundling broadband lines and 
more recently, its commitment to fiber-based ultra-high speed technologies.”
68 
Germany 
Like France, Germany too was initially reluctant to regulate Deutsche Telekom (DT).  As in France, 
after the formal enactment of access requirements, DT balked and resisted.  Unlike France, Germany did 
not undergo a regulatory reform that realigned the relative power of the regulator and the incumbent.  
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Current market analyses of German entrants read very differently than do market analyses of French or 
Nordic entrants.  DT was privatized in 1995, although as recently as 2004 the German government still 
held over 40% of the company's shares, and continues to be the company's second largest shareholder, 
owning just under 15% of the shares. The German 1996 Telecommunications Act created a somewhat 
more powerful regulator than France's original ART, particularly in that the German regulator, RegTP, 
was independent of any veto power by the Ministry of Economics and Labor.  Despite this formal 
independence,  a  2004  review  of  Germany's  policies  repeatedly  reports  concerns  by  competitors  of 
conflict  of  interest  between  the  government's  interests  as  a  shareholder  and  its  power  as  regulator.  
Moreover, as in the United States, DT used judicial review to challenge and delay or prevent most major 
regulations  related  to  access  by,  or  prices  charged  to,  competitors.    In  1998  the  RegTP  enacted 
implementing  regulations  on  network  access,  based  on  the  1996  Telecommunications Act.   Actual 
implementation was mired in lack of transparent accounting, pricing games (e.g., charging competitors 
per-minute interconnection charges while offering its own customers low flat-rate DSL services), and 
long delivery times on competitors' orders (the longest in Europe in the early 2000s, 90 days in Germany 
to 21 days in France in 2001, which the French ART then required by further reduced to 14 days).  When 
the European Commission brought action under the EU law to force clearer implementation, the German 
national courts blocked or delayed efforts by the RegTP to bring DT into compliance.  Despite the 
existence of a legal requirement to offer unbundling since 1998, therefore, DT did not actually publish a 
reference  offer  until  2002,  and  then  only  in  response  to  an  enforcement  action  by  the  European 
Commission.  The regulatory technique used to determine the rates, however, resulted in DT charging its 
competitors 13% more for wholesale leased access to its lines than it charged its own retail customers.
69 
Again, it took more than another year before DT addressed this imbalance—by raising its retail rates.  
Germany  was  also among the last to implement bitstream access, the  cheapest method of allowing 
competitors into the market, in September 2006. This new provision was passed by Germany's by-then 
reorganized and renamed regulator, the Federal Network Agency, BnetzA.
70  At the same time, however, 
the  German  parliament  was  considering  a  bill  exempting  DT  from  opening  its  VDSL  network  to 
competitors.   As  a  recent  market  analysis  report  states:  “The  German  parliament  passed  the  bill in 
December  [2006],  stating  it  was  necessary  to  protect  domestic  business  interests  and  make  DT's 
investments possible.”
71  The European Commission sued the German  government in the European 
Court of Justice after the bill became law in February of 2007, but the proceeding is likely to last until 
2010.   
Nothing  captures  the  German  regulatory  experience  better  than  comparing  the  language  in  two 
independent reviews from 2004 and 2008.  In 2004, an OECD report on German regulatory reform 
diplomatically  complemented  RegTP,  but  then  added:  “However,  RegTP  has  been  less  effective  in 
seeing  its  decisions  implemented  and  has  been  reluctant  to  investigate  important  issues  such  as 
wholesale mobile termination rates. DT has successfully used judicial review of regulatory decisions to 
delay, indeed block, the enforcement of regulatory decisions. While unbundling of the local loop was 
mandated back in 1997, through delays in the provision of leased lines, price-squeeze tactics, artificially 
low retail prices for DSL services, etc., DTAG has virtually precluded competition and retained or even 
recently established a dominant position such as in broadband services.”  In September of 2008, an 
independent review for the British Government, commissioned as part of its next generation planning 
process, described the experience of next generation access deployment in other countries.  It opened its 
description of France with: “In France, fibre deployment is happening as result of fierce competition in 
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current generation broadband services.”  The description of Germany in the same report opens with: “In 
Germany, Deutsche Telekom has been engaged in a debate over regulatory forbearance.”
72   
Germany was not able to convert its large installed cable plant, passing over two-thirds of homes, into a 
substantial source of competition.  First, most of the cable plant was owned by DT. It was not until 2003, 
four years after the European Directive requiring national telecommunications incumbents to divest their 
cable holdings, that DT in fact sold off its cable holdings. Even then, however, the German regulatory 
regime for cable continued to impede the creation of effective national competitors over the cable plant.  
Germany now has no cable-based broadband competitors of significance. 
A review of DT's primary competitors suggests that the need to build a facilities-based alternative from 
the  ground  up  has  limited  entry  to  large,  locally-anchored  networks,  and  hampered  their  expansion 
beyond  their  original  core  regions.    Two  of  DT's  three  primary  competitors  grew  out  of  regional 
networks: Vodafone-owned Arcor (13% of the market) originated as a Stuttgart network, and expanded 
to several other major cities building out its own facilities as it went along. HansNet Telekomunikation 
(10%) began, and has largely remained, a Hamburg-based regional competitor. Arcor launched its own 
network for voice competition in 1998, and was bought by UK-based mobile carrier Vodafone in 2000.  
Its strategy has largely been to deploy its own network, and pursue only interconnection agreements, not 
unbundling agreements, with DT. In 2000-2001 it tried to roll out wireless broadband networks in 243 
license areas, but abandoned the project as infeasible in 2002. In 2004-2005 the company upgraded its 
DSL  facilities  to  allow  faster  speeds,  and  in  2005  re-started  an  experiment  with  WiMax  in 
Kaiserslautern, to test whether it could extend its DSL offerings in parts of the town that its network 
could  not  reach.    In  late  2007 Arcor  announced  plans  to  invest  billions  in  building  its  own VDSL 
network, and at the same time sued DT for its refusal to open up its last mile network.  BnetzA found 
that  the  delays  were  a  backlog  caused  by  an  increased  demand  among  competitors  that  DT  was 
managing, and then announced that it was abandoning the case because under the threat of suit DT had 
eliminated the backlog. In late 2008 Arcor began to pilot experiments for a VDSL network in two small 
towns in Thuringia. In June and July of 2009, DT and Vodafone apparently reached agreement to roll out 
pilot networks in cooperation in two towns.  Arcor announced, however, that it was putting plans to roll 
out VDSL in other German cities on hold because it was not able to reach agreement with DT on access 
to DT's local networks in those areas. 
HansNet is anchored in Hamburg, where it is a successful regional provider launched in 1995. In 2005 it 
rolled out broadband in eight major western cities and Berlin, but then abandoned plans to also expand 
to three eastern cities, citing DT's refusal to open up its nationwide VDSL network to competitors.  
Since  2006,  HansNet  has  tried  to  compensate  by  contracting  with  other,  smaller  business  oriented 
networks, Telefonica Deutscheland and QS Communications, to buy unbundled parts of their networks 
instead.  Various public announcements suggest that DT's competitors were discussing combining to 
build  an  alternative VDSL  network.    It  is  difficult  to  assess,  however,  whether  these  are  efforts  to 
pressure DT to open its network, at least on a wholesale basis, and whether DT's announcement in the 
second quarter of 2009 that it would open its VDSL network on a wholesale basis is a way of staving off 
alternative investments or diffusing the regulatory pressure from the European Commission.  
DT's  final  major  competitor,  United  was,  until  recently,  the  second  largest  broadband  provider.    It 
became so purely be reselling DSL that it bought under very favorable terms from DT between 2004 and 
2006.  While it is difficult to know with greater precision, the circumstances suggest that DT created 
those  terms  so  that  it  could  reduce  its  above-90%  market  share  in  the  face  of  potential  regulatory 
pressure.  The timing of DT's initial offer of wholesale rates to United is consistent with the negotiations 
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over the German revision of the telecommunications law.  The facts that two years later, in 2006, BnetzA 
found that DT's terms to United were discriminating against smaller competing ISPs, and that when the 
discrimination was eliminated United began to shrink, are similarly suggestive.  Today United is trying 
to expand again by reaching resale agreements with Arcor as well as continuing to resell DT services, 
and by buying up smaller resale ISPs. 
Lessons from France and Germany 
Germany and France present opposing stories on the role of regulatory engagement and open access 
obligations.  Both countries had politically powerful, entrenched incumbents.  Both countries began the 
2000s with relatively weak performance in broadband. Both were prodded into action by the European 
Commission in 2002-2003.  France in fact turned around and created an effective regulatory regime that 
forced FT to open its networks to competitors.  These innovative entrants—Free and Neuf Telecom in 
particular—entered  the  market  aggressively,  investing  in  multiple  access  technologies,  building 
customer base quickly, and rolling out innovative marketing packages.  Germany faltered, permitting the 
incumbent to delay through court actions and bureaucratic foot dragging.  This appears to have created 
investment  uncertainty  for  its  competitive  entrants,  and  limited  the  primary  entry  possibilities  to 
relatively large regional providers with, of necessity, a more cautious business mentality.  Germany 
began the year 2002 with double the level of broadband penetration per 100 inhabitants that France had. 
By  2006  France  had  slightly  overtaken  Germany  by  that  measure  (although  not  in  penetration  per 
households).  Average advertised prices in Germany are substantially higher across every category of 
service, from very low speeds to very high speeds.  France is among the countries in the first tier of 
speed availability, with substantial availability of 100Mbps service.  Germany is in the second tier, with 
offerings of 50Mbps characterizing the top range available to residential subscribers.  A review of the 
company histories of those companies that generated the competitive environment in the two countries 
strongly suggests that unbundling and open access played a significant role in entry.  A review of the 
regulatory histories and political economy of the two countries suggests that that difference, in turn, was 
driven by political will, regulatory engagement, and determination around the implementation of the 
network access framework that the EC passed in 2002.   
Let us be clear: Germany is not in a crisis.  Its size and wealth allow it to grow and expand its Internet 
capabilities nicely relative to much of the rest of the world.  Indeed, Germany's penetration levels have 
grown  to  a  point  that  in  2007  it  outpaced  the  United  States  in  penetration  per  100  inhabitants.  
Germany's fast Internet residential offerings are every bit as fast as those available in the United States, 
and prices in Germany are lower than in the United States in every category of service except the very 
slowest speeds.  Together these have meant that Germany's standing in our benchmarking study is better 
than in the penetration rankings more often used.  But as a model for learning about how a country goes 
about  fostering  entrepreneurial  innovation  in  network  infrastructure  for  the  next  generation,  France 
presents a more attractive target for learning than does Germany, which it outperforms in every category 
of interest. 
In conclusion we can summarize the core lessons:   
1.  Contrary to arguments occasionally made in the United States, former government monopolies, 
just like private companies, have resisted regulations intended to ease entry by competitors likely 
to compete away their rents.  This resistance comes from both management and unions. 
2.  Formal  adoption  of  a  given  regulatory  arrangement  is  not  the  end  of  the  story.    Effective 
engagement by a regulator, and effective implementation, are critical.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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3.  Lowering entry barriers by requiring the sale of facilities seems to enable different kinds of 
entrants  than  a  purely  facilities-based  market.    As  in  the  case  of  Softbank,  the  French 
arrangement attracted entrepreneurial entrants that introduced radically new service models. The 
German approach, which limited entry to companies able to build their own facilities, seemed to 
produce more conservative entrants, which had a smaller impact on the market. 
4.7.2  United Kingdom: From access to functional separation 
In 2001, the United Kingdom's per household and per inhabitant penetration was one-seventh the level 
of penetration in the United States at that time.  Starting from a low level, it is unsurprising that Britain's 
growth rate was faster, but in the first half of 2005 Britain still had slightly lower levels of penetration 
than  the  United  States.    Since  the  beginning  of  2006  Britain  has  overtaken  the  United  States  in 
penetration,  and  is  now  ranked  in  the  second  quintile  in  both  per  100  inhabitant  and  household 
penetration.  Britain ranks 6
th or third in prices for the low, medium, and high speed tiers of service.  On 
the negative side, while BT is investing in new, next generation fiber infrastructure, the UK does not 
have fiber or really high speed DSL service to speak of.  Its sole source of very high speed service is its 
sole major cable provider, Virgin Media, at 50Mbps.   
The UK began its liberalization process earlier than any other country except the United States.  Under 
the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, Mercury Communications Limited 
was licensed as a competitor to British Telecom (BT) two years before AT&T was broken up here.  For 
the next decade, Britain had a formal duopoly. The theory behind this arrangement was that having only 
one  competitor  to  the  incumbent  BT  would  allow  it  to  build  market  share  and  develop  the  force 
necessary to challenge an incumbent as powerful as BT.  A more open market would, it was thought, 
result in several new entrants, none of which would have the necessary scale.  In 1984 Oftel, Britain's 
first independent telecommunications regulator, was created.  In 1991 the duopoly policy was reviewed 
and  abandoned.    In  1995  Oftel  reached  an  agreement  with  BT  for  accounting  separation  and 
interconnection,  which  had  their  most  immediate  effect  on  international  calls  competition  based  on 
access to BT's facilities in 1996.  Between 1998 and 2000, Oftel issued a series of reports, and managed 
a series of consultations, on terms for BT's offering of wholesale access and unbundling.  Initially, Oftel 
and BT were planning to include only wholesale access, but in response to the EU process that later 
produced the 2002  Directives discussed in the  context of France and  Germany, Oftel  expanded the 
process to encompass local loop unbundling as well.   
The unbundling process initially involved substantial consultation and negotiation.  First, a one-year 
process of consultation from late 1998 to late 1999 resulted in an Oftel policy statement on access to 
bandwidth, slated to take effect 18 months later, in July 2001.  The interim period was used for industry 
groups to meet and negotiate terms, locations, and methods of managing orders, with Oftel's apparently 
intensive engagement in facilitating the process.  During 2000, the operators tried to negotiate the pace 
and locations at which collocation and unbundling would occur; BT invited offers, and then firm offers, 
and negotiated prioritization and locations of servicing these offers. Despite this persistent effort to 
facilitate agreement, industry actors in fact failed to agree on the program.  Oftel found that it was forced 
to step in and make specific determination on points of disagreement.  When some of the promised 
entrant  offers  did  not  materialize,  the  industry  groups,  with  Oftel's  active  engagement,  tried  to 
restructure  the  locations  targeted  for  roll  out  so  as  to  assure  a  sufficient  level  of  offers  at  relevant 
locations.  By April 2001, the managed process of introduction of unbundling was suspended.     Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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Oftel had found itself drawn in to levels of intervention in unbundling that it had not experienced or 
needed in other matters since the mid-1990s.
73  In 2002 and 2003, the British parliament passed two 
laws to reform British telecommunications law and its regulatory structure, creating the new Ofcom and 
defining its powers.
74  Ofcom began a process entitled the Strategic Review of Telecommunications in 
December of 2003, which it concluded in September of 2005.  Its conclusion radically changed the legal 
demands on BT.  At that point, BT signed a binding undertaking that placed the United Kingdom in a 
class of its own in terms of regulatory strategy. The undertaking imposed functional separation between 
BT's wholesale inputs business—that is, the business of selling those aspects of its network that are only 
used by telecommunications carriers—and its retail operations.  The undertaking created Openreach, 
whose operations were separate from BT's, and which was under the obligation to deliver equal access 
under  a  concept  called:  “Equivalence  of  Inputs”  (EOI).    When  Openreach  delivers  inputs–such  as 
network elements–to other parts of BT, it must do so using the same systems, under the same terms, with 
the same timescales, as they provide them to all other non-BT carriers.  This strategy is now being 
widely considered in Europe, and has since been adopted in New Zealand and Sweden, functionally 
implemented in the Netherlands and Italy and, more recently, announced in Australia.   
Functional separation is intended to serve two functions.  First, it creates a discrete unit whose incentives 
are simply to sell network inputs to whoever wants them.  Because of the separation, it is expected to be 
neutral–in the business interest sense–among its customers, and has no reason to prefer BT over the 
competitors.  Second, it is easier to monitor and benchmark its transactions, because these all occur at 
arms length—both with non-BT parties and with BT.  The combined effect of the shift in incentives and 
ease  of  monitoring  is  expected  to  make  a  functionally  separated  network  management  unit  a  good 
remedy for a recalcitrant incumbent.   
Following  and  in  anticipation  of  this  decision,  several  ISPs  moved  to  increase  their  broadband 
capabilities relying on unbundling.  In 2005 TV giant BSkyB bought the Easynet Group, offered free 
broadband to all its satellite TV subscribers and began to invest in and expand its LLU-based offerings.  
By 2009 it had close to 12% of the UK market, which it served by using close to 1200 unbundled 
exchanges.  Italian-owned Tiscali UK began to migrate its wholesale broadband customers to unbundled 
networks in 2005 as well.  In 2007 it expanded by buying Pipex Communications, and now has over 8% 
of the British market, and is in the midst of being purchased by Carphone Warehouse, a deal that will 
make the latter Britain's largest competitor to BT.  Carphone Warehouse, as its name suggests, began its 
way as a reseller of mobile phone products, and later expanded as a reseller of fixed telephony capacity.  
In December of 2005 Carphone Warehouse bought Onetel, a broadband provider owned by a British 
energy company.  It also bought the UK assets of Tele2 from Sweden.  In October of 2006, Carphone 
Warehouse bought out the UK operations of AOL. Throughout this period Carphone Warehouse had 
been investing in building up unbundled local loop capacity, and by March of 2009 78% of its customers 
were  served  using  combinations  of  its  own  investments  and  unbundled  loops.    In  total,  Britain's 
competitor-entrants who based their service on unbundled elements make up the largest components of 
the British market, for a total of over 36% of the broadband market.  BT is second with 27%.  Another 
23% are served by Virgin Media, which consolidated several cable competitors and offers coverage to 
about 50% of UK homes over its cable system.   
In its May 2009 review of the results of functional separation, Ofcom underscored several results it 
viewed as pertinent.
75  At the most basic level, the price of a basket of residential broadband services 
decreased by 16.3% per year between 2005 and 2007.  Local loop unbundling became much more 
                                                 
73  All this from the 2002 OECD paper on regulator reform in telecomms in UK. 
74  The Office of Communications Act of 2002 created Ofcom, and the Communications Act of 2003 defined its powers. 
75  Ofcom. Impact of the Strategic Review of Telecommunications.  May 2009.   Next Generation Connectivity 
  104 
efficiently  provisioned.    In  the  third  quarter  of  2005,  just  before  the  introduction  of  functional 
separation, competitors were leasing 200,000 lines under LLU.  By the end of 2008 that number had 
risen to 5,500,000, and accounted for one third of all fixed broadband connections in Britain.  LLU, 
which, recall, is the mode of sharing infrastructure with competitors that calls for more co-investment on 
the part of the competitors than wholesale or bitstream access, grew in part at the expense of bitstream 
access.  During that three year period the number of houses in Britain that had access to at least one 
competing LLU-based operator rose from 40% to 83%, and these competitors were investing more in 
being able to take advantage of the newly-available network elements.  BT, in turn, had announced new 
investments of 1.5 billion GBP in upgrading its network to next generation access services to deliver 
40Mbps  service  to  40%  of  British  homes  by  2012.    The  Ofcom  review  is  comprehensive  and 
professional.  It addresses consumer and business market uptake and satisfaction, as well as investment 
patterns by both incumbents and entrants.  Given these results, Ofcom decided to retain the core features 
of  its  2005  decision,  with  continuous  monitoring  and  relatively  small-scale  course  corrections  and 
targeted adjustments. 
From  the  perspective  of  the  potential  role  of  cable  as  a  source  of  market  competition,  the  British 
experience is an intermediate case between the U.S. and France.  Unlike France, Britain has a significant 
cable network. It could, in principle, have been a candidate for regulatory abstention in the name of an 
effort to support intermodal competition between cable and telephone infrastructure.  Instead, Ofcom 
chose  a  “both”  approach.    It  enabled  competition  over  the  telecommunications/telephone  network 
through unbundling, implemented by functional separation, while also preserving an opening for cable 
competition.  The result has been a three- or more way competition in parts of the country covered by 
Virgin Media, and a two to three way competition in other parts where BT competes with one or two 
unbundled providers.  Britain's other major cable company, Cable and Wireless, had a couple of false 
starts in cable broadband, but has not emerged as a major source of broadband alternative service in its 
service areas.  In 2008 there was a brief period when it was thought that Virgin Media would offer 
services over Cable and Wireless facilities in those parts of the country in which it did not own cable 
plant.    The  deal  seems  to  have  collapsed,  as  Virgin  Media  announced  that  it  decided  to  focus  on 
upgrading the speed of its services over its own networks.   
The  UK  experience  raises  various  questions.    It  is  fairly  clear  that  aggressive  investment  to  build 
capacity to use unbundled loops followed the third quarter of 2005, when functional separation was 
introduced.  It is clear that this period of investment introduced new competitors, increased penetration, 
and decreased prices.  It is also clear that cable offered a competitive alternative as well, although the 
UK  firms  have  been  late,  by  comparison  to  other  countries,  to  introduce  very  high  speed  services.   
Whether  a  regime  that  would  have  applied  a  similar  model  to  the  cable  infrastructure  would  have 
enabled cable to expand earlier, or whether it would have deterred investments in the first place, remains 
a matter of speculation.  Whether BT's failure to invest in fiber infrastructure until the most recent 
announcements, and the relative unavailability of very high speed services in the UK is a vindication of 
the theory that unbundling deters investment, or whether Virgin Media's and BT's current investments in 
the  face  of  very  robust  competition  from  entrants  vindicate  the  idea  that  robust  competition  from 
entrants drives the facilities-based players to seek to differentiate themselves by even higher-capacity 
offerings, is also a matter for speculation.   
Lessons from the United Kingdom 
•  Unbundling and open access are difficult to enforce 
•  Functional separation is a potential solution to this difficulty.  It requires less direct monitoring   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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of, and intervention in, the day-to-day operations of the dominant incumbent 
•  The  introduction  of  functional  separation  had  a  much  more  significant  effect  than  the 
introduction of formal unbundling without effective enforcement 
4.7.3  Italy: Low penetration, low prices, high mobile broadband 
Italy represents an ambiguous case.  It has among the lowest penetration rate per 100 inhabitants in fixed 
lines, and even lower standings in terms of per household penetration.  On the other hand, it has low 
prices in every category of service, according to both the OECD price study and our own independent 
study, except that there are no very-high speed offerings in Italy.  Italy also has the highest rate of mobile 
phone penetration in the OECD (although this number is skewed by the high use of pre-paid accounts, 
which are counted on a per-account as opposed to a per-person basis, and there is therefore well over 
140% penetration).  It has the fifth highest level of 3G penetration, although it was fourth in 2008, 
overtaken by Iceland this year, and the several countries right behind it had 3G penetration growth rates 
between two and three times higher than Italy's 20% growth.   
Italy has no cable market to provide a source of facilities-based competition.  Telecom Italia has 60% of 
the broadband market.  Swisscom subsidiary FastWeb (13.4%), and independent entrants Wind (12.6%) 
and Tiscali (4.8%) are the other competitors of discernible size.  Italy introduced unbundling formally in 
2001, but revamped its structure, improved enforcement, and allowed for partial unbundling with the 
passage  of  the  Electronic  Communications  Code  in  September  of  2004,  which  was  Italy's  effort  to 
implement the EU Framework Directive and other access directives.  The regulated rates for unbundling 
in Italy are among the lowest in the world, and are almost as low as the rates in South Korea and 
Denmark, in terms of PPP.  Wind explicitly emphasizes its reliance on unbundled loops.  It accounted for 
1.04 million unbundled DSL lines out of the 1.38 million unbundled DSL lines that Telecom Italia sold 
in 2008.  Wind has its own national fiber-optic network, and metropolitan area fiber networks in 39 
cities.  It has announced plans to invest in, but does not yet supply, fiber-to-the-home services.  Tiscali 
does not emphasize this avenue, but its precise mix of own- and unbundled facilities is unclear.  FastWeb 
has concentrated on building an alternative infrastructure, focusing on business customers first (who 
accounted for 60% of its total sales in the first quarter of 2009). It had rolled out infrastructure in 100 
towns in Italy by the end of 2006, where it offers DSL and FttH.  It is unclear how much of its entire 
subscriber base is served by using Telecom Italia's infrastructure.   
The Italian regulator began to consider whether to impose functional separation on Telecom Italia in 
2006, in order to improve the quality of competitors’ access to its facilities.   In February of 2008, 
Telecom Italia announced its plans for functional separation to preempt regulatory action.
76 It was not 
until the end of 2008 that Agcom approved the details of the proposed separate division, Open Access.
77 
At the same time, Agcom approved an increase in the rates for unbundling, although even these new, 
higher rates, remain among the lowest in the OECD.  It is therefore too soon to tell whether the new 
arrangement will have any effect, and if so, in what direction.   Looking forward to next generation 
deployment, FastWeb has indicated that it has agreed with Telecom Italia to build out in coordinated 
fashion,  and  to  share  their  networks  rather  than  install  redundant  capacity.   This  is  consistent  with 
Swisscom's strategy in Switzerland, as we describe below.  All of these announcements and changes are, 
however, too recent to permit measurement of their effects.   
                                                 
76  http://www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail11538.htm. 
77  GlobalComms country profile: Italy.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Italy, then, presents an interesting case; its results are mixed.  Facilities-based competition is coming not 
from a relatively low-cost incumbent that already has access to ducts, like an incumbent cable or electric 
company,  but  from  a  business-oriented,  cherry-picking  technique  utilized  by  FastWeb.    Price 
competition in residential markets is therefore more likely to be coming from the lower cost competitor, 
Wind.  This level of competition seems to be enough to keep prices at a low level, although penetration 
remains low as well.  The other interesting story about Italy is on the wireless side, to which we will 
return in the next section.  A major puzzle remains why Italy's levels of penetration are so low despite its 
low prices.  One might speculate that mobile broadband is more consistent with Italian culture of urban 
street life, which would account for both the high uptake of mobile broadband and the low uptake of 
fixed.  This would also be consistent with Spain's similar pattern of low fixed, high mobile, broadband 
penetration.  But such a conclusion, without further research, is mere speculation. 
4.8  Regulatory abstention (and hesitation): Switzerland, New Zealand, and 
Canada 
The major alternative path to implementing some form of open access or unbundling was to explicitly 
commit to abstain from doing so.  Regulatory abstention would be justified on the basis that it secures 
investment incentives for incumbents, who would know they can invest in building out their networks 
without risk of being forced to share the benefits of their investments with competitors.  This was the 
path taken in the United States since the fall of 2001.  This was the path taken, most aggressively and 
purely, by New Zealand from the late 1980s until 2006.  More tentatively, but with greater success, this 
is also the path that describes the Swiss experience.  Neither Switzerland nor New Zealand implemented 
unbundling throughout most of the first generation transition to broadband. Both switched to unbundling 
and some form of open access in 2006-2007.  In New Zealand's case, this was from a sense of failure of 
the policy.  In Switzerland's, the move was the culmination of a long regulatory battle, which ended in 
introduction of unbundling after Switzerland had already done well, under its first generation policy, 
along dimensions of penetration and pricing.  As we note in our re-analysis and sensitivity testing of the 
most recent econometric analysis of OECD data below, the statistical uncertainty about the effects of 
unbundling in the OECD is strongly influenced by Switzerland; in that removing Switzerland reduces 
the  ambiguity  and  makes  unbundling  a  stronger  predictor  of  penetration.    Switzerland  has  now 
implemented unbundling, and Swisscom has now developed an innovative model for sharing the costs 
and benefits of investing in upgrading to fiber-to-the-home.  We include a discussion of Canada in this 
section, even though Canada is not a case of regulatory abstention but of regulatory hesitation.  In 
Canada's case, this meant that unbundling was originally introduced with a limited time horizon and 
very generous-to-incumbents regulated rates.  In 2008, the same policy was extended to fiber, but again, 
with a limited time horizon.  Both in the first generation transition, and today Canada has some of the 
highest regulated rates for unbundling anywhere in the OECD.  Because of these features, Canada looks 
like a case where the concern for incumbent investment incentives, without quite reaching to the level of 
abstention, resulted in a weaker version of unbundling than was implemented in many of the other 
countries we reviewed here.   
4.8.1  Switzerland 
Switzerland has the fourth highest level of penetration per 100 inhabitants, although its per household 
penetration is lower.  It has relatively low prices for medium and high speed, but higher prices for low 
speed offerings and no very high-speed offerings.  In speed offerings Switzerland ranks in the third 
quintile  of  OECD  countries  for  advertised  offers,  but  is  in  the  second  quintile  for  median  actually 
measured speeds.  In mobile cellular broadband, 3G penetration is in the third quintile, but Switzerland 
is a leader in nomadic access and hotspots, sharing with Sweden a much higher level of penetration than   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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their next-best competitors, the UK and France.  In our aggregate measure, Switzerland shows up 8
th, 
lower than it does by the traditionally salient measure, but still a strong performer.   
Broadband was launched in Switzerland by Cablecom, and Cablecom (19% of the market) itself, and 
other local smaller cable companies still occupy over 20% of the market. Cable's entry into broadband 
forced Swisscom to introduce DSL technology in 2001, and has been the main source of competition.  
The only other significant competitor (just under 10%) is Sunrise Communications, which is a reseller of 
Swisscom DSL, and is itself a recent composite of what until recently were the two primary resellers of 
Swisscom service: TDC Switzerland and Tele2.  After unbundling was introduced in 2007, Sunrise, now 
owned by Denmark’s TDC, began to invest in building unbundled local loop capacity, but between 2001 
and 2007 the two companies that make up Sunrise relied exclusively on reselling wholesale broadband 
capacity acquired from  Swisscom.  Over the  years Swisscom has been highly  effective at blocking 
efforts to require that it open its network up to competitors beyond the wholesale access it was making 
available  to  Sunrise  and  similar,  smaller  resellers.    The  history  of  cable  entry,  the  relatively  good 
performance in all but speed, and the long period during which Switzerland had not adopted unbundling, 
makes the Swiss case the best evidence in support of the argument that competition between cable and 
telephone incumbents is sufficient to drive investment, penetration, and a modicum of price competition.  
There is one potential wrinkle in this story of success without unbundling: that Swisscom operated under 
steady efforts to impose unbundling for several years before unbundling was actually introduced.  Under 
those circumstances, it is hard to tell a priori whether an incumbent would dig its heels in, resist entry, 
and extract rents for as long as it is able to hold out, or whether it would provide greater openness to 
competitors and better services, so as to establish the point that the proposed regulation is unnecessary.  
Our other case studies mostly suggest that the incumbent can be expected to resist entry, rather than try 
to behave more competitively, but it is at least possible that some of Swisscom’s strong performance is 
explained by efforts to reduce the pressures to regulate it.  Such behavior would be consistent with, for 
example,  Deutsche Telekom’s  apparent  offers  of  unusually  good  wholesale  rates  to  reseller  United, 
which helped DT reduce its market share during consideration of the new telecommunications law in 
Germany.  Despite this potential confounder, Switzerland does appear to represent the one significant 
example of high performance under inter-modal competition not complemented by open access. 
Swisscom's current plans to invest in upgrading to fiber seem to be driven not by the introduction of 
unbundling in 2007, which is not applicable to fiber, but by a combination of DOCSIS 3.0 upgrades by 
cable companies, and early efforts by power companies, like Ewt in Zurich, to enter with their own fiber 
plant, to be offered to Internet service providers on an open access model.  Many of these small electric 
utilities muscling in to fiber are municipally owned, in whole or in part, and their investments are driven 
by a commitment to provide core infrastructure that is open, by the will to improve the efficiency of 
their grids, and by the relatively lower cost of deploying fiber over an existing civil engineering plant—
their own power network.  This version of the story of next generation investment in Switzerland again 
lends support to the theory that intermodal competition is sufficient to spur investment, although with 
some nuance as to the potential role of public investment.  However, given that extension of unbundling 
to  fiber  is  very  much  a  live  regulatory  debate  in  Switzerland,  and  that  part  of  the  debate  also 
encompasses expanding the powers of the regulator more generally, it is again somewhat less clear cut 
of a case than it otherwise would have been.  It is possible that Swisscom’s current fiber strategy in some 
measure represents an effort to reduce the risk of regulation by presenting a more attractive profile as a 
responsible dominant player that acts cooperatively without the need for direct ex ante regulation. 
Irrespective of what combination of forces precisely is driving it, Swisscom's response to the challenge 
of transitioning to next generation connectivity has been an innovative and interesting one.  While it has 
not been implemented yet, it has been announced and is apparently being piloted currently.  The idea is   Next Generation Connectivity 
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to share the large part of the cost—the civil engineering and fiber laying part—by pulling four fibers to 
every home over the same civil engineering project.  Swisscom would keep one fiber and sell/share the 
others in one of four ways.  First, owners of ducts, like cable companies and electric utilities, could each 
role out similar four-fiber plants in different areas, and then exchange capacity so that each one would 
own and control a fiber into each home throughout all of the areas connected.  If the networks were of 
largely  similar  size,  they  would  not  pay  each  other—much  like  peering  arrangements  in  Internet 
carriage.  Second, companies with the cash up front but without ducts and construction capacity could 
spread the deployment risk by paying up front for a fiber into the home which, upon completion, would 
become theirs.  Third, companies without ducts or up front cash could later buy access on a distinct 
passive fiber, which would give them control equivalent to what they would get from unbundled access 
over copper.  And fourth, companies that didn't want any of this could just buy active fiber high speed 
connectivity  capacity  wholesale,  and  resell  it  to  subscribers.   The  critical  idea  here  is  that  by  pre-
positioning  distinct,  excess  passive  infrastructure,  competitors  could  credibly  commit  to  share  the 
highest fixed-cost, most future-proof elements in an architecture that would then be hard for them to 
manipulate anticompetitively.  They would then use this architecture to draw investment and spread the 
cost and risk of next generation deployment.  Needless to say, this is not a test that has been run, but it 
does present an interesting model that is distinct from both the public private partnerships we see in 
some Swedish and Dutch municipalities, and the functionally-separated single platform provider based 
on the UK model. 
4.8.2  New Zealand 
The other country that self-consciously chose not to impose unbundling regulations was New Zealand.  
New Zealand completed privatization of its nationally-owned incumbent in 1989, and decided not to 
impose sector-specific regulation, relying instead on general competition law to prevent anticompetitive 
abuses.  Because of its unique approach, it was cited in the late 1990s as a unique example of right-
thinking regulatory policy, which depended on the idea that market-driven competition would deliver the 
goods once regulators simply got out of the way.  The desired beneficial results of competition in a 
liberalized market were not quick to follow. By 2001 New Zealand did decide to implement a sector-
specific regime.  This new regime, however, was a very reticent one.  As late as December 2003 the 
Commerce Commission in New Zealand explicitly decided not to impose unbundling on Telecom New 
Zealand, arguing that the cost and risks outweighed the benefits.  The only source of competition was 
TelstraClear, the New Zealand subsidiary of Australian Telstra, which depended on developing its own 
hybrid fiber-coaxial plant–that is, on cable–and on a non-regulated resale agreement it reached with New 
Zealand Telecom that allowed it to expand its coverage from its cable customers to a national footprint.  
The results of this market structure and regulatory  approach were not spectacular.  Throughout the 
2000s, from 2001 up to and including the end of 2006, New Zealand's broadband penetration ranked 21
st 
or 22d in the OECD, ahead of Mexico, Turkey, Greece, the states that had joined the OECD after being 
set free of the communist bloc—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic—and 
Ireland.   
In April of 2006 the New Zealand parliament decided to change direction, proposing new legislation that 
would impose unbundling requirements on New Zealand Telecom.  In November the legislation was 
further revised to require that the company functionally separate its carriage from its retail services.  The 
new  telecommunications  law  implementing  these  requirements  passed  in  December  of  2006.  The 
network now is subject to unbundling, and Telecom New Zealand has separated into three divisions: 
Chorus, which is responsible for network infrastructure and upgrading to next generation connectivity, 
and Telecom Retail and Telecom Wholesale.  In anticipation of this legislation, TelstraClear reversed its 
2005 statements about withdrawing from its plans to invest beyond its then-existing urban areas (an   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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announcement  one  assumes  was  itself  intended  to  add  political  pressure  to  changing  the  regulatory 
regime).  While TelstraClear originally worked with cable infrastructure, by December of 2008 about 
70% of TelstraClear's customers were DSL subscribers.  Vodafone, New Zealand's largest mobile phone 
provider, acquired iHug, a competitive DSL provider, in October of 2006, and began to offer triple-play 
bundles (fixed, broadband, and mobile) at discounted rates with its mobile offerings.  In January of 2008 
TelstraClear concluded a new fiber ring on South Island, connecting the island's main towns with its 
fiber backbone.   
These investments by Vodafone and Telstra, combine with rankings data to suggest that the regulatory 
shift had its intended effect.  Between December of 2006, when the new law was enacted, and December 
of 2008, when the OECD last reported penetration levels, New Zealand's ranking in penetration per 100 
had jumped from 22d to 18
th, surpassing that of Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.  We do not have 
similarly fresh data on changes in per-household penetration, although in 2006, when New Zealand was 
22d in the per-inhabitant ranking, it was 16
th in per-household rankings, just behind the United States.  
We do not have sufficiently comparable household penetration data to establish whether New Zealand 
saw a similar relative improvement in its ranking in per-household penetration, although one market 
analysis suggests that it did not.
78  During the period between 2006 and 2008, New Zealand also had by 
far the largest increase among OECD countries in speeds offered by an incumbent.
79  Prices, on the other 
hand, dropped only very slightly.  We do not have sufficient historical data to compare New Zealand’s 
current  performance  on  our  more  balanced,  multidimensional  benchmarks.    Like  the  UK  in  2005, 
separation of network from information services was a critical component of New Zealand's strategy for 
dealing with a recalcitrant and politically effective incumbent that successfully resisted competition over 
its network.  And, as with the UK in 2005, performance relative to other OECD countries that had not 
made a similar shift at the same time improved appreciably, at least along the dimensions of penetration 
per 100 inhabitants and advertised speed.
80 
4.8.3  Canada: Regulatory hesitation and a robust facilities-based alternative 
We close our access-related case studies with Canada, a country that represents an ambiguous case.  It 
was a very early broadband adopter, relying primarily on facilities-based competition between cable and 
incumbent telephone companies.  As early as 2000, broadband subscriptions were already 31% of all 
Internet subscriptions.
81  As if December of 2003, Canada had the second highest level of  Internet 
penetration per 100 inhabitants in the OECD, second only to South Korea, and third highest, after South 
Korea  and  Japan,  by  the  per-household  measure.    At  that  time,  there  were  1.29  cable  broadband 
subscribers for every DSL subscriber.   
Upon  declaring  that  it  is  imposing  unbundling  in  1997,  the  CRTC  announced  that  it  would  phase 
unbundling out by 2002.  The thought was that the shadow of removal of the regulatory crutch would 
lead competitors to invest in their own facilities, but would not deter them from entering the market in 
the first place.  The CRTC also used a price determination method that was different than the approach 
used by other regulators, relying not on long run incremental cost, but on incremental cost plus a 25% 
markup to allow the incumbents to make a profit on their unbundled loops.  The theory there was to 
avoid  investment  disincentives  to  the  incumbents.    By  2001,  however,  unbundling  was  not  being 
                                                 
78  http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS153081+18-Jun-2009+BW20090618. 
79  OECD Communications Outlook 2009, Figure 7.12. 
80  On our more diverse set of measures, New Zealand does not show up as a particularly strong performer; because we do 
not have a pre-2006 measurement, however, it is hard to use our measures to show movement between 2006 and 2008, 
and the relatively old data on households would also tend to mask positive effects of the policy change.  
81  CRTC Communications Monitoring Report August 2009).  pages 213-226.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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adopted.  The CRTC then extended unbundling indefinitely.  In 2002, it cut back the markup on pricing 
to 15%, but kept the methodology.   In 2008, the CRTC completed a comprehensive review and decided 
to extend its unbundling rules, and apply them to fiber as well. Again, this determination is subject to 
phase out, just as the original implementation had been.
82  
The Canadian market is largely typified by facilities-based competition, not by unbundled access.  The 
major players are the former telephone incumbents: Bell Canada (22.44% of the market) and Telus 
(12.09%), and the major cable companies: Rogers (17.73%) and Shaw (17.76%) in different parts of the 
English speaking provinces, and Videotron (11.52%) in Quebec.  Unlike in Finland, where the former 
regional monopolists seem to have entered each other's regions, in Canada that trend seemed to have 
receded after showing some signs of life in the early 2000s.
83   In August 2009 the CRTC reported that 
the market share of revenue captured by incumbent telecommunications service providers operating 
outside their territory (residential and business) declined from 23% of market share in 2003 to 12% of 
market share in 2007. The share of revenues from residential broadband captured by all entrants, both 
non-incumbents and incumbents out-of-territory efforts, declined from 16% in 2004 to 8% in 2008.   
These  numbers  seem  to  suggest  that  the  early  observations  of  incumbents  venturing  out  of  their 
historical areas have been reversed, and that the incumbents  are retrenching in their own historical 
territories.  There are no smaller entrants of note, although there are a couple of hundred smaller ISPs, 
over  half  of  whom  resell  ISP  services  offered  by  the  incumbents,  alongside  several  local  utility 
companies, municipalities, and some ISPs using wireless technologies.  None of these has appeared as a 
substantial competitor to the five major incumbents.   
It is not entirely clear why Canada, despite its implementation of local loop unbundling, has seen no 
competitive entry beyond the incumbents.  It is certainly possible that the very early market presence of 
strong incumbents, in two technologies, crowded the market and deterred investors.  It is also possible 
that Canada's rate regulation approach made a difference.  Looking at 2008 data as reported by the 
OECD, Canada's commitment to a cost-plus-markup approach is uncharacteristic of other countries, 
where long run costs as well as less crisply defined concepts like “cost orientation plus reasonable 
profit” (Netherlands) are used.  The result, in any event, is that by comparison to high performers for 
which the OECD reported data in the Communications Outlook 2009, Canada's monthly rates for local 
loop  are  high.   As  of  September  2008,  the  monthly  price  of  an  unbundled  local  loop  in  Canada, 
excluding prices for remote areas or the most dense downtown areas, in terms of PPP, was roughly 70% 
higher than in South Korea and Denmark, almost 50% higher than in Italy, 30% higher than in Japan, 
France, or Norway, and 25% higher than in Finland or the UK.  Indeed, Canada has the highest monthly 
charge for access to an unbundled local loop of any OECD country.  Combined with the presence of 
strong  incumbents  and  the  Canadian  regulator's  practice  of  promising  to  sunset  the  requirement  of 
opening access to core facilities—originally copper loops, now fiber—it is possible that the investment 
environment is too expensive and too uncertain for non-incumbent entrants. 
The presence of strong facilities-based competition should have, however, obviated concerns about the 
state  of  Canadian  broadband  policy.    The  CRTC  indeed  opens  its  August  2009  Communications 
Monitoring report with a self-congratulatory reference to the fact that Canada has the highest level of 
penetration of all the G7 countries.  While factually true, an alternative view of Canada's performance 
might look at several factors.  In December of 2003, Canada had the second highest level of broadband 
penetration per 100, second only to South Korea.  By September of 2008, it ranked 10
th by the same 
                                                 
82  CRTC 2008 decision. 
83  Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve its Purpose: Empirical Evidence from Five 
Countries, MIT Econ. Working Papers No. 04-40, where the authors note the ILEC entry into each other's territories as a 
hopeful direction for investment in facilities based competition.  See at p. 60   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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measure.  Its numbers on speed and price are worse.  In terms of top speeds available, Canada ranked 
19
th in the OECD.  In terms of prices, Canada ranks 21
st for the lowest speeds and 23d for middling 
speeds.  It ranks next to last in prices of high speeds (only the Slovak Republic has higher prices in that 
tier of service), and it does not appear in the rankings for prices of very high speeds, because there were 
no offerings of service speeds of 35Mbps or higher in Canada in September of 2008.  Our company-
level pricing study for the highest-speed offers in the countries we observe here locates almost all of the 
Canadian companies in the cluster with the slowest speeds and highest prices.  Given these benchmark 
measures, the lessons of the Canadian experience do not seem as positive as the CRTC report presents 
them.  On our composite measure, Canada occupies the 22
nd spot.  Early aggressive facilities-based 
competition certainly made Canada an early starter, but it does not seem to have enabled it to maintain 
its standing.  Indeed, the decline in its standing in its best-performing measure, penetration per 100 
inhabitants, was worse over this period (2
nd to 10
th) than was the decline of U.S. performance by that 
measure over the same time period (10
th to 15
th). 
4.8.4  Lessons from Switzerland, New Zealand, and Canada 
•  Switzerland's experience suggests that, under the right conditions, a country can do very well 
without  effectively  enforced  open  access  regulation.    The  clarity  of  the  case  is  somewhat 
muddied by the fact that Swisscom operated throughout much of this period under the threat of 
regulation.  Moreover, both our qualitative analysis here and the following econometric analysis 
strongly suggest that the Swiss experience is unusual. 
•  The purest form of regulatory abstention was attempted in New Zealand for over a decade and a 
half.  It was considered a failure there, and was reversed 180 degrees in 2006.  Early results of 
the reversal seem to have been quick and positive. 
•  Both  countries  that  have  been  the  longest  standing  proponents  of  regulatory  abstention, 
Switzerland and New Zealand, have now shifted to adopting unbundling. 
•  In  looking  forward  to  the  next  generation  transition,  New  Zealand  is  relying  on  functional 
separation, while Switzerland's incumbent has developed an innovative voluntary arrangement to 
share the cost and risk of fiber deployment while securing to competitors access to the new 
facilities.    This  approach  depends  on  joint  investment  in  the  civil  engineering  side  of  the 
deployment, building substantial over-capacity (four separate fibers to each home) which can 
then be physically divided among the participating carriers, and virtually  divided with later-
introduced competitors. 
•  The  Canadian  experience  suggests,  consistent  with  the  experience  of  the  larger  European 
countries, that formal adoption of unbundling is insufficient to achieve competition.  In Canada, 
formal unbundling was coupled with regulatory uncertainty introduced by the threat of sunset, 
and high regulated rates.   
•  Like  the  United  States,  Canada  relies  primarily  on  its  strong  cable/telecom  facilities-based 
competition, rather than on unbundling-based entry.  Its performance has lagged over the past 
few years, and it is now a fourth quintile performer in capacity and price, and dropped from first 
to second quintile on penetration between 2003 and 2008. 
•  The  Canadian  experience  suggest  that  reliance  purely  on  competition  between  strong  cable 
incumbents and strong telephony incumbents may be insufficient to sustain high penetration or   Next Generation Connectivity 
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achieve high capacity and low competitive prices in the long term. 
4.9  Firm-level price and speed data 
Our focus throughout this qualitative analysis of the effects of open access has been on the role of 
particular firms: incumbents, open-access-based entrants, or cable and other facilities-based competitors.  
We emphasized the ways in which different firms responded to different regulatory interventions, and 
how each affected the other firms in its market.  Here we offer another look into the behavior of firms, 
through objective measures of price and speed offered.  We particularly focus offerings that are farthest 
along in the transition to next generation connectivity: the highest-end speeds offered by the 59 firms in 
the countries we studied. 
We use company level data reported in the Communications Outlook 2009, as we did in Section 3.6.  To 
these data we add independent pricing data obtained from the GlobalComms database, as we did in 
Section 3.6., but analyze it at a firm-level resolution. In our own dataset, we take the best prices for the 
highest-speed offerings in each country, by market share.  This allows us to identify what the majority of 
subscribers in these countries in fact see as the range of prices for high-speed offerings available to 
them.  In this study we included all companies offering very high speed offerings (that is, over 35Mbps), 
from both the OECD and our own datasets, and added from our own research the best, highest speed 
offerings from all U.S. providers with more than 2 million subscribers.  This biases the results somewhat 
in favor of the U.S. providers, because our basic data sets, both from the OECD and GlobalComms, do 
not include very high-speed offerings from major companies that have begun to offer very high speeds 
in the past 6 months, like Cox, Charter, or Comcast.  So we are comparing in these data formal offers 
from one year ago for other countries, to offers from U.S. firms, a year later.  Although the results are 
therefore somewhat biased in favor of the U.S. companies, they nonetheless allow us to offer a more 
fine-grained  comparison  of  the  relative  speed  and  price  offerings  of  individual  companies,  which 
together make up the aggregate.  Moreover, the scale is skewed against showing the extraordinarily high 
performance of K-Opticom, and had we used the method we used for the U.S. firms, we would have a 
similar offer, slightly lower priced, from KDDI.  So the graphic presentation of our data understates the 
degree  to  which  the  low-price,  high-speed  characteristics  of  the  Japanese  market's  best  offerings 
outperform the other firms in our dataset.   
The data is presented in a graph so that the bottom left hand corner is where slower, more expensive 
offerings will arise.  The upper right hand corner is where faster, cheaper offers are found.  These are the 
two diametrically opposed basins of attraction.  The upper left hand corner is where companies that 
compete primarily on price, not on price-speed combinations, will show up.  However, this portion of 
the graph masks the fact that many of the companies that appear in the upper right hand corner would 
also appear as very competitive on the upper left hand corner, if we included their lower-tier, slower 
offers as well as well as their highest-speed offerings.  In other words, being “higher” on the left hand 
than on the right does not mean you really are cheaper across all offerings, only that you do not even 
have a very high speed offering, and your best speed offering is cheaper than the best very-high speed 
offering elsewhere.   
What we find is, unsurprisingly, that companies, rather than technologies, compete.   And companies 
compete against their national competitors, not against hypothetical best performance feasible given a 
technology.  Even though we use newer U.S. data, we find that if we draw a line running from the Y-axis 
to the X-axis through the offers of Time Warner Cable and Cox, we find to the left and below that line 
almost all North American companies, except Telus and Cablevision, which have cheaper moderately-
high speed offers, and Videotron, which has a moderately priced 50Mbps offering.  Only KPN, the   Polices and practices: Competition and access   
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Dutch incumbent, which is slightly below that line, and Lyse, a local utility-based fiber provider in 
southern  Norway,  occupy  that  lower  left  triangle  together  with  AT&T,  Verizon,  Qwest,  Comcast, 
Charter, Time Warner, and Cox, from the U.S., and Bell Canada, Shaw, and Rogers, from Canada.  All 
the North American companies below and to the left of that line are incumbent telephone companies and 
incumbent cable companies functioning in a regulatory system that relies exclusively or primarily on 
inter-modal competition.   
At the other end, we see a natural separation between a middle swath of performers and the cluster of 
firms that offer high-speed, low-priced offerings.  The latter  group, in the upper right hand  corner, 
includes unbundling-based providers Free and SFR, alongside their incumbent provider France Telecom 
and cable competitor Numericable. We see here unbundling-based Softbank offering identical offerings 
to its incumbent, NTT, joined by KDDI and Usen that seemed to mix existing infrastructure (electric 
utility and cable, respectively) with unbundling, and cable company J:COM offering 160 Mbps and K-
Opticom offering 1GBPs at moderate prices.  Next we see unbundling-based Telenor Sweden and Tele2 
Sweden, although in our older dataset TeliaSonera Sweden does not join them.  However, using the 
same technique we used for the U.S. firms, TeliaSonera Sweden would have showed up, in its offerings 
through  buildings  and  municipalities,  roughly  where  TeliaSonera  Finland  appears.    Incumbents 
TeliaSonera  Finland  and  Elisa  are  collocated  in  that  corner,  as  is  Finnish  cable  provider  Welho.  
Similarly, South Korean entrants SK, LG Powercom, and cable provider C&M all show up in the upper 
right hand corner, although KT appears not to be meeting their price/speed offerings.   
The pattern appears to be clear: Firms compete in national markets.  Almost all the companies that offer 
the highest prices for the lowest speeds in our dataset operate in countries that rely on inter-modal 
competition: the United States and Canada.  Companies that are in the upper right corner of the graph 
hand all function in countries that either clearly enabled some of these particular competitors through 
effective enforcement of open access—Japan, France, and Sweden—or in countries that enforced open 
access,  but  where  there  are  sufficient  confounders  to  make  the  specific  effect  of  unbundling  more 
ambiguous: South Korea and Finland.  The open access countries saw firms adopt unbundling as an 
entry strategy, and these firms today continue to exist, directly or through successor firms, and continue 
to offer high speeds at low prices. The difference between offerings of telecommunications and cable 
providers France Telecom and Numericable, or NTT and J:COM, on the one hand, and Verizon, AT&T, 
and Qwest, and Comcast, Charter, and Time Warner, on the other hand, may well be the catalytic role 
played, as we describe in the case studies, by access-based providers like Free and SFR (Neuf Cegetel), 
or Softbank and KDDI.    Next Generation Connectivity 
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4.10 Econometric analysis 
Most of the work on the effects of open access on broadband measures has not relied on the kind of 
qualitative  market  and  regulatory  analysis  we  have  offered  here.
84    Instead,  it  has  focused  on 
econometric analysis of the OECD data, generally trying to test whether one of a small number of 
variables—urban  concentration,  GDP  per  capita,  education,  age,  etc.,  as  well  as  the  existence  of 
facilities based competition and unbundling regulations—can explain variation in a given measure of 
outcomes—penetration per 100 inhabitants.  We are cautious about the results of such analyses because 
of  the  small  number  of  countries,  the  small  number  of  observations,  the  thin  specification  of  the 
variables,  and  the  potential  interaction  effects  among  these  variables,  as  well  as  other  unobserved 
variables.  Nonetheless, this mode of analysis has been an important source of insight and debate, and 
properly placed in context of the qualitative analysis, can offer valuable insights.  Here, we offer an 
independent assessment.  Our conclusion is that unbundling had a positive and significant effect on 
levels of penetration; that this effect was somewhat larger, more statistically significant, and more robust 
than previously thought; and that some of the ambiguity in prior studies can be attributed to the large 
influence that Switzerland's experience had in dampening the observed effect of unbundling. 
Several econometric studies have attempted to estimate whether local loop unbundling has had an effect 
on broadband penetration rates, and if so whether the effect was positive or negative, large or small.  
Bauer et al (2003), using 2001 data, found no effect of unbundling.  Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz 
(2006),  analyzing  2000-2002  data,  found  statistically  significant  and  large  effects  for  platform 
competition, and significant but smaller effects for unbundling.  Wallsten (2006)
85 analyzing 1999-2003 
data found no significant effect for unbundling, negative effect for sub-loop unbundling, a positive effect 
for collocation, but a negative effect for price-regulated collocation. Grosso (2006), analyzing 2001-
2004 data, found positive effects for both platform competition and unbundling, and Garcia-Murillo 
(2003),
86 analyzing 2001 data, found that unbundling had an effect only in middle-income, but not high-
income, countries.  The study using the most recent data was done by John de Ridder from the OECD, 
using data from 2005 and a comparison of changes between 2002 and 2005.  De Ridder's analysis found 
that unbundling had a statistically significant but modest effect, and that competition between platforms 
(DSL and cable) and the price of broadband and Internet more generally had significant effects.  A recent 
paper by Boyle, Howell, and Zhang (2008) re-analyzed de Ridder's data using a particularly robustness-
seeking mixed-effects technique, and found that unbundling had no statistically significant effect, and 
even where it did have an effect, the size of the effect was in their view minuscule—accounting for an 
0.6% increase in penetration as compared to a 6% increase simply from the passage of time—that is, the 
fact that over time more people adopt broadband penetration regardless of other factors. 
Because the de Ridder paper offers the most recent data and extensive analysis; and because it was 
subject to recent direct methodological critique and re-analysis of the data by the critics, it offered an 
excellent target for independent review.  De Ridder provided access the original data set.  The critique 
and its method were publicly available.  We did several things to form our independent evaluation of the 
data. (See Annex).  First, we re-ran the analysis as de Ridder specified to see if we replicated his results.  
                                                 
84  Exceptions that do rely, as we do, on a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis, and offer valuable insights, 
are Atkinson ITIF report 2008, which offers a nice balance of quantitative measures and extensive country-specific 
qualitative data, and the older work, from 2004, by Jerry Hausman and Greg Sidak, comparing five major countries with 
a good bit of detail.  Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve its Purpose: Empirical 
Evidence from Five Countries, MIT Econ. Working Papers No. 04-40 
85  Scott Wallsten, Broadband and Unbundling Regulations in OECD Countries.  Working Paper 06-16, June 2006.  AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. 
86  Martha Garcia-Murillo, Broadband Deployment: The Impact of Unbundling   Next Generation Connectivity 
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We did.  Second, we re-ran the critique, to see if we could produce their results.  We replicated their 
results on the specific equations they tested.  In the process, we learned that the critique's analysis 
understated the effects of unbundling in several ways.   
First, we believe the robustness of the estimator used in the critique came at an unnecessary expense of 
power  in  the  data.    The  critique  was  correct  that  “country-effect”  must  be  modeled  to  explain 
correlations of residuals in this panel data, and de Ritter's dummy variable insufficiently accounts for the 
realized information that certain countries are always above or below average, despite the covariates we 
have accounted for.  However, of models that implement random effects, the “within-groups” estimator 
chosen  in  the  critique  discards  information  in  the  data  that  can  be  gleaned  from  between-country 
differences.  This provides complete robustness against any adverse unknown correlation in errors, but 
analysis of the structure of the dataset led us to believe that the correlation structure is relatively safe and 
homoscedastic, and that the information contained in between-country effects is too substantial to be 
ignored.   
Second, even using the critique's analysis, unbundling only loses its significance when run in equations 
that also include the price of DSL.  However, there is reason to think that price of DSL is endogenous to 
the presence of unbundling.  That is, if unbundling increases competition, and competition decreases 
prices, and you observe a country with lower prices doing well, you might think that the cause is the 
prices–not the presence of the rule–and would miss the interaction between the two.  We tested this 
possibility  and  found  that  unbundling  and  DSL  price  do  partly  explain  each  other,  and  found  an 
adjusted-R
2  of  37%:  in other  words,  there  is  an  interaction  between  the  two,  although  they  do  not 
completely explain each other.  Running the critique's specification without the partially endogenous 
factor of DSL price, even under the method recommended by the critique, yields a significant effect for 
unbundling.  Running the mixed-effects method recommended by the critique looking only at facilities-
based  competition  and  at  urban  concentration  improves  the  accuracy  of  the  assessment.    It  shows, 
furthermore, that urban concentration and unbundling each have a significant effect (more significant 
and larger than was shown in de Ridder's original analysis), while facilities-based competition has a 
much smaller, though still statistically significant, effect.    
Using  a  more  appropriate  mixed-effects  model,  we  performed  two  new  analyses.    First,  we  did  an 
influence points analysis, which is becoming common in cross-country comparisons.  In this test we 
remove each time one country, and re-ran the regression, to see whether there is one country that has a 
particularly large effect on the total result.  In this analysis we found that indeed there is such a country, 
and it is Switzerland.  As we saw in the qualitative analysis, Switzerland is a significant example of 
successful broadband deployment without the passage of unbundling rules.  Removing Switzerland from 
the data set substantially increases both the significance and the effect size of unbundling.  In short, the 
ambiguity about the effect of unbundling in prior econometric studies is in some measure an oblique 
way of pointing at Switzerland's experience. 
The second transformation we engaged in was to replace the variables describing the introduction of 
unbundling with variables that mark the time of introduction of effective unbundling as we found it in 
our analysis of the political economy aspects in the qualitative analysis.  For example, France would lose 
a  year,  or  its  unbundling  value  would  be  reduced,  for  the  postponement  until  2003  of  actual 
implementation.  So too the Netherlands, instead of being reported as having had unbundling for 9 years, 
from formal introduction, is reduced to 5 years to reflect the prohibition on naked DSL provisioning 
until 2001.  While some of these countries, like the Netherlands, are countries with high penetration that 
had their high values for unbundling reduced (thereby tending to make unbundling appear less important 
in the model), other countries with lower performance also had their values reduced.  The US and the 
UK are both reduced to having no unbundling by 2005, in the US because the litigation, and FCC 2001-  Policies and practices: Competition and access   
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2002 decisions to abandon unbundling would have had their effect during the observed period of 2002-
2005, and in the UK to reflect the factual absence of unbundling until the September 2005 decision on 
functional separation (only 200,000 loops unbundled between formal introduction in 2001 and 2005, 
growing to 5.5 million between December of 2005 and December 2008, after the separation).  Similarly, 
high-performer  South  Korea  is  seen  as  having  had  unbundling  since  1997,  instead  of  since  2002, 
reflecting the earlier availability of access to cable on which Thrunet and Hanaro built their entry.  These 
latter changes would tend to strengthen the explanatory power of unbundling.  The changes and the 
justifications for each are set out in Table 2.2 in the Annex.  When we ran these new, case-study-based 
values  for  unbundling,  the  significance  of  unbundling  increased,  the  effect  size  increased,  and  the 
analysis was robust to the elimination of any given country, including Switzerland.   
Moreover, in performing our analysis we noticed that both de Ridder and his critics understated the 
effect size of unbundling.  In both papers the authors report the effect of unbundling as the effect of 
“GUYRS” on the outcome, and the effect of simple passage of time (DUMMY) as the pure effect of 
time.  However, DUMMY reports growth over three years, while GUYRS represents growth per year.  
In effect, both those models were comparing the effect of the passage of time to one-third of the effect 
size of unbundling during the same period, and finding the latter small.  Correctly treated as growth-per-
year,  and  adjusted  to  reflect  the  actual  implementation,  suggests  that  having  effectively  enforced 
unbundling regulations in place adds about 1% per year, or about 3% of penetration growth over the 3 
years, relative to a 7%-12% increase from all other factors over the same period.  While unbundling does 
not explain the entire growth differential, then, it appears to have a statistically significant, robust, effect, 
of about 1% per year of effective enforcement.   In any given year, such an effect may not be considered 
significant.  However, if our analysis is correct, then adding unbundling could, over a decade after 
introduction, add 10% penetration points.  When one recalls that the World Bank study, described in 
Section 2.5 above, found that a 10 point increase in penetration per 100 translated into 1.21% growth in 
GDP, and that total GDP growth in the United States between 1997 and 2008 averaged 2.8%, one might 
consider the long term benefits to growth caused even by increasing penetration by 1 per 100 every year, 
over and above the effect of all other influences, to be an effect worth considering.  This of course 
assumes that there are no other positive spillovers from high penetration, not captured by GDP growth.  
We do not, however, suggest that it is appropriate to extrapolate a decade's worth of effect beyond the 
observed period.   
The econometric analysis lends support, then, to the proposition that the experience of other countries in 
the OECD is that unbundling rules, effectively enforced, increase penetration.  This is consistent with 
the results of our qualitative analysis.  Furthermore, our re-analysis of the data suggests that much of the 
ambiguity in prior analyses is explained to a large extent by Switzerland's experience.  While we too 
agree that Switzerland's experience is an example that it is possible under certain circumstances to do 
well  without  unbundling,  we  see  here  that  econometric  analysis  has  been  reflecting  that  qualitative 
caution, rather than a broader ambiguity in the results across many countries. 
4.11 Looking forward by looking back: Current efforts to transpose first generation 
access to the next generation transition 
Several  assumptions  about  the  next  generation  transition  and  how  it  is  different,  and  solutions  to 
transposing the experience of the last transition to the next, are emerging in Europe, Japan, and South 
Korea.  In Europe, the need to share a coherent view, so as to coordinate regulatory responses across 
national agencies that are independent of each other, has resulted in a particularly crisp analysis by the 
European Regulators Group (ERG).  The ERG is an EU-created body of national regulatory agencies 
(NRAs) that coordinates among all the national regulatory bodies of the member states, as well as those   Next Generation Connectivity 
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of the non-EU EFTA countries and countries on the EU accession list.  It produces annual best-practices 
reports, and its decisions inform the European Commission's implementation and enforcement decisions 
on questions of communications policy.  In other words, although it is not itself a regulator, its decisions 
reflect the collective experience of its members, and have direct influence over the body that does have 
enforcement power over the national regulators.   The need to communicate among the regulators and 
with the Commission requires the ERG to produce explicit, coherent analyses, and make its work a 
particularly valuable source of insight.  We anchor our description of current lessons being learned and 
applied  by  other  countries  in  the  ERG  report  on  Next  Generation Access  from  June  of  2009,  and 
supplement it with particular national examples as well as with, in particular, the Japanese and South 
Korean experience on mobile.  Note that this section describes current thinking in these countries. We do 
not offer our own opinion as to the substance or desirability of these assumptions or solutions. 
4.11.1  Assumptions 
Following is a list of assumptions that are currently stated in the ERG and several of the European 
national reports, with additional focus on ubiquity from Japan: 
a)  The costs of deploying will be high; and investment will entail risk. 
b)  Facilities-based  competition  is  good,  but  even  where  it  exists  should  be  combined  with 
service/wholesale and mixed (unbundled-like) models of investment and service competition to 
impose market discipline on network owners. 
c)  Fiber networks have several diverse topologies, some more conducive than others to “deep” 
competition,  that  is,  competition  based  on  investment  in  electronics  connected  to  physical 
infrastructure  on  the  unbundled  model.    Where  topology  is  not  conducive  to  such  deep 
competition, service-level, or wholesale models of access, like bitstream access, must be assured, 
and potential abuse curbed. 
d)  Finding models of spreading risk, sharing costs, or absorbing it publicly are productive avenues 
for  pursuit  in  the  construction  of  next  generation  networks.    This  might  include  public 
investment,  particularly  of  the  form  of  local  level  public  private  partnerships,  or  various 
approaches to sharing investment and infrastructure among competitors. 
e)  Ubiquity requires integration of fixed, mobile, and nomadic networks.  This supports permitting 
greater  vertical  integration  between  fixed  and  mobile  networks,  coupled  with  greater  access 
regulation. 
4.11.2  High cost 
Putting new infrastructure in place, particularly replacing current copper plant with fiber is expensive.  
Much of the expense is in relatively low-tech “civil engineering” work: digging trenches, locating ducts; 
getting into homes.  The cost of the fiber itself, and of the electronics, is minuscule relative to the cost of 
the low-tech, high labor components.  Coupled with the extremely high capacity of fiber networks, 
European future-oriented analyses are concerned that economies of scale and scope make investment in 
multiple redundant networks risky and potentially unjustifiable even in many urban areas.  The concern 
is more starkly expressed for higher-cost areas, with a potentially smaller number of subscribers to 
justify the cost.  This suggests in current analysis by the ERG that, while facilities-based competition is 
in principle desirable, because it limits the dependence of competitors on another's infrastructure and the 
relative effectiveness of regulation to prevent abuses, competition over shared facilities will play at least   Policies and practices: Competition and access   
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as important a role in next generation networks as it did in the first transition.  The ERG therefore 
suggests that the benefits of competition, even over an incumbent's facilities, are considered sufficiently 
important to justify the potential dampening effect on the rate of roll out.  Ofcom reached a similar 
conclusion in its super-fast broadband report.  Given the high entry barriers on the one hand, and the 
benefits  of  service-level  competition  on  the  other  hand  (whether  or  not  one  considers  the  case  for 
unbundling and access regulation established by the studies presented here, European regulators quite 
clearly do treat the case as established), European countries are aiming their sights on how to extend the 
same  basic  lesson  they  learned  in  the  first  generation  transition  from  dial-up  to  broadband  to  the 
transition from broadband to next generation networks.   
4.11.3  Topologies 
Current  European  plans  focus  on  three  topologies  used  to  role  out  networks  that  count  as  “next 
generation.”  The difference between them depends on (1) how close to the home the fiber gets, and (2) 
the extent to which capacity is shared among multiple subscribers.   
Where fiber is drawn from the local exchange only to a cabinet in the neighborhood, and the rest of the 
way is distributed by copper, this topology is called Fiber-to-the-Cabinet (FttC).  Its maximum speeds 
are slower, and it is effectively a version of DSL (VDSL) with the fiber pulled closer to the home, and 
the copper loops shortened.   It offers the architecture that is cheapest  for the incumbent to deploy, 
provides the lowest speeds, and is the least future-proof.  The degree to which it is hard or easy to open 
up to competition on an unbundled basis depends on certain physical features, such as the size of the 
neighborhood cabinet.  To the extent that it is physically difficult to locate the equipment of an entrant in 
the neighborhood, this architecture leaves entrants in a position more akin to resale than to unbundling 
in terms of their ability to invest in the network and retain control over critical aspects of the subscriber's 
experience.  It is in large measure seen as an interim measure, to pull higher-speed capacity closer to the 
neighborhood and the home, as part of an incremental, long-term upgrade to fiber all the way to the 
home.   
Two topologies already pull fiber all the way to the home.  The first is point-to-point, where each home 
has its own dedicated fiber optic cable to the Internet point of presence (POP).  In Amsterdam, for 
example, this means that 10,000 homes are connected to a single POP, each by its fiber, with symmetric 
capacity.  This is the most flexible architecture in terms of deploying future network upgrades, because it 
allows electronics to be changed in a single location, without additional civil engineering expenses, both 
for large numbers of households at a time and on a per-household basis.  It is also the most competition-
friendly for the same reason, because it allows competitors to connect at various places and add their 
own innovative electronics more readily, for each individual subscriber, at a relatively central location.  
The  second  is  passive  optical  network  (PON),  where  shared  fiber  capacity  is  again  pulled  to  the 
neighborhood, but instead of distributing it through copper, the shared capacity is fed into an optical 
splitter in the neighborhood and then split into individual fibers going into each home.  Each splitter 
might serve anywhere from as few as 8 to as many as 128 homes.  It is seen as an intermediate solution 
between FttC and point-to-point full fiber connections.  PON networks are more difficult to unbundle 
because the optical splitters are usually buried in the neighborhood, making the cost of collocation and 
unbundling at the relevant point much higher per-subscriber (distributed between 8 or 32 subscribers, 
instead of among 10,000).  The European discussions, influenced by a September 2008 report to Ofcom 
by Britain's Broadband Stakeholders Group, generally assume that PON networks are about five times 
more expensive to deploy than FttC networks, while point-to-point networks are yet an additional 15% 
more expensive than PON networks.
87  Experience with the Amsterdam CityNet network suggests that 
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the difference in price between PON and point-to-point networks is more contingent on the particular 
availability and history of existing plant, and that the British report was based on assumptions about 
reuse  by  Openreach  of  certain  BT  facilities.    We  have  not  made  an  independent  cost  analysis  to 
distinguish between these claims, although we do note that the important difference—the much higher 
cost of FttH over FttC—is not disputed, and that a difference of 15% in cost may be insufficient to 
change a policymaker's preference between two topologies, if the one that costs 15% more is indeed a 
thirty-year infrastructure that is both more competition-friendly and more future-proof.  
Based  on  Amsterdam's  experience  the  Dutch  incumbent's  new  joint  venture  with  Reggefiber  is 
deploying a point-to-point topology.  The CityNet experience, like the British Broadband Stakeholders 
Group report, suggests that the overwhelming portion of the cost is in the physical, lower-tech portions 
of the work.  That project calculates that the cost of fiber was about 8%-9% of the total costs, other 
materials, such as for ducts, were another 18%, and the remainder were labor.  Unsurprisingly, in more 
densely populated, multi-dwelling units areas, like city centers, the proportion of labor for indoor wiring 
is higher, and the inverse is true in less dense areas for smaller houses.  In France, where deployment is 
primarily in urban areas, and the in-building wiring is to be shared between competitors, France Telecom 
has nonetheless chosen to deploy a GPON topology.  Iliad/Free, on the other hand, is deploying point-to-
point topology in very similar geographic areas, lending support to concerns that the choice of PON 
topology  may  be  driven  in  part  by  efforts  to  hamper  competitors’  use  of  the  incumbent's  network; 
although it may also be explained by a different time horizon that the companies take in how future-
proof to make their networks.   
The core points on topology are: 
•  Fiber-to-the-home, whether PON or point-to-point, is about five times more expensive than FttC, 
VDSL, or hybrid fiber coaxial cable architectures 
•  Which topology is chosen affects the relative ease of permitting competitors to enter with their 
own electronics, as opposed to by depending more heavily on active components owned and 
managed by the incumbent 
•  FttC and PON are both architectures that are less amenable to sharing facilities over time; the 
cost difference between PON and point-to-point likely exists, but does not appear to be large.  
4.11.4  Reducing or sharing the costs of future proof, more competitive topologies 
An important part of the discussion in Europe revolves around how to reduce redundant investment in 
the civil works aspect of fiber deployment—the digging up of streets and the like.  The UK study for the 
Broadband  Stakeholder  Group  estimated  that  street  works  account  for  75%  of  the  cost  of  PON 
deployments, and 80% of point-to-point deployments.
88  A major part of European efforts is aimed at 
reducing  or  sharing  those  costs  and  the  risks  associated  with  investing  such  large  sums  in  a  new 
technology with unproven (though predicted) demand.  (In South Korea and Japan, this problem was 
primarily approached through substantial government subsidies.  Japan in particular also enjoyed entry 
by electric utilities, whose existing infrastructure was characterized in the UK report as reducing the 
civil works costs of fiber to the home deployment by 23%.
89) 
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Public-private partnerships.     
An important part of the strategies for investment in fiber infrastructure has been the implementation of 
public private partnerships.  In Sweden, government funds in municipalities support requisitioning of 
open  access  networks,  with  a  preference  for  private  provisioning  and  services  over  municipally-
requisitioned  dark  fiber  and  ducts,  but  with  a  safety  valve  for  municipal  investment  in  case  no 
companies want to light up the fiber.  A similar model is developing in many places in France, not least 
following the example of Hauts de Seine, whose then-Chairman of General Council, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
proposed subsidies for a public-private rollout in that wealthy part of Greater Paris.  A similar public-
private model, Amsterdam's CityNet, recently became more private than public when the City and the 
social housing corporations who co-owned it with private investors transferred much of their holdings to 
the new venture between KPN and Reggefiber.   
An avenue used in Sweden and the Netherlands is a form of customer pre-commitment through local 
cooperatives, which reduces up-front investment as well as take-up risk.  One example described in the 
UK report is of the town of Neunen, in the Netherlands.  Each household in the cooperative pays a one-
off  commitment/membership  fee  (20EUR).    Each  household  can  then  decide  whether  to  buy  a 
connection, which cost 2100 EUR in the original deployments, and whose price was later decreased to 
1500 EUR.  With a government subsidy of 800EUR to each connection fee, the up front cost to a 
subscriber  was  700EUR,  or  about  $810  PPP,      The  government  also  subsidized  the  full  cost  of  a 
subscription for one year.  The community contracted with Reggefiber to provide the fiber to the home 
network.  Thereafter, a triple play package cost 39.39 EUR per month.  The model aggregates demand, 
reduces risk to the developer, speeds uptake of subscribership, and directs the rate and direction of 
rollout  to  where  there  is  ability  and  willingness  to  pay  for  it.    Needless  to  say,  given  the  role  of 
government subsidies, a different decisional model about where to roll out could be influenced through a 
subsidy policy. 
Private joint ventures on an open access model.   
Two primary models are being explored in Europe for joint private investment.  As we saw in the 
discussion of the Netherlands above, the Dutch model effectively creates a general-purpose separate 
joint venture for deploying fiber, which would result in a single open access network that would gain its 
return on investment by selling capacity to competitors.   
The Swiss model is more project-specific.  Here Swisscom is laying out four separate fibers with each 
deployment, and is inviting three kinds of complementary investments from competitors.  The first are in 
the form of reciprocal four-fiber deployments by  other competitors who do have ducts (effectively, 
electric utilities).  These would then be exchanged in a straight, no-cash “my second fiber for yours” 
trade, allowing each competitor access to its own fiber over the other's deployed infrastructure.  If there 
is  substantial  imbalance  in  relative  contributions,  Swisscom  assumes  that  there  can  be  additional 
adjustment  payments.    The  second  type  of  competitor  investment  is  in  the  form  of  up-front  cash 
contributions  by  competitors  who  do  not  have  ducts,  but  who  help  reduce  Swisscom's  exposure  in 
exchange for a fiber of their own.  The third entails long-term commitments by competitors who want 
unbundled access, again, reducing the risk inherent in the investment in exchange for lower wholesale 
rates over the period agreed.  Competitors who want to provide none of these risk- and cost-sharing 
participations will be able to buy capacity at higher, short-term commitment rates.  Enabling this kind of 
collaboration requires both approval from competition authorities, and oversight to assure that the joint 
investors  do  not  exclude  others,  but  the  over-provisioning  is  thought  to  ease  that  task.    Deutsche 
Telekom too has announced several cooperative ventures with regional competitors along similar lines.  
With EWE Tel it will deploy in 4 cities, EWE TEL in 5, and each company will have access to the   Next Generation Connectivity 
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other's network in all nine cities.   Similar projects are under way with local competitors in Aachen and 
Cologne. 
Regulated deployment and open access for the last drop and in-building wiring.     
The French regulation of the past year has been focused on the cost of the final drop, or last 100 meters, 
rather than on the cost of middle mile or last mile.  Up to the final drop, competitors have access to 
France Telecom's ducts, pursuant to a regulation passed in July of 2008 by ARCEP.
90  Moreover, France 
decided to leap frog to fiber in its urban areas, Paris in particular, by opening up its sewer system to 
competitors to pull fiber, thereby avoiding much of the civil engineering cost.  
In August of 2008, the French legislature passed a new law about final drops.  The first part of the law 
requires developers of new construction to deploy fiber throughout the building or construction, and to 
make that fiber plant available to all competing operators on a non-discriminatory basis. This takes 
advantage of the fact that the incremental cost of pulling ducts through a house when it is in construction 
is much lower than opening walls and pulling wire when the construction is completed.  This part of the 
law is similar to the practice that has been common in South Korea, as we saw, and that the South 
Korean government facilitated by offering formal public certification programs that certified buildings 
as “connected” when they were wired for high speed connectivity available to operators.  The second 
part  of  the  law,  which  has  been  the  subject  of  consultation  and  implementation  by ARCEP  since, 
involves structured cooperation between competitors.  The idea is that the disruption of running multiple 
fiber plants, at different times, through a building is too great.  As a practical matter, that would mean 
that whoever gets to a building first would have a monopoly over that building unless required to share 
the facility, because owners would not permit the disruption repeatedly.  Building owners in existing 
buildings therefore have a responsibility, when they contract with a given provider, to provision access 
to that in-building fiber plant to competitors on a non-discriminatory basis.  The competitors share the 
in-building plant of whichever provider the building owner selected to implement the internal wiring.   
4.11.5  Access for non-investors: Passive and active 
Part of the task of transposing a regulatory regime from copper networks to fiber involves abstracting 
what it was about the old regulatory regime that worked. As part of this analysis, the Europeans have 
emphasized the distinction between active and passive access.
91  “Passive” elements are inert pieces of 
equipment that just carry electronics powered, generated, and directed elsewhere.  This includes duct 
access, dark fiber, fiber unbundling in PON and point-to-point networks, in-house wiring and cables, 
and,  where  copper  is  still  used  for  part  of  the  network,  copper  loops.    “Active”  services  are  like 
wholesale and bitstream access—electronic signals over the passive networks.  As with bitstream and 
unbundled access, a competitor using active components will need to invest less to get up and running, 
but  will  have  less  flexibility  to  innovate  in  services  and  technology.   A  competitor  using  passive 
components will need greater investments, but gain greater flexibility and independence to innovate.   
Ofcom's statement on superfast Internet suggests that active access will play an important role in next 
generation connectivity.
92  Because Ofcom is regulating a functionally separated incumbent, it appears 
to express less concern with monitoring for abuse, and emphasizes the importance of defining the range 
of services that need to be included as open access components.  These will, according to Ofcom's plans, 
include a wider range of active products, and Ofcom has used its convening power to get industry 
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players together to negotiate the kinds of active services they need in order to permit and facilitate 
competition.  Furthermore, Ofcom sees passive fiber access and duct access as important elements of a 
next generation competitive environment.  Ofcom gives the companies the freedom to negotiate rates for 
these services, but monitors these negotiations to assure that they permit reasonable rates of return 
reflecting the appropriate level of risk, as the UK regulator puts it.  This idea of a “risk premium” in 
rates imposed on active and passive elements sold to competitors is more widely considered in Europe 
as an important consideration in implementing access to next generation networks.
93 
The Dutch regulator OPTA is the first in Europe to impose unbundling of the fiber loop as a regulatory 
requirement.  It also used its power to shepherd through a joint venture of KPN and Reggefiber that 
would role out open access networks.  The joint venture is the only one outside of Slovenia to aim to roll 
out a fully point-to-point national network.  As we mentioned, this is the topology most conducive to 
open  access  and  passive  product  unbundling  as  well  as  active  product  wholesale  services.    France, 
Portugal,  Germany,  and  Spain  have  all  imposed  on  their  incumbents,  but  not  their  entrants,  a 
requirement to offer access to ducts, although current European efforts are to make these obligations 
symmetrical between incumbents and the newer companies.
94  Spain, like France, has required building 
owners and the providers they contract with to share in-building wiring.  Denmark for now has no 
separate next generation regulatory treatment, but because the incumbent seems to be rolling out a FttC 
or VDSL service, its infrastructure is subject to unbundling like the copper plant built on the same 
architecture, and it is required to provide access to backhaul services as well.
95  The approach in France 
and Germany has been to change little for now, but include fiber in the definition of the markets as to 
which unbundling and bitstream access are required. Vodafone now plans to compete using Deutsche 
Telekom's VDSL platform on an active-product, or wholesale basis.   
Another  concern  in  Europe  that  is  of  less  concern  in  the  United  State  involves  the  transition  from 
unbundled copper loops to fiber.  These involve recognition that entrants made substantial investments 
based on being able to connect to copper local loop, and these investments will be stranded once the 
incumbent moves to fiber and ceases to maintain the loops.  These are treated as transition problems 
focused on how long the incumbent would be required to maintain the loops and main distribution 
frames so as to allow the competitors to migrate.  Most European countries have required the incumbent 
to phase out exchanges slowly, giving advance notice, and to provide clear plans to competitors about 
future roll outs so these can adjust their investment and reinvestment appropriately.   
4.11.6  Functional separation.   
Several European regulators have considered functional separation as one potential approach to deal 
with the likely increased need for access to active components, where competitors' dependence on the 
provider is potentially high.  The UK's positive experience prompted reconsideration of the costs and 
benefits of such an approach, and not only in New Zealand.  The German regulator undertook one such 
review, but has not adopted it. The ERG issued a cautious opinion on the subject in 2007, cautioning 
European  regulators  to  consider  local  conditions,  incumbent  recalcitrance,  and  potential  effects  on 
investment.
96  In June of 2007 the Swedish regulator decided to follow the example of the UK, and 
imposed  functional  separation  on  TeliaSonera,  which  has  been  functioning  with  a  separate  access 
subsidiary since January 1, 2008.  The Italian regulator, Agcom, leaned on Telecom Italy to functionally 
separate its wholesale from retail divisions, and TI indeed, after over two years of negotiations, created a 
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separate open access division.  And we have seen that the Dutch incumbent, KPN, has entered into a 
joint venture that effectively separates it from the point-to-point fiber, open access network that it will 
build  and  use.   The  changes  in  Sweden,  the  Netherlands,  and  Italy  are  too  recent  to  have  yielded 
observable results, positive or negative.  Similarly, it is of course too soon to evaluate the September 15, 
2009 announcement by the Australian government of a new law requiring Australia's incumbent, Telstra, 
to undertake structural separation voluntarily, or force it to undergo functional separation.   
4.11.7  Fixed-mobile convergence and access to mobile networks 
The shift to ubiquitous access has, to a substantial degree, led to mergers between fixed broadband firms 
and mobile broadband providers.  In France, SFR, the mobile provider, bought Neuf Cegetel, the fixed 
broadband service.  Free, on the other hand, did not bid on a 3G license, and has instead expanded its 
reach through its innovative nomadic access sharing approach—where the network interface devices it 
furnishes its consumers serve also as nomadic access points for all Free subscribers who come within 
range of each other.  In the Slovak Republic, the major investment in Fiber comes from Orange, France 
Telecom's mobile subsidiary which is the largest mobile player in the Slovak Republic.  In Germany, 
Deutsche Telekom owns T-Mobile, which deploys not only 3G networks but an extensive network of 
hotspots.    Similarly,  in  Sweden,  Telenor,  one  of  the  entrants,  has  rolled  out  substantial  nomadic 
infrastructure through its local Glocalnet subsidiary, called Glocalzone.   Telenor now bundles access to 
hotspots in Sweden's 20 largest cities with its mobile broadband offerings on the cellular side.  Telenor 
also bought nationwide WiMax licenses in the 3.6-3.8GHz and in the 2.6Ghz bands in 2007 and 2008.  
In Japan, KDDI made this move first, anchored in their au Corp mobile brand and expanding through 
purchases and alliances to offer fiber and high-speed DSL services as well.  Softbank Yahoo!BB bought 
Vodafone Japan in 2006, creating Softbank Mobile, and recently the MIC is permitting NTT East and 
West to cooperate with NTT DoCoMo.  Similarly, in South Korea, in only the last year the same move 
occurred in both directions: the largest mobile provider, SKT, purchased the successor of Hanaro; and 
very  soon  thereafter,  KT,  the  incumbent  fixed  telecommunications  provider  and  leader  in  the  fixed 
broadband market, merged with KFT, the second largest mobile player.  Between them the two firms 
have  over  80%  of  the  wireless  market  and  over  70%  of  the  fixed-broadband  market.    On  a  more 
aspirational model, the most recent annual report from ARCEP, in France, sets as one of the rights to be 
offered to a fourth 3G licensee, should one emerge (earlier efforts to get a 3G fourth provider failed, 
when Free/Iliad was the only bidder, and it refused to pay the government's reservation price), would be 
to give the new fourth provider access to the facilities of the existing three 3G operators in France for 
purposes of collocating its 3G network equipment.  In Italy, two of the three major mobile data players, 
Telecom Italia mobile and Vodafone, have a six year agreement to share access sites for existing and 
future mobile networks, sharing poles, cables, electrical, and air-conditioning equipment.  In Australia, 
Optus and Vodafone reached similar agreements, as did Telstra and H3G.  These latter market-based 
agreements  suggest  that  infrastructure  sharing  is  valuable  even  in  the  lower-cost  setting  of  mobile 
networks.  They raise the question, however, as to whether there is need for regulation to achieve these 
kinds of sharing benefits in less competitive mobile broadband markets than Italy or Australia.  
How one treats this trend depends on whether one focuses purely on high capacity to the home or on 
ubiquitous connectivity.  From the high-capacity only perspective, the trend is worrisome.  It would 
mean  that  potential  competitors  are  being  eliminated  through  consolidation.    In  South  Korea,  for 
example,  the  dominant  mobile  and  fixed  broadband  providers  were  prevented  from  bundling  their 
offerings until 2007, because of the concern with reducing competition.  If, on the other hand, one is 
focused  on  ubiquitous,  seamless  connectivity,  then  one  sees  fixed,  mobile,  and  nomadic  access  as 
complements, and sees the kinds of integrations occurring as desirable moves in that direction.  No   Policies and practices: Competition and access   
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single program reflects that trajectory more clearly than SFR's, which allows SFR subscribers to connect 
to data seamlessly, either over their own home network when at home (an approach increasingly used 
under the term “femtocells” by mobile providers more generally, to avoid the high landline connection 
charges where wireline providers still charge them), or over their 3G network where no SFR subscriber 
is within reach, or over the Wi-Fi box and fixed line of any other SFR subscriber, when they are in 
reach.  All of this allows the subscriber to receive unlimited data service over whichever portion of 
SFR's network is most readily available.   
The  potential  problem,  of  course,  arises  when  a  new  entrant  faces  not  only  the  physical  costs  of 
implementing a fixed network, but must effectively bundle mobile data connectivity as well.  Japan and 
South Korea now appear to have extended the solution of open access from the fixed to the mobile 
arena, although the solution is in an ad hoc mode.  In Japan, it mostly took the form of a MIC-arbitrated 
arrangement between NTT DoCoMo and Japan Communications, allowing the latter to lease circuits 
and capacity on its mobile network.  The MIC has since required NTT DoCoMo to publish standard 
leasing fees for entrants, although these are largely wholesale entrants, not unbundling-like entrants.   In 
South  Korea,  because  both  acquisitions  involved  dominant  players—one  in  wireless,  the  other  in 
fixed—the open access requirements were imposed as part of the merger approvals.   As a condition of 
merger approval, both companies must now open their mobile data networks to competitors.   
The core lesson from these cases suggests that the shift from a policy focus on high-capacity fixed 
broadband to the home, to ubiquitous, seamless access, requires two seemingly opposite moves.  The 
first would tend to reduce potential competition by permitting vertical integration between fixed and 
mobile service providers, thereby removing one avenue for facilities-based competition in high capacity 
data to the home.  The second would tend to increase competition over the small set of discrete facilities-
based channels to each subscriber, both fixed and mobile, by opening the entire converged fixed-mobile 
network to access by competitors: to both the fixed and mobile components.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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4.12 Annex:  Pricing 
This annex details the two pricing studies that we carried out: the first as part of the benchmarking 
exercise in this report (Part 3)and the second as part of our evaluation of the effects of open access 
policies  in  Part  4  (Competition  and Access).    Our  benchmarking  pricing  study  sought  to  validate, 
complement, and complete the results of the OECD pricing data set using an independent market data 
set.
97 We found that the data sets are somewhat correlated, but due to the thinness of the data, the 
analysis is very sensitive to variations between the two sets.  As a result we combined the two sets to 
present a fuller picture of the data and compared the results to the original.  Our firm-level pricing study 
for the highest-speed service tier sought to identify the prices and speeds of offerings, throughout the 
OECD, that are furthest along toward next generation networks in their capacity.   
4.12.1  OECD pricing data set 
The OECD pricing data set includes 631 consumer broadband offerings surveyed in September 2008 
from broadband providers in OECD countries.
98  These offerings are categorized based on the speed of 
the connection:  low (256Kbps to 2Mbps), medium (2.5Mbps to 10Mbps), high (10Mbps to 32Mbps) 
and very high (greater than 35Mbps).  We prefer using this approach to describe the pricing data because 
the  OECD  measure  of  price-per-megabit-per-second  includes  speed  as  an  endogenous  factor  and, 
therefore,  double-counts  the  availability  of  high  speed  service  tiers  within  the  pricing  benchmark.  
Breaking down prices based on tiers provides a more direct representation of the price-to-performance 
tradeoffs that consumers makes than the composite totals do.  
Graphs of the average price from the OECD pricing data set are shown in Figures 4.3 through 4.6. These 
results are computed using a simple average of all the offerings in the data set for that country in that 
tier. 
                                                 
97 TeleGeography’s GlobalComms 3.0 data set 
98 OECD (2009) Communications Outlook 2009. Table 7.4, p 302-309.   Policies and practices: Competition and access   
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4.12.2  Berkman study using the GlobalComms data set 
Methodology 
The objective of this analysis is to examine, validate, and complement the results of the OECD data set, 
starting with a review of their methodology and then comparing OECD measures with an independent 
study.  The OECD includes a wide range of providers in their data, regardless of size and market share.  
Close inspection of the data reveals that firms with a small share of the market have a disproportionate 
influence on the average price than most consumers would expect based on the number of subscription 
plans  available  to  them.    We  constructed  an  alternative  measure  that  considers  only  the  top  four 
providers from each country.  On average these top four providers combined have 80% of their local 
markets.  The United States had the lowest percentage of market covered by those top four at just under 
60%  of  market  share.    Our  analysis  takes  a  straight  average  of  offerings  from  only  those  top  four 
providers and disregards the rest.   
The second change we made to the OECD methodology was to remove any offerings with data caps of 
less than 2 GB per month.  We chose 2 GB per month as the lower bound because that was the lower end 
of  the  data  usage  rates  quoted  by  U.S.  cable  firm  Comcast  as  the  median  monthly  usage  of  its 
subscribers.
99  The impact of this change in methodology was clear in countries, such as Australia and 
New Zealand, where caps are a common way to address the low-price market.  In these countries we 
saw entry level prices rise over the original OECD average price, but we believe that these prices are 
more comparable to prices from other countries where data caps are not prevalent. 
We  applied  this  new  methodology  to  the  GlobalComms  3.0  market  database.    GlobalComms  is  a 
regularly updated database of international broadband statistics, maintained by the  widely-cited and 
long-time industry analysis group Telegeography, a division of PriMetrica, Inc. The firm states that the 
data comes from primary sources wherever possible (e.g., the operators), and secondarily from national 
regulatory agencies, international statistics organizations, and other sources.  It covers both wireline and 
wireless services and is used by companies worldwide to perform market analysis.  The data set we 
constructed out of the GlobalComms database contained 529 offerings observed between February 2008 
and July 2009. We also added to this database a recent offering in the very high speed tier from Comcast 
in the United States, based on our own research, to reflect the introduction of new offerings based on 
DOCSIS 3.0 from U.S. cable providers, which were not otherwise reflected in either of the data sets we 
examined.  Including this offering lowered the average price in the United States in the very high speed 
tier. 
Results 
We graphed the two data sets to see how similar or different the resulting averages are, and the results 
are shown in Figures 4.7 through 4.10. 
                                                 
99 http://www.comcast.net/terms/network/amendment/ (last visited Sept 4, 2009)   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Note:  Belgium, UK, Japan, Portugal are top 10 players in OECD dataset but are not displayed 
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In the low, medium, and high speed graphs, if a country did not have a data point in both data sets, then 
it was not displayed.  For example, Belgium is ranked third in the low speed tier for price, but it does not 
appear on the low speed correlation graph because, although Belgium does have three data points in the 
GlobalComms data set in that speed tier, none of them is from a top four provider.  The orange box in 
the lower left hand corner of each graph indicates the cut-off point for the top ten countries on each axis.  
In the very high speed graph, because there are so few data points, all of the data points from both sets 
are shown, and the orange box was drawn at $70 per month.   
Each  of  these  graphs  shows  differing  degrees  of  significant  correlation.    The  significance  of  the 
correlation across the tiers gives us some added measure of confidence in the quality of each of the 
pricing studies.  Some of the variation between the data sets may be accounted for by fluctuations in 
currency exchange rates, given the time elapsed during which the offerings were surveyed.  Similarly 
prices may have changed throughout that time period.  Finally, although each of these data sets has 
many data points, with 30 countries and 4 tiers, the average number of points per result in each data set 
is between 4 and 5. Variation in even a single offering can have a large impact on the resulting average.  
Looking  at  a  few  countries  in  particular  highlights  the  sensitivity  of  this  analysis.    Finland  has  a 
consistently higher average price in the GlobalComms data set than the OECD data set.  The OECD data 
set has many more offerings listed for Finland than does the GlobalComms data set.  This includes 
several offerings at lower speeds and lower prices which pull the OECD average down relative to the 
GlobalComms average.  Additionally, some of the offerings appear to be for the same service but at a 
higher price in the GlobalComms data set.  Poland presents similar difficulties.  The GlobalComms data 
set includes several providers with much higher price points than the OECD data set, which pulls the 
GlobalComms average up relative to the OECD average.  In Switzerland, GlobalComms has a low 
speed offering at just $3 per month which drops the average from $20 to $14. 
Key take-aways 
There are two key findings from this analysis.  First, a country that has been identified in the top ten in 
both data sets (those that fall within the orange box), can confidently be labeled as a high performer in 
that speed tier.  Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden all reside in the top ten in both 
data sets for the low speed tier.  Denmark, Italy, Greece, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom are all in the top ten for the medium speed tier.  Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are all strong performers in the high speed 
tier. 
Second, there is no clear optimal data set between these two.  Both the OECD and GlobalComms data 
sets are similar in their aims and methods, and though they are clearly correlated, they also clearly have 
some distinct data within them.  Given this, we decided to combine both data sets to yield a set with 
many more samples on which to apply our methodology. 
4.12.3  The combined data set 
The combination of the OECD and the GlobalComms data sets revealed nearly 150 duplicate offerings 
which were manually tagged and removed from the combined set.  Where there was a duplication, we 
kept the OECD offering.  The resulting set had nearly 1000 entries.  Of those, 277 were excluded in our 
methodology for being from a non-top four provider or having a data cap of less than 2 GB.  The results 
of this data set are shown in Figures 4.11 through 4.14.     Policies and practices: Competition and access   
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In the low speed tier, the United States moves up seven places, from 12
th ranked in the original OECD 
ranking, to 5
th here.  This is due primarily to the methodological change that excludes some higher-price, 
smaller-competitor offerings, which results in a drop in the average price by $3.  We see many other big 
movers, including New Zealand which falls by eleven places, Germany and Switzerland which both 
improve by ten places, Luxembourg and Poland which both improve by seven places and the United   Policies and practices: Competition and access   
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Kingdom which falls seven.  New Zealand is impacted by the removal of the low-price, sub-2GB cap 
offerings.   Adding  the  GlobalComms  data  set  results  in  two  new  lower  price  options  affecting  the 
German average.  The OECD data set includes only two offerings from Luxembourg in this tier.  The 
GlobalComms data set adds another three unique offerings from two other carriers at more competitive 
prices.  Poland adds some more competitive offerings from top four carriers and removes some less 
competitive offerings from non-top four carriers.  The United Kingdom still suffers from a lack of data 
in the low speed tier.  This may be a factor of the sparseness of the data sets or could be a sign that there 
are fewer options in the United Kingdom in this speed tier. 
In the medium speed tier, merging the data sets has little impact on the United States, moving it from 
17
th to 18
th.  There are fewer big movers at this speed; however, the Slovak Republic improves by 
thirteen  places, Austria  improves  by  nine,  and  Greece  falls  by  ten.    Both  the  Slovak  Republic  and 
Austria, similar to the United States in the low speed tier, have offerings in the OECD data set from a 
few smaller providers with higher prices that are excluded in our methodology.  Greece’s change in 
rankings is more due to other countries’ movement than its own.  Greece’s average price increases 
slightly (from $32 in OECD set to $34 in the combined set), but it suffers a large fall in the rankings as 
several other countries improve their average prices. 
In the high speed tier, the United States’ average price falls by $10 resulting in a five place improvement 
in the rankings.  This change in price is mostly a result of excluding higher price options from the 7
th 
largest provider, Qwest.  In this tier, we do not see any countries shift more than a quintile in one 
direction or the other. 
In the very high speed tier, the United States falls two spots as the Slovak Republic and the United 
Kingdom are added to the mix of countries with very high speed offerings.  Norway is notably missing 
since its one offering in this tier was from a non-top four carrier, Lyse. 
In conclusion, we found that both the OECD and GlobalComms data sets suffer from sparse data as we 
cut by country and speed tier.  Combining the two data sets yields a somewhat more robust set, but 
further work into a more comprehensive data set that accurately  represents the options available to 
consumers and is less sensitive to variation would be necessary to further delve into this question. 
4.12.4  Firm-level offerings at the highest-speed tiers 
As part of our analysis of competition and access regulation, we used our combined data set to identify 
specifically the discrete prices and speed offerings made by firms in OECD countries at the highest 
speeds.  The source was the combined data set from GlobalComms and the OECD.  From this data set 
we  selected  all  offerings  that  fell  into  the  very  high  speed  tier,  that  is,  offerings  above  35Mbps, 
anywhere in the OECD.  Where a firm had multiple offerings in this tier, we selected the lowest price for 
the highest speed offering.  For this analysis we did not restrict offerings to only top four firms.  To these 
we added the highest available speed offered in each of the countries for which we focused on in Part 4 
(Competition and Access), where there were no offerings in the very high speed tier (Canada, Germany, 
Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).  To these we added the results of our own 
independent Web-based search for what were the best prices, at the best speeds, available from all U.S. 
broadband  providers  that  were  identified  in  the  GlobalComms  data  set  as  having  over  2  million 
subscribers. For these we included the lowest-priced, highest-speed offering we could from either the 
firm’s Web site or news reports about a firm’s launch of an offer.   
Because our initial examination identified the offerings of U.S. firms as among the lowest speed and 
highest priced, and because we have a particular interest in understanding prices in the United States, we   Next Generation Connectivity 
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decided to complement our initial findings with these additional, independent searches to assure that we 
were not missing much better offerings available in the United States.  As a result, we indeed include 
more offerings at the highest speeds, and substantially better-priced offerings than were available purely 
by examining our combined data set as described in Part 4 above.  The results, as we describe them here, 
are therefore highly biased in favor of U.S. firms. We found, for example, that were we to use the same 
methods in Japan, we would have to include another offering from KDDI that is as fast as K-Opticom’s 
1Gbps offer, at an even lower price, and TeliaSonera Sweden would join the group of highest-speed, 
lowest-price offerings.  We, nonetheless, chose to report the more expanded U.S. set because even with 
the strong bias in favor of U.S. firms our initial important finding, of high prices and low speeds, holds, 
and because the few discrete observations we made for firms elsewhere also tended to cohere with 
observations we found in the data set. 
Our methodology resulted in 59 observed offerings.  We then used the company profiles and our own 
research to characterize each firm in our data set as an incumbent telephone company, a cable company, 
an  unbundling-based  entrant,  a  facilities-based  telecommunications  provider,  that  is,  a  provider  that 
came in and built its own telecommunications facilities not based on existing infrastructure like cable or 
power, and “other,” which includes primarily power companies. For companies like Telenor, Norway’s 
incumbent, we characterized offerings from Telenor in Sweden as made by an entrant, not an incumbent, 
because that is its role in the Swedish market.  Where a firm uses mixed approaches, but we knew 
precisely  how  it  provided  the  particular  offer,  we  characterized  the  firm  using  that  technique.  
Numericable in France, for example, is characterized as a cable company in our findings here, because 
although it also offerings unbundling-based DSL services at the high speed tier, using its newly acquired 
Completel unit, the offering we report here, in the very high speed tier, is available only over its cable 
lines. 
Conclusion 
Our complete findings are described in the main text.  In brief, we found that the highest prices and 
lowest speed combinations occur in North America, where there are no unbundling-based entrants, and 
where  both  the  United  States,  formally,  and  Canada,  practically,  have  come  to  rely  on  inter-modal 
competition, in most cases between at most two regional competitors in any given regional market.  
Conversely,  the  lowest  prices  and  highest  speeds  are  offered  by  firms  that  occupy  a  market  with 
unbundling-based  entrants  alongside  incumbent  telecommunications  companies  and  facilities-based 
competitors, both cable and power.   Furthermore, the very tight clustering of offerings in France, Japan, 
Sweden, South Korea, and Finland suggests highly competitive markets that are functioning at more or 
less the frontier of the feasible, particularly given the tight clustering of price/speed offerings across 
firms in these many different markets.  This becomes particularly obvious when compared to the more 
scattered offerings by U.S. firms ranging from the bottom left to top left quadrants.  The presence of the 
French firms, where there is so little facilities-based competition, all in the top right hand quadrant 
suggests that open access and, in particular, unbundling, rather than facilities-based competition, is a 
major driver of the  effect.   But the national  character of markets is  also observable from the  tight 
clustering of Swisscom, Fastweb, Cablecom, and Sunrise in the top left hand quadrant for Switzerland, 
the near-identical offerings by Orange Slovenska and Slovak Telecom, and the emphasis of British firms 
BSkyB, Tiscali UK, and O2 UK on lower speeds.   Policies and practices: Competition and access   
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4.13 Annex:  Unbundling econometric analysis 
4.13.1  2007 de Ridder paper 
The de Ridder report (OECD, 2007) collects 11 possible covariates to predict QTOT, the total broadband 
usage in the 30 OECD countries.  The first data set uses 2005 compiled data, and the second dataset, 
called  the  Panel  dataset,  includes  both  2002  and  2005  data.   The  covariate  treatment  of  deliberate 
interest  is  a  variable  GUYRS,  which  represents  the  total  number  of  years  since  a  country  adopted 
unbundling.  
The analysis technique was unweighted least squares linear regression, and a “step down”
100 method 
was applied.  The demand variables (Price in terms of log of DSL price, GDP per capita, education, any-
speed Internet saturation, and weather) were analyzed separately from the supply variables.  The supply 
variables include: LNPDSL – the price of DSL in log; UURB – the percentage of population that resides 
in urban areas; CFAC – the amount of competition, represented by the percentage of non-DSL lines in 
QTOT;  and  GUYRS  –  the  number  of  years  since  adoption  of  unbundling.    Since  the  regressions 
including GUYRS are the only ones of interest, we will restrict our analysis to those results. 
When the Panel data was used, all 30 × 2 - 6 = 54 data points (6 data points from 2002 were deemed to 
be unreliable) were used together in a series of OLS regressions, and a dummy variable to represent the 
difference  in  years.    The  covariate  treatment  of  deliberate  interest  is  the  variable  GUYRS.    The 
coefficient of the dummy variable can be interpreted as the average amount of growth in broadband 
penetration throughout the OECD, controlling for changes in other variables that occurred over the three 
year period between 2002 and 2005. 
According to de Ridder, there are a number of significant findings regarding GUYRS: 
1  In 2005 data alone, when Price of DSL is included, GUYRS is not significant.  GUYRS is 
significant  in  two  regressions,  when  included  with  UURB  +  CFAC  and  with  UURB  alone.  
These achieve about 52% adjusted R
2, and pin the effect of policy at about 1.25, or about an 
additional 1.25% use of broadband per year of policy adoption.   
2  Price in the 2005 datasets has a negative effect, and comparatively around 2%.  Because this is 
loge-price as measured, broadband use increases (0.69 × 2.5 =) 1.7% for every halving in the 
price of DSL. 
3  When Panel data is used, including 2002 and 2005 data in a model, GUYRS is significant for 
several regressions, including one large supply model when Price is used (PDSL + UURB + 
CFAC + GUYRS + DUMMY). In this model, the t – stat = 3.17 significant GUYRS variable is 
measured  to  have  a  0.596%  effect  for  every  year  of  adoption,  but  it  has  its  most  value  an 
alternative regression (CFAC + GUYRS + DUMMY), where it has a 0.94% effect and the adj-R
2 
is 62%. 
                                                 
100  By “Step Down,” we mean that de Ridder tends to start with the largest possible model (or the largest possible demand 
and the largest possible supply model), finds the linear regression coefficients, and then chooses smaller models in a 
succession.     Policies and practices: Competition and access 
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Critique of de Ridder 
The 2008 New Zealand Institute (Boyle, 2008) critique of de Ridder focuses on the Panel data and 
critiques the regression:  
QTOT ← (PDSL + UURB + CFAC + GUYRS + DUMMY) 
The critique focuses on regressions with both Log-price-of-DSL and GUYRS.  Their results can be 
summarized as follows: 
1.  When  a  Robust  regression  in  the Arellano  and  Peterson  sense  is  used,  the  GUYRS  in  this 
regression has fallen out of significance, into a non-statistically-significant 0.6% estimate. 
2.  An effect of 0.6% per year of adoption is a small effect compared to the three year dummy 
variable,  which  correspondingly  adds  about  7%  broadband  penetration  over  the  three  year 
period. 
Implementation issues in the critique 
The Arellano method (Arellano, 1987) is not necessarily standard, considering that the Peterson paper 
(Peterson, 2007) advertising it came out the same year as the de Ridder paper was published.  We agree 
that a linear regression is inadequate for the Panel data, and believe that country effects must be modeled 
within  the  analysis  as  a  significant  source  of  correlated  error.  However,  the  Arellano  estimate  as 
described is an exclusively within-group estimator.  In the OECD Panel data, there are only at maximum 
two points of data per group (i.e., country), and six countries have only one source of data.  A within-
group estimate subtracts out the group-effect by fitting a regression based upon deviation in covariates 
about a group mean.  In this data set, within-groups, there is little variation in the covariates.  For most 
data, the GUYRS variable for 2005 is exactly three years more than the 2002 data.  This means the 
variable is nearly computationally identical to the dummy variable, which is a 0 for 2002 and a 1 for 
2005 data.  We seek to learn about between group variation, to compare countries with little or no 
GUYRS to those with more years of unbundling. 
We used a mixed effects model: 
{ { { { it
tCountryi GroupEffec
i
ts FixedEffec iates Co
it
QTOT
it Z X Y ε β β + + + =
var
0  
Where country effects are pre-supposed to be independently distributed Zi ~ N(0, τ
2).  Error terms εit 
could be correlated within country.  The R-package “lme4” implementation of mixed effects regression 
was used to get the point estimate for  β ˆ .  To use more robust scores for the standard error, a White-
based variance estimate was used by calculating fixed-model residuals: 
4 ˆ ˆ
LME
it it it β X Y = u −  
Thus  it u ˆ  is an estimate for Zit + εit.  The Sandwich estimator used for S.E. ( ) β ˆ  was then: 
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2 2 ˆ ˆ .  If correlation amongst residual errors comes from error in measuring the 
country effect, this error estimate accounts for  i Z ˆ  within-country error. 
Still,  the  standard  errors  are  not  as  large  as  the Arellano  estimates,  and  the  error  for  the  GUYRS 
coefficient, whose information is concentrated in between-country effects, is smaller.      
Figure 4.16. Difference between within groups estimator and usual mixed effects estimator.  Both 
the within groups estimator and the mixed effects estimator are trying to estimate a linear model 
with normally distributed groups effects.  Consider, the data simulated here with a true line of 
slope 1 and two groups of data points, the Group A and the Group B which are significantly 
separated on the GUYRS scale.  The standard deviation for the country effect is four times the 
usual noise.  A usual mixed effects regression would try to assess a noise distribution for the 
country effects (red lines) and produce estimates for the country effect along with the linear 
regression factors.  A within groups estimate deletes country effect from the model by separating 
out the mean X values and Y values within each country and replotting the data points on a 
centered scale.  In the case of the GUYRS variable, which had significant between country 
variation, this can lead to an estimator with a very wide variance.  Arguably, with only two 
countries, it is very difficult to perceive an effect.  A linear regression for the plot on the left would 
over estimate the true effect.  A linear regression for the within groups plot on the right would 
under-estimate the true effect.  However, when the country count gets larger, 30 in our dataset, the 
mixed effects estimate will produce a GUYRS coefficient estimate with much less standard error 
than an estimator that did not use between groups information.  Later tests performed attempted 
to assess the robustness of the mixed effects regression that we have posed.  We feel confident that 
the only country whose removal generated a large change in the point estimate was Switzerland, 
and removing Switzerland would have produced a much larger coefficient effect, not a smaller 
one. 
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Collinearity and endogeneity in the GUYRS 
Significant focus has been placed on de Ridder's Panel regression: 
{ it it it it it it
QTOT
it DUMMY GUYRS CFAC UURB LNPDSL Y ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  
In this linear model, both the log of the DSL price (LNPDSL), and competition as measured in amount 
of  alternate  sources  to  broadband  (CFAC)  are  included,  along  with  the  variable  GUYRS.    Later 
regressions also included SIP, the overall nationwide Internet penetration, both broadband and dialup.    
De Ridder found a residual positive effect for GUYRS.  However, GUYRS arguably has an effect on the 
price  of  DSL  (the  reverse  could  also  be  argued),  as  well  as  the  amount  of  competition  or  Internet 
penetration.  If GUYRS were to solely increase broadband use by reducing price, then one would fully 
expect βGUYRS to be negligible in this model.  Instead, the positive  GUYRS β ˆ  estimate describes the residual 
effect, after taking into account price, that unbundling has on broadband use.  Explaining this residual 
mechanism could be difficult; it may be that consumers find it easier to obtain broadband now that a 
preferred company offers it. 
When using linear regressions it is often difficult to explain a causal effect from observed correlations.  
In natural experiments of this sort, a procedure of matched-pairs analysis, such as in (Rubin, 1974), 
matching countries with similar levels of other covariates though different values of treatment (in this 
case the GUYRS level), and measuring the difference in response between pairs, is a better standard.  
However, the OECD data set is small, and the pre-supposed treatment variable GUYRS is measured on 
a  continuous  scale.    Rather  than  eliminate  the  former  analyses,  we  checked  to  see  whether  linear 
regressions could be deemed appropriate.  We attempted to predict treatment variable GUYRS from the 
rest of the covariates, to test for unbalance.  If other covariates of the predictors are too high, we can 
assume we need either matching or a more advanced model.  Here is the result of a linear regression 




2 of this regression is 37%, meaning that still 63% of variation in GUYRS cannot be 
accounted for with the other variables.   We see that the price of DSL is the only significant predictor in 
this model.  However, when Switzerland is removed from the model, the adjusted R
2 rises to near 60%.   
Switzerland  has  many  covariates  similar  to  high  GUYRS  countries,  specifically  a  low  price  for 
broadband, though it did not adopt unbundling.   
We take from this analysis a caveat that GUYRS influence on broadband penetration might still act 
mainly through price, but that there is enough balance on price that a linear regression might identify a 
residual direct effect.   
  Estimate  Std. Error  T value  Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  -1.7034  8.0822  -0.21  0.8350 
LNPDSL  -0.9575  0.3393  -2.82  0.0099 
     UURB  -0.0303  0.0411  -0.74  0.4681 
     CFAC  0.0247  0.0267  0.92  0.3661 
      AGE  0.3950  0.2543  1.55  0.1346 
        SIP  0.0332  0.0455  0.73  0.4729 
       SUN  -0.2201  0.3810  -0.58  0.5694   Next Generation Connectivity 
  142 
Relating dummy estimate to GUYRS/year 
As stated earlier, the GUYRS variable is measured in years from adoption of unbundling regulation.  
The dummy variable in the Panel regressions represents the gain in Broadband between the years 2002 
and 2005.  Thus the dummy variable is a three year effect.  It is still true that a ≈ 0.6% effect per year for 
GUYRS  is  dwarfed  by  a  ≈  7%  effect  for  the  dummy,  though  it  should  be  noted  that  for  a  fair 
comparison, the GUYRS estimate should be multiplied by 3.   
Arguably, it is appropriate to measure GUYRS as a linear effect in time.  Using mixed effects regression 
for QTOT as a function of (LNPDSL + UURB + CFAC + GUYRS + “random-Country Effect”) we see 
that  the  GUYRS  residual  effect  in  Figure A.2  does  seem  to  be  well  described  by  a  linear  effect.  
However, for a more robust analysis, we will give output for GUYRS as measured as a 0 or 1 variable, 0 
if the country had not adopted the policy at the time, 1 if it did.  
Figure 4.17. A mixed effects regression was used to predict QTOT, using LNDSL, CFAC, UURB, 
GUYRS, and a random country-group effect.  This plot is the residual noise (using the measured 
effects for all fixed variables other than GUYRS) as a function of the GUYRS variable measured 
in years.  A linear trend seems sufficient to explain a percentage of this variation. 
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The other issue is the negative values for GUYRS, which were used in the de Ridder analysis and the 
critique,  which  described  GUYRS  2002  levels  with  negative  values.    This  seems  inappropriate.  
Countries did not gain a GUYRS effect when they moved from -3 values of adoption to 0.  Both the 
2002 and the 2005 value should be zero for countries that had no unbundling in either 2002 or 2005. 
4.13.2  Revised analyses 
Original GUYRS variable 
We  first  reanalyzed  the  same  regressions  of  de-Ritter's  report  (OECD,  2007),  using  a  non-negative 
GUYRS variable, and our robust mixed-effects analysis for the Panel data.  We ran the same series of 
2002-2005 Panel regressions covered in de Ridder, plus one additional regression QTOT ← UURB + 
CFAC + GUYRS + DUMMY, with a mixed effects regression, and with GUYRS correctly coded for 
negative values, we see that GUYRS is largely significant in most models, as long as both Age and SIP  
(the overall rate of Internet penetration) are not included in a large-as-possible model. 
Table 4.2 . This table relates linear regressions for the original de Ridder analysis using 2005 data 
only.  Since 2005 GUYRS values do not contain negative values; our analysis is identical to de 
Ridder's on this dataset. 
   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Table 4.3  A table of coefficient magnitudes, standard errors, and t-statistics performing 6 multiple 
mixed-effects regressions predicting QTOT total broadband penetration for the 30 OECD data set 
(30 (2005) + 24 (2002) = 54 data points. 
 
Since GUYRS is correlated with the price of DSL and Internet Penetration, one needs to ask whether a 
regression with both terms included is worthwhile.  If GUYRS were to act to change broadband use by 
lowering the price of broadband, then using LNPDSL in the model might confuse the effect.  Since 
GUYRS  has  significant  t-statistics  even  in  models  when  the  price  is  included,  we  now  seek  an 
explanatory mechanism for this residual effect.  Because we have limited ourselves to DSL prices, this 
residual  effect  might  come  from  reduced  prices  in  other  broadband  options,  or  the  generation  of 
competition  might  lead  to  increased  access  to  regions  that  were  previously  under-supplied  with 
broadband.  Since the regression with both price of DSL and Internet Penetration in the model has a non-
significant GUYRS effect, this combination may be the best way to interpret how a legal unbundling 
results in increased broadband usage.   
Finally, we point out the sensitivity of these model measurements for the GUYRS variable in Figure 2.1.  
One  of  the  main  influential  points  on  this  regression  is  Switzerland's  effect.    The  inclusion  of 
Switzerland in the dataset tends to reduce the t-statistic for GUYRS, since it is a country that did not 
adopt unbundling, though it has significant broadband usage.  Eliminating Switzerland may result in a 
doubling of the t-statistic for some of these regressions.  However, no single country has as large a single 
effect in supporting the model.  Other than in Regression #5 (LNPDSL + AGE + UURB + GUYRS + 
DUMMY),  where  eliminating  Finland  from  the  dataset  results  in  a  non-significant  regression,  the 
significant t-statistics seem to be robust to outliers.       Policies and practices: Competition and access 
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Figure 4.18 .  Histograms of t-statistics for the GUYRS coefficient in the six regressions from Table 
4.3.  In each histogram, the thirty regressions (each eliminating one country from the dataset) are 
taken, the t-statistics for the GUYRS coefficient is collected, and the distribution of these t-
statistics are plotted in the histogram.  Regression #3 (UURB+CFAC+DUMMY), on the top right, 
does not include the GUYRS variable.  In these regressions, eliminating Finland, Iceland, Not-
Applicable, Japan, Finland, and Iceland, respectively, results in the lowest possible t-statistic.  In 
Regression #5 (LNPDSL + AGE + UURB+GUYRS+DUMMY), eliminating Finland is enough to 
take the GUYRS coefficient out of statistical significance.  In no other regression does taking out a 
data point significantly alter the regression.  However, the country of Switzerland seems to have a 
significant dampening effect on regressions #1, #2, #5, and #6.  Switzerland represents the right 
most outlier in those histograms.  Eliminating Switzerland results in much more significant 
models than when it is included. 
 
  
4.13.3  An alternate GUYRS variable 
After collection and review, a replacement set for the original GUYRS variable has been proposed.  A 
change to this variable results in many more countries defined to have GUYRS = 0 than before.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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Table 4.4.  Performing the linear regressions on the 2005 dataset using the alternate specification 
for GUYRS.  Now GUYRS seems to have larger effects. 
 
With this alternate specification, GUYRS now has t-statistics greater than 3 in all regressions where it is 
included.  The effect is enlarged to approximately 1% of broadband penetration per year of adoption of 
unbundling.  As a comparison, the dummy variable, which represents 3 years of effect, generates about 7 
to 12% increase in broadband over three years, or 2 to 4% per year.   
Table 4.5. A running of the Panel regressions from Table 4.3, now with the Alternate GUYRS 
specification.  GUYRS is much more significant in all regressions. 
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Figure 4.19. Using the alternate specification, we inspect here the sensitivity to countries for the 
Panel regressions in Table 4.4, in the same manner as Figure 4.18.  We see that Switzerland again 
has a strong effect toward making the regressions more significant, but no single country will 




Alternate GUYRS variable, zero or one 
The Years specification for GUYRS unbundling may not be the best representation of the effect of 
unbundling adoption.  As an alternative, we code countries that have adopted unbundling as a 1, and 
countries before adoption as a 0.  Using the new specification to define unbundling countries, the Panel 
regressions now appear as:   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Table 4.6 .  The 2005 table using GUYRS as a 0 or 1 variable, using the alternate values 
 
Table 4.7.  The new definition of GUYRS is modified to have only 1 or 0 values for unbundling 
adoption.  These are the fits for the six mixed effects regressions from previous Table 4.3 and Table 
4.5 
 
Using sensitivity analysis, we see that in this case, Switzerland's effect is not quite as large.  In the five 
regressions  that  include  GUYRS,  the  greatest  effect  on  the  GUYRS  t-statistic  can  be  found  from 
Switzerland, Switzerland, Mexico, Switzerland, and Finland, respectively.  Removing a country does not 
take away the significance from the GUYRS variable.       Policies and practices: Competition and access 
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Figure 4.20. As in Figure 4.19, it seems that the GUYRS coefficients for the regressions in Table 4.7 
have some outlier countries.  However, this country is not always Switzerland. 
 
 





value  Justification for alternative value 
Australia   6  1 
Reflects the resistance by Telstra, and the high prices until the 
competition  notice  issued  in  March  2004  by  ACCC,  which 
reportedly led to lower prices. 
Austria   7  5 
Reflects  that  Austria  Telekom  failed  to  comply  with  the  1999 
Order that seems to be the basis of the 7 year designation here; 
instead it was in 2001 in response to the EC directive that Telkom 
Austria did some more unbundling, and when UPC actually was 
able to enter using unbundling. 
Belgium   5  0 
Reflects  continuing  complaints,  to  this  day,  about  absence  of 
LLU; all entrants who are not facilities based, about 22% of the 
market,  are  resellers.  This  suggests  no  real  competition  on 
network management, which may explain the data cap anomaly. 
Canada   9  5 
Reflects initial sunset and high LLU rates, followed by the 2001 
decision  to  extend  LLU  indefinitely  and  reduction  in  service 
charges.  
Czech Rep.  2  2  No change 
Denmark   8  8  No change 
Finland   10  10  No change 
France   5  4 
Reflects  delayed  implementation  between  formal  adoption  in 
2001 and actual implementation following EU action in 2002 
Germany   8  0  Reflects DT resistance and BnetzA lack of capacity   Next Generation Connectivity 





value  Justification for alternative value 
Greece   5  0 
Reflects the fact that only in May of 2007 was LLU regulation 
changed, and a new framework put in place that seems to have 
resulted in a shift of some of the wholesale/carrier pre-selection 
model operators shifting to more unbundling 
Hungary   4  4  Insufficient data to form an opinion 
Iceland   6  6  No change. 
Ireland   5  0 
Eirecom  litigated  extensively  to  delay  the  regulator,  and 
succeeded in delaying implementation of unbundling throughout 
the relevant period. 
Italy   5  5 
Data is ambiguous about quality of implementation; insufficient 
data to argue that there was in fact no real LLU uptake 
Japan   9  6 
Reduces  the  period  to  reflect  the  weakness  of  MPT  until  the 
passage of the new requirements by MIC in 2000 
South Korea   4  9 
Reflects the fact that Thrunet entered over access to incumbent 
facilities—cable owned by Kepco. 
Luxembourg   5  0 
Justified  by  claim  that  incumbent  effectively  only  offers  an 
unregulated wholesale product to competitors, with no effective 
enforcement to the contrary 
Mexico   0  0  No change. 
Netherlands   9  5  Reflects exclusion of competitors from naked DSL until 2001. 
New 
Zealand   0  0  NZ changed only after 2005 
Norway   5  5  No change. 
Poland   3  0 
Reflects the fact that Netia only enters unbundling in 2007, and 
Multimedia Polska Stillhas had to get an ad hoc decision from the 
regulator as late as August of 2007 on its unbundling arrangement 
with incumbent TP Group. That a regulator still needs to rule on a 
negotiation is a good sign that LLU has not been implemented 
seriously. 
Portugal   5  3 
2002 citation by EU of Portugal as a particular site of lack of 
compliance with the unbundling directives. 
Slovak Rep.  0  0 
Should  remain  0.  LLU  never  passed,  only  promised.  Still  not 
passed. 
Spain   5  4 
Reflects the April 2002 new reference offer reducing LLU rates 
by 30%. 
Sweden   5  5  No change. 
Switzerland   0  0  No change. 
Turkey   0  0  No change. 
UK   5  0 
Reflects unobserved BT resistance that led to massive jump in 
unbundled loop usage after functional separation implemented in 
2005 
US  10  0 
Reflects  2001-02  FCC  decisions  to  shift  to  intermodal 
competition  
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5  Mobile broadband 
A central part of next generation transition planning has been the integration of mobile broadband with 
fixed  broadband  networks.    Where  ubiquitous  access  is  the  emphasis,  wireless  broadband 
communications  provide  the  critical  component  of  mobile  and  nomadic  access.  The  ability  to  be 
connected seamlessly everywhere is the driving force behind an emphasis on fixed-mobile convergence.  
Where basic fixed access competition is the concern, wireless is seen as a potential additional, lower-
cost provider that can increase competition in broadband access to the home.  And where concerns over 
equity and access in remote locations are the major focus, wireless technologies are seen as a major 
potential solution because of their lower costs.   
The United States is in the fourth quintile of OECD countries in terms of 3G penetration.  While the 
growth rate in U.S. subscriptions is high, and is 10
th in the OECD, several countries with higher growth 
rates currently have lower levels of penetration than does the U.S. Because of this, it is unclear whether 
our current performance in 3G penetration will improve or decline in the near future.   
It is difficult to pin down a particular policy or practice responsible for better performance in mobile 
broadband penetration.  The primary regulatory differences between the United States and countries that 
are  high-performing  in  the  area  of  mobile  data  appear  to  be  the  later  introduction  of  3G-specific 
allocations in the United States, and the relative regional fragmentation of the licenses.  In Europe, 
Japan, South Korea, and Australia, national regulators auctioned or awarded in beauty contests between 
three and five nationwide licenses intended specifically for 3G services.  In the United States, the AWS 
auction (the first 3G-specific auction) was concluded five or six years later, in the latter half of 2006.   
Because of the flexibility of licenses granted earlier, however, it is not correct to treat the 2006 AWS 
auction as the critical point of 3G licensing in the U.S.  Most prominently, Verizon Wireless was the first 
U.S. mobile carrier to introduce 3G services; it did so in 2003 and continues to make flexible use of its 
allocations in the 800 and 1900 MHz bands for delivering 3G services.   Similarly, Sprint Nextel, Leap 
Wireless, and Alltel use one or both of those bands for 3G services.  On the other hand, AT&T Wireless 
and T-Mobile use only the later-allocated 1.7MHz or 2.1MHz bands for 3G services.  It is certainly 
possible that the need to upgrade earlier equipment on the same channels, the uncertainty of when new 
spectrum would be available (the spectrum ultimately awarded in 2006 was first identified five years 
earlier),  and  the  regional  fragmentation  contributed  to  relatively  slow  and  uneven  rollout.   A  clear 
benefit of the flexible allocations aspect of American policy, however, emerges when one considers that 
the most salient concern currently reported by European regulators is transitioning GSM spectrum, the 
900 and 1800 MHz bands, over to 3G.  The U.S. policy of flexible allocation ex ante allowed licensees 
to make that transition for themselves early on.   
Nomadic access seems to have developed not from spectrum policies but from business models and 
public interventions.  We noted in the prior chapter how competitive entrants, like Free in France or 
Telenor in Sweden, or incumbents like Swisscom and BT through Openzone, are innovating with new 
service models to extend their network using nomadic access.  Similarly, we see public, municipal 
efforts contributing to the availability of nomadic access.  This does not appear to be the result of any 
country-specific  spectrum  policy  differences  that  we  have  observed.    We  therefore  do  not  further 
elaborate here on our earlier emphasis on nomadic access in the context of benchmarking and access.   
The tentative nature of our descriptions of wireless broadband policy is perhaps best captured by the 
European Regulator's Group June 2009 report on next generation transition.  Regarding wireless policy, 
the ERG stated:  “It would appear, however, that at this point is too soon to give a definite solution to or     Mobile broadband 
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present best practices to problems identified by NRAs and Member States on how to handle future 
transitional problems. The main reason for this is that while regulators are considering different ways to 
handle transitional issues, there is still little actual practice as such.”
101  In this report, the ERG reported 
the primary current challenges faced by the European regulators as: 
1.  Refarming the 900 and 1800 MHz band originally allocated to 2G, GSM services.  The problems 
here are: 
•  The original grants do not permit the grantees to offer 3G services 
•  Adding flexibility would give the original grantees an unfair advantage over competitors who 
have higher-frequency allocations, and would therefore face higher infrastructure costs with 
more base stations to deliver equivalent services 
2.  790-862 MHz: the digital dividend spectrum, released by the transition to digital TV 
3.  2.6  GHz  band  and  3.4-3.8GHz  bands,  both  relatively  less  contentious  but  require  increased 
regulatory  flexibility  to  achieve  their  use,  and  in  some  cases  to  free  them  from  incumbent 
occupants, including government users 
These  kinds  of  challenges  are  familiar  to  Americans,  even  if  the  specific  frequencies  are  slightly 
different.  The primary insight to be gained is from the difficulties raised by refarming the GSM bands.  
In theory, because of the flexible definitions of personal communications services allocations, the United 
States does not have a similar problem.  We note, however, that the difficulty presented is as much about 
assuring  that  after  the  transition  the  countries  continue  to  have  a  competitive  market.    The  early 
advantage of Verizon in deploying 3G services may or may not be due to its ability to reuse its 800 and 
1900 MHz bands.  If it is, and if the advantage persists, then competitive imbalance may turn out to be a 
price the United States is paying for its early flexibility.  This is a question that should require future 
observation.   
We approach the 3G question using the same approach we used for our analysis of competition and 
access.  We consider country-level case studies of firm behavior to identify the likely effects of policies 
that recur as important to shaping the market.  Our review leads us to identify no definitive driver of 
high 3G penetration.  We see countries with very different strategies and market structures doing well, 
and  other  countries  without  obviously  different  policies  doing  worse.    Countries  with  auctions,  for 
example, have done both well, and poorly.  Countries with beauty contests have similarly performed on 
both sides of this divide.  Countries with four or five simultaneous allocations have done well, and 
poorly.  South Korea did very well even with what was initially a two-player allocation, for all practical 
purposes.  Our primary conclusion is therefore that there is substantial need for additional study of 
mobile wireless policies and business models, to be extended to both mobile cellular architectures and 
nomadic access.   
Of the top ten countries in terms of 3G penetration, four substantially outperform their fixed  broadband 
penetration: Italy, 5
th in 3G but 22
nd in fixed; Spain, 7
th in 3G by 20
th in fixed; Australia, 3
rd in 3G but 
16
th in  fixed;  and  New  Zealand,  equal  with  the  UK  at  10
th  in  3G,  but 18
th in  fixed.   The  top two 
countries, Japan and South Korea, are the overall high performers, as are Sweden (6
th) and Finland (8
th).  
Of these, only Sweden and the UK are truly high performers on nomadic access as well, with South 
                                                 
101 ERG (08) 60 rev 1; RSPG09-277, European Regulators Group and Radio Spectrum Policy Group Joint Publication, 
ERG-RSPG Report on transitional radio spectrum issues, June 2009, pp 23-24.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Korea making a respectable showing in that dimension as well.  Here, we cover the consistently high 
performers first, then move to cover the low-fixed, high-mobile performers, and the low-mobile, high 
fixed performers (the Netherlands and Canada).  We then look at the differences among the Nordic 
countries,  where  Sweden  and  Finland  have  substantially  higher  mobile  broadband  penetration  than 
Norway and Denmark.   
5.1  The consistently high performers: Japan and South Korea 
 
Just as they do in fiber infrastructure, Japan and South Korea lead the world in 3G penetration as well.  
Japan  has  over  close  to  72  3G  subscriptions  per  100  inhabitants,  and  South  Korea  has  63.    By 
comparison, the United States has 20.6 3G subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.   
Japan awarded three identical, 2x20MHz paired spectrum blocks in a beauty contest to NTT DoCoMo, 
KDDI's au Corp, and Vodafone in June of 2000.  NTT DoCoMo launched the world's first 3G network 
in 2001.  DoCoMo still holds over 70% of 3G subscriptions.  Vodafone was purchased by Softbank in 
2006.  Since then, Softbank Mobile has emphasized lower prices and cross-selling with its broadband 
service, and has invested in cellular infrastructure, more than doubling  the number of base stations 
between 2006 and 2008 relative to the number it originally purchased from Vodafone.  Softbank Mobile 
added more subscribers to its network in 2008 than either NTT DoCoMo or KDDI au Corp.  The three-
way competition, with smaller entrant eMobile (a division of eAccess, the owner of AOL Japan) well 
behind, has emphasized very high speed data and mobile video and music distribution, as well as lower 
prices.   All  the  carriers  no  longer  sell  2G  services,  and  all  are  pushing  to  develop  and  launch  4G 
technologies. 
On  the  regulatory  front,  the  MIC  has  responded  to  the  competitive  structure  of  the  3G  market  by 
allocating more spectrum to 4G services in the 1.7 GHz range, as well as the bands originally intended 
to be allocated in the 1.5 GHz range, so as to expand the number of 4G licenses it intends to issue from 
three to four.  This is intended to allow all four mobile carriers, including eMobile, to compete in the 4G 
market.   
The South Korean experience must be treated with caution, as it appears to be a particularly salient 
example of the managed economy model of regulation.  The South Korean MIC auctioned two identical 
20 MHz blocks for 3G licenses in December 2000, to SKT and KTF (majority owned by KT).  It then 
granted a third license to LGT in mid 2001, and actually awarded the three licenses simultaneously in 
November of 2001.  LGT did not deploy at all, and was fined for the interim reservation period.  In 
2006, when the providers were not rolling out networks beyond Seoul, the MIC threatened them with 
fines.  Investment followed throughout the country.  Throughout 2006 the MIC fined SKT, KTF, and 
LGT for price fixing and illegal handset subsidies.   
The most interesting move in South Korea is the shift, since 2007, toward encouraging fixed-mobile 
convergence.  All carriers were permitted to integrate with fixed line providers, in moves described 
earlier in the Competition and Access part.  This vertical integration was, as in Japan, accompanied by a 
requirement that the mobile carriers open their data networks to competitors.  These requirements do not 
yet appear to have been implemented, and it is therefore too soon to tell what their effect on competition, 
availability, price, and service innovation in mobile data will be. 
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5.2  High mobile, low fixed performers 
Italy, Spain, Australia, and New Zealand all substantially outperform their fixed-line penetration when it 
comes to mobile broadband networks. 
Italy auctioned five identical licenses in October of 2000, each providing 2x10MHz paired and 1x5 
unpaired blocks to each licensee.  There were only five contenders, after one potential bidder, Blu, 
withdrew.  Of the five licensees, Ipse 2000, a subsidiary of Spain's Telefonica Moviles, failed to deploy, 
and had its license revoked in 2006.  The remaining four licensees: Telecom Italia Mobile, Vodafone 
Italy,  Wind,  and  3  Italia  (owned  by  Hong  Kong-based  Hutchison-Whampoa)  remain  in  intense 
competition today.  3 Italia launched 3G services first, in March 2003; while it remains the smallest of 
the four providers in terms of total mobile subscribers, it continues to be the largest 3G provider, with 
34% of the 3G market, followed by Vodafone and Telecom Italia (29% each), and Wind making up the 
small remainder.   
The major regulatory tension of the past few years has involved the initial prohibition, in 2006, on 
Telecom Italia and Vodafone from offering integrated fixed-mobile packages, which was later reversed 
in 2007.  Now, TI, Vodafone, and Wind all offer bundled packages for their fixed and mobile offerings. 
Moreover,  since  June  of  2008 Vodafone  also  bundles  access  to  its Wi-Fi  hotspots throughout  Italy.  
Trying to match these owners of fixed and mobile platforms, fixed broadband providers FastWeb and 
Tiscali are both offering 3G services, which they buy wholesale from primary mobile network operators. 
The current primary challenges that the Italian regulator reported to the ERG were the “refarming” of 
the 900 and 1800 MHz GSM bands, and the reassignment from defense use to civilian use of allocations 
at 3.5GHz.  The former is widely reported throughout Europe, and primarily raises the concern that 
reassignment to some providers, but not others, would enable those who have the new, lower-frequency 
spectrum to offer lower-cost services, with fewer cell sites and better coverage, thereby upsetting the 
competitive structure of the market.  The 3.5GHz band appears to primarily involve internal politics of 
budget compensation to the Defense department for the lost frequencies.  Neither issue is resolved as 
yet.  As noted in the Access and Competition part, the Italian providers Telecom Italia and Vodafone 
have entered voluntary agreements to share cell infrastructure so as to reduce the costs of their 3G 
networks. 
In 2000, Spain awarded four identical, 2x15MHz paired, plus 1x5MHz unpaired blocks in a beauty 
contest to Telefonica (the Spanish incumbent), Vodafone, Orange (a subsidiary of France Telecom) and 
Xfera, a consortium whose members included Vivendi and TeliaSonera.  Launch was slow initially, and 
in 2004 the Spanish authorities permitted the competitors to share infrastructure in order to reduce costs 
of deployment.  Vodafone, Telefonica, and Orange all launched 3G services that year, and HSDPA 3.5G 
in 2006, while Xfera struggled internally and ultimately launched only in 2006.  The Spanish regulator 
reported to the ERG that its major transition issue concerned how to transition 900MHz and 1800MHz 
to 3G without distorting competition.  Telefonica and Vodafone do have 900MHz allocations, while 
Orange and Xfera do not.   
Australia  conducted  a  more  fragmented  auction  than  any  of  the  prior  countries  we  have  reviewed, 
resulting in the emergence of four 3G licensees: Telstra, Vodafone, Optus (a subsidiary of Singaporean 
Sing-Tel)  and  Hutchison  3G  Australia  (H3G),  each  holding  somewhat  different  amounts  and 
configurations  of  spectrum  dedicated  to  3G  services.    Two  additional  smaller  winners  of  the  2001 
licenses, Personal Broadband Australia and 3G Investments, did not develop into substantial players in 
the Australian market.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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The difference in Australia's initial approach does not seem to have dampened competition.  All four 
national licensees from 2001 were active participants in the 3G market until H3G and Vodafone merged 
in June 2009.  H3G was the first to launch 3G services in 2003.  In response, Optus and Vodafone signed 
a collaboration agreement, in which they agreed to share their infrastructure, like cell towers, so as to 
lower the cost of deployment and speed up construction of their competing networks.  Incumbent Telstra 
signed a similar, 50/50 deal with H3G.  The deals raised concerns in the regulator that the alliances were 
pulling the country's 3G market into an effective duopoly, but the regulator then took no apparent public 
action against these alliances.  All four (now three) players in the 3G market claim to have near 100% 
coverage for the Australian population, although the Australian's government's contentious relationship 
with Telstra, which took its most recent major step with the announced national broadband network plan 
and  the  requirement  that  Telstra  undertake  structural  separation,  also  spilled  over  to  lawsuits  over 
coverage, over dropping of CDMA service before 3G service was in fact universally available, and over 
advertising practices.  
New Zealand's relatively high 3G penetration followed a substantially different path.   As with the other 
countries surveyed, New Zealand allocated blocks of spectrum for five 3G licenses in January of 2001.  
One of the blocks was awarded to the Maori Spectrum Trust's Huataki.  The other four were auctioned.  
No bidder in the auction was permitted to own more than 15MHz of spectrum.  Of these four, only two 
emerged as real competitors: Vodafone and Telecom New Zealand's mobile arm.  The other two, Telstra 
and Clear, merged in late 2001, but still failed to launch 3G services after two false starts.  The New 
Zealand  3G  market  is  now  relatively  evenly  split  between  the  leader, Vodafone,  and  New  Zealand 
Telecom.  In the meantime, several efforts to build a third provider in the spectrum block awarded 
Huataki have not materialized.  Despite the spectrum caps, and new efforts that resulted in redistribution 
of 900/1800 MHz spectrum from Vodafone and Telecom Mobile to Huataki as part of plans to reuse the 
2G spectrum, no third provider has emerged in New Zealand.   
New Zealand's market therefore has two 3G players, unlike the other countries we have observed, which 
have mostly four, or in the case of South Korea and in large measure Japan, three providers.  Whether 
New Zealand's high mobile penetration rate results from the fact that its fixed broadband market has 
long been uncompetitive; whether it is the small size of the market (although New Zealand is no smaller 
than Norway or Finland); or whether competition between two providers is not much less effective than 
three or four providers to achieve high penetration remains unresolved by the New Zealand example.   
5.3  Low mobile, high fixed countries 
Two countries stand out as top ten performers in fixed broadband penetration who find themselves in the 
bottom quintile in the OECD in terms of 3G penetration.  These countries are the Netherlands and 
Canada.  Both currently have lower penetration, but higher growth rates, than the United States.   
The market structure and trajectory in the Netherlands appear no different than those of the higher-
penetration  countries.     The  Dutch  regulator  allocated  five  standard  UMTS  licenses  to  the  existing 
mobile phone providers: KPN Mobile, Vodafone, Orange, T-Mobile, and O2.  KPN bought O2 in 2005.  
T-Mobile bought Orange in 2007.  The remaining three competitors are all active in the 3G market.  
They appear to be offering and competing on a wide range of services, including mobile video and 
integration with hotspots.  Nonetheless, the number of 3G subscribers reported in the Netherlands is 
lower than in the majority of OECD countries.  The Netherlands has a reasonably high degree of 2G 
penetration, and two of its major players, KPN Mobile and Vodafone, paid the Dutch government to 
extend their GSM licenses for an additional three years to last until 2013, the same year that their other 
competitors' 2G licenses expire.  These all suggest that the Dutch competitors are continuing to focus on     Mobile broadband 
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their 2G and 2.5G offerings, and that this may be slowing transition to 3G.  The major 3G players began 
rolling  out  mobile  TV  offerings  over  the  3G  and  3.5G  networks  since  2007.    It  may  be  that  the 
Netherlands' anemic performance in mobile broadband is transitory.  It did see a 125% growth between 
the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.  While the gap may be closing, the experience of 
the Netherlands certainly diminishes any claims that there might be a simple recipe for success in the 
mobile sector.     
Canada's wireless mobile broadband market and regulatory environment are the most similar to those of 
the United States, but with poorer results.   Like the United States, Canada had flexible allocations in the 
mid-1990s  that  formed  the  basis  of  its  3G  transition,  well  before  Industry  Canada  got  around  to 
auctioning 3G-specific licenses (called, like in the U.S., Advanced Wireless Services) in the past year.  
Like  the  United  States,  Canada  had  many  regional  licenses.    Its  wireless  market  is  nonetheless 
dominated by three national players, which together account for 95% of wireless customers, rendering 
much of the activity surrounding these three practically moot.  As in the United States, the three players 
are extensions of fixed-broadband incumbents, except that in Canada one of these is a cable operator—
Rogers.  The other two are Bell Canada and Telus.  As in the United States, Canada too has had two 
distinct technologies, but there the rollout has been inverted.  In the U.S., Verizon was first with its 
1xEV-DO Rev A version of mobile broadband, and continues to lead the market with it. In Canada this 
was  the  choice  of  Bell  Canada  and  Telus.  Rogers,  however,  using  the  European-compatible  W-
CDMA/HSDPA standard, now leads the market.  Because the latter allowed Rogers to be the only 
provider to offer mobile video calling, Bell Canada and Telus are both moving in a joint effort to roll out 
their own W-CDMA/HSDPA network, apparently in a bid to compete more effectively with Rogers.  In 
the meantime, all these players purchased additional spectrum in the recent AWS auctions, preparing for 
rolling out 4G services when these become feasible.  Several potential entrants purchased spectrum in 
those  auctions  as  well;  most  prominently  from  the  perspective  of  fixed-mobile  convergence,  these 
included the other two regional cable operators, Shaw and Videotron.  They also included a new entrant, 
Globalive,  an  extension  of  a  long-distance  reseller.    In  all,  these  new  entrants  may  revitalize  the 
Canadian market, but this is, of course, speculative. 
Were  Canada  the  only  example  of  a  negative  mismatch,  we  might  have  suggested  that  regional 
fragmentation and the absence of a single, globally-compatible standard were determinative.  However, 
given the similarly weak performance in the Netherlands, with its almost identical structure to that of 
other, higher-performing European mobile data markets, this is a difficult conclusion to sustain.  Instead, 
we simply note here the necessity of further and deeper study into mobile broadband.  In theory, a 
beauty contest that results in three players, such as in the case of Japan, should do poorly by comparison 
to an auction of flexible licenses that results in many players of diverse sizes.  The result, when looking 
at Japan and Canada, was the opposite.  Why, and what exactly we in the United States can learn from 
these disparate performances, should be the subject of further study. 
5.4  The Nordic countries 
The  Nordic  countries  present  an  interesting  case  because  all  four  are  high  performers  on  fixed 
broadband,  but  Sweden  and  Finland  have  much  higher  3G  penetration  than  Norway  and  Denmark.  
Norway and Denmark each have slightly higher penetration rates, at 21% and 25%, than does the United 
States (20%). Both countries, however, have had slower growth rates in the past year.   Sweden (42%) 
and Finland (38.8%) both have much higher current rates, and while Sweden's growth rate is slightly 
lower than in the United States, Finland's 3G penetration growth rate has been almost twice as high as 
that of the U.S.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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Sweden awarded four licenses to provide 3G service in December of 2000, each for a nominal license 
fee of $11,000.  The licenses were awarded in a beauty contest, and in a unique move, Sweden awarded 
none of these licenses to its incumbent, Telia.  Instead, they went to Swedish entrant Tele2, Vodafone 
Sweden, Hi3G (the Hutchison-Whamopoa entrant), and Orange Svierge.  Telia re-entered the market 
soon thereafter by entering a joint venture with Tele2, named Svenska UMTS-Nat.   
The  licenses  were  conditioned  on  by  far  the  most  aggressive  roll  out  requirements,  requiring  the 
licensees to roll out 3G service to 99.98% of the population within two years of the original grant.  
While none of the licensees indeed met this ambitious target, the following few years saw several efforts 
by the licensees to extend the period, and by the regulator to threaten fines and injunctions.  Through 
this dynamic, and with explicit permission to share facilities (TeliaSonera with Tele2, Vodafone with 
Hi3G) so as to reduce costs, 98% of the population was covered by 3G network coverage by the middle 
of 2006.  The cost was that Orange dropped out of the grueling race in 2002, and had its license revoked 
in 2004.   
Since 2003, Hi3G has played the role of catalyst in the Swedish market.  It was the first to roll out 3G 
service in May 2003; it was later the first to roll out higher speed HSDPA services in November of 2006, 
just as the 3G network coverage reached the high levels required by the regulator.  In each case, it was 
followed within six months to a year by TeliaSonera and Tele2's joint venture, and then by Vodafone.  In 
each  case,  lower  prices,  bundling  of  handsets,  and  new  applications  played  a  role  in  attracting 
subscribers.  In 2007 Hi3G launched higher upload speeds with HSUPA, and in 2008 higher download 
and upload speeds yet by deploying HSPA+. 
In  May  2008  the  Swedish  regulator  attempted  to  push  forward  the  next  generation  transition  by 
awarding four 4G licenses in the 2.6GHz range, which are technology neutral, and whose licensees, 
TeliaSonera, Telenor, Tele2, Hi3G and Intel, claim they will use both for Long Term Evolution (LTE) 
mobile and WiMax services.  It is also working to reallocate the 900 MHz GSM spectrum, and channels 
cleared by the digital TV transition in 790-862MHz, to mobile broadband.   
In all, the Swedish story is one of: four concessions through a beauty contest; aggressively defined and 
enforced rollout requirements, and fierce innovative competition from those players who survived the 
grueling process. 
Finland held the first 3G auction in 1999, distributing six UMTS licenses.  Of these, however, only three 
became nationwide providers—the licenses originally assigned to Telia and Sonera, one of which was 
sold to DNA of Finnet Group when TeliaSonera was formed, and to Elisa.  Of the remaining three, two 
never took off, and one is a regional licensee in the Aland islands.  Unlike the Swedish authority, the 
Finnish FICORA did not impose any deployment requirements, except that all networks be operational 
by January 2001.  This requirement was met only experimentally, and it was not until October of 2004 
when TeliaSonera launched the first commercial 3G network in 20 cities.  Elisa launched in only eight 
cities  a month later, and DNA launched a year later, in three cities.  By April of 2006 take-up was still 
slow, and the regulator allowed bundling of 3G phones with subscriptions, increasing take-up.  In late 
2006  to  mid-2007  the  Finnish  regulator  engaged  in  a  series  of  calls  to  the  providers  to  lower  and 
coordinate their rates, which was apparently followed not by price competition but by a coordinated 
lowering of prices.   In 2007 the Finnish regulator was the first in Europe to permit providers to offer 3G 
services  in  the  900  MHz  band.    It  is  difficult  to  disentangle  which  of  these  acts  had  an  effect  of 
increasing  growth  and  moving  Finland  from  a  weaker  performer,  more  in  line  with  Norway  and 
Denmark, to a strong performer like Sweden.  Finland saw 3G penetration growth rates of over 80% 
between 2007 and 2008, and 144% between 2008 and 2009, leading it now to occupy a position in the     Mobile broadband 
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top 10 countries in terms of 3G penetration.  In April of 2009, the Finnish regulator granted TeliaSonera, 
Elisa, and DNA additional 1800MHz bands in which to launch 4G, LTE services. 
Norway  awarded four identical 2X15 plus 5 licenses in  December of  2000, apparently  in a beauty 
contest.  Two of its licensees failed however, leaving only Telenor and Norway's first mobile telephony 
entrant, NetCom (now owned by TeliaSonera), in play.  It imposed much weaker roll out requirements 
than did Sweden, and quickly relaxed even those in 2003.  Hi3G bought one of the two unused licenses 
and was given several years to begin to roll out its network; it has not done so yet, and has now received 
extensions until 2012.  The fourth license was sold in a sealed bid with only one bidder, to the third 
facilities-based GSM provider, Mobile Norway, which teamed up with mobile reseller Tele2.  It has not 
yet rolled out its 3G services.  In all, the Norwegian market seems to have begun anemically with two 
failed launches and delayed launches by the remaining providers; part of what is puzzling about this 
picture is that several of the same players, most prominently TeliaSonera and Hutchison-Whamopoa, 
have been extremely active and aggressive in the Swedish and Finnish markets, but much less so in the 
Norwegian market.   
Finally, Denmark awarded four identical nationwide UMTS licenses in September of 2001.  They were 
nominally “auctioned,” although all four were awarded for an identical price to Hi3G, incumbent TDC's 
Mobile Nordic, Telia Denmark, and Orange, which was later bought out by Telenor.  The build-out 
requirements were less stringent than Sweden's, but more so than Finland or Norway.  Denmark also 
prohibited its providers from sharing infrastructure.   Hi3G was the only 3G provider until the end of 
2005, when Mobile Nordic rolled out 3G services.   It took another year for Telenor to roll out 3G 
service.  Hi3G was also the first to launch HSDPA, and remains the leader in speeds and subscriptions, 
with 36% of the 3G market.  As in Norway, much of the market jockeying in Denmark has taken the 
form of acquisition of resellers, or mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). 
Observing the Nordic countries leaves one with more questions than answers.  The most successful of 
the bunch, Sweden, used a beauty contest and aggressive regulatory deadlines to push investment.  The 
second most successful, Finland, used auctions and a very light regulatory touch of a while, followed by 
more of an emphasis on price regulation and freeing up more spectrum.  Norway and Denmark mostly 
followed intermediate strategies, with only middling success by global standards.   
5.5  Mobile broadband: conclusions 
Our conclusions with regard to mobile broadband strategies is that more study is needed.  We observe 
successes and failures with beauty contests and auctions.  We observe successes and failures with loose 
and  tight  rollout  requirements.    We  observe  successes  and  failures  with  flexible  allocations  and 
inflexible allocations.  We cannot say that allocating 20 or 40 more MHZ to 3G resulted in better or 
worse results, whether these were translated into a fifth national licensee or in larger allocations per 
licensee.  The subject is intensely important, will play a central role in the transition to ubiquitous 
connectivity, and is poorly understood. 
We do see, however, increasing trends to fixed mobile convergence, with the owners of mobile licenses 
buying fixed broadband providers, or vice versa; and shared physical facilities to reduce deployment 
costs.  In several cases, both in this section and in the section on competition and access in the fixed 
lined,  we  see  that  mobile  cellular,  nomadic,  and  fixed  services  are  being  integrated  to  form  the 
experience of seamless, ubiquitous access for subscribers.  In each case, these are trends that might raise 
concerns of competition policy, where potential competitors combine, but where there appear to be good 
reasons having to do with shifting to seamless connectivity.  A major consideration in future planning   Next Generation Connectivity 
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will  be  how  to  allow  these  kinds  of  integrations  that  promote  seamless,  ubiquitous  access,  without 
undermining competition.   
5.6  Nomadic access 
By “nomadic access” we mean wireless access to the Internet using non-cellular technologies, mainly 
Wi-Fi,  where  the  user  logs  in  to  some  form  of  wireless  extension  of  an  existing  fixed  network 
connection.  Nomadic access is provided mostly as what we know as Wi-Fi hotspots.  As a matter of 
spectrum policy, it depends on permission to operate unlicensed devices, rather than on a license to 
operate a network or particular service in a defined slice of spectrum over which the licensee exerts 
exclusive control.  American consumers are familiar with nomadic access in airports, coffee shops or 
other public spaces, and in city spaces where municipalities themselves, or non-profits, have set up 
public Wi-Fi access areas.  Internationally, we observe several models for making wireless nomadic 
connectivity that go beyond this kind of free-standing Wi-Fi hotspot to provide an element in a user's 
mobile connectivity options.  Most of the innovation here is not technical or institutional, but in services.  
All the top countries in this domain, and in terms of hotspots per 100,000, are European countries.  The 
practices are largely described in the competition and access chapter.  Here we merely  recapitulate to 
locate the European experience with fixed-nomadic developments.   
What appears to be the most important trajectory that is different from what we see in the United States 
are the uses that French broadband provider Free and fixed-mobile broadband provider SFR are doing 
with their systems.  Unlike hotspot providers, whether in a given locale or of a national footprint, Free 
and SFR do not deploy special hotspots with their own dedicated connections.  Instead, they configure 
their fixed broadband end user equipment in the user's home, as a dual system: one capable of providing 
a  secure  home  network  to  the  subscriber,  and  the  other,  at  the  same  time,  providing  a  hotspot  for 
permitted users.  In the case of these two companies, these permitted users are other subscribers of the 
same carrier.  In Free's case, at least, the fixed home network traffic has priority in situations where it 
competes for congested capacity with the nomadic users.  In the case of Free, this offering also allows 
mobile phone users whose phones have Wi-Fi capabilities to make mobile voice calls.  The combination 
of nomadic mobile broadband and phone allows Free to function in competition to the increasing fixed-
mobile converged platform of France Telecom/Orange, and SFR, itself a mobile provider that more 
recently through its neuf Cegetel purchase also offers fixed broadband connectivity.  SFR seems to use 
this nomadic capability to complement and balance the load on its 3G network, by routing calls and data 
uses from handheld devices over either the firm's 3G network, or over its fixed-plus-nomadic network, 
at least whenever a subscriber is within reach of another subscriber.  The interesting feature of this 
approach is that it offers a very direct and simple path to blanket all areas with substantial residential 
penetration with nomadic access, without developing an additional standalone mesh networking or other 
extension technique.   
An alternative approach that continues to build nomadic access through extension of home broadband 
networks is the model adopted by FoN.  Here, end users become members of a club with hundreds of 
thousands of members.  Each member can use the Wi-Fi box of any other member.  Others can buy 
access instead of using in exchange for their own capacity.  Again, the advantages are similar to those of 
the Free or SFR model, but the implementation does not depend on any given carrier adopting the 
program.  Instead, users can opt in themselves by installing the necessary equipment in their home, 
connected to their broadband network.   
Beyond the user-side versions like FoN, we also see carrier-side bundling of more traditional hotspots 
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the  broadband  entrants  it  purchased,  Glocalzone,  its  own  hotspots,  and  a  newer  set  of  hotspots  it 
contracted with pan-European wife hotspot provider The Cloud, which include 800 spots in Sweden, and 
another  8,000  throughout  Europe.    Together,  these  provide  coverage  in  24  of  Sweden’s  cities,  and 
Telenor bundles free access to all these nomadic access points with its mobile broadband subscriptions.   
In response, TeliaSonera Sweden also bundles its nomadic access network, which covers over 2,200 
hotspots  throughout  Sweden,  with  its  mobile  broadband  offerings.    Beyond  these  bundled  offers, 
Swisscom, which has a large network of Wi-Fi hotspots, offers lower rates for Wi-Fi hotspot use for both 
fixed-broadband and mobile subscribers.  British Telecom provides a separate offering, Openzone, sold 
on a separate monthly subscription or bundled with mobile roaming minutes.   
Nomadic access is at present very much a poor relation to mobile broadband over cellular networks.  
The hotspots model has developed as a relatively expensive, occasional access mode, or as a way for 
municipalities, in particular, to make specific city spaces, like parks or squares, Internet friendly.  We are 
beginning, however, to see models that leverage existing fixed-broadband connections to provide more 
comprehensive coverage, at lower-cost.  These new approaches, most clearly those offered by FoN, on 
the  one  hand,  and  Free  and  SFR,  on  the  other,  suggest  a  development  trajectory  that  could  make 
nomadic broadband components an important element of ubiquitous, seamless connectivity.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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6  Policies and practices: Public investments 
The  American  Recovery  and  Reinvestment  Act  appropriated  USD7.2  billion  to  development  of 
broadband  networks  throughout  the  United  States.    In  this  part,  we  survey  similar  stimulus-type 
investments  in  other  countries,  as  well  as  investments  by  countries  that  have  been  supporting  the 
construction of networks on the supply side, or fostering demand for broadband on the demand side, 
over a longer time period and as part of a strategic focus on broadband, rather than as a specific response 
to the economic crisis.   
Some  countries,  most  prominently  South  Korea,  Japan,  and  Sweden,  have  had  long-standing 
investments in rolling out infrastructure both to urban centers and to wider populations.  In Europe, 
government investments are constrained by European Union rules limiting state aid, which were put in 
place  originally  to  prevent  national  governments  from  using  their  funds  to  aid  local  industries  in 
contravention of the single market.  This has meant relatively constrained programs with an emphasis 
either on unserved populations or on company- and technology-neutral public tenders.  More generally, 
getting numbers on actual public investments is difficult.  The OECD reports total investments in public 
infrastructure, but does not separate what is publicly funded from what is privately funded.  South Korea 
often  announces  total  investment  that  includes  both  government  and  government-mandated  private 
investment, an arrangement that has no real parallel in the United States.  With Japan, much of the public 
support has come in the form of loan guarantees and low-cost loans, the costs and value of which are not 
readily available.  These difficulties are not unique to other countries.  One would be hard-pressed to 
describe all the government investments of the United States in Internet infrastructure, from Defense 
Advance  Research  Projects Agency  (DARPA)  funding  of  early  Internet  development  through  every 
bond issued by a local municipality to support rollout by its rural electric utility.  Describing levels of 
long-term  investment  is  therefore  a  less  certain  exercise  than  describing  immediate  stimulus-style 
responses.  The descriptions we offer here should therefore be taken more as illustrations of the kinds of 
investments made than as a comprehensive and exhaustive catalog.   
Here we offer a description of major supply-side national investments in infrastructure, followed by a 
major example of municipal investment and how it was dealt with in Europe.  The section on supply-
side investments ends with the European guidelines on state investment in broadband, issued September 
17, 2009.   It is followed by a description of demand-side spending programs. 
6.1  Major public investments 
By  far  the  most  ambitious  public  investment  program,  an  outlier  by  all  accounts,  is  the  current 
Australian government's announced investment in building a 100Mbps fiber-to-the-home network to 
90% of its citizens, complemented by wireless and satellite technologies for the remaining population 
that lives too remotely to be served by fiber.  Public reports of this plan suggested an investment level of 
AUD43 billion, or somewhat over USD34 billion.  In comparative terms, adjusted for population size, 
this would mean the equivalent of somewhat less than a half trillion dollar investment by the United 
States.   In terms of proportion of GDP, it would be the equivalent of a one-time investment of 4.24% of 
annual GDP.  Again, this would be the approximate equivalent of a USD600 billion investment.  Upon 
inspection, the news reporting on this plan substantially overstates the public funds commitment.
102  The 
announcement  followed  a  smaller,  unsuccessful  public  tender  for  the  construction  of  a  publicly-
supported national network.  The Australian government then announced that it would invest in, and 
form, a public-private partnership whose goal would be to roll out the national fiber network.  The total 
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cost of the project over eight years is projected to be up to 43 billion AUS.  The initial actual investment 
of the government would be a reallocation of funds appropriated under a 2007 plan, AUD4.7 billion, or 
about USD3.175 billion in purchasing power parity terms.  Furthermore, the government plans to issue 
infrastructure  bonds  for  6.3  billion  Australian  dollars,  for  a  total  investment  in  the  public-private 
partnership of AUD11 billion, or $7.43 billion PPP.  When one adjusts for the size of the Australian 
population, the Australian government's commitment would be the equivalent of a U.S. government 
investment of USD107 billion to build fiber to the home networks to 90% of the U.S. population. If one 
counts solely the committed funds from 2007, this would be the equivalent of about USD46 billion.   
The  other  major  country  cited  for  massive  direct  public  investments  is  South  Korea.    The  most 
expansive descriptions of what the South Korean government invested
103 place that number at USD24 
billion for the KII-Government phase in the late 1990s, 1.76 billion in low cost loans to the private 
providers, 16.3 billion from 2000 to 2006, 25.5 billion, public and private investment, from 2004 to 
2007, and another 18 billion public and private from 2008 to 2010.  This is about USD85 billion in total, 
which is higher, but on the same order as a USD70 billion number also occasionally proffered as the 
South Korean investment, public and private, in broadband deployment.  As already mentioned, these 
numbers bundle public and private investment in ways that makes it difficult to tease them apart.  In 
U.S. terms, adjusted for population size, the total investment since the mid-1990s would translate into 
about USD443 billion, again, roughly commensurate with the purported Australian commitment.  But 
again,  as  in  Australia,  these  numbers  are  more  representative  of  investments  in  the  total  costs  of 
deployment, rather than actual government outlays.  The current South Korean plan, for example, calls 
for an additional USD27 billion to be spent between now and 2012. Only USD1 billion of this amount 
will be spent directly by the government.
104 As such, while these numbers sound outlandishly large as 
specifically government expenditures, they are well below the total (overwhelmingly private) investment 
in public telecommunications facilities in the United States since 1997, which has been over USD750 
billion.
105  The question for our purposes here is, in all these cases, what is the proportion of public 
funds spent.   
By contrast to the less certain numbers elsewhere, it is quite clear that public authorities in Sweden spent 
about USD817 million between 2001-2007.
106  In per capita terms, that is just over USD90, which 
translates into about USD27.6 billion dollars.  In terms of percent of annual GDP, it is about one quarter 
of  one  percent  of  Sweden's  GDP,  spent  over  six  years.    In  U.S.  terms,  this  would  translate  into  a 
commitment of just under USD35 billion dollars over six years.   This number is lower than, but roughly 
consistent with, some of the proposals for stimulus spending on broadband infrastructure in the United 
States.
107 
6.2  Stimulus investments 
Like the U.S. Congress, other countries have announced or committed funds, often as part of broader 
investment encouragement, to support the next generation transition.  The following table summarizes 
these investments.   
                                                 
103 The most comprehensive description of past investments that we have found is Atkinson et al, ITIF, Explaining 
International Broadband Leadership (2008). 
104 OECD, Working Party on Information Economy, The Impact of the Crisis on ICTs and Their Role in the Recovery, Aug 
17, 2009. p. 34. (OECD Impact of Crisis on ICTs) 
105 OECD Communications Outlook 2009 Table 4.17. 
106 Ministry of Enterprise, Energy, and Communications Sweden, June 4 2009 presentation; ITIF Broadband Report, 2008, 
p. 25. 
107 Derek Turner, Down Payment on Our Digital Future, Free Press 2008.  
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Table 6.1.  Public investment in broadband from around the world 
 
Planned investment  Government share 
Govt share in US 
terms, pop. adjusted, 
in millions USD
108 
Australia  AUD43B  4.7B AUD (reallocated funds) 
6.3B AUD (anticipated bonds) 
45,853 
61,463 
Austria  EUR125M  EUR25M  1,050 
Canada  CAD225M  CAD225M  1,677 
Finland  EUR66M  EUR66M  3,920 
France  EUR750M  Unknown  Unknown 
EU  EUR1B  EUR1B  912 
Germany  EUR150M  EUR150M (uncertain)  657 
Italy   EUR1.25B  EUR1.25 (not yet committed)  7,770 
Japan  JPY185B  JPY185B  3,820 
South Korea  USD27B  ~USD1B  6,330 
Luxembourg  EUR195M  EUR195M  126,000 
New Zealand  NZD1.7B  NZD850M (not yet 
committed) 
58,300 
Portugal  EUR50M  + EUR61M   EUR111M  4,700 
United Kingdom  GBP200M + 
GBP150-175M per year 
GBP200M + 
GBP150-175M per year 
1,530 + 
1,150-1,340 per year 
United States  USD7.2B  USD7.2B  7,200 
 
Looking at the investments reported as stimulus responses to the financial crisis in August of 2009 
alone, the United States has made one of the larger public commitments to next generation broadband.  
Luxembourg is an outlier in terms of per-capita investment, but its minuscule size and extreme wealth 
make it a largely irrelevant comparator.  Australia and New  Zealand  have both made major  public 
announcements about plans to make major government investments, but we are not certain at this point 
what the level of funds actually committed in New Zealand will be, or what the ultimate result of the 
bonds issuance in Australia will be.  Both of these plans, should they be put into effect as announced, 
will outstrip on a per capita basis even Sweden's investments in the first half of this decade and place the 
two countries as among the most publicly-funded networks in the world.  Italy has not yet appropriated 
sums equivalent to those that the U.S. has committed (on a per-capita basis), but has announced plans to 
do so.  The South Korean government's share of investments planned for the coming three years is 
similar to the U.S. recovery investment, but needs to be taken on the background of the already very 
large investment that government has made in both the first generation and next generation transitions.  
The other major investors are Finland, Japan, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, all of which have 
invested  about  half  or  a  bit more  than  half  on a  per  capita  basis  than  the American  Recovery  and 
Reinvestment Act appropriated.  Of this group only the U.K., with its new tax on copper loops intended 
                                                 
108 This number converts local currency investment to PPP dollars, divided by the population size to reach per-inhabitant 
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to  provide  a  large  annual  infusion  to  next  generation  roll  out,  on  the  order  of  what  would  be  the 
equivalent of a USD1.15 to 1.35 billion per year, has chosen a path that will ultimately lead it to higher 
direct public investments, should it continue this policy for five more years.   
Observing both longer term and stimulus investments, it appears that the United States has spent more in 
the stimulus mode than most other nations, but less than the most publicly-funded nations, in particular 
Sweden, as well as South Korea and Japan. We note only that these three nations are, by a wide margin, 
the leaders in fiber deployment.  To the extent that one sees the long-term trajectory of the fixed element 
of next generation networks to be in fiber closer to — and ultimately at — the home, we can perhaps say 
that substantial government investments seem to be associated with approaching that goal more rapidly.   
6.3  Municipal investments  
There has been substantial attention given to municipal and regional efforts as a pathway for private 
intervention.  In the United States, various stories from Burlington, Vermont to Bristol, Virginia at the 
municipal level, have suggested that municipal and regional investments may provide an appropriate and 
productive pathway for public investment.  The finances of local and regional projects are difficult to 
capture  comprehensively  in  a  way  that  would  allow  genuine,  aggregate  comparisons  of  levels  of 
investments.    False  starts  are  unlikely  to  be  reported  systematically.   As  a  result,  making  a  strong 
analysis of the relative effectiveness of municipal initiatives is beyond the scope of our analysis.  We 
treat the examples more as inspiration for a future, more detailed study, and for efforts to create learning 
networks and systems for synthesizing and communicating best-practices. 
The role of municipalities has been the most extensive and systematic in Sweden.
109  Of Sweden's 
roughly  290  municipalities,  over  200  have  been  engaged  in  some  form  of  public  support  for,  or 
tendering of, broadband deployment.  They have been the conduit of over USD 250 million, or the rough 
equivalent of what a USD12 billion investment would mean in U.S. per capita terms.  They added their 
own  funds  to  these  national  funds,  at  a  level  that  accounts  for  about  11%  of  total  investment  in 
broadband deployment from 2001-2007.  The basic model of the Swedish municipal investment is that 
the municipality builds passive capacity, or dark fiber, and leases it out to private providers who then 
compete on services and electronics, and do so through operator-neutral public tenders put in place for 
constructing the capacity.  The model is applied both in major cities, like Stockholm, and in smaller 
towns, including surrounding countryside.   
The most recent annual report by the Swedish regulatory authority suggests that municipalities will 
continue to play a central role in the country’s next generation broadband strategy.  Specifically, the 
Swedish  Post  and  Telecom  agency  (PTS)  noted  that  municipalities  would  begin  to  integrate 
communications infrastructure planning into their urban planning programs.  A particular target would 
be to identify pockets of unavailability on a very local level, and to ensure that these are covered by 
connectivity.  To support efforts in that direction, while limiting the reporting burdens on carriers, the 
national  authority  would  collect  information  about  network  services  and  availability  on  a 
comprehensive, geographic basis, and make that information available to municipalities to include in 
their  local  and  urban  planning  processes  and  in  their  network  deployment  tenders.    Moreover,  the 
Swedish report suggested that as part of their task, one major role municipalities can play going forward 
is  to minimize  the  difficulties  of  obtaining  permits  to  site  equipment and  access  ducts.    In  all,  the 
Swedish experience has worked substantially through local authorities, in collaboration with the national 
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government, and has included funneling of national funds, application of local funds, and the integration 
of local planning powers with funding and expenditure to attain near-universal coverage.   
Perhaps the most ambitious — and for a while, contentious — municipal project has been Amsterdam's 
CityNet.
110 The project is deemed ambitious because its ultimate aim was to provide a fiber-to-the-home 
network throughout the  city,  and controversial because its deployment sparked a political and legal 
battle with, in particular, the Dutch cable broadband industry, and was in some measure the impetus for 
the  very  recent  European  Commission  guidelines  on  state  aid  to  broadband  deployment,  which  are 
discussed  below.   The  project  has  also  been  successful  because  it  has  been  deployed  and  is  being 
extended; because it was upheld when challenged in the European Union, and has now created the 
model for potential municipal investment in next generation infrastructure even in the presence of robust 
market-based competition; and because its success has led the Dutch government to reverse an earlier 
reticence to allow similar municipal investments elsewhere in the Netherlands.   
The plan initially called for connecting 37,000 households, with longer term plans to roll out to all 
400,000 households in Amsterdam (comprising about 5.5% of Dutch households).  The network was to 
be a point-to-point fiber network, in which about 10,000 households would be connected directly, each 
by its own fiber, to each Internet point of presence (POP).  The system was to operate in three distinct 
layers.  The first layer was called the “passive network infrastructure.”  It included ducts, fiber, and 
street cabinets.  The second layer was the active wholesale layer.  It included network management, 
control, and maintenance systems such as switches, routers, and optical splitters.  It was to be managed 
and maintained by a wholesale network operator working on a contract from the city.  The third layer 
was the retail layer, which would consist of providers who would buy capacity, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, from the two lower layers, and provide retail services to customers.  They would invest each in 
their own service platform: equipment, services, and billing/customer care.    The first, passive layer, is 
owned  by  a  partnership  called  Glasvezelnet  Amsterdam  (GNA).    Its  members  are:  the  City  of 
Amsterdam, with a one-third share; five social housing corporations (a non-profit model of housing 
ownership of apartment buildings), which owned about one-third of the apartments in the covered area, 
owned a one-third share of GNA; and the remaining third was equally divided in two one-sixth shares 
between two for-profit investors, ING real-estate, a subsidiary of ING, and Reggefiber, a Dutch company 
whose business it has been to build open fiber networks.   The shares reflected the actual share of 
investments made by each of the parties in the EUR18 million project.   
GNA issued a tender to construct passive networks to dig and construct the ducts, and pull the fiber.  
This tender was issued to construction companies, and GNA retained ownership over the ducts, fiber, 
and cabinets.  GNA also issued a public tender for the concession to operate the wholesale layer.  The 
contract was awarded to a subsidiary of Telcom Italia, BBned. BBned was to invest in active wholesale 
layer  components,  which  it  would then  own  and  operate  while  also  operating,  but  not  owning,  the 
passive layer.  The contract required BBned to remit fees per connected household to GNA, and to sell 
wholesale access services to third party service providers on an open access, nondiscriminatory basis.  
These retail providers would sell services to end users and pay fees to GNA.  BBned itself had retail 
affiliates that would sell such services.   
In the European Union case, Dutch cable operators UPC and ONO, as well as France Telecom and 
Swedish cable operator Com Hem, intervened to persuade the Commission that the public investment 
would undermine market provisioning and that, unlike in smaller and more remote municipalities, the 
investment was unjustified in an urban center already served by commercial operators.  European cases 
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on state aid arise from the concern that states will undermine the common market purposes of the Union 
by helping their own companies against potential entrants from other countries.  Given the substantial 
history  of  state  enterprises  in  several  European  countries,  the  Commission  polices  government 
investments fairly closely to assure an efficient, pan-European market.  Following this concern, state-aid 
cases  aim  to  make  sure  that,  where  there  is  government  investment  in  a  project  of  this  sort  — 
particularly in an context where, as in Amsterdam, there is indeed plenty of market investment to go 
around  —  it  is  done  on  terms  that  would  have  been  reasonable  for  a  market  investor  (even  if  the 
particular  market  investors  serving  the  same  market  did  not  choose  to  make  a  similarly-structured 
investment).   
Factors that helped persuade the European Commission that Amsterdam's investment in GNA was a 
kind of investment that a private company might have made provide useful insight into what a model of 
legitimate municipal investment (that would not undermine market provisioning) might look like.   The 
elements that the Commission reviewed included:   
a)  the co-investment by two private companies, on equal terms, one a real-estate development firm 
that had plausible reason to invest in improving the broadband infrastructure of its real estate 
holdings and the other a company specializing in open fiber infrastructure; 
b)  the fact that the investment was in passive elements, which were expected to last for thirty years 
and therefore could be sustained with the relatively lower rates of return expected by GNA;  
c)  the fact that the City of Amsterdam was to be reimbursed all of its pre-project investments, with 
interest, as part of the project costs, all of which were ultimately intended to be paid from user 
fees paid by the wholesale users, and ultimately the retail subscribers;  
d)  a close review of the business plan: the Commission submitted the GNA business plans to one 
independent review by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the Dutch authorities submitted a report 
from a consulting firm and Delft University, both of which confirmed that the GNA business 
plan  was  sound,  that  the  internal  rate  of  return  for  the  project  was  “within  the  market 
expectations for companies active in the telecommunications market,” and that it was robust to a 
wide range of sensitivity tests based on penetration rates, cost evaluations, and other market 
contingencies.   
The assessment of the business soundness of the model, made by the Commission in December of 2007, 
was later borne out when Reggefiber, as part of its joint venture with incumbent KPN, bought out much 
of the shares of the city and the social housing corporations, raising its ownership stake to 70% in 
February  of  2009.    By  that  point,  the  project  had  already  rolled  out  to  43,000  homes  (more  than 
originally planned), and was planning to roll out to 100,000 more homes beginning in the summer of 
2009.
111 
The nature of the European Commission's decision provided, perhaps unsurprisingly, a boost to the 
model  of  municipal  fiber-to-the-home  investments  in  the  Netherlands.    Following  the  battles  over 
Amsterdam, the cable companies in the Netherlands persuaded the Dutch parliament to limit the ability 
of municipalities to invest in fiber-to-the-home facilities where there were market actors in the market 
already.  The Commission's decision has led the current Dutch government to reverse course on that 
decision, and to initiate a process to support municipal efforts built on the Amsterdam model. 
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6.4  The new European guidelines 
In part as a result of the Dutch experience and experiences elsewhere, like in Sweden, and in part in 
response to the new wave of stimulus investments, the European Commission took up more generally 
the problem of state aid to broadband deployment.  It published its final decision on September 17
th, 
2009.
112  The general starting point of the European Commission is that it has “taken an overwhelmingly 
favorable  view  towards  State  measures  for  broadband  deployment  for  rural  and  underserved  areas, 
whilst being more critical for aid measures in areas where a broadband infrastructure already exists and 
competition takes place.”
113  The Commission appeared particularly concerned to prevent crowding out 
of market provisioning where market provisioning was feasible.   
One arm of acceptable public investment is the arm established in the City of Amsterdam case: that is to 
say, where the municipality is investing pursuant to a business plan that is within what would be normal 
for  a  market  actor  in  this  market  to  do.    This  can  be  proven  either  by  co-investment  by  private, 
commercial  actors  on  equally  advantageous  and  risk-susceptible  terms  (that  is,  the  public  investor 
cannot seek to attract complementary investments by absorbing an unfair share of the risk not reflected 
in the distribution of returns), or by an independent evaluation of the municipality's business plan as 
consistent with industry practices.   
The second arm of acceptable public investment occurs where a public investment, municipal or by a 
higher-level of government, is justified as provisioning a public good, or in the language of EU law, a 
“service of general economic interest” (SGEI).  This is primarily intended to apply to investments in 
unserved  and underserved areas.   Indeed, the decision very  clearly  states that it will have  a strong 
presumption against treating a publicly-owned and invested network intended to create a third network 
alongside two already-existing facilities-based competitors, each offering triple-play offerings (so called 
“black areas”) as acceptable under this arm of the public-goods-provisioning rationale .  To the contrary, 
it sees so called “white areas,” areas with no provider, as a proper target of state investment.  As such, 
this section seems applicable precisely to the kinds of investments in unserved and underserved areas 
that are the core of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  (In “gray areas,” where there is only 
one provider and no real prospect of a second one entering within three years, the Commission takes an 
intermediate view, preferring access regulation where feasible, and public investment in an alternative 
network as a fall back option where de facto monopoly in an area cannot be attenuated by effective 
regulation.)  The Commission's requirements for such an investment are particularly enlightening, both 
about the assumptions they  exhibit regarding where  competition is likely and most productive, and 
because of the way in which they integrate the task of transposing the lessons of the first generation 
broadband transition to the next generation investments.   
One important requirement that the EC places on even those investments it deems acceptable is that they 
not be coupled with a formal promise of exclusivity, or monopoly licensing provision.  The opinion 
rejects the idea that, over and above subsidies, any company providing service in these unserved or 
underserved areas needs a monopoly right over provisioning.  It also requires technological neutrality, 
and open tenders for any such investments.   
One of the most interesting aspects of these guidelines is their effort to limit the range of what is offered 
publicly, and use it, to the extent possible, to provide a platform over which competitive, market-based 
services  higher  up  in  the  stack  will  be  offered.   This  part  of the  EC opinion  therefore  serves  as  a 
particularly interesting window into current European thinking about integrating the natural-monopoly 
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attributes of at least some broadband markets with the possibility that at least some layer of services will 
be competitive, riding on top of a shared platform.  It also provides a window into current thinking about 
access,  competition,  and  transposition  of  the  first  generation  transition  with  the  next  generation 
transition.  We reproduce here the whole of the relevant part of the holding, including its very interesting 
footnotes.   
(27) Given the state of competition that has been achieved since the liberalisation of 
the  electronic  communications  sector  in  the  Community,  and  in  particular  the 
competition  that  exists  today  on  the  retail  broadband  market,  a  publicly-funded 
network set up within the context of an SGEI should be available for all interested 
operators. Accordingly, the recognition of an SGEI mission for broadband deployment 
should  be  based  on  the  provision  of  a  passive,  neutral34  and  open  access 
infrastructure. Such a network should provide access seekers with all possible forms 
of  network  access  and allow  effective  competition  at  the  retail  level,  ensuring  the 
provision of competitive and affordable services to end-users.35 Therefore, the SGEI 
mission  should  only  cover  the  deployment  of  a  broadband  network  providing 
universal  connectivity  and  the  provision  of  the  related  wholesale  access  services, 
without including retail communication services36. Where the provider of the SGEI 
mission  is  also  a  vertically  integrated  broadband  operator,  adequate  safeguards 
should be put in place to avoid any conflict of interest, undue  discrimination and any 
other hidden indirect advantages.37  
Notes: 
34 A network should be technologically neutral and thus enable access seekers to 
use any of the available technologies to provide services to end users. Although such 
a requirement may be of limited application in relation to the deployment of an ADSL 
network infrastructure, this may not be the case in relation to a NGA, fibre-based 
network where operators may use different fibre technologies to provide services to 
end- users (i.e., point-to-point or G-PON).  
35  For  example,  an ADSL  network  should  provide  bitstream  and  full  unbundling, 
whereas  a  NGA fibre-based  network  should  provide  at  least  access  to  dark fibre, 
bitstream, and if a FTTC network is being deployed, access to sub loop unbundling.  
36 This limitation is justified by the fact that, once a broadband network providing 
universal connectivity has been deployed, the market forces are normally sufficient to 
provide communication services to all users at a competitive price.  
37 Such safeguards may include, in particular, an obligation of accounting separation, 
and may also include the setting up of a structurally and legally separate entity from 
the  vertically  integrated  operator.  Such  entity  should  have  sole  responsibility  for 
complying with and delivering the SGEI mission assigned to it.  
To  justify  a  public  investment,  the  EC  requires  that  states  engage  in  detailed  local  mapping  of 
availability,  need,  and  rollout;  that  they  use  an  open  tender  process;  that  they  accept  the  most 
economically advantageous offer (which need not be the lowest bid); that the tenders be technologically 
neutral; that, where possible, they use existing infrastructure (except where the recalcitrance of the local 
monopolist is part of the problem); that the successful bidder offer its network for wholesale services to 
other providers at rates that are benchmarked against wholesale rates in other, competitive areas, and; 
that the tenders or laws pursuant to which a tender is made include claw back provisions allowing the 
state to seek restitution of profits found to have been excessive following such price benchmarking 
exercises.     Next Generation Connectivity 
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Finally, the newly-minted European decision explicitly embraces the dual-goals approach taken by some 
countries, which seek, independently, to reach their entire population with broadband networks, and 
large  portions  of  their  populations  with  next  generation  connectivity.    The  Commission  accepts  as 
legitimate the possibility that European countries will invest in next generation access networks, beyond 
their investments in bringing first generation broadband to their entire populations, even in urban areas, 
where doing so is seen as speeding up deployment and acquiring the social spillover benefits on a faster 
schedule than current private firms appear ready to follow.  The Commission treats the presence or 
absence of immediate plans to deploy such Next Generation Access networks (NGAs) in the near (three 
year) future as a distinct “market” for purposes of designating “black,” “white,” and “gray” areas—in 
other words, making it much easier, for many more regions and municipalities, to claim “white” or 
“gray” status than would have been possible were the measure the existence of two facilities-based 
competitors  offering  first-generation  broadband  networks,  like  xDSL  (and  presumably  less-than 
DOCSIS 3.0 cable, though that is not made explicit in the opinion; the opinion does explicitly treat 
ADSL 2+ that provides 24Mbps service as not falling within the definition of “next generation”).  One 
path the Commission envisions for this process is the passage of rules: rules requiring new construction 
buildings or infrastructure (like roads, sewage plants, energy, or transportation projects) to include fiber 
connections; acquisition of rights of way for use by communications networks; requirements on existing 
private network operators to coordinate their civil works or share infrastructure; or requirements to share 
poles and ducts.  Moreover, the Commission contemplates that investments in civil works like pulling 
ducts, as well as regional investments intended to increase the competitive attractiveness of either under-
developed or technology-cluster regions, by providing high-end infrastructure, will also be considered 
acceptable as long as they comply with the other constraints placed by the Commission.   
The  critical  point  of  this  part  of  the  opinion  however,  is  that  the  European  Commission  will  treat 
investment in speeding up deployment of networks capable of very high speed service as a distinct 
market, and as justifying investment to speed up deployment even in areas where there are two facilities-
based competitors who are offering triple-play packages over networks that offer below 24Mbps service. 
(The  precise  cutoff  between  what  counts  as  NGAs  and  what  does  not  is  not  clearly  specified;  but 
24Mbps is clearly not treated as NGA.)  The Commission will presume that these existing providers do 
have  such  plans,  but  member  states  can  rebut  that  presumption  by  showing  that  those  existing 
competitors do not have explicit business plans to upgrade their service to next generation levels within 
three years.  In that case, the Commission will treat even such areas as “gray” or “white” areas (as 
appropriate given the actual plans of the present broadband providers) in terms of next generation access 
networks.   
In all events, the networks constructed with public aid will have to comply with all the requirements 
stated above, with the Commission's special emphasis that:  
An “open access” obligation is all the more crucial in order to deal with the temporary 
substitution  between  the  services  offered  by  existing  ADSL  operators  and  those 
offered by future NGA network operators. An open access obligation will ensure that 
ADSL  operators  can  migrate  their  customers  to  a  NGA  network  as  soon  as  a 
subsidised network is in place and thus start planning their own future investments 
without suffering any real competitive handicap.  
In addition, whatever the type of the NGA network architecture that will benefit from 
State aid, it should support effective and full unbundling and satisfy all different types 
of network access that operators may seek (including but not limited to access to 
ducts,  fibre  and  bitstream).  In  this  respect  it  should  be  noted  that  "multiple  fibre" 
architecture allows full independence between access seekers to provide high-speed 
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addition, the deployment of NGA networks based on multiple fibre lines supports both 
"point-to-point"  and  "point-  to-multipoint"  topologies  and  is  therefore  technology 
neutral. 
114 
6.5  Demand side programs: Subsidies and skills training 
In addition to the supply-side subsidies, several of the countries we have studied have developed various 
demand-side interventions to increase not only the supply of broadband, but demand for it as well.   
As on the supply side, the most systematic and extensive demand-side program was implemented in 
South Korea.  Its elements included: 
•  Extensive skills training to large swaths of the population, free or on highly subsidized terms. 
The relevant populations included the elderly, military personnel, and farmers.   
•  Most extensive and visible among the adult population training programs was the Cyber 21 
training program that targeted housewives.
115  The program consisted of a week-long, 20 hour 
course,  subsidized  through  over  a  thousand  training  institutions  so  that  courses  cost  about 
USD30.
116  Take up was dramatic, with one report noting over 70,000 participants in the first ten 
days. Several discussions of South Korean programs at the time seem to mention this program as 
one that had a serious impact.   
•  Funding  and  constructing  thousands  of  public  access  sites,  where  residents  were  given  free 
access and training 
•  Subsidized provision of personal computers to low income families.  Initially, this was done 
through low-cost loans, and later the government directly purchased computers and leased them 
for four years to low income families, while at the same time paying the full cost of broadband 
service for these families for five years 
•  Free personal computers in every school in the country 
•  50,000 free computers were given to low-income students with good grades 
•  Curriculum and school assignments were developed so that having a connection and knowing 
how to use it became an integral part of going to school.  It was how you got your homework 
done 
•  Including digital literacy measures in college entry metrics, so that having high performance on 
digital literacy metrics enhanced one's likelihood of getting a better higher education 
•  In  the  housing  market,  the  government  initiated  a  building  certification  program  whereby  it 
issued a certificate of connectivity to buildings that were well wired and ready to receive and 
distribute broadband.  These became the basis for building owners to compete in the real estate 
market 
                                                 
114 EU Guidelines, English version, page 23-24. 
115 Kushida and Oh. 
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No other country that we observed has engaged in as extensive a set of policies.  In various countries we 
saw bits and pieces of programs reminiscent of elements of the South Korean program.  These include: 
•  Adult skills training: in the United Kingdom, the Train to Gain program, which is a workplace 
training program, has worked with over 127,000 employers and provided training for over a 
million workers.  The Swedish government ran training programs for small business owners 
about use of ICTs in their business.  The German government too offers consulting and prizes for 
innovative uses of ICTs and training in them for small and medium businesses. 
•  Funding  and  constructing  public  access  sites  in  various  communities:  Canada's  Community 
Access Program constructs and offers training through community technology centers 
•  Subsidies for home personal computers: The Swedish government throughout the early 2000s 
allowed employers to provide personal computers to employees on a pre-tax basis; the British 
government provided cheap financing for families to lease computers over a four year period 
•  School-based interventions:  
-  Broadband connections and computers at school: Sweden, Canada, France, the United 
Kingdom  Germany,  and Australia  all  fund  connections  for  schools,  which  are  made 
available to the schools either free or at very low rates 
-  Schoolteacher  training:  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom  both  invested  heavily  in 
teacher training programs 
-  Curriculum development and digital learning objects: Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia have all invested in developing online curriculum offerings and learning tools 
-  Real-estate  market  deployment:  On  the  housing  side,  France  worked  not  through 
carrots—like  the  South  Korean  certification  program—but  through  requirements:  of 
installation of open wires in new construction, and of requirements of shared facilities 
whenever an existing building is wired under contract with one of the fiber providers. 
While the United States adopted subsidies to school deployment of Internet connectivity through the E-
rate program since the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the heavy emphasis on skills training is an 
important lesson carried by these international studies.  Least known in the American debate have been 
the heavy investments in adult education.  One important pathway seems to have been investment in 
workplace-based  training  programs,  both  for  employees  and  for  small  and  medium  sized  business 
owners is an interesting observation.  Better  known  and  clearly  important  is  the  extent  to  which 
investment in skills training, including intensive teacher training, rather than merely in hardware and 
connectivity, was central in several other countries to the school-based programs.       Country overviews: Denmark 
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A. Denmark 
Introduction 
Denmark  is  among  the  world's  leading  nations  in  broadband  penetration,  even  though  some  of  the 
country's regions are sparsely populated. Early liberalization of the telecommunications market and LLU 
did not keep former monopoly telco TDC from taking the lion's share of the broadband market. DSL is 
still the leading technology but alternative platforms are on the rise. The government has emphasized the 
public sector's role in demand for broadband while not making any direct investments on the supply 
side. The regulatory framework poses very low barriers to entry into the broadband market while newly 
introduced sharing of costs for shared future infrastructure is supposed to attract new investment. 4G 
licenses are to be auctioned in 2010. 
Market highlights  
Overall, 69.5% of households in Denmark have broadband access.
117 
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117 OECD Broadband Portal, Table 2a, from EU Community Survey, from 2007. 
118 Does not include 3G Wireless.  Since subscriptions are shared within a household, this number will never be 100. 
119 OECD Broadband Portal, Table 1d, as reported by individual governments, as of 2008.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Broadband development to date 
The development of broadband in Denmark started with liberalization of telco services and the abolition 
of  the  exclusive  right  of  Tele  Denmark  (now  TDC)  to  establish  broadband  networks  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  municipalities  in  1995.
120  Estimates  of  early  broadband  subscriptions  differ 
significantly. According to a report to the National IT and Telecom Agency (IT- og Telestyrelsen), by 
December  31
st,  1999,  almost  10%  of  Danish  households  and  SMEs  were  connected  by  broadband 
through ISDN
121, which was the leading technology at that time, while access via xDSL and cable was 
still  rare.
122  In  a  recent  economic  report,  IT-  og  Telestyrelsen  estimates  the  number  of  broadband 
subscriptions to have been a mere 0.5 per 100 inhabitants for the year 2000.
123 
ISDN was soon passed by DSL. Denmark adopted local loop unbundling in 1998 and line sharing was 
required in 2001, resulting in a rise of new entrants in the market for DSL.
124 In 2002, when broadband 
subscriptions had risen to 8.3 per 100 inhabitants,
125 DSL subscribers accounted for more than two 
thirds of Denmark's 445,842 broadband subscribers; a large majority of the other third connected via 
cable. By 2005, broadband penetration had gone up to 24.7 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
126 and 
there  were  826,181  xDSL  subscriptions  and  364,803  cable  subscriptions  with  capacities  of  at  least 
144kbit/s.
127 From January 2001 to January 2005, the cost of household ADSL service decreased by 
over 45%.
128 
In  2008,  DSL  was  still  the  most  important  technology  for  broadband  access,  although  alternative 
platforms have gained momentum. The number of FTTx connections (such as fiber-to-the-home) has 
grown from 30,000 in 2006 to 108,000 in 2008, making it the fastest growing alternative technology.
129 
At the same time, with only 16,882 subscribers at the end of 2008, WiMAX was not a yet a significant 
alternative option to DSL or cable broadband.
130 There are currently four 3G licenses in use, which 
together cover a spectrum from 1900 to 1980 Mhz and from 2110 to 2170 Mhz.
131 4G licenses in the 2.5 
GHz band are expected to be auctioned in March 2010.
132 
Market share and key players 
Even though the fixed-line market was completely liberalized in 1996,
133 the successor of Denmark's 
monopoly fixed-line operator was still the dominant player at the end of 2008.
134 In the broadband 
                                                 
120 OECD, Regulatory Reform in Denmark, Regulatory Reform in the Telecommunications Industry, 2000, p.7. 
121 Whether ISDN should be considered broadband is certainly debatable. 
122 Eirwen Nichols et al., The Status of Broadband Services For Consumers and SMES, A Report to Telestyrelsen, October 
2000, p.5. 
123 IT- og Telestyrelsen, Economic Key Figures 2008, June 2009, p.12. 
124 Sherille Ismail and Irene Wu, Broadband Internet Access in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis, October 2003, p. 
14. 
125 Ibid, p.4. 
126 IT- og Telestyrelsen, Economic Key Figures 2008, June 2009, p.12. 
127 IT- og Telestyrelsen, Tele Yearbook - 2005, p.26. 
128 The Danish Government, IT and Telecommunications Policy Report 2005, March 2005, p.10. 
129 GlobalComms Denmark, p.16. 
130 GlobalComms Denmark, p.16. 
131 http://en.itst.dk/copy_of_frequencies/licences/3g-licences/ 
132 http://en.itst.dk/copy_of_frequencies/licences/Auctions-and-calls-for-tenders/2-5-ghz/expected-time-table 
133 i.e. Tele Denmark's exclusive rights to provide telephony services, leased lines, mobile communications, cable television, 
etc were removed. See: OECD, Regulatory Reform in Denmark, Regulatory Reform in the Telecommunications 
Industry, p.7 et sq. 
134 Fixnet Nordic controls a share of 82.1% of all subscriber lines. See: GlobalComms Denmark, p.3.     Country overviews: Denmark 
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market, TDC (now Fixnet Nordic) had accumulated 1.16 million broadband subscribers by the end of 
March 2009.
135 This equals a market share of 56.6%, which is split between its DSL and cable (sold 
under the YouSee brand) divisions. In 2009 TDC also acquired Fullrate, which had a market share of 
3.7%. TDC's main competitor in the broadband market is Telenor who offers DSL, VPN and VoIP 
services and whose share is 14%. Telia Denmark accounts for 9% of the market, which it serves via 
various subsidiaries using DSL and fiber-optic cable. 
The growing market for FTTH is lead by independent Dansk Bredband with 18.8% and Energi Midt 
with  16.5%.  Two  other  providers  follow  with  just  above  10%  market  share.
136  Three-quarters  of 
WiMAX  connections  are  operated  by  Danske  Telecom  (owned  by  Call  Me  which  is  part  of  Telia 
Denmark).  ELRO,  a  utility  provider  has  announced  to  aim  for  nationwide  deployment  of  WiMAX 
services by 2010.
137 
The market for 3G connections is lead by Hi3G with a share of 36.2%. It was the first provider to 
operate a 3G network and is expected to roll out HSPA+ later in 2009.
138 Mobile Nordic (owned by 




Broadband and the telecommunication industry does not fall under one single law but is regulated by 
several different acts, including primarily the Act on Competitive Conditions and Consumer Interests in 
the  Telecommunications  Market,  the  Act  on  Cable  Laying  Access  and  Expropriation  etc.  for 
Telecommunications Purposes, and the Act on Radio Frequencies. 
The regulatory framework poses very low barriers to entry.
140 Neither licenses nor registration with the 
regulating  body  are  needed,  except  for  operating  fixed-wireless  connections.  The  main  focus  of 
legislation is on the promotion of competition in the telecommunications market. 
The  National  IT  and  Telecom  Agency  (IT-  og  Telestyrelsen)  regulates  and  supervises  the 
telecommunication industry. As a division of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation, it 
also frames and conducts initiatives and implements national IT and telecom policies. Ex-post regulation 
by  the  agency  follows  comprehensive  market  analyses  and  has  often  taken  aim  in  the  years  after 
liberalization at interconnection and LLU prices. 
As a member of the EU, Denmark is also obliged to implement the EU Framework Directive, which in 
Article 8.2 requires that "competition in the provision of electronic communications networks, electronic 
communications services and associated facilities and services" is promoted by  "(a) ensuring that users, 
including disabled users, derive maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, and quality; (b) ensuring 
that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic communications sector; (c) 
encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation". 
                                                 
135 GlobalComms Denmark, p.16. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 GlobalComms Denmark, p.9. 
139 GlobalComms Denmark, p.16. 
140 A fact that caused existing telcos to call for a stricter regime, see: GlobalComms Denmark, p.15.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Broadband strategy 
Denmark's broadband development is based on a plan issued by the Danish Government in 2001.
141 The 
plan laid out the ambitious aim "that Denmark should be the world's leading IT nation."
142 One of the 
goals  articulated  in  the  plan  is  to  "have  fast,  cheap  and  secure  internet  for  support  and  further 
development of the Danish welfare society." Even in 2009, Denmark sees great potential and advantages 
in being a leader in the digital world and "the Government's target is for all Danes to have broadband 
access by the end of 2010 at the latest."
143 
Believing in the market's ability to provide the infrastructure for digital leadership,
144 the broadband 
strategy called for the analysis and monitoring of the market and the behavior of the demand side actors 
and giving consumers enough information about products and prices while regulation and interventions 
should "contribute towards a high  competition and security level in the  IT and telecommunications 
sector."
145 
The  strategy  by  which  Denmark  seeks  to  achieve  this  is  based  on  four  principles:  a  market-driven 
infrastructure without the use of public funding, technology neutrality in the regulation of the market, 
transparent regulation, and the public sector as a contributing force behind demand for IT.
146 The Danish 
broadband strategy has been described as a "soft-intervention" strategy, which is "characterized by low 
government  involvement  in  broadband  infrastructure  deployment"  as  it  relies  "on  market  forces  to 
ensure broadband supply."
147 
To boost demand, Danish Government decided to invest in public sector IT and IT services where the 
following  criteria  are  met:  increased  prosperity  and  productivity;  better  public  service  and  welfare; 
increased efficiency in the public sector; skills development within and via IT; and an IT-related boost 
of the Danish cultural heritage  and media production.
148 As the broadband plan from 2001 puts  it: 
"Increased penetration of fast internet connections will require a wider range of relevant content on the 
web  -  there  must  be  something  worthwhile."
149  The  strategy  also  suggests  that  public-private 
partnerships should be established for the development of new public IT services for the citizens.
150 A 
couple  of  regional  and  municipal  initiatives  have  reached  out  to  the  private  sector  for  a  rollout  of 
fiber.
151 
Denmark’s broadband strategy has proven to be successful; Denmark leads the OECD in broadband 
penetration rates
152 and the price for a monthly broadband subscription can be as low as USD 6.06.
153 
                                                 
141 In its brochure "VISION 2015: 100 megabits for all", the Danish Energy Association argues that there is an urgent need 
for a new broadband strategy if economic growth and jobs are to be secured. 
http://www.danishenergyassociation.com/Theme/Broadband.aspx 
142 http://en.vtu.dk/files/publications/2001/from-hardware-to-content-strategy-for-fast-cheap-and-secure/html/inde0002.htm 
143 The Danish Government, IT and Telecommunications Policy Report 2009, March 2009, p.6. 
144 if demand is high enough 
145 http://en.vtu.dk/files/publications/2001/from-hardware-to-content-strategy-for-fast-cheap-and-secure/html/inde0009.htm 
146 IT- og Telestyrelsen, Comments on FCC GN Docket No. 09-47, June 2009, p.1. 
147 Inmaculada Cava-Ferreruela and Antonio Alabau-Muñoz, Broadband policy assessment: A cross-national empirical 




151 see section: Government investment in infrastructure 
152 OECD, Broadband Growth and Policies in OECD Countries 2008, 2008, p.35. 
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However, the fastest download speeds offered by the incumbent provider are lower than those found in 
many other countries
154 and prices for fast connections are still relatively high.
155  
Policy interventions and outcomes 
Government investment in infrastructure 
In accordance with its broadband strategy, which emphasizes a market based approach to broadband 
development, the Danish central government has neither invested substantially in the deployment of 
backbone infrastructure nor carried out any other major investments in broadband networks for business 
and residential connectivity. Instead, it has applied a philosophy of establishing fast IT infrastructure in 
the public sector which in turn boosts public sector demand for broadband connections. Although 21,000 
households  and  businesses  still  had  no  access  to  broadband  in  2008,
156  the  government  remains 
committed to its policy of not funding any broadband infrastructure
157 but rather supporting demand 
through the promotion of IT use in the public sector, education and research programs. 
However,  there  have  been  a  couple  of  public-private  partnerships  for  broadband  deployment  on  a 
regional and municipal level. The most notable of these are Djursland.net and Aarhus Network. The 
former was established in 2001 and covered 8 municipalities, which rented fiber optic capacity from the 
county and extended the coverage by radio to remote areas. In the latter, the municipality of Aarhus 
contracted Netdesign to rollout and operate a fiber optic network based on an open network model 
intended to eventually cover 1,500 localities.
158 
Skill building, education, and demand programs 
Denmark has invested considerable energy in improving the technological proficiency of its populace, 
initiating a number of government programs designed to promote the use of information technology and 
enhance user skills. In 1993, an educational network was established, linking
159 primary and secondary 
schools as well as universities to a conference and learning environment and later to the internet.
160 In 
1997, research institutions were able to connect to Forskningsnettet, a research network, which in 1999 
allowed downstream speeds of up to 10 Mbit/s.
161 
The  Danish  Government  has  found  it  crucial  for  the  nation's  "ability  to  utilize  the  strong  growth 
potential  found  everywhere  in  the  country"  that  "knowledge  should  be  put  to  work  in  the  Danish 
regions."
162 In a regional action plan in combination with the Finance Act for 2005, about DKK 130 
million have been allocated to be spent on a number of regional technology centers.
163 
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In 2002, a government proposal was adopted, which " gives the employee the right to a tax allowance of 
up to DKK 3,500 each year against the cost of having a computer made available at home by his/her 
employer. The scheme requires the employer to contribute 25 per cent of the costs. In addition, data 
communications access paid for by the employer will be tax free, provided the employee has access to 
the employer's network from home."
164 
IT skills are fostered by nine new ICT programs introduced in 2006 at the university level. By 2007, 
enrollment to ICT university programs had risen by 24% from the previous year.
165 For the period from 
2004 to 2007, DKK 370 million have been granted to municipalities to buy and install PCs for the 
youngest students, provided that the municipalities pay at least the same amount.
166  
In 2008, a requirement for the use of open standards in the public sector came into force, along with the 
use  of  open  document  formats.  Some  years  before,  government  and  municipalities  jointly  created 
"eDay2", which was an initiative to "ensure that private citizens and businesses can communicate safely 
with public authorities with digital signatures no later than February 1, 2005."
167 In 2009, 50% of basic 
public services for citizens were available online in Denmark and 86% for enterprises."
168 
Another notable part in Denmark's IT policy is the action plan for green IT by which the Ministry of 




As an early adopter of local loop unbundling, Denmark has actively pursued open access policies to 
promote competition in broadband markets.  The principal instrument that guides competition policy in 
the  telecommunications  sector  is  the  Act  on  Competitive  Conditions  and  Consumer  Interest  in  the 
Telecommunications Market, which is applied by Telestyrelsen (in some cases in consultation with the 
Danish Competition Authority).  
Two  principles  govern  policy  regarding  interconnection:  "Firstly,  the  principle  that  all  providers  of 
public  telecommunications  networks  or  telecommunications  services  are  under  an  obligation  to 
negotiate between them agreements on exchange of traffic, with a view to ensuring mutual access to 
their telecommunications networks or telecommunications services. Secondly, based on the desire to 
facilitate  the  establishment  of  an  effective  telecommunications  sector  driven  by  competition,  the 
principle  that  a  number  of  special  requirements  should  be  set  for  providers  of  telecommunications 
networks  or  telecommunications  services  who  have  significant  market  power  in  a  given  submarket 
within  the  telecommunications  sector,  or  who  control  a  special  competitive  bottleneck  resource."
170 
Those requirements for operators with significant market power include - among others - the obligation 
to meet interconnection requests on non-discriminatory terms and at cost-related prices. 
                                                 
164 The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, IT for All - IT and Telecommunications Policy and Action Plan 
2002. 
165 The Danish Government, IT and Telecommunications Policy Report 2008, March 2008, p.13. 
166 The Danish Government, IT and Telecommunications Policy Report 2008, March 2008, p.9. 
167 The Danish Government, IT and Telecommunications Policy Report 2005, March 2005, p.5. 
168 European Commission, Europe's Digital Competitiveness Report, Country Profiles 2009, August 2009, p.18. 
169 See: The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Green IT Guidelines for public authorities, December 2008. 
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The Act on Competitive Conditions and Consumer  Interest in the Telecommunications Market also 
contains provisions on Universal Service Obligation. TDC was appointed universal service provider for 
six years (possibly extended by another two years) from 1 January 2009.
171 
Prices for local loop unbundling "are set by Telestyrelsen in cooperation with industry players and are 
based on long run average incremental costs."
172 In order to promote competition and lower costs for 
high downstream speeds, in 2006 and 2007, the regulatory body "decided to reduce TDC's wholesale 
prices for broadband.
173 In March 2009 the regulator's plan to require Fixnet Nordic (TDC) to give 
competitors wholesale access to its cable network was backed by the European Commission.
174 
In December 2008, a bill was passed, which requires companies that share the use of the network to also 
share the cost of the infrastructure. The Ministry hopes this "will result both in incentives to invest in 
new  technology  and  also  in  competition  between  the  services  on  the  existing  telecommunications 
networks."
175 No accounts of operators requesting competitors to share the cost of future infrastructure 
are publicly available. 
In  the  field  of  mobile  broadband,  the  Act  on  the  Establishment  and  Joint  Utilization  of  Masts  for 
Radiocommunications gives operators the right to use an antenna mast that is owned by a competitor 
and sets out rules for compensation and sharing of costs.  
Network non-discrimination 
Network neutrality is not currently at the center of any political debates. Yet it has been the topic of an 
international  conference  arranged  by  the  Ministry  of  Science,  Technology  and  Innovation  on  30 
September 30
th, 2008. According to the Government's IT and Telecommunications Policy Report from 
March 2009, "Denmark will continue its endeavors to guarantee an open internet for all."
176 
Spectrum policy 
The Frequency Act requires the Minister for Science, Technology and Innovation to issue a mandate, 
which  serves  as  a  framework  for  Telestyrelsen  to  manage  the  spectrum  of  radio  frequencies.
177 
Frequencies  are  allocated  by  way  of  auctions.  The  Frequency  Act  was  revised  in  2007  and  a  new 
Frequency  Act  is  expected  to  enter  into  force  on  1  January  2010  allowing  the  market  to  trade 
frequencies and thereby allocating them more efficiently.
178 The new act will also implement technology 
neutrality in the use of frequencies and provisions that ban hoarding and anti-competitive behavior.
179 
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An auction of additional spectrum is slated for the end of 2009, following  a 2008 decision by  the 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation to issue licenses in the 2500-2690 MHz and 2010-2025 
MHz bands for fixed and mobile broadband services.
180 
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B. France 
Introduction 
The development of broadband access in France has been driven primarily by the deployment of DSL.  
Broadband  penetration  rates  increased  markedly  after  a  shift  in  the  regulatory  environment  and  the 
implementation  of  local  loop  bundling.  This  allowed  competitors  access  to  the  network  of  France 
Telecom and helped to drive down broadband prices in France; consumer broadband prices in France 
are now among the most affordable in the world.  Average broadband speeds in France also place it 
among the leaders.  France is not among the highest performers in terms of broadband penetration rates. 
However, after strong improvements over the past six years, broadband penetration rates in France are 
now higher than the OECD average.  
The broadband strategy in France has historically relied on private investment and the promotion of 
market competition. Competition in broadband markets has helped to spur innovation in retail markets, 
particularly  in  broadband  offering  that  combine  fixed  and  mobile  coverage.  This  appears  likely  to 
change, as the French government has announced its intention to help finance the deployment of fiber 
networks.  The current broadband policy debate in France focuses on the issues of access and sharing of 
fiber networks.  Each of the major players is investing in fiber infrastructure.  
Market highlights  
Overall, 42.9% of households in France have broadband access.
181 
 
 Fiber / LAN  Cable  DSL  Other  Overall  
Subscriptions per 100 people 
182  0.1  1.4  26.6  0.0  28.0
183 
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Broadband development to date 
Compared to its European neighbors, France was slow to adopt widespread broadband Internet. In 2001, 
penetration  rates  in  France  stood  at  about  one-third  of  the  overall  average  for  OECD  countries.
184 
However, following an overhaul of the regulatory regime, broadband penetration rates in France have 
improved  substantially  over  the  past  six  years.    Broadband  penetration  rates  in  France  are  now 
approximately 25% higher than the OECD average.   
Broadband connectivity in France has been driven primarily through the use of DSL connections via the 
France  Telecom  (FT)  network.    DSL  subscriptions  make  up  95%  of  all  broadband  connections  in 
France.  The implementation of local loop unbundling (LLU) of FT networks has allowed Iliad/Free and 
Neuf/SFR to establish themselves as major competitors to FT in broadband markets. The largest cable 
telephony and broadband cable company, Numericable, controls a vast majority of the broadband cable 
market. However, this constitutes only about 5% of the overall broadband market. Cable networks have 
been deployed only in big cities, explaining the low global market share of the technology.  The wireless 
broadband is offered as a complementary service by DSL operators and has emerged as a result of the 
convergence between fixed and mobile broadband access, rather than as an autonomous technology. For 
example, subscribers to Iliad’s broadband service (sold under the brand Free) have access to the service 
box of other Free subscribers to form a subscriber-based system of nomadic access. Similarly, SFR 
enables its customers to connect wirelessly via FoN subscribers.  
Broadband connectivity is accessible to 99% of the overall population in France, and 97% of residents in 
rural areas (compared to European averages of 93% and 70%).
185 
                                                 
184   OECD, G7 historical penetration rates.  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/14/39574797.xls. 
185   http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/343&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui 
Language=en     Country overviews: France 
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Broadband subscriptions in France (2003-2009, in millions) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using ARCEP data 
Despite commitments by several of the major broadband companies—including FT, Free, and SFR—to 
invest in fiber roll-out, fiber-based broadband connections remain marginal in France. Iliad, the parent 
company of Free, announced EUR 1 billion investment to construct 4 million connections until end of 
2012.
186    They  intended  to  provide  the  connections  in  Paris  by  the  first  semester  of  2007.  France 
Telecom has also committed to investing in fiber roll-out. 
The investments in fiber roll-out have been somewhat delayed due to the public controversy regarding 
access to the infrastructure of France Telecom. Therefore, broadband through fiber has not developed as 
fast as initially expected. By December 2008, only 550,000 households had access to fiber connections 
in their building,187 and the number of subscribers remains very low: among 170,000 of all the very 
high-speed connections, only 40,000 were through fiber.188 
Key players and market share 
The historical state-monopolist, France Telecom (FT) remains the leader of the market, although its 
share of the market dropped substantially following the implementation of local loop unbundling. The 
FT subsidiary Orange currently holds approximately 50% of the DSL market. (Figure xx). 
                                                 
186   Iliad, Press Release, September11, 2006. 
187   ARCEP, Annual Report, 2008. 
188   ARCEP, « Tableau de bord du Très Haut Débit au 31 décembre 2008 ». Published  July 4, 2009   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Market share of DSL operators in France (2002-2009) 
 
Source: Financial company communication, press releases (collected by Microeconomix)  
Between 2001 and 2004, following the regulatory decrease in wholesale prices, several new operators 
entered the market and gained increasing market share. Building upon unbundled access, Free and SFR 
have each captured approximately one quarter of the DSL market.  
A  number  of  mergers  over  the  past  several  years  have  contributed  to  an  increase  in  market 
concentration. The last wave of corporate acquisitions in 2008 (Figure xx) consolidated the position of 
FT-Orange’s two principal challengers, Free and SFR-Neuf.  
Two  recent  entrants  to  the  broadband  sector,  Bouygues  and  Darty,  have  adopted  distinct  market 
strategies. Bouygues, a telecommunication company, offers convergence of voice and data for their 
subscribers  through  broadband  access.  Darty,  a  large  retailer  specializing  in  household  electronics, 
entered as a virtual operator in 2007. It was not previously active in the telecommunication sector.      Country overviews: France 
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Mergers and acquisitions on the French DSL market (2001-2009) 
 
Source: Microeconomix 
Only one of the top three operators, Free, was not active in the telecommunication sector before its entry 
in the broadband market. Iliad is a start-up that introduced an offer for broadband access through ADSL 
at EUR 30 per month in 2002, and did not change their price even when adding more services, such as 
unlimited VoIP and TV, to their offer.  According to the OECD, this price for broadband access was the 
best in Europe in 2005.
189  This price has become the reference point for the French broadband market, 
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The Law of 26 July 1996 opened the telecommunications sector to full competition and mandated the 
creation of the regulatory authority, ART (Autorité de Régulation des Telecommunications), which was 
subsequently established on January 5
th 1997. ART is an independent administrative authority tasked 
with regulating the liberalization of the telecommunications sector.  In 2005, the French Parliament 
made ART responsible for regulating postal activities; the authority thereby became ARCEP (Autorité 
de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes). 
As  in  other  European  markets,  the  French  regulatory  framework  is  driven  by  implementation  of 
European  directives  on  liberalisation  of  telecommunications  sector,  with  the  Framework  Directive 
2002/21/EC as a starting point.  ARCEP has relied primarily on ex ante intervention into wholesale 
broadband markets. Through access rules and the regulation of tariffs, ARCEP actions have been aimed 
at ensuring that France Telecom's rivals could compete effectively against the previously state-owned 
monopolist, which controlled household access via the copper network.   
Between 2000 and 2002, the principal regulatory issue centered on the reference offer made by France 
Telecom to other operators for wholesale access and the co-localisation of operators in DSLAM rooms.   
These activities were intended to satisfy local loop unbundling requirements, which had been mandated 
by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  in  2000.
191    As  with  each  member  state,  France  was 
responsible for the implementation of this law within its own legal system.  In 2002, the European 
Commission started a non-compliance procedure by opening infringement proceeding against France 
regarding the Regulation on Unbundling of the Local Loop.
192  The European Commission indicated 
that the reference offer from incumbent operators should be sufficiently unbundled to allow competitors 
to pay only for what they use.  In addition, they must provide a breakdown of costs for the sub-loop so 
that an operator can install equipment closer to customers' premises than the local exchange.  
The infringement proceedings opened by the European Commission modified substantially the behavior 
of ART, which then introduced sub-loop unbundling and significantly reduced the rate charged for local 
loop access. Although the monthly rental fee became the lowest in Europe after Denmark, the total 
monthly cost per unbundled loop, including the connection fee, whether full or shared, was still high; in 
2003, France was 9
th in the EU for full unbundled loop and 6
th for shared access.
193 
However, price was not the only consideration.  ARCEP also moved to dismantle other obstacles to 
access unrelated to price. It defined in detail a number of service quality indicators and put forward a 
protocol for migration to unbundled loops to ensure that the incumbent and new entrants could work 
together.  This included setting precise time limits, forcing FT to disclose the plans of its telephony 
                                                 
190   Iliad has increasingly relied full unbundling to recover revenue generated by telephony. A significant portion of Iliad’s 
profit is due to fixed-to-mobile calls, because of high interconnection rates. These interconnection rates used to be very 
high in Europe, but after the intervention of regulators they fell from 40 to 7 cents. FT’s prices on these services have 
been decreasing at the same time, whereas the prices set by the alternative ISP have stayed at a very high level.  The 
regulator expected that the fall in wholesale prices would lead to a similar decrease in retail prices due to competition, 
but this has not happened.  Iliad’s business model could not be replicated in countries without such an interconnection 
regime. 
191   Regulation 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, OJ L 336, 30/12/2000, 4. 
192   European Commission, Press Release nr IP/02/445, March 20, 2002.  
193   EU Telecommunications Regulatory Package – 9th Implementation Report – Annex 1, 2003. See figures 63 to 66.     Country overviews: France 
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exchanges (“centraux téléphoniques” in French), and setting the exact price of an hour of work on 
LLU.
194  This was aimed at preventing the incumbent from continuing the delaying tactics it was alleged 
to have undertaken in the past in order to gain an advantage in the DSL market.
195  
The regulatory focus on LLU, along with interconnection, has had a clear impact on the provision of 
broadband in France.  LLU represents 60% of broadband access bought on the wholesale market, and 
represents more than 90% of the growth in the first quarter of 2009.
196 For setting tariffs, in 2005 
ARCEP  launched  a  consultation  process  devoted  to  pricing  of  the  local-loop  and  published  a 
methodology  in  December  2005.  The  current  cost  accounting  method  was  chosen  to  evaluate  the 
investment in local loop assets. The total cost of unbundling is defined as the sum of the local loop costs 
(which  includes  a  capital  cost  and  an  operation  cost),  the  costs  of  services,  and  a  fraction  of  FT's 
common costs. FT is required to base its regulated prices on this total cost accounting method.  The 
figure below reports the downward evolution of France Telecom' prices agreed by ARCEP between 
2000 and 2009. 
LLU price on wholesale access French market (2000-2009) 
 
 
Most of the recent debates regarding the regulatory framework concern the implementation of fiber 
networks.  ARCEP  has  stated  that  France  Telecom’s  civil  engineering  infrastructure,  including  the 
underground infrastructure that hosts the local loop, is the critical element in the deployment of a new 
fiber local loop. This civil engineering infrastructure has been defined as an essential facility, and France 
Telecom is thereby required to provide access to it. ARCEP has also stated that it will seek to avoid 
duplication  of  installation  in  buildings,  but  without  eliminating  competition  at  the  service  level. 
                                                 
194   OECD Regulatory Reform in France: Regulatory Reform in the Telecommunications Sector (2003). 
195   On this issue, the misadventures of an early ISP, Mangousta, with FT should be mentioned. Mangousta was launched in 
1999 and was one of the first DSL providers in France. Even if FT was obligated to  deliver DSL access through resale or 
unbundling, it prevented the small company from entering some of their telephone exchanges, and even damaged the 
installations of their new competitor. This eventually led to the bankruptcy of Mangousta. The managers of this 
ephemeral ISP brought the case before the European Commission and as FT feared the imposition of a considerable fine, 
they chose to settle the case directly with the managers and paid them compensation that covered slightly more than their 
initial investment.  
196   ARCEP, "Tableau de bord des offres de gros du haut débit par DSL", June 2, 2009.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Operators  will  need  to  share  the  terminating  sections  of  their  fibre  optic  network.  Debate  over  the 
specific modalities for rolling out and sharing new fiber deployments are on-going. 
Broadband Plan 
In 2008, the Prime Minister F. Fillon created a new ministry dedicated to the digital economy. E. Besson 
was appointed as a minister of State "in charge of the development of digital economy." He was later 
replaced by N. Kosciusko-Morizet, who remains the current minister of State.  
In 2008, E. Besson presented the new broadband strategy for France “France Numérique 2012.” This 
plan aims, among numerous other goals, to provide universal access to broadband Internet throughout 
France before the end of 2010. To achieve this goal, the French government will contract at a local level 
with private operators to provide universal access for the 2 to 3% of citizens who do not have broadband 
access, with the specification that connectivity should be no less than 512 kbps and at a cost of no more 
than  EUR  35  per  month.  The  plan  also  provides  new  financial  and  administrative  tools  for  local 
governments' investment in network infrastructure. Since the initial release of the strategy, targets are 
being redefined towards higher speeds and an applications-based definition of targets in addition to 
pursuing fixed-mobile convergence.
197 
The initial plan within the “France Numérique 2012” strategy was to organize a call for tender for the 
supply of the universal broadband access by January 2010. The call for tender was intended to occur in 
the first quarter of 2009, but has been postponed due to the economic slow-down.  
Policy interventions and outcomes 
Government investment in infrastructure 
The government has never directly invested in infrastructure, whether for DSL or fiber technologies, but 
limited its role to setting the regulatory framework through the creation of an independent regulatory 
authority (ART, later ARCEP).. 
Investments in infrastructure have been made at the local level. Using the loans from the Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations (CDC), the financial arm of the French state, many local governments have 
developed broadband infrastructure in the areas without adequate broadband coverage in order to reduce 
the disparity between urban and urban broadband penetration rates.  
Public investments in services must conform with European guidelines and the scope of authorized 
public intervention depends on the level of service offered by private operators. In the "white zone", 
where no private operators provide broadband service, public intervention is a classical response to 
market failure. Local governments may subsidize the building of networks and may also directly provide 
broadband  access  according  to  Act  2004-575  on  Confidence  in  the  Digital  Economy.
198  Local 
government may be permitted to become minority investors in these projects and contract with private 
operators, either through a "public service delegation" or public-private partnerships. For example, the 
governments of Oise, Pyrénées Atlantique, Loiret, and Alsace have established public network projects 
                                                 
197 http://www.arcep.fr/fileadmin/reprise/communiques/communiques/2009/comnq-nkm-fibre-100709.pdf. 
198   This act improves the prevention and enforcement system on the Internet.     Country overviews: France 
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by leasing unbundled local loops and installing DSLAM.
199  85 of the 102 projects launched so far cover 
each more than 60.000 inhabitants.200  
The relevance of public intervention in the "grey zone" has been widely discussed. The "grey zone" 
refers to local DSL markets where the incumbent operator remains the only provider of broadband 
access. Local government can argue that the competition is too low, and build an alternative network to 
promote an effective competition in the market. However, these public  subsidies have to fulfill the 
European rules regarding public subsidies. In 2007, under the Community State Aid rules, the European 
Commission approved the funding by Sicoval (an association of municipalities on the south-east side of 
Toulouse) of a very high-speed telecommunications network exclusively serving businesses and public 
organizations on its territory.  
Investments in the “grey zone” yield litigation risk.  For example, the municipality of Paris wanted to 
offer  free  wireless  network  "Paris  Wi-Fi",  so  it  organized  a  call  for  tender  for  the  supply  of  the 
infrastructure and later proceeded with the investment.  France Telecom, after it had not been selected in 
a call for tender, brought an action against the municipality in an administrative French court in March 
2007(on the basis of the L 1425-1 article of "Code General des Collectivités territoriales"
201). Thus far, 
France Telecom has not been successful in its litigation and “Paris Wi-Fi” continues to operate. 
Despite these difficulties, new loans from the CDC will be made available through the plan "France 
Numérique 2012" and local governments may be permitted to become minority investors.  
Public  investment  in  broadband  access  infrastructure  will  likely  increase  in  the  future  through  the 
deployment of fiber networks.  Projects estimated to cost EUR 25 to 40 billion are expected to be 
partially financed with public funding 2010.
202  This plan for publicly-backed financing, announced by 
President Sarkozy in 2009, aims to rebuild and redesign French industry with a clear focus on high-tech 
industry.  The amount has not been set, but the bond could be the range of EUR 80 to 100 billion.  
Competition policy 
The  French  competition  law  follows  common  European  standards  concerning  the  abuse  of  market 
power,  collusion,  and  mergers.  France’s  competition  policy  is  in  line  with  European  Commission's 
approach  of  decentralized  ex  post  enforcement  through  national  institutions.    In  2008,  national 
regulatory institutions were restructured with most of the responsibilities concerning the competition law 
given  to  Autorité  de  la  Concurrence.  This  new  authority  has  the  capacity  to  proceed  with  its  own 
investigations and make decisions in all the fields of the competition law. The Ministry of the Economy 
remains responsible for consolidations that fall below a certain threshold. 
The decision by French authorities to address the anticompetitive practices of FT regarding broadband 
access had a profound impact on broadband markets in France. They penalized the incumbent operator 
for practices aimed at pre-empting the emerging DSL market between 2001 and 2002 and benefiting its 
Wanadoo subsidiary.  Their practices included predatory prices,
203 discriminatory conditions in access to 
                                                 
199 OECD, “Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies: The Development of Broadband 
Access in Rural and Remote Areas,” Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Committee for Information, 
Computer and Communications Policy (Geneva, Switzerland) May 10, 2004, 23. 
200 French Government, « Plan de développement de l’économie numérique, France Numérique 2012 », October 2008. 
201   Available online at : http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070633& 
idArticle=LEGIARTI000006389450&dateTexte=20080222 
202   Les Echos, September 11, 2009. 
203   Decision by the EU Commission of 16 July 2003, imposing a €10M fine on FT.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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the  local  loop,
204  and  smear  campaigns
205  against  the  alternative  operator.  The  incumbent  was  also 
accused  of  impeding  effective  competition  in  broadband  markets  in  overseas  departments  through 
margin squeeze. In bringing its case against FT, the French competition authority argued that the low 
penetration of broadband access was a direct consequence of the practice. 
The competitive analysis of mergers has been especially relevant in two recent cases: SFR-Télé 2
206 and 
SFR-Neuf.
207 Interestingly, the planned operations raised concerns about the possible dominant position 
of the new entity not in DSL markets but in pay-TV markets. The two operations were approved in the 
light  of  commitments  by  SFR  and  Vivendi  to  ensure  access  to  Vivendi  TV  content  by  other  DSL 
operators. 
Spectrum policy 
The  1996  Telecommunications  Act  set  up  the  Agence  Nationale  des  Fréquences  (ANFR),  a  body 
responsible for planning, monitoring, and coordinating spectrum usage in France.  The ARCEP assumes 
the authority for determining rates for spectrum license fees and administrative taxes.  France has used 
comparative selection procedures (commonly referred to as a “beauty contest”) to allocate spectrum 
licenses for the telecommunication sector, including 3G licenses. Initially four licenses were offered for 
tender at the price of EUR 4.95 billion. This was perceived as too high by a number of operators, and 
only two licenses were awarded in June 2001, to FT and SFR. In December 2001, the government 
decided to change the license price in order to allocate the remaining 2 licenses, with the modifications 
also applicable to the two existing license holders. The price was reduced to EUR 619 million with an 
additional tax of 1% on revenue from 3G activities.
208  Only Bouygues Telecom applied for a license 
and was awarded a concession in September 2002.
209 
In July 2006, ARCEP decided to allocate a fourth 3G license, and Iliad indicated that it was interested in 
acquiring it.  After considerable negotiation over the financial details, Iliad declined ARCEP’s offer. In 
January 2009, the French government decided to split the blocks of frequency on offer into three lots of 
5MHz, with one reserved for a new entrant with a price of EUR 206 million.  Illiad is officially a 
candidate since August 2009. The tender is still pending. 
The national plan, “France Numérique 2012,” proposes the reallocation the 790-862MHz band, which 
was used previously for analog TV, to fixed and mobile broadband.  This part of the “digital dividend” 
will be used in coordination with the other European countries.
                                                 
204   Decision 05-D-59 (Conseil de la concurrence 7 November 2005), imposing a €80M fine on FT. 
205   Decision 07-D-33 (Conseil de la concurrence 15 October 2007), imposing a €45M fine on FT. 
206   http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4504_20070718_20600_en.pdf 
207   http://www.dgccrf.bercy.gouv.fr/boccrf/2008/08_04bis/c2007_181_sfr_9cegetel.pdf 
208 OECD Regulatory Reform in France: Regulatory Reform in the Telecommunications Sector (2003). 
209 GlobalComms, DT Company Overview (updated March 2009).     Country overviews: Japan 
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C. Japan 
Introduction 
Japan  is  often  cited  as  a  global  leader  in  broadband  technology,  speed,  and  price.  The  Japanese 
government has maintained and adapted an aggressive broadband policy since the late 1990s, which has 
included low-interest loans and tax deductions for infrastructure build-out. Both NTT, The formerly 
government-run  monopoly,  and  MIC,  the  regulatory  agency,  were  reorganized  in  1999  in  order  to 
facilitate removal of legacy technology-specific regulations and to add safeguards to ensure competition. 
Competition in DSL was strongly influenced by entry of Softbank BB into the Japanese market, using 
unbundled access to NTT's network.  High demand and a growing market attracted cable and power 
companies, which spurred fiber deployment.  Today, regulators have embraced a user-centric policy 
framework  that  focuses  on  ubiquitous  access  and  a  “layers-based”  regulatory  framework.  The 
government  aims  to  encourage  facilities-based  competition  with  access  to  poles  and  rights-of-way. 
WiMax is not widely deployed, but 3G wireless penetration is high, with providers evolving to 4G. 
 KDDI is expanding Wi-Fi integration as an aspect of fixed-mobile convergence. 
Market highlights  
Overall, 67.6% of households in Japan have broadband access.
210 
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210   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 1e, from EC Community Survey, as of 2007. 
211   Does not include 3G Wireless. Since subscriptions are shared within a household, this number will never be 100. 
212   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 1d, data supplied by Japanese Government, as of 2008.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Broadband development to date 
Cable was the leading source of broadband access early in Japan, but it was eclipsed by the rapid growth 
of DSL.  DSL took off after the establishment of local loop unbundling, interconnection, and “dark 
fiber” backbone leasing rules for dominant firms were established in 2000 and 2001.  New entrants like 
Softbank took advantage of these rules to roll out DSL that was both faster and cheaper than NTT’s 
service.    NTT’s  service  has  to  date  focused  on  more  expensive  ISDN  services.    As  DSL  proved 
successful, others entered the market and NTT followed suit, triggering a period of aggressive price-
slashing and deployment.
213   
By this time, NTT’s fiber network had begun to reach most urban households, and the company planned 
to charge a premium for a proprietary non-IP service.  However, it quickly faced facilities-based IP 
competition  from  utility  company  subsidiaries  like  K-Opticom  and  TEPCO.  This  pushed  NTT  to 
abandon  their  proprietary  plans  and  compete  on  open  Internet  service.
214  NTT’s  fiber-to-the-home 
facilities are bound by unbundling and interconnection rules due to their status as a dominant wireline 
carrier, and thus NTT is also subject to service-based competition from firms like Softbank.   






























                                                 
213   Yasu Taniwaki, Broadband Competition Policy to Address the Transition to IP-Based Networks: Experiences and 
Challenges in Japan, Tokyo, Japan: International Foundation for Information Technology, October 2006. 
214   Takanori Ida, Broadband Economics: Lessons from Japan, Routledge, 2009.     Country overviews: Japan 
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The  next  phase  of  service  development  likely  involves  packaging  of  fiber/DSL  and  3.5/4G  mobile 
wireless to provide ubiquitous service – ultra high-speed from the home and increasingly high speed 
mobile.  These partnerships will likely take the form of NTT East/West with NTT DoCoMo, Softbank 
BB with SoftBank mobile, and the utility subsidiaries with KDDI/au. 
Market share and key players 
NTT’s legacy as a formally state-owned monopoly continues to be reflected in its market share, which 
hovers  above  50%  in  the  wireline  access  business.    Softbank  is  the  largest  competitor,  with 
approximately  14%  of  the  market  made  up  primarily  of  DSL  subscriptions  (although  fiber 
subscribership continues to grow), followed by eAccess (DSL).  The remaining competitors include a 
diversity of DSL and fiber competitors that take advantage of the interconnection and unbundling of 
NTT’s network, as well as the emergent facilities-based fiber competitors.
215 
In the wireless market, NTT likewise commands about 50% market share through its wireless arm, 
DoCoMo.  However, the remainder of the market is less fragmented, with au (KDDI) commanding 
nearly  30%  of  the  market  and  Softbank  Mobile  capturing  most  of  the remainder.
216  However,  new 
entrant eMobile (owned by eAccess) has aggressively deployed its W-CDMA network, and recently 
became the first to roll out HSPA+ services that offer a theoretical maximum of 21Mbps.
217 All four 
competitors are on track to begin 4G LTE service in 2010 or 2011, with DoCoMo and Softbank likely to 
skip  HSPA+  and  go  straight  to  LTE.
218    Recent  rules  have  facilitated  the  entry  of  Mobile  Virtual 
Network  Operators.    Several  companies  have  WiMax  deployments  planned  or  in  trial,  but  these 
currently have relatively small market share. 
Regulatory framework 
Wireline broadband access falls under Japan’s Telecommunications Business Law, regardless of the 
technology in question.  This regulatory approach reflects a “layers” oriented approach that distinguishes 
between physical (access), service, platform, and content. Jurisdiction belongs to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (MIC), which is exploring how to further transition the underlying legal 
structures to an explicitly layers-based approach. The result of this framework is that competition, speed, 
availability,  and  discrimination  are  examined  within  each  layer,  but  integration  between  services  in 
different  layers  is  not  prohibited.    The  MIC  sees  this  as  a  deregulatory  approach  that  nevertheless 
maintains market and social safeguards. 
Wireless services fall under a separate regulatory regime that includes interconnection stipulations and 
equal treatment of operators, depending on market share.  However, the MIC seems to be interested in 
unifying  its  regimes  using  the  layered  approach.
219    This  might  help  rationalize  assessment  of  the 
increasingly vertically integrated wireline and wireless markets.  These vertically integrated offerings 
are not considered substitutable, but instead components of new “Fixed Mobile Convergence” services 
that introduce new competitive considerations. 
                                                 
215   GlobalComms Database, updated March 2009. 
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Political economy 
The history of the telecommunications political economy in Japan is the history of the battle between the 
government  and  NTT.    After  NTT  was  privatized  in  1985,  the  company  began  to  wrestle  with  its 
regulator, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT).  MPT argued for the breakup of NTT 
in 1990 and 1996, and, although it never succeeded, it did manage to force NTT to be transformed into a 
holding company and to give certain concessions.   MPT was reorganized into the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (MIC) in 1999.  At the same time, the Cabinet Office charged with IT 
promotion was strengthened and began to push back against NTT as well.  One of the key issues was 
interconnection, since the government sets the price and terms of use for competitors that enter the 
market and use NTT lines.  However, these measures did not address the needs of new competitors like 
eAccess that sought to collocate their equipment within NTT’s facilities.  The government took further 
steps to encourage greater competition as Japan lost its global lead in connectivity. In 2000, the new 
“Basic IT Law” gave the government clear jurisdiction and a mandate.  In the same year, the Fair Trade 
Commission issued a warning to NTT and the MIC compelled NTT to define its terms of collocation, 
and the ministry required NTT to provide access to its dark fiber and local loop.  Japan has evolved from 
a relatively static but weak “managed regulation” approach to a “strategically liberalized” structure in 




As Japan took major steps to empower its regulatory agencies and to establish new competition rules, 
the Cabinet Office and the MIC cooperated on broadband strategy.  In November 2000, the government 
issued its “Basic IT Strategy” that described Japan as “backwards” with respect to IT, and proposed a 
high-level strategy.
221  In January 2001, in order to enable the rapid and efficient implementation of its 
strategy, the Japanese government set up the IT Strategy Headquarters.  The headquarters is led by the 
Prime Minister and consists of all Cabinet members plus a number of industry experts.  Soon after its 
inception, the  IT Strategic headquarters  announced the  “e-Japan Strategy,”
222 a policy program that 
focused on broadband infrastructure and also set specific penetration and price targets.  In 2003, the e-
Japan Strategy II was adopted, which noted that many of the infrastructure targets of the initial e-Japan 
Strategy had been met, and turned to usage and uptake.
223 It promoted the use of ICTs in areas such as 
medical care, food, living, small business financing, employment, and government services.  In 2004, 
the MIC launched a new “u-Japan strategy.”
224  That strategy is based on the vision that networks should 
be  ubiquitous  –  available  anytime,  anywhere,  to  anyone.    These  goals  were  echoed  in  the 
complementary “New IT Reform Strategy” released by the IT Strategy Headquarters in 2006.
225  Each 
of these initiatives began with high-level targets, was backed up by a strong executive and regulatory 
bureaucracy, and was reinforced in a series of more granular policy packages.
226 
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Policy interventions and outcomes 
Government investment in infrastructure 
The Japanese government has offered loans and tax deductions designed to incentivize broadband build-
out since the mid 1990s, but its efforts dramatically accelerated in 2000 as the Basic IT Law went into 
effect and the national strategies began.  The policies introduced over the next several years included a 
series of tax incentives, including a highly accelerated depreciation schedule for capital investments in 
telecommunications.  These incentives were described at a 2007 ITIF event, along with lowered fixed 
asset taxes for designated network equipment.
227  The government-owned Bank of Japan also began to 
guarantee loans for network infrastructure, which allowed relevant companies to borrow money more 
cheaply.
228 In order to support underserved areas and stimulate infrastructure development, a grant-in-
aid  system  for  promoting  local  telecommunication  infrastructure  was  created  in  2006,  which  has 
disbursed funds every year to date since its inception. The 2008 “Strategy on the Digital Divide” built on 
these efforts, and also sought to eliminate “zero broadband” areas.  As part of its economic recovery 
efforts, Japan has committed 185 billion Yen (1.9 billion USD) to, “…eliminating the digital divide, 
promoting the development of wireless broadband and fostering digital terrestrial broadcasting.”
229 
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Skill building, education, and demand programs 
Several of the policy packages that were part of Japan’s national broadband strategies have included 
skills and demand programs.  For instance, the u-Japan strategy described one of its goals as, “By 2010, 
80% of the population to appreciate the role of ICT in solving social problems.”  It then spelled out 
specific  policy  interventions  to  promote  the  use  of  information  technology  in  health  care,  public 
security,  education,  and  the  environment.
230    The  government  also  aggressively  pushed  its  services 
online, resulting in a high percentage of internet-based citizen-to-government transactions. 
Popular services from the private sector have also stimulated broadband demand.  For example, IP-based 
digital video is offered by most major providers, including Softbank’s DSL video service.  VoIP rapidly 
gained popularity and helped motivate adoption.  Likewise, content from the entertainment and gaming 
industries has motivated consumers to subscribe to higher tiers of broadband service. 
Competition policy 
The government generally views competition in a layered model, and tends to work more aggressively 
to  preserve  competition  at  the  physical  layer.  After  the  long  battle  to  break  up  NTT  resulted  in  a 
compromise  that  left  the  company  intact,  the  government  focused  heavily  on  these  service-based 
competition measures.  This motivated copper unbundling, dark fiber open access, and the 2009 rules 
intended  to  ensure  unbundling  of  Next  Generation  Networks  (NGNs).    The  government  sees  no 
evidence that these policies have diminished NTT’s incentives to invest in infrastructure.
231 
The government has not fundamentally restricted horizontal or vertical integration of services.  As the 
Fixed Mobile Convergence trend continues, mobile companies are likely to work closely with wireline 
providers.  Likewise, providers might increasingly integrate vertically.  Potential market abuses are dealt 
with through open access to the physical layer as well as a strong ex-post dispute resolution system.  
Much of this is outlined in the “New Competition Promotion Program 2010.”
232 
The Telecommunications Business Dispute Settlement Commission is charged with realizing fair and 
effective competition in the telecommunications business sector and the quick and efficient settlement of 
disputes  based  on  the  Telecommunications  Business  Law.  The  Commission  conducts  mediation  or 
arbitration pursuant to an application by a telecommunications carrier.  It deliberates and reports to the 
Minister when there is an enquiry concerning an order for consultation or an award to the Commission. 




The Japanese government has articulated clear principles of neutrality that will guide its policy making 
process and evaluation of network providers, including: 
•  Free access to the content and application layer;  
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•  Use of networks at an affordable price;  
•  Free connection with any terminal that meets technical standards.
234 
These  principles  drive  specific  interventions  that  seek  to  preserve  open  access  between  layers,  and 
especially access to the lower telecommunications layer.  The MIC delivered a “Report on Network 
Neutrality” in September of 2007, which outlines a framework to maintain “fairness in network cost 
sharing,” and “fairness in network use.”
  235  It acknowledged that it might be the case that content-
neutral traffic shaping could address congestion issues, but the MIC sought further comment on “packet 
shaping  guidelines.”    Overall,  the  report  notes  that  in  the  context  of  unbundling  and  open  access 
provisions, some of the discrimination concerns were mitigated by effective facilities-based or service-
based competition.  
Spectrum policy 
Japan has relied heavily on a licensed model of spectrum use, and has used comparative hearings as the 
means of allocation.  One exception to the licensed model has been Wi-Fi, but even in this case the 
government originally intended to charge fees for operation and to require firms to obtain a license, but   
later  backed  down.    On  the  mobile  side,  the  government  typically  seeks  proposals  from  interested 
providers and chooses the winners, who are then required to pay standard fees.  This approach has the 
advantage of making spectrum available relatively quickly, but the well-known disadvantage of working 
outside of the dynamic market.  Japan has been criticized for continued reliance on “beauty contests,” 
and  continues  to  face  pressure  to  adopt  an  auction-based  model.
236    The  4G  LTE  licenses  were 
nevertheless allocated to four providers, as determined by the government.
237  The new regime has 
promised  to  consider  auctions,  “as  appropriate.”
238  Japanese  broadcasters  have  been  resistant  to 
unlicensed operation in TV “white spaces,” and the conversation has not progressed.  The MIC conducts 
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D. South Korea 
Introduction 
Due to a regulatory regime based on competition, privatization, and aggressive government programs 
focused  on  boosting  demand,  South  Korea  has  become  a  world  leader  in  broadband  by  several 
measures.
240  After the privatization of the state-run telecommunications provider (Korea Telecom, or 
KT) and the encouragement of new entrants into the broadband market in the late 1990s, DSL and cable 
broadband  services  expanded  rapidly.      KT  has  since  regained  its  majority  market  share  in  fixed 
broadband, and both the fixed and mobile markets have consolidated in recent  years.  Nonetheless, 
South  Korea  maintains  a  competitive  mobile  broadband  market,  with  three  companies  offering  3G 
service  across  the  country.      The  government  has  provided  substantial  loans  to  support  network 
deployment, funded public information technology training programs, and encouraged broadband access 
through  a  building  certification  program.    The  South  Korean  government  is  now  promoting  the 
Broadband Convergence Network and the IT839 programs, both of which envision the convergence of 
wireline, wireless, and RFID networks to allow ubiquitous connectivity through a panoply of mobile and 
fixed devices.    
Market highlights  
Overall, 94.1% of households in South Korea have broadband access.
241 
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Broadband development to date 
South  Korea  began  its  broadband  rollout  in  the  late  1990s  with  the  rapid  expansion  of  both  cable 
broadband access and DSL using copper infrastructure.  Cable broadband access grew with the entry of 
Thrunet into the broadband market.  Thrunet used cable plant leased from Kepco, the government-
owned power company that owned cable facilities but did not provide broadband.
244  Hanaro Telecom 
entered the market in 1997 and, like other new entrants, found that competing against incumbent KT in 
the data sector was more profitable than competing in the wireline telephone market.  Hanaro sparked a 
price war by offering broadband DSL as a free addition to wireline telephone service.
245  In response, 
KT abandoned its ISDN plans and invested in DSL.   By 2002, 70 out of 100 South Korean households 
had  broadband  subscriptions.
246    By  that  time,  KT  had  gained  a  majority  share  in  the  broadband 
market
247 due to its geographic reach and competitive pricing.
248  It was only then that the South Korea 
regulator mandated unbundling of local loop network elements.
249  
Over  80  %  of  Koreans  live  in  dense,  urban  housing,  an  arrangement  that  has  produced  significant 
economies of scale for the expansion of broadband service.
250  Moreover, because landlords, rather than 
incumbent KT, own local loop facilities, competitive carriers are able to negotiate with multi-dwelling 
unit  owners  rather  than  KT.
251   Today,  South  Korea  is  moving  toward  a  fiber-to-the-home  (FTTH) 
model.  Although development has been slowed by high costs, ADSL and VDSL subscriptions continue 
to decline as Ethernet connections to fiber nodes grow in popularity
 .
252  
By the end of 2007, fiber connections constituted one-third of all South Korean Internet connections.
253  
The South Korean government is now promoting the Broadband Convergence Network and the IT839 
program, both of which envision the convergence of wireline, wireless, and RFID networks to allow 
ubiquitous connectivity through a panoply of mobile and fixed devices.
254  The combined plan calls for a 
network aimed to support a list of eight services, three infrastructures, and nine growth engines.  By 
2013, the program expects speeds of both fixed and wireless broadband to be up to 10 times faster than 
at the beginning of 2009.
255 
By  mid-2005,  the  rollout  of  W-CDMA  mobile  networks  had  stalled  in  South  Korea.  Following 
regulatory intervention, South Korea’s two largest mobile providers accelerated the deployment of W-
CDMA, and by March 2007, SK Telecom offered HSDPA service nationwide, along with competitor 
KTF Corp.   
By  March  2008,  three  companies  were  offering  3G  wireless  service  in  South  Korea,  two  using  a 
combination of 1xEV-DO and W-CDMA technologies and one with a more recently deployed EV-DO 
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Rev A network.
256  As of May 2009, KTF offered 5.76 Mbps service in major South Korean cities.
257  In 
2008, the Korean Communications Commission announced plans to allocate various blocks of 700MHz, 
800MHz,  and  900MHz  spectrum  from  SK  Telecom  to  smaller  operators.
258    Since  then,  wireless 
penetration in South Korea has reached 94 percent.
259  South Korea is the only country in which 100% 
of mobile phones subscriptions are 3G. 
The South Korean government licensed spectrum for WiMax in the 2.3 GHz band in 2005.  In April of 
that  year,  Hanaro  Telecom  returned  its  license  in  light  of  doubts  raised  by  investors  regarding  the 
business case for WiMax technology.
260  KT Corp launched WiMax service in South Korea,  called 
WiBro (wireless broadband), in 2006.
261 Following intensive marketing by  KT in 2007, the service 
gained 10,000 subscribers per month in 2008 and, according to one report, is expected to serve 2.5 
million people by 2011.  Today, two providers, KT and SKT, provide mobile WiMax service in South 
Korea.
262  In late 2008, the KCC endorsed a voice-over-WiMax standard that may speed deployment of 
voice service over WiMax in 2009.    
Market share and key players 
Despite losing customers to new entrants such as Hanaro Telecom in the late 1990s, the former state-run 
monopolist  KT  rebounded;  as  of  2005,  KT  enjoyed  approximately  a  52  percent  share  in  the  fixed 
broadband  market  of  130  ISPs.
263      However,  despite  the  plethora  of  providers,  as  of  2006,  three 
companies controlled 85 percent of the market.
264  By 2007, fiber, DSL, and cable service each held 
roughly one-third of the fixed broadband market, with cable service including leased access over power 
lines.
265  
The wireline and wireless broadband markets have experienced some consolidation in recent years.  For 
example, in February  2008, South Korea’s largest mobile provider, SK Telecom, purchased Hanaro 
Telecom, which held a 23 percent fixed broadband market share as of 2005.
266  KT merged with second-
largest mobile provider KTF in 2009, to form KT.  
Competition in the South Korean wireless market is intense.  SK Telecom controls approximately 50 
percent of the market and holds one of three 3G spectrum licenses.  Rival KTF Corp holds a 3G license 
and controls approximately 31 percent of the market.  LG Telecom, the smallest 3G license-holder, 
controls approximately 18 percent of the market, and although its relatively late network deployment has 
put it at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis KTF Corp and SK Telecom, its exclusive use of EV-DO 
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Rev A—which has a lower deployment cost than the W-CDMA networks utilized by its competitors— 
may allow LG Telecom to pass savings to customers.
267   
In 2008, wireless network costs grew and subscriber growth slowed.  In response, South Korean wireless 
operators have begun to offer bundled services in conjunction with fixed line partner companies.
268  In 
April 2009, Korean regulators ordered KTF to open its mobile data network to third party services and 
providers as a term of KTF’s merger with KT.  SK Telecom must also open its mobile data network per 
government fiat.
269    
 Regulatory framework 
In March 1992, the Korea Communications Commission was established under the Framework Act on 
Telecommunications,  which  was  originally  enacted  in  December  1983.    The  creation  of  the  KCC 
coincided with the initiation of a competition policy that emphasized deregulation and privatization in 
South Korean telecommunications markets.
270  In 2008, the KCC absorbed the Korean Broadcasting 
Commission and the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) in an effort to vest regulatory 
authority  for  various  communications  media  in  a  single  body.
271    The  KCC  oversees  competition, 
consumer protection, and arbitration of unfair practices in the regulated industries.
272 
South Korea categorizes service providers as facilities-based providers, resale providers, or value-added 
service (VAS) providers.
273  These classifications govern the type of services providers may offer and 
other legal obligations, such as contribution to the universal services fund.  In 2009, the KCC announced 
that it would begin working on a new regulatory framework to take account of IP-based services.
274   
In South Korea, mobile network operators must hold spectrum licenses, and the KCC is expected to 
announce new methods of spectrum allocation by the end of 2009.  Few regulatory barriers, however, 
bar  entrance  into  the  fixed  broadband  market.
275    As  of  2002,  the  Korean  government  mandated 
unbundling of local loop facilities, and between 2008 and 2009, required the two largest mobile data 
network operators to open their networks to third party services and providers.
276  
 Political economy 
The first major step in the privatization and deregulation of South Korean telecommunications markets 
took place between 1987 to 2002 with the privatization of KTA, the state-owned incumbent wireline 
provider.
277  The government, with strong support from elected officials, gradually divested itself of 
KTA, later renamed KT, and concluded a bargaining agreement with KTA’s labor union to limit foreign 
ownership.
278    Mid-1990s  legislation  gave  the  MIC  strong  regulatory  authority,  and  the  president 
appointed IT experts to serve as MIC ministers.
279  
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Despite its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, the KCC has proven an aggressive regulator.  
Prior to 2007, Korean regulators resisted SK Telecom’s and KT’s desire to offer bundled services by 
citing  the  providers’  dominant  market  positions  in  the  mobile  and  wireline  markets,  respectively.  
Though the regulatory bodies clashed on this issue, the ban was dropped in April 2007. In an effort to 
accelerate  the  deployment  of  converged  services,  further  rate  deregulation  of  bundled  services 
followed.
280   The  KCC  has  issued  numerous  fines  for  price  fixing  in  the  leased  line,  landline,  and 
broadband sectors and for uncompetitive trade practices.  In 2008, the KCC temporarily banned KT 
from new broadband signups in response to that company’s illegal sharing of customer information with 
telemarketers.    The  Korean  government  limits  foreign  direct  ownership  of  telecommunications 
companies to 49 percent.   
Broadband strategy 
In  1987,  South  Korea  passed  the  Framework  Act  on  Information  Promotion  in  support  of  the 
development of information technology.
281  This legislation established the National Information Society 
Agency (NIA) to oversee network construction.    
Since the early 1990s, South Korea’s broadband deployment strategy has focused on the cultivation of a 
“knowledge-based  society.”
282    In  1993,  the  NIA  launched  the  plan  for  the  Korea  Information 
Infrastructure (KII), which ran from 1995 to 2005.
283  In 1995, South Korea enacted legislation to drive 
the KII comprehensive plan for a national broadband backbone.
284  After KII, South Korea implemented 
a series of 5-year programs to invest government funds in broadband deployment.  The country also 
provided network build-out incentives for providers and used public education projects targeting specific 
demographics, including military personnel, farmers, and housewives, to bolster broadband demand and 
use.
285  In addition, the government has provided tax breaks to businesses that invest in broadband 
communications systems.
286  
More recent government programs, including IT839 and the Broadband Convergence Network, promote 
network convergence and investment in emerging technologies by Korean companies that may export 
technology overseas.
287 Through these programs, the Korean government has provided over $70 billion 
in loans to service providers.
288   Korea also required KT, as  a term of its privatization, to provide 
broadband service of at least 1 Mbps to all homes and villages.  The “Digital Divide Closing Plan” 
provided loans of $926 million between 2001 and 2005 to offset the cost of connecting all 144 telecom 
service districts to the national broadband backbone.
289  
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Policy interventions and outcomes 
Government investment in infrastructure 
As  noted  in  the  previous  section,  South  Korea  has  provided  numerous  loans  to  broadband  service 
providers in support of the deployment of broadband networks.   These include: an initial $77 million in 
preferred loans to facilities-based providers in 1999, an additional $77 million in loans for non-urban 
areas in 2000,
290 $70 billion in loans through the IT839 and Broadband Convergence Network programs, 
(an investment that recipients pledged to match), and $926 million for rural broadband to KT as a 
condition of its privatization.   In 1997, the government began the Cyber Building Certificate system, 
under which residential and commercial buildings are certified as providing specified tiers of broadband 
access  speeds.
291  This  program  has  motivated  builders  to  invest  in  broadband,  as  many  Koreans 
apparently want to live in buildings with high-speed broadband capacity.
292  
Skill building, education, and demand programs 
South  Korea  has  long  sought  to  boost  demand  in  the  information  technology  sector  via  various 
government-supported educational programs, such as the PC for Everyone program in 1996, a computer 
literacy program in 1998, and Cyber Korea 21, a program focused on digital literacy, in 1999.
293 South 
Korea’s Ten Million Internet Education project sought to expose 10 million people to various Internet 
programs in 2000; that year, 3.4 million people learned basic Internet skills.
294  The government has also 
deployed  educational  programs  targeted  at  specific  demographic  groups,  such  as  the  One  Million 
Housewife Digital Literacy Education Project,
295 and provided Internet training subsidies targeting 2 
million people in 2002.
296  South Korea has also funded and constructed thousands of free public access 
sites and provided personal computers in every school in the country. 
Competition policy 
Competition policy has governed South Korean telecommunications regulatory approaches from the late 
1980s  especially  in  the  wake  of  the  privatization  of  KTA  (later  renamed  KT).    In  1997,  the  MIC 
instituted  procedures  for  selecting  a  competitor  to  challenge  KT,  which  Hanaro  Telecom  won.
297  
Competition in the broadband market exploded in the late 1990s with the entrance of Hanaro and cable 
provider Thrunet, but re-regulation following KT’s resurgence shows that the government has kept a 
close  eye  on  market  competition.
298    The  government  identified  KT’s  dominance  as  a  barrier  to 
competition  and,  since  2004,  has  subjected  the  company  to  stricter  regulations  relative  to  its 
competitors.
299  
South Korea did not mandate the unbundling of local loop network elements until 2002, well after DSL 
and cable broadband offerings had gained significant ground.
300  The relatively late unbundling mandate 
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partly reflects the strong platform-based competition that characterized the South Korean market in the 
early years of broadband development. The absence of unbundling in Korean broadband development 
should not, however, be overstated, given that initial entry by Thrunet depended on infrastructure leased 
from Kepco, the government-owned cable company, which was required to lease access to its cable 
facilities.
301    South  Korea  has  also  mandated  open  access  conditions  on  cable  providers
302  and  the 
opening of South Korea’s two largest mobile data networks.
303  
Network non-discrimination 
South Korea has no strict network non-discrimination rules but has mandated open access and line-
sharing, which may have obviated the need for a more rigorous net-neutrality regime.
304  Despite these 
policies, however, South Korea has not been free from non-discrimination controversy in recent years.  
In  2006,  for  example,  several  network  operators  slowed  or  blocked  Hanaro  Telecom’s  new  IPTV 
service,  claiming  it  consumed  excessive  bandwidth.    The  KCC  forced  the  affected  companies  to 
negotiate but made no lasting policy declaration.
305  
Spectrum policy 
In 2006, the Korea Radio Promotion Agency (KORPA) was established to manage South Korean radio 
spectrum.
306  Wireless operators require a spectrum license from the KCC to offer wireless service, 
though only three mobile network operators hold licenses, which permit both 2G and 3G services.  3G 
licenses were allocated by auction in 2001.  The two winners, SK Telecom and KTF Telecom, were 
allocated  the  B-band  at  1940  MHz  to  1960  MHz  and  the  C-band  at  1960  MHz-1980  MHz, 
respectively.
307  LG Telecom, which failed to win a license at auction, was later awarded the A-band at 
1920 MHz-1940 MHz.
308  Spectrum licenses  run  for 10  years, after  which providers can apply  for 
renewal.  The MIC has revoked operators’ spectrum concessions for failing to launch services and has 
demanded payments from operators to reserve unused frequencies.
309  
Other spectrum allocations include the following: KTF holds spectrum in the 1700 MHz band, which it 
uses for 2.5G CDMA services.  It also holds spectrum in the 2100 MHz band, which it uses for 3.5G W-
CDMA services.  LG Telecom holds 1700 MHz spectrum for 2.5G and 3.5G CDMA and EV-DO Rev A 
services.  SK Telecom  holds 800 MHz spectrum for 2.5G and 3G CDMA services and 2100  MHz 
spectrum for 3G and 3.5G W-CDMA services.
310 
Wireless regulation in South Korea is currently in flux.  South Korean regulators are now considering 
allowing  mobile  virtual  network  operators  (MVNOs)  to  offer  services  using  license-holders’ 
networks.
311    Moreover,  the  KCC  is  in  the  midst  of  an  800  MHz  redistribution  resulting  from  SK 
Telecom’s previous monopoly over the desirable 800 MHz band.  In 2011, SK Telecom will be forced to 
give 20 MHz of its 800MHz band spectrum to smaller operators, which will receive a total of 40 MHz.  
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KTF and LG Telecom may be forced to relinquish their 1.8Ghz licenses in exchange for 800 MHz 
spectrum concessions.
312 
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E. The Netherlands 
Introduction 
The Netherlands has been a global leader in broadband deployment, with longstanding high rates of 
penetration and near-ubiquitous wireline availability via both DSL and cable.  In line with EU rules, the 
Dutch government has unbundled both copper and fiber lines to the home.  Cable television was widely 
deployed at the advent of broadband, which led to a high rate of cable modem subscriptions.  Former 
government telco monopolist KPN was forced to migrate from ISDN to DSL in order to compete.   
Strong competition between the platforms persists today.  The copper infrastructure was largely built out 
by  KPN,  but  the  initial  cable  build-out  was  often  done  locally  and  later  purchased  by  cable  firms.  
Amsterdam has served as a prime example of municipal public-private partnerships in Fiber-to-the-
Home initiatives.  3G deployment and adoption has been slower than in similar countries.  An auction 
for additional 2.6GHz and 3.5GHz spectrum, which might serve as the platform for 4G evolution, was 
delayed until Q1 2010. 
Market highlights  
Overall, 73.8% of households in the Netherlands have broadband access.
313 
   Fiber / LAN  Cable  DSL  Other  Overall 
314 
Subscriptions per 100 people 








Price very high speed, 
OECD+GC
10



















Wi-Fi hotspots per 
100,000, Jwire
11
Price mid speed, 
OECD 2
Median download, 
speedtest.net 25 3G penetration, GC
8






9 Price low speed, OECD 8
Maximum speed, 
OECD 2
Penetration per 100, 
OECD
Rank Price metrics Rank Speed metrics Rank Penetration 
metrics
Note: Details in Part 3 













Price very high speed, 
OECD+GC
10



















Wi-Fi hotspots per 
100,000, Jwire
11
Price mid speed, 
OECD 2
Median download, 
speedtest.net 25 3G penetration, GC
8






9 Price low speed, OECD 8
Maximum speed, 
OECD 2
Penetration per 100, 
OECD
Rank Price metrics Rank Speed metrics Rank Penetration 
metrics
Note: Details in Part 3 
Source: OECD, GlobalComms, Jwire, Speedtest.net, 
Berkman Center analysis
 
                                                 
313   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 2a, from EU Community Survey, from 2007.  Some recent estimates near 90%. 
314   Does not include 3G Wireless.  Since subscriptions are shared within a household, this number will never be 100. 
315   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 1d, supplied by the Dutch government, as of 2008.     Country overviews: the Netherlands 
  207   
Broadband development to date 
The earliest Internet access in the Netherlands that surpassed dial-up speeds was ISDN, offered over 
KPN’s copper loop.  Following EC policy and regulatory initiatives, the government liberalized the 
sector over the period of 1996-1997. It removed restrictions on offering telecommunications services 
and introduced various network access requirements.   
ISDN service doubled from 1997 to 1998, reaching over 1.5 million lines (mostly business).
316 During 
this  same  period,  cable  providers  began  to  offer  broadband  Internet  service.    Cable  television 
infrastructure was already widespread, having been deployed by municipalities or public associations in 
many cases.  These groups built and owned the infrastructure, proving its viability and would often 
subsequently sell the facilities to larger companies years later.  Cable modem subscribership rapidly 
surpassed the user base of ISDN.  KPN was forced to respond by introducing ADSL, and spent the next 
several years catching up with the cable. 
Some copper local loop unbundling had been mandated by OPTA as early as 1997, but the regulator did 
not initially implement “full unbundling.”
317 By 2002, however, the Netherlands was in compliance with 
the European Commission unbundling regulations.  That same year, KPN was forced to offer bitstream 
access  as  well.    Since  then,  the  cost  of  unbundled  copper  services  has  dropped  dramatically.  DSL 
overtook cable in 2003, enjoying roughly a 60% share of subscribership since.
318  In the meantime, the 
many smaller cable operators were mostly consolidated in companies like Ziggo and UPC. 
Fiber has been slower to deploy in the Netherlands than in some other countries, in part due to the ability 
of the cable and copper infrastructure to be stretched to support higher speeds.   
As FTTH trials commenced in the mid 2000s, cable providers upgraded their networks to support higher 
speeds.  The major cable companies are now in the process of deploying Euro DOCSIS 3.0, which 
aspires to speeds of 60-120Mbps.   
KPN and its competitors have deployed ADSL2+ and are in the process of rolling out VDSL in an effort 
to remain competitive with lower-end fiber offerings.  KPN has executed its FTTH strategy in narrowly 
targeted  fashion,  but  ultimately  intends  to  abandon  its  copper  infrastructure.  The  company  recently 
formed a joint venture with fiber infrastructure owner Reggefiber.  Reggefiber subsequently gained a 
majority stake in the Amsterdam CityNet project, which has become a model case for public investment 
pushing the commercial viability of Fiber-to-the-Home.  To date, European Commission rules on state 
aid have made the government skittish to invest in fiber – in contrast with the municipally-aided cable 
build-out that helped fuel the initial broadband energy in the country.  However, this stance may be 
shifting. 
Wireless penetration is very high, but 3G build-out and adoption has lagged behind many European and 
Asian  countries.    3G  deployment  ramped  up  later  than  many  other  nations.    The  number  of  3G 
subscriptions as a percentage of all mobile subscriptions is less than half that of neighboring countries 
Belgium and Germany.
319 Intel-backed Worldmax is the only company that has deployed WiMax, and it 
serves only some areas of Amsterdam.  Its plans for future build-out are unclear. 
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Market share and key players 
DSL  enjoys  a  roughly  60%  market  share,  with  alternative  (non-KPN)  DSL  providers  capturing 
somewhere between 10% and 20% of the DSL market.
320  Tele2-Versatel is the leading unbundled DSL 
provider using ADSL2+ for speeds of up to 24 Mbps, including TV service.  In August of 2009, Tele2 
announced the rapid rollout of their VDSL2 network, which is designed to provide download speeds of 
up to 60Mbps and is intended to be available to a million homes in 2010. The next-closest competitor, 
BBned  has  an  established  ADSL/VDSL  network  capable  of  slightly  slower  speeds  and  has not  yet 
announced  plans  to  migrate  to  VDSL2.    BBned  embraces  an  “open  provisioning”  model  in  which 
partners can also provide Internet service over their network.  BBned’s owner, Telecom Italia, has stated 
its intention to sell the company but no buyers have yet surfaced. 
With about a 40% market share overall, cable providers have maintained a strong presence.  Over the 
years, the municipal networks and smaller commercial entities have been acquired by larger entities.  
Today two firms – Zesko and UPC – capture most of the cable market, with the few remaining regional 
operators maintaining a small share.  Zesko acquired several smaller providers in 2008 and, via its Ziggo 
brand, serves roughly double the number of subscribers as UPC. 
Fiber-to-the-Home  still  constitutes  a  small  portion  of  broadband  subscriptions  nationwide,  but  it  is 
showing some signs of more rapid growth.  KPN has stated its intentions to build out fiber nationwide 
and phase out its copper infrastructure.
321  This process has accelerated with KPN’s joint venture with 
leading fiber operator Reggefiber (KPN has a 41% stake in the company).  The Amsterdam CityNet 
project  is  an  example  of  a  fiber  public-private  partnership  that  won  buy-in  from  commercial 
providers.
322  In Phase 1 of the project, serving 43,000 homes, Draka Comteq won the rights to build out 
the “passive” physical layer of the network, and BBned won the rights to provide the “active” internet 
service.  In Phase 2, Reggefiber/KPN won the rights to provide these services to another 100,000 homes 
and also acquired a majority stake in the group that owns the fiber project.
323 
In the 3G wireless market, KPN commands about a 50% share, with the remainder split fairly evenly 
between T-Mobile and Vodafone.  Five providers narrowed to these three when, in 2005 KPN, acquired 
Telefort(O2) and in 2007 T-Mobile acquired Orange.  There is an active MVNO market, serving over 3 
million customers.   
In 2010, the government will auction six new licenses in the 2.6GHz and 3.5GHz range.  It is unclear at 
this stage whether any of these new frequencies are likely to be used for WiMax, or if instead they will 
all be used for UMTS (3G or LTE) service.
324 
Regulatory framework 
Wireline  regulation  in  the  Netherlands  is  primarily  done  via  the  OPTA  (Independent  Post  and 
Telecommunications  Authority),  with  help  from  competition  authority  NMa  and  some  additional 
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oversight from the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  Wireless is also regulated primarily by the OPTA, but 
the Agentschap Telecom does frequency allocations.   
In the 1990s, the government shifted from a regulated monopoly model to a liberalized approach that 
allowed open competition across sectors.  In 2004, a revised Telecommunications Act went into effect, 
which  (among  other  things)  brought  the  Netherlands  into  line  with  the  EU  Regulatory  Framework.  
European Commission law and regulation control a great deal of what the national regulatory agencies 
are permitted to do. 
The  Dutch  government  describes  its  approach  as  being  market-oriented.
325    This  commitment  is 
implemented  through  engaged  regulation:  unbundling  and  competitive  requirements,  and  regular 
reviews by the regulator.  OPTA has set maximum prices for unbundled services, and reviews these and 
other requirements on a regular schedule to determine whether significant market power is being used to 
extract rents that are substantially higher than actual costs.
326  Similarly, NMa worked with OPTA to 
achieve competitive concessions before  approving the KNP/Reggefiber joint venture.
327  OPTA  has 




Much  of  the  political  economy  in  the  Netherlands  involves  the  regulator’s  attempt  to  balance  the 
benefits of the incumbent’s infrastructure and the creation of incentives to stimulate competitive entry.  
OPTA and KPN regularly spar over terms of interconnection, tariffs, and the like.  The regulator has 
generally  managed  to  carve  out  jurisdictional  and  enforcement  powers  to  mandate  the  terms  of 
competition in the presence of significant market power (which almost invariably is assumed to exist in 
the  case  of  KPN,  but  not  others).    These  efforts  have  controlled  profits  for  KPN  and  encouraged 
opportunistic entry by alternatives. 
As with all European Union states, there is an additional level of political economy at work.  OPTA, and 
the government as a whole, does not have complete latitude to set the terms of regulation.  The European 
Commission sets guidelines and recommendations across Europe, and differences often emerge.  For 
instance, OPTA and the EC have recently debated the economic models used for fiber unbundling.
329  
Municipal fiber deployments have also been subject to approval at the EC level, under its state aid 
guidelines.  More broadly, the Commission is in the process of drafting a Recommendation on access to 
Next  Generation  Access  (NGA)  networks.
330    This  will  shape  the  relative  power  of  national  level 
regulatory agencies and broadband providers across Europe. 
Broadband strategy 
The  broadband  strategy  of  the  Netherlands  has  been  roughly  articulated  in  a  series  of  documents 
released by the government or government-convened expert panels.  These planning documents are 
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largely coherent in their vision and prescriptions, but because they are authored by various groups, they 
often differ in particulars or emphasis.  Broadband is generally defined as consisting of a lower tier from 
1Mbps to 10Mbps, and a higher tier that supports the full range of broadband activities. 
One  coordinated  national  effort  to  define  broadband  strategy  was  the  2002  document,  “Nederland 
Breedbandland.”
331  The government convened an “expert panel” of industry leaders and academics, 
which  outlined  a  high-level  multi-year  plan.    The  group  recognized  the  high  capital  costs  of  next-
generation infrastructure build-out and embraced a diversity of financial strategies.  This is included the 
note that, “In geographical areas where market parties will not invest in new infrastructure themselves, 
public-private partnership can be a powerful instrument in encouraging the development of broadband,” 
and  that,  “In  most  cases,  a  particular  neighbourhood  will  be  financed  by  a  combination  of  various 
stakeholders, such as a housing association and local traders and public bodies.”  It also explained, “The 
Government  will  have  to  continue  to  place  the  role  of  competition in the  broadband  market  at  the 
forefront of its incentive policy.  This means, inter alia, that the unbundling of networks and open, 
transparent and non-discriminating access for service providers will be basic principles in developing 
new business models for local broadband networks.” 
In 2004, the Ministry of Economic Affairs published an outline of broadband strategy going forward.
332  
The paper echoed many of the conclusions of the expert panel’s document, including an emphasis on the 
municipal role in build-out, the need for open access to physical infrastructure, and the importance of 
coordinating standards nationwide.  It recommended several action areas, including government-funded 
research, guidelines for municipalities and provinces, direct stimulus for local broadband build-out, a 
public-private  convening  group,  and  a  variety  of  knowledge-sharing  initiatives.    A  new  convening 
group, NBL sought to develop a platform for knowledge-sharing in the Dutch “kennisbank” (knowledge 
bank) model.
333  The government also supported a project called “Connecting the Dots” that sought to 
support best practices sharing between local initiatives.  The recommendations included the creation of 
the E-Norm Task Force, which brought together industry players to establish a reference model for 
broadband technology.
334  The paper also established an “impulse committee” on broadband, which 
published more detailed guidelines for implementing the Ministry’s vision.
335  Some of these guidelines 
were ultimately implemented, while others (such as subsidies) were not. 
Much of the on-the-ground strategizing in the wireline market has taken place at the local level. The 
overall structure of broadband strategy in the Netherlands consists of high-level decisions or vision-
setting on the national level with substantial latitude for localized solutions. 
Policy interventions and outcomes 
Government investment in infrastructure 
Historically, the Dutch government has offered considerable aid for the build-out of new technologies.  
This was inherent in the era of the public monopolist, but the government has also actively invested in 
cable  and  fiber.  In  the  “Kenniswijk”  (Knowledge  District)  project,  the  government  designated  one 
                                                 
331   http://www.expertgroepbreedband.nl/ 
332   Ministry of Economic Affairs (NL) “The Broadband Paper; A question of pace and better utilisation” (May, 2004) 
333   http://www.nederlandbreedbandland.nl/ (The group has the same name as the 2002 panel report, but is distinct) 
334   Jan Burgmeijer, “Interoperability of Services in an Open Broadband Market: Cases from The Netherlands,” B@Home 
WP0, Deliverable D0.9, 2006. http://www.freeband.nl/FreebandKC/keywords?document=File-65402 
335   Bekkers, R., S. Maltha, J. Poort & S. van Geffen, “Naar een nationale strategie voor breedband, Advies van de 
Impulscommissie Breedband,” Utrecht, 2004.     Country overviews: the Netherlands 
  211   
geographical region as a test bed for residential fiber rollout.  From 2000 to 2005, it offered subsidies up 
to 50% of the cost of build-out and helped with the formation of public-private partnerships.
336  This 
included the fairly successful OnsNet project. 
However, government-funded models have been cast into doubt in recent years, and measures at both 
the EU level and the national level have sought to limit state investment in the interest of avoiding 
market distortion.  From the time of the updated EU Regulatory Framework in 2002, there has been 
confusion regarding what would be permitted under state aid guidelines.  For example, in 2005, the 
European Commission ruled against public investment by the city of Appingedam,
337 but permitted a 
public-private joint venture in Amsterdam a year later.
338   
From 2004 to 2007, Dutch parliament debated various revisions to the Telecom Act.  Ultimately, new 
language introduced limits on municipal entry or ownership of infrastructure, above and beyond the EC 
limitations.  Some existing municipal investment projects were allowed, and other communities found 
ways to work within the rules to encourage local deployment.  For example, the Amsterdam CityNet 
project appears poised to serve upwards of 140,000 households using a model in which the city is a 
partner with private firms.
339  Nevertheless many municipal projects have slowed.
340 
The Commission recently clarified its position, appearing to support a relatively liberal set of scenarios 
in which government investment will be permitted.
341  Some important distinctions, like which networks 
will be considered “Next Generation,” remain unclear.  Secretary of Economic Affairs Frank Heemskerk 
has indicated broader support for municipal investment and for revisions to the Telecommunications Act 
to facilitate this.
342  The explanatory text accompanying these revisions notes, “The current economic 
situation makes reconsideration of the statutory restrictions necessary. The possibilities for governments 
to responsibly contribute to economic growth should not be limited more than is absolutely necessary. 
One  such  possibility  is  to  encourage  the  construction  of  broadband  networks…  Cases  such  as 
Amsterdam fiber show that the involvement of a municipality can be the proverbial push in the back.  
Right now lenders have become reluctant by the economic crisis, but the involvement of municipalities 
can be an important incentive for banks and other lenders to participate.”
343 
Competition policy 
The  overarching  competition  philosophy  of  the  Netherlands  consists  of  managed  facilities-based 
competition.  These competitive facilities do not include the access networks in the last mile, but rather 
the backbone up to the unbundled copper or fiber lines to the home.  OPTA has maintained unbundling 
controls on the incumbent, and has extended these controls to new fiber networks.   
OPTA also recently took steps to force cable providers to open access to their networks for television 
service (but not broadband).
344  However, this has also affected the broadband market, because it has 
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enabled DSL-based providers such as Tele2 to announce plans for more robust triple-play offerings.
345 
Generally speaking, the competition policy of the Netherlands seeks to refrain from regulation except in 
cases of significant market power, per EC guidelines. 
Network non-discrimination 
Network discrimination has not been a prominent issue in the Netherlands.  There has, however, been 
recent  discussion  of  the  issue  in  the  context  of  cable  operator  UPC’s  protocol-specific  bandwidth 
caps.
346    The  Dutch  consumer  organization  Consumentbond  has  accused  UPC  of  unfair  business 
practices due to lack of disclosure of traffic management practices.   
Much of the debate around network non-discrimination is occurring at the European Union level, as the 
so-called  “Telecoms  Package”  (a  review  of  the  existing  set  of  EU  directives  for  electronic 
communications from 2002) is hammered out.  In a recent round of debate, some new language was 
introduced  that  appeared  to  permit  network  discrimination  in  some  cases.    The  French  advocacy 
organization La Quadrature du Net has organized resistance to this language in EU countries, but it 
remains to be seen what will be contained in the final language.
347  
Spectrum policy 
The Dutch government has relied on auctions for all recent spectrum allocations. The last major auction, 
for 3G frequencies, took place in 2000. Historically, auctions in the Netherlands have not realized the 
high prices seen by other European countries.  In 2009, Agentschap Telecom, announced a new auction 
of  2.6GHz  and  3.5GHz  frequencies,  but  after  some  resistance  and  complications,  the  auction  was 
postponed  until  2010.    The  government  also  added  a  requirement  that  20%  of  the  bandwidth  be 
auctioned to new entrants.
348  After the  government’s protracted battle with KPN over whether the 
company  could  keep  the  warehoused  2G  spectrum  that  was  acquired  in  the  Telfort  buy-out,  KPN 
returned the spectrum to the government for re-auction in 2010.
349  This outcome was the result of the 
Dutch government’s desire to have all allocated spectrum actively in use. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
favor of a more expansive cable unbundling proposal, but this never progressed to implementation. Kammerstukken 
30800 XIII, nr. 18) 
345   http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2009/02/11/ec-gives-green-light-for-dutch-open-cable/ 
346   http://yro.slashdot.org/story/09/08/23/1921206/First-European-Provider-To-Break-Net-Neutrality 
347   http://www.laquadrature.net/Telecoms_package 
348   http://www.telegeography.com/cu/article.php?article_id=28137 
349   http://www.telecompaper.com/news/article.aspx?cid=684135     Country overviews: Sweden 
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F. Sweden 
Introduction 
Sweden  committed  a  decade  ago  to  providing  comprehensive  national  broadband  coverage  and  has 
subsequently emerged as one of the top performers in broadband provision and adoption, scoring well in 
terms of broadband penetration, speed, and affordability.  The Swedish government has been actively 
involved in rolling out broadband infrastructure through public investments, both at the federal and 
municipal levels, and public-private partnerships that have contributed to the deployment of a broadband 
internet infrastructure that now reaches 98% of the country’s residential population.   
Swedish  regulators  have  intervened  at  several  junctures  in  broadband  markets  to  enact  strong  open 
access rules in the telecommunications sector, starting with the introduction of a local loop unbundling 
requirement  in  2001.    This  was  consolidated  further  in  2004  with  a  mandate  that  TeliaSonera,  the 
incumbent telecommunications company, provide bitstream access for broadband entrants.  In 2007, the 
regulatory  authority  went  a  significant  step  further,  forcing  TeliaSonera  to  functionally  separate  its 
network and retail internet services divisions.  Open access provisions in Sweden now apply both to the 
copper and high-speed fiber infrastructure.    
Sweden’s  open  access  policies  have  helped  shape  a  market  structure  in  which  the  four  larger 
companies—which  together  account  for  95%  of  subscriptions—compete  across  several  platforms, 
including copper, cable, fiber, and wireless.  As reflected in the price offerings and consumer options, 
the level of competition in Swedish broadband markets is strong. Sweden has been a leader in deploying 
fiber in municipal networks in various combinations of public and private sector involvement.  Sweden 
ranks third in the world in fiber/LAN connections behind South Korea and Japan, with over 450,000 
subscribers. Future broadband plans include expanding the reach of fiber networks and achieving full 
residential internet access at speeds of 2 Mbs or higher. 
Market highlights  
Overall, 66.6% in Sweden have broadband access.
350 
   Fiber / LAN  Cable  DSL  Other  Overall 
351 
Subscriptions per 100 people 
352  6.5  6.2  19.1  0.2  32.0 
                                                 
350   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 2a, from EU Community Survey, from 2007. 
351   Does not include 3G Wireless.  Since subscriptions are shared within a household, this number will never be 100. 
352   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 1d, as reported by individual governments, as of 2008.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Broadband development to date 
Over the past decade, internet use in Sweden has shifted rapidly from a reliance on low bandwidth dial-
up to higher speed services.  In 2001, the number of broadband users tripled; by the end of year, about 
455,000  private  customers  "were  connected  to  the  internet  via  some  form  of  access  with  higher 
transmission  capacity."
353  DSL  and  cable  respectively  accounted  for  9%  and  4%  of  internet 
customers.
354 Internet penetration among households with a capacity of 2Mbps or more was at 2.6% in 
2001.
355 In 2002, subscriptions for IP telephony in broadband networks were introduced.
356 Household 
penetration  of  fixed  internet  connections  in  2003  was  up  to  20%  while  household  penetration  for 
connections with capacities of 2 Mbps or more had increased to 4%.
357  
Household broadband use surged from 2004 to 2005 as the number of households with internet access of 
2 Mbps or more grew by 40% to serve 21% of households.  The overall rate of fixed connections stood 
at 39%.
358 By January 2005, all municipalities had a connection to the national backbone and interurban 
networks and "all urban areas with more than 3,000 inhabitants have a local network in some part of the 
urban  area."
359  The  rise  in  broadband  users  coincided  with  a  continued  increase  in  the  number  of 
independent ISPs competing for the residential and business markets, which cut into the incumbent’s 
market share.  Two cable companies, Com Hem and UPC, together accounted for 16% of the consumer 
market.  Other entrants took advantage of Swedish policies that opened up the TeliaSonera’s network to 
competitors.  Two of these entrants, Bredbandsbolaget (B2) and Glocalnet, had accumulated 20% and 
6% of the market.    
In 2000, Sweden issued four UMTS wireless licenses for a nominal fee, although these licenses came 
with an aggressive deployment requirement that over 99% of the population have access within two 
years.  Interestingly, the four recipients of the licenses—Tele2, Vodafone Sweden, Hi3G, and Orange 
                                                 
353   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2001, p.32 et sq. 
354   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2005, p.78 
355   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2001, p.61. 
356   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2003, p. 19. 
357   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2003, table 33, p.81. 
358   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2005, table 32, p.81. 
359   http://www.pts.se/en-gb/Documents/Reports/Internet/2005/Broadband-in-Sweden-2005---PTS-ER-200524/     Country overviews: Sweden 
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Svierge—did not include the incumbent Telia. (Telia subsequently entered in to a joint venture with 
Tele2 to return to the market.) The ambitious coverage targets were not met.  By 2005, three of the four 
licenses were in use and only 90% of the targeted coverage had been achieved.
360  Even though the 
coverage targets were not met, Sweden still had the best 3G coverage in Europe.   
In 2008, broadband subscriptions in Sweden greatly outnumbered ISDN or dial-up connections with 
DSL  technology  constituting  41%  of  all  subscriptions.  Mobile  broadband  Internet  subscriptions 
accounted for 21% of the total while fiber and fiber-LAN subscriptions had risen to 14%.
361 The total 
number of broadband internet subscriptions had grown by 20% over the previous year and subscriptions 
with 2 Mbps (fixed and mobile) grew by 45%.
362 Household fixed broadband penetration was 60% in 
2008.  Among broadband subscribers, 83% had connections of 2 Mbps downstream or higher, up from 
69% a year earlier.
363 There were 153 local fiber/LAN broadband networks and more than 98% of the 
population was covered by a high-speed network.
364 In the wireless market, there were approximately 
3.5 million UMTS and CDMA 2000 subscriptions.
365  
Market share and key players 
The Swedish market for local, long-distance and international telephony was liberalized in 1993 opening 
up  telecommunications  markets  to  competition.
366  In  1996,  three  years  after  liberalization,  the 
government-owned former monopoly operator, Telia, had a share of 71% of the telecommunications 
market.
367 At that point, Telia was the only operator in Sweden that offered a public ISDN network.
368 
In  2002,  Telia  merged  with  the  Finnish  state  telecommunications  company,  Sonera,  to  form 
TeliaSonera.    The  TeliaSonera  merger  followed  a  failed  merger  attempt  with  the  Norwegian 
telecommunications  company,  Telenor,  which  is  now  is  its  largest  competitor  in  Sweden.    The 
governments of Sweden and Finland still hold minority ownership stakes in the company, which is still 
the dominant fixed line and mobile operator in Sweden.  In mid-2008, TeliaSonera held 39% of the 
market for broadband subscriptions.
369  
Telenor expanded its presence in Sweden through the purchase of several local broadband services, 
including Bredbandsbolaget (B2) and Glocalnet.  Both of these companies established themselves in the 
Swedish  market  by  accessing  consumers  on  existing  infrastructure  made  available  to  them  through 
Sweden’s  open  network  policies.    Telenor  currently  accounts  for  about  one  fifth  of  the  broadband 
market in Sweden.  The cable television provider, ComHem—a former subsidiary of TeliaSonera—
offers consumers broadband service over its cable network as well as triple play options.  Com Hem, 
which in 2006 had acquired its largest rival in the cable market, UPC, now accounts for 18% of the 
broadband  market.    Tele2,  the  Stockholm-based  telecommunications  company,  serves  15%  of  the 
broadband  market.    Together,  these  four  companies  account  for  95%  of  household  broadband 
subscriptions in Sweden; the rest of the market is shared by several smaller players. 
                                                 
360   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2005, p.30. 
361   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2008, table 15, p.93 
362   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2008, table 34, p.98 
363   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2008, table 34 (cont.), p.99 
364   GlobalComms Sweden, p.15. 
365   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2008, table 15, p.74. 
366   GlobalComms Sweden, p.2. 
367   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 1996, p.10. 
368   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 1996, p.19. 
369   GlobalComms Sweden, p. 15.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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DSL  connections  account  for  over  40%  of  household  broadband  connection.    Fiber  and  fiber-LAN 
networks have a slightly bigger share of the market than cable, holding 14% and 13%, respectively.
370  
Sweden trails only South Korea and Japan in household fiber penetration rates.   
TeliaSonera is the largest single owner of fiber, accounting for approximately 45% of the whole optical-
fiber coverage in 2009.  Publicly-owned fiber-infrastructure in the hands of government, the Swedish 
National Rail Administration, Vattenfall, Svenska Kraftnät, and municipal enterprises jointly accounted 
for 45% of the total.
371  Municipal networks alone control 20 to 25% of the coverage.
372 Among the 
more than 150 local fiber/LAN networks in 2008, a majority are owned by municipal authorities or 
municipally run companies.
373 
The  market  for  wireless  broadband,  which  grew  by  229%  from  mid-2007  to  mid-2008,
374  is  also 
dominated by TeliaSonera with 39% of active subscriptions, ahead of Tele2, Hi3G Access and Telenor 
with 25%, 19% and 15%, respectively.
375 Each of the four major players operate 3.5G networks and are 
expected to deploy 4G service in 2010.




The 2003 Electronic Communications Act (EkomL) lays out the regulatory structure for all electronic 
communication networks and services in Sweden, covering both wireline and wireless communications 
systems.  The passage of this act, enacted during a period of rapid growth in broadband, reinforced 
Sweden’s  policy  commitment  to  carry  out  tough  regulatory  action  in  order  to  promote  wide-scale 
broadband internet coverage and adoption.   
The act of 2003 aimed to “ensure that electronic communications are as accessible and efficient as 
possible and are open to free competition.” The act further states, “We wish to give an authority power 
to force market-dominating companies to allow competitors access to their networks or to limit their 
prices to the end-customer to what is reasonable.”
378  
The passage of this new telecommunications act strengthened and expanded the regulatory authority of 
the  Swedish  Post  and  Telecom  Agency  (PTS,  short  for  Post  och  Telestyrelsen)  to  intervene  where 
market players with significant market power were hindering competition for broadband services.  In 
essence, the legislation aimed to open communications markets by attenuating the market power of 
TeliaSonera.   
PTS, which is overseen by the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy, and Communications, also acts as an 
adviser to the government with respect to broadband development and IT strategy.  The Swedish legal 
and regulatory framework for the IT sector is influenced substantially by EU policy; competition laws 
and EU legislation such as the Framework Directive are of particular salience to the telecommunications 
sector.    
                                                 
370   The Swedish Telecommunications Market 2008, table 30, p.93 
371   http://www.pts.se/en-gb/Documents/Reports/Internet/2009/Dark-fibre---one-year-later---PTS-ER-200924/ 
372   Dark Fibre, Market and State of Competition, p.22 et sq. 
373   GlobalComms Sweden, p.15. 
374   GlobalComms Sweden, p.15 
375   GlobalComms Sweden, p.8. 
376   GlobalComms Sweden, p.11 et sq. 
377   GlobalComms Sweden, p.12. 
378   http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/01/84/54/5ae98894.pdf     Country overviews: Sweden 
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Political economy 
The political economy of Sweden's broadband industry is dominated by the interplay between state 
controlled  former  monopoly  TeliaSonera  and  industry  watchdog  PTS.    As  the  incumbent 
telecommunication  provider,  TeliaSonera  owned  a  large  majority  of  the  nation's  copper  and  fiber 
networks and benefited from significant market power in different industry sectors. The PTS in turn 
began to exert its regulatory power to promote competition by ordering local loop unbundling or through 
price setting.  TeliaSonera has consistently sought to maintain its competitive advantage and preserve 
control  over  its  network  infrastructure,  resisting  PTS  plans  to  open  the  incumbent’s  networks  to 
competitors.  Frustrated with the slow progress in opening up TeliaSonera’s networks to other entrants, 
PTS has progressively enacted a series of more stringent open access measures designed to enhance 
competition.   
TeliaSonera is not alone in benefiting from (former) public ownership: B2 used a strategic partnership 
with  the  National  Swedish  Rail  Administration  to  gain  access  to  the  railway  communication 
infrastructure.
379 Municipalities and publicly-owned companies have joined forces to build local fiber 
networks, thereby adding to the picture of a sector heavily influenced not only by regulatory power 
struggles but also by cooperative public-private partnerships.  
Broadband strategy 
Sweden initiated its current broadband policy more than a decade ago.  With the 1999 release of IT Bill 
1999/2000:86, the country embarked on a plan to create “an information society for all.” The policy 
described  a  reliance  on  market  forces  in  conjunction  with  public-private  partnerships  to  deploy 
broadband across the large and sparsely populated country.   
The Swedish Government formed an ICT commission and embraced its recommendation to fund a fiber 
network.
380  In  addition  to  national  projects,  the  Government  allocated  funds  to  regional  and  local 
broadband projects, allowing "operators to choose their preferred access platform…to best suit each 
region targeted."
381 Involving municipalities and regional operators had already been part of the national 
broadband infrastructure program of the IT bill.  
An updated IT policy, published in 2004,
 lays out three central objectives:
  
•  IT must contribute to a better quality of life and help improve and simplify everyday life for 
people and companies. 
•  IT must be used to promote sustainable growth. 
•  An effective and secure physical infrastructure for IT, with high transmission capacity, must be 
available in all parts of the country so as to give people access to, among other things, interactive 
public e-services.
 382 
The  bill  refers  to  public  confidence  in  IT  and  coordination  as  two  essential  conditions  required  to 
achieve  these  objectives,  with  the  first  condition  supported  by  education  and  countering  threats  to 
                                                 
379   Explaining International Broadband Leadership, Appendix G: Sweden, p.G3. 
380   Broadband Stimulation in France, Ireland, and Sweden, p.15. 
381   GlobalComms Sweden, 14. 
382   See: From an IT policy for society to a policy for the information society, Summary of the Swedish Government Bill 
2004/05:175, p. 7 et sq.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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security.  The plan calls for the state to take responsibility in organizational, logistical, and technical 
issues in order to meet the coordination objective.
 383 
Operating in its policy role, PTS published its own strategic plan in 2007, entitled "Proposal for Swedish 
broadband strategy." This document established as a goal that the entire Swedish population should have 
access to infrastructure with at least 2 Mbps downstream capacity by 2010.
384 To meet this short-term 
objective,  public-private  partnerships  and  government  funding  are  critical  to  increased  broadband 
access, as has been the case in the past.
385 
Policy interventions and outcomes 
Government investment in infrastructure 
In 1999, the Swedish government committed over EUR 600 million for the installation of a national 
backbone, "which has resulted in the deployment of some 200 metro networks in more than one hundred 
towns."
386 The roll out was carried out by Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish National Grid operator.
387 The 
government allocated an additional EUR 700 million to regional and local broadband projects.
388 Tax 
breaks were also used as an incentive to promote the spread of broadband.
389 Consistent with the stated 
goal of coordinating public and private investments, private operators spent an estimated USD 1 billion 
between 2001 and 2007 as part of the process.
390 
PTS recommends that the government should continue to support the rollout of broadband infrastructure 
by providing an additional SEK 1.1 billion (over USD 150 million at current exchange rates), half of 
which  could  be  covered  by  funds  associated  with  the  EU  structural  funds  and  rural  development 
plans.
391 Without this financial support from central Government, PTS believes it is "unreasonable to 
assume that commercial forces alone are sufficient to achieve the objective of broadband for all by 2010 
and  that  the  possibility  of  imposing  obligations  on  a  party  to  provide  universal  services  cannot  be 
viewed as a means of achieving this objective."
392 
An early notable government-funded project is the dark-fiber network funded by the city of Stockholm 
in 1994. This project, Stokab, was initiated after the refusal of the private sector operator, Telia, to 
provide  fiber  capacity.  Stokab  later  expanded  its  operations  to  other  municipalities  and  the  model 
became a key piece of Sweden’s broadband infrastructure policy.
393 
Skill building, education, and demand programs 
In  addition  to  the  large  public  investments  in  infrastructure,  the  Swedish  government  also  supports 
initiatives to promote demand for broadband access by fostering digital literacy, increasing access to 
                                                 
383   From an IT policy for society to a policy for the information society, Summary of the Swedish Government Bill 
2004/05:175, p. 8 et sq 
384   p.22 et sq. 
385   Proposal for Swedish broadband strategy, p.54. See also section "Government investment in infrastructure" 
386   http://www.bbwo.org.uk/broadband-3045 
387   Ibid. 
388   GlobalComms Sweden, 14. 
389   Explaining International Broadband Leadership, Appendix G: Sweden, p.G2. 
390   Ibid. 
391   Proposal for Swedish broadband strategy, p.54. 
392   Proposal for Swedish broadband strategy, p.66. 
393   http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/PracticeNote.aspx?id=3244     Country overviews: Sweden 
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personal computers, and encouraging the use of broadband for education.
394 As early as 1998, tax breaks 
were introduced for companies that supplied employees with personal computers.
395 In a later push for 
digital literacy in education, the government "introduced a USD 25 million project to raise IT literacy 
among schoolteachers."
396 In addition, the government also carries out initiatives pursuing quality and 
sustainable growth—two other sub-goals of its IT policy—by promoting, for example, improvement of 
e-services in the health care sector and promotion of IT skills in SMEs, which, among other things, are 
likely to boost demand for broadband.
 397 
Competition policy 
Swedish government regulators have acted aggressively to open up broadband markets to competition 
with a focus on providing competitors access to TeliaSonera’s network.  Unbundling was introduced in 
2001, though it was slow to take hold.  In 2003, PTS ordered TeliaSonera to lower the wholesale price 
for access to its network, asserting that TeliaSonera had engaged in discriminatory pricing practices that 
favored  some  operator  over  others.    In  2004,  TeliaSonera  accepted  a  PTS  ruling  clarifying  further 
unbundling requirements of its last mile copper network, but chose to appeal to the courts the ruling that 
required it to provide wholesale bitstream access to its competitors.  TeliaSonera eventually complied 
with  this  mandate  in  2007  after  losing  in  the  courts.
398  The  rulings  at  the  time  did  not  include 
TeliaSonera's fiber-optic network. However, TeliaSonera's copper network remains an issue of critical 
interest for PTS and one of three principal topics of the agency's 2007 "Proposal for Swedish broadband 
strategy".
399 Another important ruling by PTS in 2005 required TeliaSonera to offer naked DSL in 2005 
so customers would have the option to take telephony and internet services from different operators.
400 
In 2007, PTS submitted a statutory proposal for non-discrimination and openness in the local loop which 
states that, "the market that currently deals predominantly with access to TeliaSonera's metallic loop is 
not a functioning marketplace…the authority can conclude that there is neither sufficient transparency 
nor equal treatment in the market. The current situation falls far short of the goals of effective and 
competition-neutral access, nor does it establish adequate conditions to gradually loosen the regulation 
to promote competition on the route to more sustainable competition."
401 PTS proposes as a remedy 
"that the ability of the public authority to impose functional separation on a dominant stakeholder should 
be  introduced,  meaning  that  the  parts  of  the  operation  representing  bottleneck  resources  should  be 
separated from the rest of the organization
."402 TeliaSonera announced its agreement to comply with this 
quasi-voluntary  functional  separation  and  in  early  2008  created  a  subsidiary,  TeliaSonera  Skanova 
Access,  to  serve  wholesale  customers.    This  arrangement  was  reinforced  later  in  the  year  with  the 
passage of legislation and regulations to implement this policy.  
                                                 
394   Explaining International Broadband Leadership, Appendix G: Sweden, p.G4. 
395   Swedish commitment to broadband both in the cities and in the countryside, p.13 
396   Explaining International Broadband Leadership, Appendix G: Sweden, p.G4. 
397   see From an IT policy for society to a policy for the information society, Summary of the Swedish Government Bill 
2004/05:175 
398   GlobalComms Sweden, p.15 
399   Proposal for Swedish broadband strategy, p19 et sq. 
400   Explaining International Broadband Leadership, Appendix G: Sweden, p.G3. 
401   Improved broadband competition through functional separation, p.59. 
402   Improved broadband competition through functional separation, p.79.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Network non-discrimination 
Network  neutrality  violations  have  not  been  the  source  of  any  complaints  to  PTS  and  the  agency 
therefore has not seen any reason to take action in this space.
403 Of possible relevance, the Electronic 
Communications Act in Chapter 6, Section 17 prohibits processing of a message by others than the 
relevant users or in special situations.  
Spectrum policy 
In 2006, PTS produced a spectrum policy, in which the agency makes the following recommendations 
(inter alia): neutrality of service and technology, licenses should be allocated by auction, "second-hand 
trading shall be promoted," and "spectrum allocation shall be harmonized with other countries as far as 
this is possible."
404 
Licenses may be awarded to cover either the whole nation, a region, or a municipality, while bidders are 
limited to a maximum of one license per municipality. Contrary to requirements that came with the 3G 
licenses, authorities have not attached any rollout obligations to the licenses auctioned recently.
405 
In its 2009 Strategic Policy paper, PTS makes the liberalization of spectrum management a priority, and 
“covers  lowered  entry  barriers  and  measures  to  facilitate  technology  and  market  development  by 
formulating conditions for using and liberalizing frequencies. One important objective for 2009 is for 
market players to have access to more spectrum than last year, on terms that are technology and service 
neutral.” 
                                                 
403   Network neutrality, memorandum, p.7. 
404   PTS spectrum policy, p.6. 
405   GlobalComms Sweden, p.14.     Country overview: Switzerland 
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G. Switzerland 
Introduction 
Switzerland  has  experienced  strong  results  in  broadband  deployment,  despite  taking  a  substantially 
different approach than other countries that have performed well in this space.  Switzerland has relied 
primarily on inter-platform competition between the incumbent telecommunications company that offers 
DSL and cable companies.  Unlike the majority of its European neighbors, Switzerland has been slow to 
implement local loop unbundling, formally adopting this policy only in 2007.  However, it is difficult to 
attribute  their  success  solely  to  a  regulatory  abstention  given  the  consistent  efforts  of  the  national 
regulatory authority to implement local loop unbundling since 2003. 
The political discourse about broadband over the past two years has centered around three core themes: 
firstly,  the  likely  effects  of  local  loop  unbundling  as  introduced  in  2007;  secondly,  a  possible 
amendment to the Law on Telecommunications to allow ex-ante regulation and to recast the regulatory 
framework into one that is technology-neutral; and thirdly, extension of the regulatory power of the 
Federal Communications Commission (ComCom) to the regulation of fiber networks.  
Switzerland is moving towards an innovative strategy for sharing the costs and risks of deploying the 
next generation of higher capacity infrastructure for the country, adopting a cooperative approach to 
deploy fiber directly to homes in Switzerland and to provide subscribers with access to multiple service 
providers through the same infrastructure.  
Market highlights  
Overall, 52.8% of households in Switzerland have broadband access.
406 
   Fiber / LAN  Cable  DSL  Other  Overall 
407 
Subscriptions per 100 people 
408  0.4  9.7  23.2  0.3  33.5 
 
                                                 
406   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 2a, from EU Community Survey, from 2006. 
407   Does not include 3G Wireless.  Since subscriptions are shared within a household, this number will never be 100. 
408   OECD Broadband Portal, Table 1d, supplied by the Swiss government, as of 2008.   Next Generation Connectivity 
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Broadband development to date 
DSL is by far the most popular broadband access technology in Switzerland, accounting for more than 
two-thirds  of  subscriptions  in  2009.
409  Cable  ranked  second  with  somewhat  less  than  a  third  of 
broadband connections, a great majority of which are provided by Cablecom. The rising popularity of 
DSL  reflects  a  marked  change  in  Swiss  broadband  markets;  in  2002,  cable  held  a  majority  of  the 
broadband market with a 56% share. The historic popularity of cable modems may be explained by the 
existence  of  cable  TV  networks  in  most  parts  of  the  country  at  the  time  of  liberalization  of  the 
telecommunications market in 1998. In addition, cable companies were the first operators to roll out 
commercial high-speed Internet in 2000. Swisscom, in contrast, only made limited efforts to introduce 
ADSL  in  1998  and  did  not  start  its  commercial  roll-out  until  2001.
410  In  July  2003,  Switzerland 
witnessed a relatively equal split between cable and DSL. Since then, however, the market has shifted 
substantially with the spread of DSL. Observers attribute this decline of cable modem access to several 
factors, including broader coverage (currently, about 98% of all households can be reached with DSL, 
compared  to  93%  reached  by  cable)
411  and  advertising  campaigns  launched  by  the  resellers  of  the 
Swisscom wholesale products.
412 Swisscom has for many years offered wholesale products to its direct 
competitors  for  resale.    However,  according  to  analyses  by  the  independent  regulator  ComCom, 
Swisscom's  resale  products  offered  by  its  competitors  are  not  able  to  effectively  compete  with 
Swisscom.  The  new  entrants  were  not  able  to  establish  a  competitive  position  in  the  liberalized 
telecommunications market (see Figure 1).
413 Swisscom’s main competitor Cablecom, by contrast, was 
arguably  not  able  to  maintain  momentum—even  based  upon  the  initial  advantage  of  broad  TV 
penetration—since  it  is  covering  less  than  55%  of  the  cable  TV  market  (Switzerland  has  about  40 
regional or local cable-providers).
414 Cablecom is currently seeking to catch up by investing in higher 
                                                 
409   OFCOM (2009). The Swiss telecommunications market- an international comparison: Extract from the 14th European 
Union Implementation report extended to include Switzerland. p. 106.  
410   GlobalComm (2009). Country overview Swiss section. Broadband Market Commentary.  
411   OECD (2009). Communications Outlook 2009. p. 136/205. 
412   OFCOM (2009). The Swiss telecommunications market- an international comparison: Extract from the 14th European 
Union Implementation report extended to include Switzerland. p. 106.   
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performance  cable  technology  (DOCSIS  3.0),
415  which  will  make  it  possible  to  offer  consumers 
download speeds of 100 Mbs or higher.
416     
Although optical fiber connections are not as widespread as in other European countries, there has been 
much activity in that area recently that illustrates fiber’s growth potential. Swisscom already operates a 
network with optical fiber lines, although this network usually ends at street cabinets (FTTC, fiber-to-
the-cabinet) and doesn’t yet extend to homes or small and medium-sized enterprises. However, more 
than 10 local power utilities—mostly (but not exclusively) owned by municipalities and cantons—have 
announced  plans  to  invest  in  fiber-to-the-home  (FTTH)  networks.  These  relatively  small  power 
companies are becoming new players in the broadband market and have challenged Swisscom, which, in 
response, announced plans in 2008 to bring fiber to 100,000 homes by the end of 2009 along with large 
investments  in  fiber-to-the-home  networks  over  the  next  six  years.  The  strategic  rationale  for  the 
movement of the small power companies into this market is multifaceted. One of the main reasons put 
forward is that power companies are facing the challenge to maintain client loyalty in a liberalized and 
therefore increasingly competitive energy market environment, where consumers will be able to switch 
easily from one provider to another. Such advanced services in combination with increased user choice 
require a reliable and high-quality communication infrastructure in order to monitor and manage the 
customer relationship, often referred to as "smart metering."
417 In addition, power companies often have 
the  technical  expertise  at  hand  to  deploy  such  networks,  since  they  already  maintain  their  own 
broadband network between power plants. Further, the conduits that bring power lines to homes often 
have enough space remaining to accommodate additional fiber cable. These several factors result in low 
market entry costs for power companies. Also, the broadband business is similar to their core business 
and therefore recognized by the utility companies as an attractive opportunity.
418 Finally, the ownership 
structure of many of the power companies matters: cities and municipalities, which are often owners or 
shareholders of such companies, view open access telecommunications infrastructure as a key factor for 
the  attractiveness  of  their  location  and  argue  that  open  access  should  become  part  of  the  universal 
service concept.
419    
In addition to these developments, the federal regulatory authority of the telecommunications industry, 
ComCom,  launched  a  series  of  fiber-to-the-home  roundtable  talks  to  coordinate  plans  of  potential 
investors,  broadband  providers,  and  other  interest  groups.  By  October  2009,  the  participants  of  the 
roundtables had agreed on technical standards to deploy new fiber into buildings, which will make it 
easy for customers to switch providers and will ensure that different network and service providers can 
reach customers.
420 
In 2000, ComCom awarded four 3G licenses. Three of them were sold to existing telecommunication 
companies (Swisscom, Sunrise, and Orange) and one to a newcomer (3G Mobile AG, formerly Sonera) 
for a total amount of about USD 29.5 million. In 2002, ComCom was forced to relax the deadline set for 
the launch of the 3G licenses, since the operators weren't able to meet the conditions set forth in the 
licenses.  In  the  wireless  market,  3G  (UMTS/HSPA)  is  currently  the  fastest  growing  technology, 
covering 60% of the country in 2008.
421 Nevertheless, the penetration rate is still low compared to the 
                                                 
415   http://www.cablecom.ch/en/index/kabelanschluss/netupgrade.htm?setlang=4 (last visited 9 September 2009). 
416   Neue Zürcher Zeitung (4 July 2009). Interventionsgelüste im Telekommarkt. p. 19. 
417   Staub, Richard (2009). Glasfaserkabel für alle Haushalte. in: Elektrotechnik (May 2009). p. 62-63.  
418   City Council of St. Gallen (2008). Vorlage Stadtparlament: Pilotprojekt für Breitbandnetz auf der Basis "Fibre tot he 
Home" (FTTH). p. 6-7.  
419   City Council of St. Gallen (2008). Vorlage Stadtparlament: Pilotprojekt für Breitbandnetz auf der Basis "Fibre tot he 
Home" (FTTH). p. 1.  
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OECD average (20% in 2007).
422 In 2006, ComCom revoked the 3G license from 3G Mobile AG as the 
company couldn't meet the conditions stipulated in the license.
423 Swisscom recently announced plans to 
invest in HSPA+ in the next several years. Handsets supporting this technology are expected to be sold 
in 2010.
424 At the end of 2008, five GSM-licenses were in use (Swisscom, Sunrise, Orange, Tele2, and 
In&Phone), with coverage of nearly 100% of the population.
425    
WiMAX still plays a marginal role in the broadband market. In 2007, a license was awarded to Inquam 
Broadband.
426  The provider is expected to launch a mobile WiMAX service.
427 Swisscom decided in 
2008 to use satellite connection for universal access services rather than WiMAX.  
Satellite Connections (Eutelsat) are used to provide broadband connections to remote areas that cannot 
be served with DSL or cable networks. The market share of this technology within Switzerland is small, 
and, with DSL coverage of about 98%, the situation is unlikely to change in the near future.    
Although the Swiss government hasn't developed any policy concerning the deployment of wireless 
hotspots, the telecom industry has been actively investing in the spread of hotspots. Again, Swisscom is 
the major player in the field and has installed over 1,200 wireless hotspots in Switzerland, especially 
around  railway  stations.  Furthermore,  the  federal  railway  company  (SBB)  is  working  closely  with 
Swisscom to enable consumers to surf the Internet during their travels.
428 On a local level, there are a 
growing  number  of  open  wireless  city  networks,  which  provide  city  centers  with  Internet  free  of 
charge.
429  
Market share and key players 
Swisscom is by far the most important provider of wireline and wireless services in the Swiss market. 
The  company  is  the  former  national  telephone  company.  Although  the  liberalization  of  the 
telecommunications market took place in 1998,
430 the federal government still holds a 55% stake in the 
company.
431  Complete privatization had been planned at that time, but the Swiss parliament decided 
against a full implementation in 2006.
432 Since 1998, four major wireline and wireless providers have 
competed with Swisscom in the broadband market, namely Sunrise (formerly TDC Switzerland), Tele2 
(now merged with Sunrise), Cablecom, and Orange. 
In 2007, ComCom awarded Swisscom with a 10-year universal service license. The license contains, 
among other things, the obligation to provide broadband connections to all households and serve all 
geographic  areas  of  Switzerland.  The  minimum  transmission  rate  is  set  to  600/100kbits/s  and  a 
maximum price was set at CHF 69 per month.
433 However, the consequences of this obligation are quite 
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limited due to the fact that the broadband network already reaches 98% of Swiss households.
434 The 
universal service obligation does not stipulate any specific requirements for access technologies.
435  
The broadband market share of Swisscom is 55.3%, representing more than twice the share of its closest 
competitor, Cablecom (19.2%). In the summer of 2008, Sunrise had a market share of 12.8%.  Sunrise 
later merged with its previous competitor Tele2, allowing the company to extend its market share to 
over 18% at the end of 2008.
436 
Figure 1: Market shares of broadband connections in Switzerland and in the EU, December 
2008
437 
Swisscom  was  the  only  provider  that  increased  its  market  share  in  2008  (not  taking  into  account 
Sunrise's  merger  with  Tele2);  direct  competitors  were  unable  to  hold  their  market  shares.    This  is 
remarkable, as Swisscom is one of the few incumbents in Europe that is outperforming its newly entered 
competitors.
438 The dynamism of Swisscom can partially be explained by strong management with high 
public and political visibility, coupled with a very solid financial background.
439 Observers argue that 
the fiber-to-the-home roll-out is somehow linked with the decision taken by Federal Council in 2005, 
according to which Swisscom is not allowed to make major investments in foreign companies as long as 
the Swiss government is its majority shareholder.
440 Swisscom’s high customer satisfaction rates may 
also contribute to their success and may help explain why better prices alone are often not incentive 
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enough  for  consumers  to  change  telecommunication  providers.  Overall,  the  company's  image  and 
customer trust in its reliability seem to contribute significantly to Swisscom's ongoing success.
441  
As already mentioned, new players are currently entering the Swiss market, as local power providers 
start  to  invest  in  fiber-to-the-home  networks.  As  a  result  of  this  increased  competition,  Swisscom 
recently announced investments of over USD 2.64 billion in fiber-to-the-home connections over the next 
six years ("Fibre Suisse").
442 Swisscom's multi-fiber strategy is based on the deployment of four fibers to 
each home. One of these fibers would be used by Swisscom itself, the other three could be bought or 
rented  by  other  providers.
443  Sunrise—Swisscom's  strongest  competitor—has  entered  a  nation-wide 
cooperation with the former monopolist, agreeing to buy Swisscom's wholesale fiber products.
444 The 
multi-fiber network is expected to reduce Swisscom's deployment costs and protect its market share. 
According to experts, the multi-fiber approach taken by Swisscom may even help the company to avoid 
regulation as it offers non-discriminatory access to competitors.
445  
In  the  wireless  market,  Swisscom  has  the  largest  market  share  (62%  in  March  2009),  followed  by 
Sunrise  and  Orange  with  21  and  18%,  respectively.  In  2005,  new  competition  in  the  corporate 
communications market came from In&Phone as they had been awarded a GSM-1800 license. In the 
same year, the two main Swiss retailers Migros and Coop launched their own products in cooperation 
with Swisscom and Orange.
446     
Regulatory framework 
Although  Switzerland  is  not  a  member  of  the  European  Union,  the  regulation  of  the  Swiss 
telecommunications  market  is  highly  influenced  by  the  EU  telecommunications  framework.  The 
legislative framework is intended to serve the goal of universal service: broad access to reliable and 
affordable telecommunication services. 
The  most  important  law  governing  the  telecommunications  market  in  Switzerland  is  the  Law  on 
Telecommunications  (LTC)  and  the  corresponding  Ordinance  on  Telecommunications  and  Services 
(TIO).
447 Since its amendment in 2007, key elements of the LTC regime include local loop unbundling 
and an ex-post mechanism to set prices for network access. According to this ex-post approach, which is 
a target of considerable criticism, ComCom is only permitted to intervene in response to a respective 
request  by  a  telecom  company  and  under  the  condition  that  negotiations  between  the  relevant 
competitors have failed for three months. The LTC establishes ComCom as the independent regulator 
for the Swiss telecommunications market. ComCom is attached to the Federal Office of Communication 
(OFCOM).   
Optical fiber networks are not within the scope of LTC and remain therefore unregulated—a fact that 
has triggered discussions about the need to amend the LTC, as mentioned earlier.
448 In light of this 
regulatory vacuum, ComCom has taken on the role of a facilitator, in addition to the role of a regulator, 
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and has recently organized a series of fiber-to-the-home roundtables to explore soft-law approaches to 
standardize  and  coordinate  the  roll-out  of  additional  fiber  infrastructure  among  the  different 
stakeholders.
449  
Experts are calling for another amendment of the LTC to correct for deficiencies that they claim lead to 
uncertainty on the market and result in a sub-optimal environment for future investments. According to 
critics of the current regime, the reliance on ex-post regulatory mechanisms prevents regulators from 
taking the necessary steps to ensure a well functioning market. Moreover, they assert that the regulations 
should be technology-neutral, as opposed to the current regulatory structure that varies by technology. 
For example, ComCom is currently unable to intervene and impose solutions to market problems related 
to fiber networks.
450   
Political economy 
The political economy of broadband policy in Switzerland revolves primarily around the efforts of Swiss 
regulators, with the support of newer entrants into the telecommunication markets, to secure additional 
regulatory powers that would allow them to act more forcefully in opening up Swisscom’s infrastructure 
to competitors.  The struggle over local loop unbundling, described in more detail below, dragged on for 
many years before Swisscom was ultimately forced to open its copper wire to its competitors.  
Today, a newer version of the same debate is underway regarding further amendments to the LTC that 
would offer regulators expanded power to intervene in broadband markets, again pitting entrants against 
the incumbent.  Swisscom seeks to avoid any further regulations, whereas its competitors, including the 
local  power  providers,  want  further  amendment  of  the  LTC  to  regulate  fiber  deployment.  The 
disagreement over the practical and philosophical aspects of regulatory policy is occurring both in the 
marketplace and within government.
451 On the one hand, ComCom is pushing for another amendment, 
whereas, on the other hand, the Federal Council argues that such a step would be premature in the light 
of the fact that the LTC was amended in 2007. In the meantime, independent experts are calling for a 
public mandate.
452  The outcome of this political debate is still open and hard to predict; no decisions 
have been made so far.  
Occupying the far side of the political landscape is an ongoing process characterized not by antagonism 
but by cooperation.  These recent round-table discussions, facilitated by ComCom and bringing together 
the  most  important  stakeholders,  including  Swisscom,  seek  to  frame  a  coordinated  approach  to 
deploying the next generation of fiber-to–the-home networks that will offer excellent transmission rates 
and be open to multiple service providers.   
Broadband strategy 
The Federal Council formulated an initial Strategy for a Swiss Information Society in 1998, which was 
updated and enhanced in 2006.  The Federal Council's paper sets forth the basic principles of such a 
society and identifies the areas where action is most urgent. These guidelines are intended to inform the 
development of agency- and department-specific sub-strategies. In 2008, the Federal Council decided to 
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renew the mandate of the Interdepartmental Information Society Committee (ISSC). The committee has 
until 2011 to implement the Federal Council's strategic goals.
453 
The Swiss strategy regarding broadband development has four core areas and principles:
454  
•  Universal Service: An economical, reliable, and high-quality technical infrastructure should be 
offered to all in Switzerland.  
•  Non-discriminatory  Access:  Equal  and  unimpeded  access  to  information  and  communication 
technologies should be granted to all. 
•  Federalism: Clear legal  regulations and voluntary  cooperation should eliminate inefficiencies 
typical for a federal country.     
•  Cooperation: The government seeks to promote and facilitate an effective partnership among 
government, business, civil society, and science.   
 
Surprisingly, Switzerland has not yet formulated a more explicit and detailed strategy on broadband 
infrastructure at the federal level. However, OFCOM and ComCom are reportedly working on a white 
paper describing their broadband policies. The document is expected to be released in spring 2010.   
On the local level, cities such as Zurich and St. Gallen have built strategic partnerships with local power 
utilities and broadband service providers to deploy fiber-to-the-home networks. These initiatives are 
long-term  engagements  (in  the  case  of  Zurich,  for  ten  years)  to  develop  and  guarantee  a  non-
discriminatory and open core infrastructure.
455 
Policy interventions and outcomes 
Government investment in infrastructure 
The Swiss federal government does not directly invest in broadband infrastructure. The primary task of 
the  government  is  to  build  a  sound  regulatory  framework  that  creates  incentives  and  favorable 
conditions for market development. 
In contrast to many other countries, the Swiss government has not made a commitment to use parts of 
the country's stimulus packages to invest in the national broadband infrastructure.
456 A motion by a 
Swiss parliamentarian asked the Federal Council to support the regional development of the fiber roll-
out. The Federal Council responded that it was too early to consider such measures.  
At the local level, by contrast, there have been several initiatives aimed at strengthening the country’s 
broadband infrastructure. For instance, in a 2008 vote, the people of Zurich approved a public loan of 
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over  CHF  200  million  to  support  the  local  power  company  in  providing  fiber-to-the-home  to  all 
households. At the same time, several private-public partnerships were formed in about nine cities and 
villages in Switzerland, aimed at building open wireless networks (WLAN). The local utility provider 
owned by the City of St. Gallen, for example, invested about USD 150,000 in a local open wireless 
initiative.
457 
Skill building, education, and demand programs 
The  federal  government  has  introduced  a  variety  of  different  programs  and  strategies  to  support 
development towards an open information society. However, due to the strong federal system, cantons 
play a key role when it comes to educational or cultural initiatives and measures. Nevertheless, the 
following examples are illustrative of the variety of national initiatives:  
e-Health:  
The goal of this initiative is to formulate measures to gradually establish an electronic patient file and a 
portal with quality-assured online information and access to patient files by 2015. The strategy was 
implemented in 2007 with the intention of contributing to the development of a health system that is 
more reliable, more cost-efficient,  and of higher quality. One objective is to help patients to better 
inform  themselves  of  health  care  choices  based  on  quality-assured  information.  In  addition,  the 
parliament took first steps toward introducing a national insurance card. This card will not only store 
information about the patient's insurance, but will also include specific health data that could be used by 
health care providers. 
458   
e-Government strategy:  
Designed as a joint strategy of the confederation, the cantons, and the municipalities, this initiative seeks 
to pursue three main objectives: "the economy carries out transactions with the authorities electronically; 
the authorities have optimized their processes and deal with each other electronically and the population 
can carry out important, frequent or time-consuming, transactions with the authorities electronically."
459 
e-Inclusion:  
The aim of this project is to build a network for people who would normally be excluded from the 
information society, i.e., to bridge participation gaps. Since 2006, the Coordination Office Information 
Society has promoted different projects that provide support to “digital have-nots” and help them to 
acquire the skills needed to participate in the information society. The Swiss  Integration Network's 
members have committed themselves to launch their own projects and support the implementation of the 
initiative.
460    
Competition policy 
Broadband competition in Switzerland has been most active at the intermodal level, principally between 
cable operators, led by Cablecom, and the incumbent, Swisscom, offering DSL service over copper 
lines.    Proponents  of  intermodal  competition  can  point  to  the  fact  that  a  large  majority  of  Swiss 
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households have access to both cable and DSL connections.  Moreover, competition from cable service 
providers is likely to have played an important role in Swisscom’s decision to invest in upgrading its 
Internet offerings, seen by some as a direct response to the entry of cable operators into broadband 
markets. More recently, Cablecom has started the process of upgrading its system to offer increased 
transmission rates with Swisscom responding with investments in fiber.  
Despite these signs of viable competition among different proprietary platforms, Swiss regulators, in 
step with their European counterparts, have also pursued open access policies. The Swiss government 
decided to open the "last mile." Reasons can be found in the telecommunications market: Swisscom, the 
former monopolist, was still dominating the market and new entrants were struggling to find a way into 
the market. Swisscom's dominance was particularly overwhelming in the wireline telecommunication 
market. Although the situation looked better on the broadband market, where competition came from a 
relatively  strong  cable  provider,  the  main  problem  was  the  dependence  of  the  service  providers  on 
Swisscom's wholesale products.  The Federal Council feared that this fact could have negative effects on 
future innovation in the broadband market.
461 
Following a public consultation process in 2002, the Swiss Federal Council issued a decree in 2003 
requiring  local  loop  unbundling  of  Swisscom’s  network.    After  several  years  of  resistance  from 
Swisscom and regulatory uncertainty, an amendment to the Law of Telecommunications was completed 
in 2007 that would begin the implementation of opening up the incumbent’s copper network to its 
competitors.  This includes unbundled access to the local loop, bitstream access for four years, access to 
leased lines, and access to cable ducts. These policies apply only to the copper wire network.
462 As of 
January 2009, Swisscom had signed eight contracts with other operators and 31,000 access lines were 
effectively unbundled.
463 The Federal Administrative Court confirmed in February 2009 that Swisscom 
is a dominant player and must therefore offer cost-oriented bitstream access.   
In 2008, ComCom set the price for unbundling the local loop for the first time. Price will be reduced to 
CHF 18.18 (about USD 17) from the price charged by  Swisscom of CHF 23.50 (about USD 22). In 
addition to the price setting for fully unbundled access to the local loop, the conditions for co-use of 
resources at the main distribution frame (co-location) and the interconnection were regulated as well.
464 
Network non-discrimination 
Net neutrality has not become a major issue in Switzerland. No complaints regarding discriminatory 
practices have been lodged with ComCom, and the agency has therefore not taken any action in this 
respect.  None of the relevant agencies of the Swiss government, such as the Federal Council, ComCom, 
and OFCOM, have made any official statement regarding their position on network neutrality. 
On a local level, the fiber deployment in the city of Zurich aims to avoid monopolization of the new 
network  by  granting  all  service  providers  discrimination-free  access.  Consumers  are  empowered  to 
decide which provider they want to use.  
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Spectrum policy 
Spectrum policy in Switzerland has been structured on the auction of licenses to competitive bidders.  
However,  the  anticipated  level  of  competition  for  licenses  has  been  disappointing.    ComCom,  the 
agency that is responsible for allocating licenses, decided in 1999 to reward the four UMTS licenses 
with an auction procedure, with a minimum price at CHF 50 million. Initially, ten telecom companies 
showed interest. Due to the difficult market situation in 2000, six companies decided to withdraw their 
initial offers. As a consequence, the four licenses were awarded to the four remaining companies for the 
minimum price.
465 A similar situation arose in the award process for the broadband wireless access 
(BWA) licenses. ComCom sought to auction three licenses in 2006. However, Swisscom was the only 
company interested in this license after several competitors decided not to participate. In 2007, another 
BWA license was awarded for CHF 5.8 million, again to a sole bidder, Inquam Broadband.
466  
ComCom  is  currently  preparing  for  a  coordinated  reallocation  of  the  most  important  mobile phone 
frequencies which become available again in 2013 and 2016. 
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